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“Coppers” 
- Slang term used for police officers.
Can be traced back to the early 19th century in New York City  
when the first police force consisted of an eight men unarmed patrol unit 
who wore an eight point copper badge on their shirt  
to distinguish themselves as officers of the law.  
As a result the general public started calling them coppers. 
(UrbanDictionary.com) 
- The term was the original unsharpened word, originally used in Britain to
mean ‘someone who captures’ (the term ‘cop’ is recorded  
in the sense of ‘to capture’ from 1704, derived from the Latin word ‘capere’).  
The common myth is that it is a term referring to the police officer’s buttons 
which are made of copper. 
(A Dictionary of Historical Slang, 1972)  
“Panser” 
- synonyms: (nouns) gadebetjent, ordenshåndhæver, patruljebetjent, ordensbetjent,
strisser, brynje, strømer (DK). 
- (noun) cop, armour (UK).
(Wiktionary.org) 
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Abstract 
This PhD study explores how police respond to organised crime via proactive 
investigation as a representation of a new policing paradigm called proactive 
policing. Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition the study is based 
on comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork in the Danish police and examines: how 
do proactive investigations unfold in the police and which conditions impact this 
and why?  
The study’s empirical findings are analysed and interpreted through a theoretical 
framework compelled by Erving Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical model for social 
interaction and Peter K. Manning’s (2010) theoretical concept of the police métier. 
Throughout the thesis, a theoretical framework is built and developed concerning 
the police’s proactive performance which is determined by a specific proactive detective 
métier. Moreover, the groundwork for a comprehensive embedded police research 
methodology is developed and proposed (Hartmann et al. 2018). 
The analysis examines first the broader context of the Danish police in which the 
practice of proactive investigation is carried out. A selection of key external and 
internal events which within the last decades have affected and shaped the current 
state of the Danish police and contemporary policing are analysed. The purpose is 
to explore how these events have impacted the police organisation and the 
conditions for proactive police work. These events concern societal changes such as 
crime problems and internal matters such as organisational reforms. More precise 
they deal with governance, strategic priorities, and occupational conditions in the 
police in general and proactive policing specifically. Social and political structures 
are important to the police institution, which reacts to and interacts with the 
different stimuli it is exposed to. Even the micro-cosmos of proactive investigation 
is connected to macro-oriented politics and societal developments which have 
direct and indirect influence on how this practice is carried out.  
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Second, the formal frame of the police’s strategy against organised crime as well as 
aspects of the informal world of proactive policing are explored. The analysis 
focuses on how success of proactive policing is measured, and how proactive 
investigation is performed both on the police’s front stage and backstage (Goffman 
1959). This is done by scrutinising the political backdrop and underlying notions of 
the police’s strategy, strategic and operational objectives, and key performance 
indicators. Moreover, the analysis examines the ruling epistemic culture (Cetina 
1999) in the police and culturally anchored assumptions about police work which 
impact police practice.  
Third, the central and preparatory phase leading up to the launch of proactive 
investigations is analysed by looking at how prime targets (priority offenders) for 
proactive investigations are identified and what influences this process. The analysis 
explores the organisational battle between the sustainment of traditional 
approaches to identifying investigation targets and the efforts to implement more 
analysis-driven strategic approaches. The ruling methods for targeting are analysed 
as well as how the implementation of new methods meet challenges when 
encountering the police’s organisational and cultural frames, including the 
dominant police epistemic culture. The implications of different targeting 
approaches for proactive investigation as a central component of the police’s 
strategy towards organised crime are moreover discussed.  
Forth, the concrete practice of how proactive investigation is carried out is 
examined and analysed by looking into the different investigative phases and 
various investigative measures (tactics and techniques), which are set in motion 
during a proactive investigation. A model for proactive investigation is proposed 
with the purpose to identify a specific methodology and it is discussed why this is a 
difficult task. Moreover, the organisational collective notions concerning the 
professional endeavour of detective work—and consequently detectives’ 
investigative mindset—is identified and discussed in terms of how this impacts 
proactive investigation practice.  
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Fifth, all analytical findings are combined and a cohesive narrative about the 
performance of proactive investigation and the shaping forces of the proactive 
detective métier is developed and presented. The study contributes with unique 
empirical, methodological, and theoretical knowledge about proactive policing in 
general and proactive investigation specifically and how these phenomena can be 
studied, interpreted, and understood. 
Keywords 
Proactive policing, covert policing, invisible policing, proactive investigation, 
organised crime, police performance, detective métier, police research, police 
sociology, qualitative methods, embedded police research methodology. 
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Resumé 
Denne ph.d.-afhandling undersøger, hvordan politiet responderer på organiseret 
kriminalitet via proaktiv efterforskning som en del af det nye politiparadigme 
proaktivt politiarbejde. Forankret i en fænomenologisk-hermeneutisk tradition 
baserer dette ph.d.-studie sig på omfattende etnografisk feltarbejde i dansk politi og 
undersøger; hvordan udfolder proaktiv efterforskning sig i politiet, og hvilke 
forhold har indflydelse herpå og hvorfor?  
Studiets empiriske fund er analyseret og fortolket udfra en teoretisk ramme 
bestående af sociologen Erving Goffmans (1959) dramaturgiske model for social 
interaktion og sociologen Peter K. Mannings (2010) teoretiske koncept politimétier 
(police métier). Gennem denne afhandling opbygges og udvikles en teoretisk 
forståelsesramme omhandlende politiets proaktive performance, som er determineret 
af en specifik proaktiv efterforskningsmétier (proactive detective métier). Herudover 
udvikles og præsenteres en omfattende metoderamme for embedded police research 
methodology (Hartmann et al. 2018). 
Først analyseres den brede kontekst for dansk politi, hvori proaktiv efterforskning 
praktiseres. Fokus er at analysere et udvalg af centrale eksterne og interne 
begivenheder fra de sidste årtier, som har påvirket og formet dansk politis 
nuværende tilstand og status, herunder den måde hvorpå politiarbejde aktuelt 
udføres. Formålet er gennem analysen at undersøge, hvordan disse begivenheder 
har påvirket politiorganisationen og rammerne for at udføre proaktivt politiarbejde. 
Begivenhederne omhandler samfundsforandringer såsom kriminalitetsproblemer 
og interne forhold såsom organisationsreformer. Mere specifikt drejer det sig om 
ledelse, strategiske prioriteringer og arbejdsforhold i politiet generelt og i relation 
til proaktivt politiarbejde specifikt. Sociale og politiske strukturer er essentielle for 
politiet som institution, idet den reagerer og interagerer med de forskellige stimuli, 
den er udsat for. Selv proaktiv efterforsknings mikrokosmos er forbundet til 
makroorienteret politik og samfundsmæssige udviklinger, som dermed har direkte 
og indirekte indflydelse på, hvordan den praktiseres.        
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For det andet udforskes den formelle ramme for politiets strategi over for 
organiseret kriminalitet, såvel som aspekter af den uformelle ramme for proaktivt 
politiarbejde. Analysen fokuserer på, hvordan succes i forbindelse med proaktivt 
politiarbejde måles, og hvordan proaktiv efterforskning udspiller sig både på 
politiets forscene og bagscene (Goffman 1959). Den politiske baggrund for politiets 
strategi, og de underliggende forestillinger herom sammen med de strategiske og 
operationelle mål og måltal, analyseres. Derudover afdækkes den dominerende 
epistemiske kultur (Cetina 1999) i politiet, samt de kulturelt forankrede antagelser 
om politiarbejde, som har indflydelse på praksis.   
For det tredje analyseres den helt centrale, indledende fase, der leder op til 
igangsættelse af proaktive efterforskninger ved at undersøge, hvordan prioriterede 
efterforskningsmål identificeres og udvælges, og hvad der påvirker disse processer. 
Analysen udforsker den organisatoriske konflikt mellem fastholdelsen af 
traditionelle tilgange til at identificere efterforskningsmål og forsøg på at 
implementere mere analysebaserede og strategiske tilgange. De dominerende 
tilgange til måludpegning analyseres, samt hvilke organisatoriske og kulturelle 
udfordringer implementeringen af de nye metoder møder, inklusiv politiets 
epistemiske kultur. Implikationerne af de forskellige tilgange til måludpegning for 
proaktiv efterforskning diskuteres som en central komponent af politiets strategi 
mod organiseret kriminalitet.  
For det fjerde undersøges og analyseres den konkrete proaktive 
efterforskningspraksis ved at afdække de forskellige efterforskningsfaser, taktikker 
og teknikker, som igangsættes i løbet af en proaktiv efterforskning. Der præsenteres 
og udvikles en model for proaktiv efterforskning med henblik på at identificere en 
metodologi, og det diskuteres, hvorfor dette viser sig vanskeligt. Derudover 
identificeres og diskuteres de organisatoriske, kollektive forestillinger og holdninger 
til efterforskningsprofessionen, og analysen identificerer og diskuterer et særligt 
efterforsknings-mindset, og hvordan dette påvirker efterforskningspraksis. 
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Til sidste kombinerer afhandlingen de analytiske fund og udvikler og præsenteres 
et sammenhængende narrativ, der beskriver politiets performance for proaktiv 
efterforskning, og hvordan denne influeres af den proaktive efterforskningsmétier. 
Ph.d.-studiet bidrager med unik empirisk, metodologisk og teoretisk viden om 
proaktivt politiarbejde generelt og proaktiv efterforskning specifikt, samt hvordan 
disse fænomener kan studeres, fortolkes, og forstås. 
Nøgleord 
Proaktivt politiarbejde, skjulte politimetoder, usynligt politiarbejde, proaktiv 
efterforskning, organiseret kriminalitet, politiforskning, politisociologi, kvalitativ 




PART ONE: SETTING THE SCENE  
 

Chapter 1: In a Nutshell 
- On the study’s background, knowledge contributions, and structure 
The investigation of crime is fundamentally a form of information work, it is 
concerned with the identification, interpretation and ordering of information with 
the objective of ascertaining whether a crime has occurred and if so who was 
involved and how. 




ATT.: Regional Coordination Staff
Through several years the police have received information that Mr. 
NIGEL SMITH who is a long-time member of the organised crime group 
FALCONS has been involved in extensive trafficking of illicit drugs. 
Mr. Smith has been linked to previous investigations and he has also 
been the subject of inquiry himself. It has not yet been possible to 
build a case against Mr. Smith probably because of his suspected 
role as a kingpin. Within the last three years, Mr. Smith has been 
linked to two ongoing investigations/operations. 
In connection with Operation Seagull, 26 kilos of cocaine were found 
in the basement of an apartment building in the centre of 
Metropolis. The police were able to link one of the residents to the 
area of the basement where the cocaine was found, but the inquiry 
disclosed that the actual users of the basement were two young 
members of Falcons. DNA analysis of forensic evidence connected the 
two organised crime members to the basement, but also DNA from a 
senior member of Falcons Mr. FRED ROSS HUNT was found. All three 
were arrested and charged with distribution of illicit narcotics. 
During Operation Seagull intelligence information was obtained from 
other police districts and departments:
⁃ Intelligence report from November 14, 2015 stating that Mr. 
Fred Ross Hunt is dealing illicit narcotics and the kingpin 
behind it is Mr. Nigel Smith.
⁃ Intelligence report from June 3, 2016 stating that Mr. Fred 
Ross Hunt and Mr. Nigel Smith have access to two large lorries, 
which they use to transport illicit narcotics. The lorries are 
owned by Miss LOUISA BROWN, who is the cousin of Mr. Fred Ross 
Hunt.
⁃ Intelligence report from August 20, 2017 stating that Mr. Nigel 
Smith is the sole distributor of cocaine in the Eastern part of 
Metropolis and that the drug storage is located in the basement 
of an apartment building. 
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Through forensic analysis it has been determined that the seized 26 
kilos of cocaine are compatible with several other cocaine seizures. 
The forensic report concludes that the cocaine origins from the same 
production as:
⁃ 8 kilos of cocaine seized from a lorry in connection with a 
random custom control at the Southern border (lorry driver Mr. 
NEIL HASTINGS arrested and charged with distribution of illicit 
narcotics. Mr. Hastings had no previous criminal record or 
connections to organised crime).
⁃ 10.5 kilos of cocaine found in a warehouse in February 2018 
(Operation U-turn, suspect fled abroad and is currently sought 
through Interpol).
⁃ 15.7 kilos of cocaine seized in connection with a joint police 
operation with co-operating European law enforcement partners 
(Operation Lucky Star, charged: Mr. SONNY DAVIS).  
Concerning Operation Lucky Star, it is reported that Mr. Sonny 
Davids is connected to Mr. ALLAN VOUNG, who is a long-time member of 
Falcons. Their contact and communication is well established and 
have been frequent and predominantly conspicuous, as they on several 
occasions have been seen holding face-to-face meetings in remote and 
rural areas.
Two different intelligence sources state that Mr. Nigel Smith often 
travels to South America and South Asia where he supposedly invests 
millions of Euros in businesses and real estate. 
Based on the above information from previous investigations and 
intelligence reports, the instigation of a proactive investigation 
against Mr. Nigel Smith as the prime target and against the people 
working for him as secondary targets is proposed. The purposes are: 
1) to disclose Mr. Nigel Smith’s criminal activities, 
2) to identify the criminal network around him including his 
business partners, 
3) to identify dealers and byers, 
4) to collect information and documentation to support the 
national monitoring of the members of organised crime.
A successful outcome of such an operation will depend on the 
establishment of a large proactive investigation team with 
continuous available resources. The investigation will be time-
consuming, longitudinal, and resourceful with a proposed extension 
for up to 18 months.
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The report above is a re-constructed narrative based on a police record from an 
authentic case file attached to a police operation named Operation Goldilocks. It 
represents an investigation proposal (efterforskningsoplæg) addressed to police 
management at national and regional level with the suggestion to launch a so-called 
proactive investigation (fremadrettet efterforskning)1 against specific individuals in 
the organised crime environment in Denmark. These individuals were by Danish 
police considered to be priority and prolific offenders and as such high-value 
investigation targets (prioriterede efterforskningsmål) as they were suspected of 
committing serious and considerable drug offences through several years.  
A number of studies have explored police patrolling and order maintenance 
(McLaughlin 2007; Reiner 2010; Brodeur 2010), but both in an international and in 
a Scandinavian context there is little research regarding police’s criminal 
investigative practice despite the fact that this is an important, key function in 
policing (Innes 2003; Stelfox 2009; Brodeur 2010; Hald & Rønn 2013; Fahsing 2016; 
Weisburd et al. 2019). Moreover, investigation practices regarding proactive 
investigations are particularly under researched (Manning 2004; Brodeur 2010; 
Bacon 2016; O’Niel 2018).  
This PhD study explores how police respond to organised crime via proactive 
investigation as a representation of a new policing paradigm called proactive 
policing. The introduction of this paradigm in different reform efforts has proved to 
be a sustainable trend in modern policing in most Western countries (Manning 
2010; Sherman 2013; Weisburd et al. 2018). Anchored in a phenomenological-
hermeneutic tradition, I have carried out a comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork 
to examine the following research question:  
How do proactive investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold 
in the police and which conditions impact this and why?  
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Through this approach, I have developed and laid out the groundwork for a 
comprehensive methodology which I—building on the works with colleagues 
Hartmann, Høgh and Rønn (2018)—label as embedded (police) research methodology 
suggesting a comprehensive methodology proposing a specific scientific stance, 
specific research design, and the use of specific research methods to undertake an 
embedded (inside) researcher position (see Chapter 4).  
The works of sociologists Erving Goffman (1959) and Peter K. Manning (2010) have 
guided the theoretical interpretation of the analytical findings. Throughout the 
thesis, I  build a theoretical framework for proactive investigation as a specific 
policing discipline and as a social performance (Goffman 1959) determined by 
specific external and internal conditions by developing a theoretical concept called 
the proactive detective métier (Manning 2010).  
Consequently, this study contributes with unique empirical, methodological, and 
theoretical knowledge about proactive policing in general and proactive 
investigation specifically and how these phenomena can be studied, interpreted, 
and understood. 
In this first chapter of the thesis, I introduce, frame, and unfold the patchwork of 
parts, which make up this particular research study and the thesis as a whole. The 
purpose is to provide the reader with a contextual foundation for reading the 
coming chapters, and consequently understanding of the origins of the study, and 
the circumstances around it. The chapter therefore aims to introduce the reader to 
the research field, in which this study is situated, to account for the motivations and 
research interests behind it, and thus the specific research focus. Moreover, the 
chapter is intended to make clear how and why this study is relevant, and what its 
unique empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions are. Lastly, the 
chapter is meant to provide the reader with a framework of expectations—a clear 
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structure of the thesis and the separate chapters, and in what way the content is 
presented and why.  
The chapter is structured as follows:     
First, I present the general themes of the study and its knowledge gaps as well as 
my motivations and research interests.  
Second, I introduce the research question and the study’s scientific relevance and 
submit a structure of the thesis. 
Third, I account for the study’s knowledge ambition and thereby empirical, 
theoretical, and methodological contributions. 
1 In Danish two different expressions are used about proactive investigations, which I will discuss 
further in Chapter 2. 
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Puzzles and Background 
Research Field and Knowledge Gaps 
Policing varies in historical, cultural, and social context (Manning 2013). It includes 
a variety of diverse activities, which have changed considerably since the origin of 
the police (Brodeur 2010; Reiner 2010; Ellefsen & Larsson 2014; Terpstra & Salet 
2019; Bowling et al. 2020). Some of these activities are at public display for example 
the traditional law and order related duties such as traffic controls, preventive 
patrolling, crowd control, conflict resolution, and even some elements of criminal 
investigation (e.g. crime scene investigation, house-to-house enquiries, and other 
information gathering). Every now and then the public is moreover invited to assist 
the police or to participate in police work for example in connection with searching 
for missing people, keeping and eye out for burglars in the neighbourhood, or 
providing information on specific offenders or criminal events.  
Nevertheless, a certain amount of police activity takes place ‘behind the scenes’ 
without any public insight or knowledge. This type of policing is what police 
researchers Bethan Loftus and Benjamin Goold (2012) label as invisible policing. 
Criminal investigation overall is to some extent encumbered by confidentiality and 
is therefore rarely something the public, journalists or others will be granted access 
to. Even though it is a key function in policing, police’s investigative practice is the 
least researched police activity (Brodeur 2010). It may have to do with the nature of 
investigation work and its sensitivity to outsiders’ (including researchers’) insight. 
This is the case when it comes to so-called reactive investigations—meaning 
investigations of crimes which have already occurred (such as the burglaries, fraud, 
violent assaults, homicides etc.). It is, however, indeed the case when it comes to 
police’s investigation of organised crime namely proactive investigations (Bacon 2016).  
Organised crime is generally not reported to the police. The investigation of 
organised crime is therefore largely depending on police’s own initiative. This calls 
for police being proactive and assertive employing activities which can uncover 
potential ongoing criminal events or criminal activities under planning. As such, 
police are in a peculiar vacuum. Often, they have no tangible events or leads in 
organised crime cases and consequently they are bound to work with suspicion as 
their primary line of enquiry. Suspicion which is typically compelled by information 
stemming from confidential informants—other criminal agents with questionable 
reliability (Marx 1988) (a dilemma which I discuss in detail in Chapter 7).  
Like the police response, threats from organised crime are predominantly invisible 
to the public. Organised crime encompass typically diffuse threats and subversive 
measures such as infiltration of and exploitation of legal markets, systematic social 
fraud, money laundering etc., which police themselves do not fully overview or 
comprehend. It comes from a variety of social environments and social agents; some 
who are known or unknown to the police—and some who are very difficult to gain 
knowledge of. Due to this invisibility and diffusiveness the police themselves co-
producers and co-constructors of the phenomenon (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 2013). As 
such, organised crime investigations evolve around overwhelming amounts of 
fragile and sporadic information, which is identified, collected, processed, and 
interpreted with the purpose of building arguments (eventually evidence) that 
criminal activities are in fact taking place and that specific individuals are 
responsible. That being so, the policing of organised crime and specifically the 
instigation of proactive investigations is far from a straightforward job. It raises 
complex professional and ethical issues and dilemmas in relation to accountability, 
transparency, public security, privacy and so on. At the same time, police 
organisations are experiencing increasing political awareness and demands in most 
Western societies with aggravating concerns about potential security and crime 
risks, which they must balance together with a professional and responsible 
practice (Harfield & Harfield 2016). 
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External conditions such as the emerge of new crime challenges, organised crime, 
and terrorism have together with dramatic fiscal changes as a consequence of 
financial instability all over the Western world meant that police are urged to 
prioritise their resources differently and to develop new innovative methods in their 
approach to crime and disorder (Terpstra & Salet 2019). Conventional policing 
methods have failed in terms of meeting the challenges of modern society including 
the changes within criminal environments and the public’s demand for service (see 
e.g. Weisburd & Braga 2019; Manning 2008c). This condition has been imperative in 
introducing a new policing paradigm namely proactive policing to replace 
conventional police approaches mirrored in the reactive policing paradigm (Fyfe et al. 
2018; Weisburd et al. 2019) (see further elaboration in Chapter 2). Proactive policing 
refers to all policing strategies that have as one of their goals the prevention or 
reduction of crime and disorder and that are not reactive in terms of focusing 
primarily on uncovering ongoing crime or on investigating or responding to crimes 
once they have occurred (Weisburd & Majundar 2018). An implicit condition within 
proactive policing is that police should have ‘smarter’ strategies, approaches, and 
methods for police work (Maguire 2000). This new paradigm therefore also 
promotes a shift from conventional experience-based policing towards knowledge-
based policing. In terms of the response to organised crime this suggests amongst 
other that police should work proactively based on knowledge from e.g. criminal 
intelligence and focus their resources on those groups and offenders who pose the 
greatest threats to society and cause most damage and harm—to get most value for 
money (Ratcliffe 2016; Weisburd & Majmundar 2018). The question is, however, if 
policing generally—and proactive investigation specifically—in practice have 
changed because of the introduction of the new paradigm and if so, in what ways?  
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Research Interests and Motivations 
Despite an increased public interest in police work and the accumulating public 
awareness of police performance and implicit legitimacy there is generally speaking 
a knowledge gap when it comes to how police work is carried out (Innes 2003; 
Manning 2010). Although criminal investigation is a popular theme for mass media, 
crime novels, television series, and films, it is generally surrounded by mystery, 
stereotypical conceptions, and overrated notions of police’s actual capabilities and 
prospects (Perlmutter 2000; Brodeur 2010). According to Norwegian police 
researcher Helene Gundhus (2014) the emerging of proactive methods within 
policing has moreover not been given the attention it deserves within police 
science. Consequently, it remains ‘a black box’ how proactive policing is manifested 
in police organisations and specifically in investigation practice; how proactive 
investigations are organised and instigated, how targets for investigation are 
selected, and how investigations are carried out—and this is the focus of this study. 
There are notable paradoxes, challenges, conflicts, dilemmas, and potentials 
connected to proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically as 
it represents police’s use of covert measures on behalf of, but also towards the 
public. British scholars Harfield & Harfield (2016: 4) categorise covert policing as a 
‘moral minefield’ as they say it:  
(…) operates in an arena of permanent tension between preserving respect for the 
individual human dignity and maximising the utility so long as any good generated 
outweighs any harm caused.  
To fulfil an overall public demand of legitimacy, proactive investigation therefore 
requires a professional practice rooted in dominant principles of e.g. legality and 
proportionality where enforcement, legal rights, and concerns for the individual are 
balanced in a responsible way, and where basic human rights are considered 
(Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018; Harfield & Harfield 2016). This is what Manning (2010) 
refers to as democratic policing; a redistributive mechanism resting on notions of 
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trust, equality, and legitimacy. The police are, for example, the only ones in 
democratic societies who are entrusted with the power to use coercive and potential 
lethal force against its citizens. This condition in itself makes policing a relevant and 
necessary study object for scientific research. It is also ultimately what defines the 
police: although police’s use of force is generally rare, and even though the police 
have a number of other responsibilities and tasks, their mandate to use force is the 
determining difference between them and other democratic institutions. Therefore, 
the power to use force against, to incapacitate, and to sanction citizens make police 
and police action of immense significance for both society as a whole and its 
individuals (Manning 1977; Klockars 1985).  
Since the beginning of my employment within the Danish National Police 
(Rigspolitiet) from 2009, I have primarily been working with the field of organised 
crime, specifically the police’s response to organised crime groups (rockere og 
bande, kriminelle netværk og grupperinger). Through this work, I have gained 
insight into how the police and the criminal environment respectively operate. My 
educational background in sociology and criminology has additionally increased 
and influenced my interest in policing as a research field and the broader 
implications of different types of policing for society. In my daily observations of 
‘the world of policing’—in this context meaning both policing as a process and 
police as an institution (see for example Jaschke et al. 2007)—I have furthermore at 
first hand encountered the competition between the reactive and the proactive 
paradigm and consequently the rivalry between the two epistemological rationales 
of experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing. This made me 
interested in and curious about the conflicts and contesting interests which arise 
when trying to implement new ways of doing things within a police organisation. I 
have as such found it pertinent to explore the implications of these challenges for 
policing specifically and for society generally. At the same time, my function as an 
employee within the police puts me in a privileged position as I can study these 
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conditions from the inside—a rare and advantageous, but also windy position in 
police research (see further discussions of this researcher position in Chapter 4).  
The above components have altogether raised my overall interest in how police deal 
with organised crime through proactive measures while balancing societal 
expectations of providing public safety and security, political demands regarding 
quality and efficiency together with the preservation of democratic values? Further, 
how do police integrate a new paradigm and new methods in established practices 
and organisational assumptions? The police do not exist in a vacuum, they are not 
derived from society; they are, on the contrary, a social institution with independent 
agency operating in a bureaucratic system of crime control, which has tremendous 
impact on people’s welfare and lives (Garland 1990). It is therefore relevant to 
explore how this social institution reacts to and interacts with the external stimuli 
and demands it is exposed to, and how the democratic legitimacy it has been given 
is administered.  
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Focus and Contributions 
Relevance and Structure 
The research puzzle that drives this study is concerned with the exploration of how 
police respond to organised crime via proactive investigation, why they do so, and 
the implication for society in general. The police are not merely responders to 
organised crime—they have in wide terms both the power to define (organised) 
crime and the power to process it and they are as such both co-constructors, co-
producers, and co-contributors of the phenomenon (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 1988; 
2013; Manning 2010). The study is situated within the Danish police, which becomes 
an example of ‘the police’ as an organisation and as a social institution. The 
microcosmos of proactive investigation becomes an example of police work, and of 
how the police as a bureaucracy and its agents as professionals with wide 
discretionary powers react to and integrate new stimuli. It is within this 
microcosmos that not only the impact of external social structures and formal 
conditions can be examined, but indeed the informal subterranean mechanisms 
which guide policing get exposed and their magnitude become clear (Loftus 2010; 
Cockcroft 2012). In this study, I seek to investigate the dynamic interplay between 
macro and micro level by looking at the research question of how proactive 
investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in the police and 
which conditions impact this and why. By ‘unfold’, I refer to how the police 
organisation conceptualise and interpret proactivity, and how it is implemented and 
practiced. By ‘conditions’, I refer to how external and internal, formal and informal 
structures, rationales, and assumptions influence and shape this practice. 
As many police studies, this study is interdisciplinary and anchored in a variety of 
research fields such as proactive policing, covert policing, invisible policing, criminal 
investigation, intelligence studies, organisational studies etc. Throughout the analysis, I 
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therefore draw on key studies from police science, which I present in Chapter 2, 
where I outline ’state of the art’ of the research field.  
The study’s theoretical framework concerns the dramaturgical model of policing 
and the police métier (Goffman 1959; Manning 2010), which I present in Chapter 3 
together with an account of how central theoretical concepts are applied. This 
framework is indeed a part of my preunderstanding and additionally it guides the 
analysis as it continuously provides the spectacles through which I view and 
interpret the empirical findings. A particular embedded research methodology 
guides how the study is framed and designed, how information is collected, and 
how the empirical material is analysed and interpreted—which I introduce and 
unfold in Chapter 4.  
In Chapter 5, I examine a selection of external societal changes (such as crime 
problems) and internal organisational matters (such as reforms), as I ask and 
analyse: how have these events impacted the police organisation and the conditions for 
proactive police work? It is important to understand the social and political 
structures, which the police react to and interact with, as even the microcosmos of 
proactive investigation is influenced by macro-oriented politics and societal 
developments. The analysis is therefore meant to provide a contextual frame of the 
Danish police in which the practice of proactive policing is carried out. 
In Chapter 6, I explore the formal frames and aspects of informal structures in 
which proactive investigation unfolds. I ask and analyse specifically: how is the 
success of proactive policing measured? I look at both political and strategic demands 
for the police together with culturally anchored assumptions and rationales about 
what makes up good police work. I discuss how these formal and informal 
conditions impact the practice of proactive investigation, and the overall police 
response to organised crime.    
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In Chapter 7, I focus on the central and preparatory phase leading up to the launch 
of proactive investigations by asking and analysing: how are prime targets for proactive 
investigations identified and what influences this? I identify ruling methods for targeting 
and analyse how new methods are sought instigated as a part of the policing 
paradigm and the challenges this implementation meets when encountering the 
police’s organisational frames and police epistemic culture. I discuss the 
implications of different targeting approaches for proactive investigation as a 
central component of the police’s strategy towards organised crime.  
In Chapter 8, I focus on the practice of proactive investigation as I ask and analyse: 
how is proactive investigation carried out? I scrutinise and analyse the process and 
content of central investigative tactics which are set in motion during a proactive 
investigation. Throughout the chapter, I seek to identify a specific methodology and 
discuss why this is a difficult task. Moreover, I examine the collective notions 
concerning the professional endeavour of detective work, and consequently how 
these impact proactive investigation practice.  
In Chapter 9, I combine the analytical findings from the previous four chapters and 
ask and analyse: how is proactive investigation performed and what makes up and shapes 
the proactive detective métier? As such, I seek to display a cohesive narrative about the 
dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation and to identify and develop a 
concept of the proactive detective métier and its shaping forces. 
In Chapter 10, I draw conclusions based on the analysis and answer the study’s 
research question. I account for the study’s knowledge contributions to research 
and practice, and finally I offer some perspectives of these in relation to the broader 
discussion of proactive policing and proactive investigation and its implications for 
society.    
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Analytical Process 
As I will unfold throughout Part One of this thesis, police work is by many scholars 
regarded as a practice built on tacit knowledge and silent work experiences (Finstad 
2000, Gundhus 2006, Loftus 2010; Hald 2015 etc.). This is indeed the case for 
invisible, covert policing and as such proactive investigation which is surrounded by 
a high degree of secrecy. Practices and procedures seem obvious for and are rarely 
questioned by detectives and members of the police organisation and consequently 
they are poorly defined and described (Hartmann et al. 2018). Additionally, the 
classic literature on police occupational culture underlines that police are notorious 
sceptical of outsiders and their potential critical view on the organisation (Reiner 
2010).  
These conditions combined indicate that it requires a specific research 
methodology to study and capture the subterranean structures and underlying 
assumptions of police practice cf. embedded police research (see Chapter 4).The 
embedded approach relies on the foundation that police work in general and 
proactive investigation in particular to a large extent is context dependent and 
sensitive to situational factors. To explore the meaning of context and situational 
factors it is important to understand the lifeworld, informal norms, and collective 
values which bind the police profession together as these conditions have vital 
implications for e.g. investigation practices. To gain insight into these, however, 
requires a close participation in everyday police activities. I do this by taking a 
qualitative approach carrying out a comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork looking 
at both strategic documents, strategic and operational decision-making, 
investigative case work, and views and perspectives of police managers as well as 
detectives. In the context of this study and in accordance with the theoreteical 
framework (see Chapter 3), I view police action as a combination of organisational 
and individual action based on both institutional and professional premises and 
conditions. Consequently, in the context of the Danish police I investigate both the 
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circumstances surrounding the police organisation and the perspectives of 
individual police officers and their agency. Moreover, I look at both the strategic 
level (management/decision-makers), the operational/tactical level (frontline 
policing/detectives), and the dynamic interplay between these. The different 
empirical parts are thereby derived from different levels (strategic/operational-
tactical) and perspectives (organisation/agents) and I view them as influencing each 
other continuously. The study is furthermore composed by a variety of research 
methods including participant observation, ethnographic interviewing, and 
document research. This is in accordance with the phenomenological-hermeneutic 
scientific stance, which is framing the methodological approach and likewise 
informs the method for analysis.  
The research question is explorative and requires both a theoretical examination 
and an empirical study. I apply a hermeneutic analytical approach conducting a 
first-degree analysis (førsteordensanalyse), which is explorative and 
phenomenological in nature and intended to answer the question of what goes on? 
Subsequently, I conduct a second-degree analysis (andenordensanalyse), which is 
hermeneutic and interpretative in nature looking at why does it go on this way? (Van 
Maanen 1979). The analytical method is indeed an ongoing circular process where 
additional layers of interpretations, knowledge, and understanding are progressively 
added through each chapter. The continuous analytical process is therefore an 
ongoing interaction between theory, methods, and empirical findings with the aim 
to identify and generate patterns, moving from specific situational characteristics of 
actions or statements in relation to proactive investigation (the individual empirical 
parts) to a general level looking at the proactive phenomenon as a whole (the entire 
empirical material) (Dahlager & Fredslund 2008). Every part and chapter of the 
thesis is thereby intended to provide a (new) contextual frame for analysis for the 
coming parts and chapters and serve thereby as (new) hermeneutic circles of 
interpretation (see Chapter 4 for further elaborations).   
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Knowledge Ambition 
It is the starting point of this study that the role of police research primarily is to 
build in-depth knowledge about the police itself, aspects of police work, the police’s 
role in society, and the interplay between the police and the public. In relation to 
the latter, American sociologist Carl B. Klockars (1985) claims that there are two 
approaches to explore this: 1) to look at the norms expressed in laws, written 
policies which govern police work, and 2) to look at the way the police actually go 
about their work and use the means at their disposal. In this study, I seek to 
combine the two approaches and as such generate knowledge of the dynamic 
interplay, but also formal and informal conditions, and inherent conflicts and 
counter conceptions between ideals and reality.   
Manning (2010) differentiates between sociology of the police and sociology for the 
police. Sociology of the police explores the relevance of theories and concepts as 
they apply to the organisation, occupation, and its impacts—analytically driven and 
data based. Sociology for the police is devoted to evaluating the status, management 
and level of performance of the police while reducing negative matters e.g. 
corruption, violence, malfeasance etc. Manning (ibid.; 2005) is generally critical 
towards police studies as, he argues, they often lack theoretical grounds and 
analytical questions and instead focus on practical problems or issues stemming 
from the practical world. He says (ibid.: 100): 
In many respects, policing studies is too much about the police and too little about 
the context of culture of policing, including its legitimacy, grounding in democratic 
values, restraint, and tolerance of differences.  
This, Manning (ibid.) says, has the consequence that police studies fail to recognise 
the police and police action in the context of society suppressing contradictions 
and impediments and thereby have a willingness to please ‘the police audience’ 
rather than ’the scholarly audience’. Although this study is occupied with specific 
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police practice, it is certainly my ambition to view this practice in a societal context 
concretely by exploring the dynamic between external drivers and internal 
responses. I will moreover argue that the embedded approach seeks to combine the 
two approaches in search for a middle ground of sociology of and for the police.  
This middle ground can be said to consider requirements from both the scholarly 
audience and the police audience. A key ambition of mine is to produce scientific 
knowledge, which can constitute a foundation to support a continuous professional 
development of proactive investigation practice in service of society and as such 
function both as ‘a mirror’ and 'a motor’ (Innes 2010a). Such different requirements 
of research and practice are therefore interdependent in my view; in order to 
impact the practical context of policing it is necessary to produce sound and well-
founded (scientific) knowledge about this practice—but also knowledge about the 
prospects of this practice by delivering a broader, theoretical discussion. Since 
proactive and covert police work is tacit and poorly described, a fundamental aim of 
this study is therefore first and foremost to uncover and clarify aspects of proactive 
investigation practice and thereby make parts of invisible policing visible. A field as 
complex and comprehensive as proactive investigation cannot be fully grasped. 
Accordingly, this thesis does not represent the truth about the world of proactive 
investigation as this would be impossible. Instead, it offers an interpretation of this 
world and suggests possible theoretical explanations. It therefore represents a 
snapshot of what goes on and why it goes on this way seen through a particular set of 
spectacles. The study has three main purposes:  
First, based on extensive empirical material it is my aim to explicate and analyse 
existing practices around proactive investigation in regard to the police’s response 
to organised crime and the surrounding conditions which shape and influence this 
performance. A precondition for change and development of police’s professional 
practice is namely specific knowledge about the current state of affairs and ruling 
ways of doing things. 
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Second, through this examination I wish to build a theoretical framework for the 
performance of proactive investigation as a specific discipline within policing and 
by developing a theoretical concept called the proactive detective métier. My ambition 
is that the study thereby contributes to some of the knowledge gaps within the 
research fields of both proactive policing and criminal investigation, but perhaps 
more importantly to the field of police sociology and police science.  
Third, I seek to develop and lay out the groundwork for the contours of a 
comprehensive embedded police research methodology. Ideally, this study delivers a 
methodological contribution to the field of police science and police research and 
perhaps even serve as an example of sensitive sociology (Jacobsen et al. 2005). This 
methodological contribution shall be seen as directly connected to and as a 
precondition for the thesis’ analytical findings and thereby its combined theoretical 
contribution. A combination of these empirical, theoretical, and methodological 
contributions does not exist in the literature at present time. Thus, this will be my 
significant original contribution to the research field and police practice. 
Along the lines of Manning (1977; 2004), the study is based on extensive fieldwork—
but it is not an ethnography and it is not a detailed description of day-to-day police 
work. It is an attempt to articulate a perspective on (proactive) policing as an 
activity, as an organisation, as a set of symbolic repertoires and situated actions, as a 
source of myth, drama, and common sense theories of social conduct (ibid.). 
Although the study has a rather narrow starting point (proactive investigation), it 
touches upon many themes within policing and police science. As mentioned 
earlier, my ambition is therefore that the study does not only comment on the 
microcosmos of investigation practices. My ambition is to add to our deeper 
understanding of the world of proactive policing—not only through proactive 
investigation as an observable practice, but as an example of an enduring, pragmatic 
45
phenomenon in modern society (proactivity) with important implications for 
democratic ideals. 
Consequently, I strive to understand and explain the professional practice field of 
proactive investigation and the conditions under which it unfolds. As I explore how 
a new paradigm is interpreted and implemented within the police organisation, I 
also produce knowledge about how police organisations handle societal changes, 
new crime and security threats, and shifting public and political expectations and 
demands. For that reason, the insights of the study can be useful in the broad and 
pertinent debate that considers the evolution and implications of policing in society 




Chapter 2: New Trends in Modern Policing 
- On the study’s position and empirical and theoretical backdrop 
Some general programmatic changes in policing (…) have emerged in the past 
twenty-five or so years: community policing, problem-solving policing, hot-spot 
policing, and crime mapping and crime analysis. All these are essentially tactical 
modifications in resource deployment and thus require neither reorganisation nor 
change in strategies. They require neither new resources nor resource allocation. 
They do not require policy change or rethinking the standard operating procedures 
(…) They are on the surface quite significant attempts to reform, but no shifts, even 
in large and innovative departments, have been made in the fundamental random 
patrol, responses to 911 calls, and investigative functions. Investigative work, 
subject of research in the 1970s, remains now outside any reform efforts.  
- Democratic Policing in a Changing World by Peter K. Manning (2010: 155).  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I introduce the research field in which this study is situated. The 
chapter therefore displays ‘state of the art’ in the sense that it accounts for the 
empirical and theoretical backdrop of the field of proactive policing and proactive 
investigation—including the rise of the new proactive policing paradigm, as well as 
research about criminal investigation and related issues. The purpose is to give an 
overview of the different research fields in which this study is situated and 
contributes to and to provide definitions for central concepts from these.  
My main argument in this chapter is that there has been an international paradigm 
shift (Kuhn 1962) from reactive to proactive policing in most Western countries, 
including Denmark, over the last decades. This shift is predominantly understood 
as a change in logics—from a reactive to a proactive focus which has impacted the 
way policing is perceived, practiced, and organised due to primarily external 
conditions e.g. societal developments, which is mirrored in a proactive commitment 
in strategies and police documents of police organisations. This new-orientation 
towards proactivity and knowledge-based policing can be observed in connection 
with many aspects of police work including criminal investigation. However, I also 
argue that the transformation of police organisations and clear changes within 
police practice meet several obstacles for various reasons. The aim is therefore to 
present the drivers of the proactive paradigm as well as its key challenges by 
accounting for central police research which is relevant for this study's focus and 
analysis. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
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In the first part of the chapter, I present the changes and innovations within the 
field of policing with the purpose of explaining why a new policing paradigm has 
emerged. I account for new perspectives on crime prevention which, I argue, indeed 
has influenced the conceptualisation of the proactive paradigm. Furthermore, I 
present the differences between the old and the new policing paradigm and lay out 
the groundwork for the definition of proactive investigation. 
In the second part of the chapter, I introduce the proactive paradigm in the context 
of criminal investigation. I account for the distinction between reactive and 
proactive investigation and introduce the backdrop of proactive investigation in 
relation to the emerging of organised crime. Additionally, I point to current 
research on proactive policing which has brought attention to some of its 
challenges. Finally, I take on a conceptual exploration of proactive investigation as a 
distinct policing discipline.  
The third part of the chapter is an introduction to a selection of key studies on 
criminal investigation in general and proactive investigation specifically and I 
furthermore introduce two central theories of criminal investigation. I discuss how 
this research is relevant in this study.  
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The Rise of a New Policing Paradigm: From Reactive 
to Proactive Policing 
Understanding Changes and Innovations within Policing 
In the last three decades, there have been some significant developments within 
policing in many Western countries. Various changes within society combined with 
new crime challenges have led to an introduction of what could be described as a 
genuine paradigm shift within crime policy and policing.1 This shift is 
predominantly understood as a change in logics—from a reactive to a proactive 
focus. Thus, instead of responding to and solving criminal offences, which have 
already occurred one at a time, the focus is directed at identifying ‘dangerous’ and 
prolific offenders and high-risk localities with the purpose of preventing or 
disrupting criminal activities (Lomell 2018; Weisburd et al. 2019). The idea is to 
move from a general case-by-case focus which leads to the prosecution of 
responsible individuals to a general preventive focus where the purpose is to 
prevent crime and manage risks—popularly referred to as a move from detection to 
disruption (Innes & Sheptycki 2004).  
The complex backdrop of this change consists of a variety of components. American 
criminologists David Weisburd and Anthony Braga (2006; 2020) argue that 
international innovation within policing began as a consequence of the crisis of 
confidence in American policing in the 1970s. Growing alienation between the 
police and the public as a result of confrontations and conflicts in connection with 
race riots and anti-war demonstrations led to concerns about police misconduct 
and police violence. The police’s relationship with certain societal groups—
especially minority communities—was severely strained. Both policy makers and 
scholars raised questions about the impact of the dominant strategies of policing 
especially in regards to the questionable success of the standard model of policing (I 
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will explain this model later in this chapter). American criminal justice and policing 
scholar David Bayley (1994: 79) argues that the need for change in policing is 
strongly connected to the police’s lack of effectiveness:  
Police are in a bind. They are costly without being clearly effective. The usefulness of 
their core strategies—mobile patrolling, visible presence, and deterrent criminal 
investigation—is doubtful. Understandably, therefore during the 1980s, as crime 
and costs of policing both rose inexorably, the police came under acute political 
pressure to demonstrate that they were giving value for money. Their legitimacy was 
no longer guaranteed by their mission and their authority under the law.  
The increased complexity of the criminal environment, the increased prevalence of 
organised crime, and the diffuse threat from terrorism must be seen as key drivers 
especially within the last decade and has changed not only the police’s manuever 
room and resource allocation considerably (Ratcliffe 2008a). These drivers have 
indeed changed the political agenda and the public debate of safety and security. 
This adds to the complexity in police work as the police are continuously 
experiencing increased expectations from the public not only to maintain law and 
order and solve crimes, but also to collaborate (and compete) with public and 
private institutions to offer security and safety to the public and consequently 
manage the risks of post-modern risk society (see e.g. Beck 1992). 
The logic of focusing on prevention and managing risks in relation to prioritising 
police resources puts pressure on the performance culture as this is strongly 
connected to the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) as a governing 
model within the police. NPM has meant an overall focus on efficiency, internal 
control, and ‘value for money’ within all public institutions leaving the police to 
prioritise operational results. This has accumulated a performance culture where 
police activities and their impact are to be documented and measured continuously 
(Fyfe et al. 2018; Wathne 2018). This form of governance where control and 
efficiency are used as disciplinary motivators proposes measurement, which offers 
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some challenges for the police organisation (I elaborate this discussion in Chapter 
5 and 6).  
Increased globalisation and offender mobility have changed for example organised 
and transnational crime significantly and the prevalence of organised criminal 
networks and gangs have resulted in e.g. the expansion of police’s intelligence work 
(Ratcliffe 2016). New technological changes have developed new crime types such as 
cybercrime and expanding economic crime, which has put additional demands on 
the police (Loveday 2017; Fyfe et al. 2018). The demanding gap between an increase 
in recorded crime and the lack of allocation of resources to the (British) police in 
the period of 1970s to the 2000s can perhaps be reframed: as conventional crime 
through the last 10-20 years might have been declining, there has been an increase 
in recorded complex crime types and an increase in service obligations of the 
police2. These conditions have internationally proposed new demands in terms of 
police’s efficiency and the quality of police work. 
Furthermore, international research (see e.g. Weisburd & Braga 2006a; 2019; 
Sherman 2013, Ratcliffe 2016; Weisburd et al. 2019) has indicated that conventional 
methods for crime prevention and crime reduction such as e.g. preventive 
patrolling, rapid police response and follow-up investigations are not very efficient. 
As such, modern policing becomes ‘knowledge-intensive’ in the sense that 
individual police officers are expected to possess a number of specific competences 
to function as an authoritative and capable professional in a more complex policing 
landscape. Dean et al. (2010) propose a comprehensive analysis of the challenges 
police meet in encountering entrepreneurialism in organised crime and point to a 
‘knowledge war’ between police and organised crime offenders. Criminal 
organisations are, as they argue (ibid.) to a large extent ‘knowledge organisations’ 
whereas police organisations are bureaucracies which propose a fundamental 
challenge for the police response. Therefore, they say (ibid.), the success of police is 
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on the whole depending on police organisations’ abilities to carry out what they 
refer to as competitive policing (se Figure A from Dean et al. 2010: 175). 
Figure A. Strategic Knowledge Framework for Sector Policing of Organised Crime. 
Targeted policing and competitive policing require specialist competences in terms 
of knowledge work and knowledge management as policing organised crime 
businesses is fundamentally different than policing individual or groups of 
offenders. Therefore, this brings about the question of police generalists versus 
police specialists (this entire discussion can be referred to as the professionalisation 
agenda). In connection hereto, the police’s service obligations and with that their 
interaction with the general public seem to be an increasing part of police work and 
the public’s demands as to how they are encountered and serviced by the police 
keep increasing (see e.g. Tyler 2017). 
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Defining Proactive Policing 
The police are as any other social institution affected by various external conditions 
pushing new crime policies and a new policing agenda and thereby altering the 
demands for police work and the police’s response to crime and disorder. 
Therefore, since the 1980s and 1990s—especially in the US and in the UK—new 
approaches, strategies and models for policing have been developed in order to 
transform traditional police forces to modern police services to meet the future of 
policing. A number of dichotomist ‘labels’ and concepts have emerged in this 
process in the effort to illustrate the change in policing and hereby explain some of 
the developments. Holistic, smart, innovative, preventive, proactive policing are concepts 
to describe the move from experience-based to evidence-based policing whereas 
problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing, community policing, hotspot policing, 
predictive policing all refer to specific policing strategies or models, which require 
and prescribe definite methods and procedures for police work and have the goals 
of prevent or reduce crime and disorder (Weisburd & Braga 2019 provide a 
comprehensive introduction to some of these policing strategies and models which 
they call ‘innovative’, see also). This contrasts with the standard model of policing, 
which has an emphasis on reacting to particular crime events after they have 
occurred, mobilising resources based on requests coming from outside the police 
organisation, and focusing on the particulars of a given criminal incident (Weisburd 
& Majundar 2018). Some of the innovative concepts are describing more or less the 
same developments and are therefore interchangeable, but still they have been 
implemented with different purposes across Western nations and police 
departments in various forms and with various results.  
  
What I will underline here is that these concepts, models and approaches have the 
commonalities of being centered around and conditioned by knowledge production. 
By this I mean that that there is a requirement of a continuous development and 
practical use of a knowledge base consisting of: 1) knowledge about crime, and 2) 
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knowledge about police responses. As such they share the founding principle of 
what I refer to as knowledge-based policing. In a practical context, this suggests that 
the police in order to be competitive (Dean et al. 2010) should apply analytical 
processes when identifying crime problems and planning police responses and 
operational tactics. Moreover, they should apply systematic assessments and 
evaluations of these with the purpose of establishing steady learning processes 
within the organisation. In this thesis, I refer to the proactive policing paradigm as an 
overall categorisation of this change in policing in accordance with Fyfe et al. (2018) 
and Weisburd et al. (2019). I do so as it is my view that the fundamental difference 
lies in the shift from a reactive to a proactive focus. Along the lines of Gundhus 
(2010), I define this shift as a shift from police as being merely responders to crime 
and disorder reported by others—to police as being proactively defining their work 
field and objectives themselves. Such a proactive focus is conditioned by a 
transformation of the police into a knowledgeable organisation (Holgersson 2006; 
Bjørgo 2006; Hestehave 2018) which focuses on further education of police officers 
and implementation of academic research. In this regard, I view knowledge-based 
policing as an umbrella of those approaches which hold the ambition to plan and 
carry out police work on the basis of knowledge of police methods and tactics and 
knowledge of crime, disorder, and societal conditions. 
In the Danish police the orientation towards a more proactive paradigm began in 
the late 1990s where ideas from intelligence-led policing where introduced together 
with concepts such as crime analysis intelligence gathering etc. (Strand 2011; 
Christensen 2012; Rønn 2012).  
A New Perspective on Crime Prevention 
The introduction of the new policing paradigm has concurrently, and perhaps as a 
consequence, deployed a new perspective on the concept of crime prevention 
which is another important element to mention in this connection. Although the 
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mission statement of e.g. the Danish police clearly states that one of the general 
objectives of the police is to prevent crime (see The Danish Police Act), there has 
traditionally been a clear division between police’s prevention and enforcement 
activities as these tasks have been viewed as separate within the police organisation 
(Gundhus & Larsson 2014). Consequently, crime prevention has within the police 
since the 1970s been viewed as a specific function carried out in those units 
working with youths and social authorities (kriminalpræventive afdelinger og 
sekretariater). Police officers in these units have primarily focused on school visits 
providing information about traffic rules or drug abuse, hosting preventive 
meetings in the local community and informing citizens about how to avoid 
burglary and so on. The social status of preventive police work has consequently 
been rather low internally within police organisations as it does not evolve around 
law and order (Gundhus 2014). Crime prevention has conventionally also been 
understood as non-punitive and as an alternative to punishment (Lomell 2018). 
However, in police research, police as a general preventive function towards crime 
has been criticised (see e.g. Reiner 2010) and Bailey (1994) even refers to the 
phenomenon ’the myth of police’ concluding that the police do not prevent crime 
in contrast to public perception. 
Regardless, a new tendency in the interpretation of prevention especially in relation 
to police work is a strong focus on prevention or disruption of specific actions 
committed by specific individuals. Norwegian criminologist Heidi Mork Lomell (2012) 
describes this new tendency with reference to the concept of pre-crime society,3 
which is characterised by being future-oriented and focused on the prevention of 
possible risks.4 Within the literature the concept of pre-crime society is used more 
and more to describe a tendency within law-making as there is an increased focus 
on criminal acts, which have not yet been committed. Traditionally, the criminal 
justice system has been concerned with crimes committed and the evidence attached 
to these crimes. Throughout the last two decades, an international tendency is 
however that potential acts are criminalised and can be sanctioned or penalised (see 
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Lomell 2018 for an elaboration of this issue). Most clear is the tendency within anti-
terrorism laws where a shift towards pre-crime due to a change towards civil 
liberties has taken place within the political climate in the last 15-20 years (see 
Flyghed 2000 and 2005 for a full introduction). Lomell (2018) argues that recent 
years’ concepts and practices such as pre-emption, precaution, prediction and 
disruption have entered the preventive realm, along with coercion and punishment. 
This pre-crime and pre-emptive logic is part of the pursuit of security as opposed to 
the pursuit of justice. In that sense, Lomell argues (ibid.) referring to Zedner (2007) 
that there is a shift from a reactive criminal justice state to a new preventive security 
state as the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed 
by the pre-crime logic of security. Lomell (2012: 89) concludes:  
The new preventive paradigm actively uses criminal law and coercive sanctions tied 
to them to confront, disrupt and target threats before they emerge [...] In contrast to 
conventional crime prevention, it is the enforcement of criminal law that is the core 
of this new paradigm in prevention. 
Similarly, the intelligence literature refers to prevention of pre-emptive, anticipatory 
actions where intelligence services are supposed to intervene before potential 
threats develop and intervention is thereby considered to be societal self-defense 
(Lomell 2012). New threats from especially terrorism have redefined the concept of 
prevention and this logic is increasingly transferred from intelligence services to 
police services. It is no longer (merely) about preventing individuals’ offending 
careers or re-offending; rather it also involves the prevention of potential acts in the 
planning. This means that there is an implicit expectation that police work also 
includes the prediction of crime, the identification and the countering of risks and 
threats. Put in another way, police are expected to respond proactively to these 
instead of reactively responding to them.With the introduction of a more proactive 
paradigm for policing follows thereby a revised interpretation of the concept of 
crime prevention, which is also central in this study’s exploration of proactive 
investigation and police’s interpretation of this concept. 
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In the Danish police this redirection of prevention into disruption can e.g. be 
identified in the strategies for organised gang crime, which I look further into in 
Chapter 6.    
The Old and the New Paradigm 
As mentioned earlier, I ascertain the change within policing as predominantly 
illustrated by a shift in focus from reactive to proactive. This might seem minor, but 
it has a tremendous impact on the way policing and the role of the police is 
understood. More importantly, it is essential when looking at police work and the 
concrete tasks of the police as reactive and proactive objectives and tasks can be 
fundamentally in competition. Within the literature, there is a model for a proposed 
continuum of police work from traditional to innovative (Knutsson & Søvik 2005). 
With an outset in that model and based on the accounts in this chapter, I have 
proposed an illustration (see Figure B) of the continuum between the reactive 
policing paradigm and the proactive policing paradigm. This continuum proposes 
an ideal type model of the two paradigms, which reflects two underlying rationales 
of being respectively experience-based and knowledge-based. The practical world of 
policing is of course more diverse and complex and borrows elements across the 
different approaches. Within the continuum, there are as such hybrid models, 
blurring lines, and overlapping activities when it comes to police work and in the 
practical world of policing it is not merely one or the other, but a combination.  
Apart from focusing on prevention and risk management, the proactive policing 
paradigm is based on the idea that police’s strategies, responses, and everyday work 
should build on analysis of crime problems and disorder, and evaluation of the 
effect of the police responses to these. The overall purpose is to make police better 
capable of preventing and responding to different types of crime, disorder, and 
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societal threats and as such tailor and instigate the best-suited and efficient 
strategies and responses. 
Figure B. Continuum of Reactive and Proactive Policing. 
On an operational and a tactical level, this is characterised by being problem-led; 
patrols are inserted in problem areas and the police respond to serious and harmful 
incidents. The fulcrum is the monitoring of potential crime threats and 
investigation of potential criminal acts and priority offenders. The traditional 
approach to policing mirrored in the reactive paradigm has conventionally been 
one-dimensional and pragmatic focusing on law and order-tasks and the response 
to reported crime. This is in the literature referred to as the before mentioned 
standard model of policing, which is still regarded as the primary operational model 
of policing (Manning 2010). American criminologist Lawrence Sherman (2013: 2) 
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explains the standard model of policing in terms of the three R’s; rapid responses, 
random patrolling, and reactive investigations. This approach is case-by-case driven 
focusing on visible, but random patrolling in public, responding quickly to calls for 
service and investigating crimes already occurred (Tilley 2008). American 
criminologists David Weisburd & John Eck (2004: 44) explain:  
This model relies generally on a “one size fits all” application of reactive strategies to 
suppress crime, and continues to be the dominant form of police practice in the 
United States. The standard model is based on the assumption that generic 
strategies for crime reduction can be applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of 
the level of crime, the nature of crime, or other variations. Such strategies as 
increasing the size of police agencies, random patrol across all parts of the 
community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-up 
investigations, and generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest policies are 
all examples of this standard model of policing. 
Still, based on three decades of criminological and police research (for a 
comprehensive overview see e.g. Bayley 1994; 2015; 2016; Weisburd & Braga 2019; 
Reiner 2010; Sherman 2013; Weisburd et al. 2019; Bowling et al. 2020), the 
conclusion from both academic scholars, police practitioners, and the political 
environment has been that conventional policing methods are not adequate in 
terms of meeting the challenges of modern society, including the changes within 
the criminal environment and the public’s demand for service. In other words, the 
more complex societal order, which police are part of, is continuously proposing 
new demands to the police as a public service institution, to prioritise resources 
more strategically, to focus on ‘what works’, and in terms of individual police 
officers’ way of carrying out police work (see also Dean et al. 2010). These conditions 
challenge existing institutional frames and individual practices within police and 
police accountability and legitimacy become key components in this connection. 
Consequently, this raises questions about roles and responsibilities including the 
police as an active agent in the dynamic between internal adjustments as a reaction 
to external demands, which I will analyse in more detail in relation to proactive 
investigation in Chapter 6. 
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In this study, I differentiate between the proactive paradigm versus the knowledge-
based episteme, and the reactive paradigm versus the experience-based episteme. 
Although these respectively share some commonalities, the epistemic notions of 
knowledge-based policing are not dominated by proactivity per default, just like 
experience-based policing does not hold the ambition to be reactive per se. In 
practice, these ideals are moreover blurry in the sense that knowledge includes 
experience just as experience includes knowledge. In this sense, the proactive and 
the reactive paradigms merely display some overall trends and developments within 
policing and society in general. 
1 In this context I refer to Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) perception of paradigms. 
2 E.g. Denmark: alterations within mental health institutions and psychiatric care. 
3 In the world of fiction, this concept can be dated back to Philip K. Dick’s science fiction short story 
The Minority Report from 1956, where Precrime is the name of the police authority, whose 
responsibility is to identify and neutralise individuals who will commit crime in the future. 
4 Historically both biological, psychological and sociological criminology have been interested in 
examination of physiological and socio-economic characteristics of offenders with the purpose of 
predicting who will be criminals. Cesare Lombroso had for instance in the late 19th Century a 
theory of ‘the born criminal’ who could be identified based on physical traits before they had 
committed criminality (Sørensen 2013). 
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Policing Uncertainties: From Reactive to Proactive 
Investigation 
Widening the Field of Criminal Investigation 
The new policing paradigm has not only changed the general understanding of and 
approach to policing. It has additionally changed the nature of criminal 
investigation and criminal procedure. Gundhus (2014) claims that we are witnessing 
a possible shift towards a pre-crime society in everyday policing practices and a 
development of new phenomena in policing for some of which we even lack 
appropriate language. As Fyfe et al. (2018) note; reactive and proactive policing are 
often understood as fundamentally different and separate activities within the 
police which are even regulated by different legislation. However, as the reactive 
realm becomes more proactive, it is getting more and more difficult to distinguish 
between proactive and reactive policing.  
Proactive policing is therefore not only in the process of replacing reactive policing, 
but it has the intention of changing policing activities that have traditionally been 
reactive—such as criminal investigation (ibid.). This change is mirrored in the 
increased focus on ongoing or ‘could-be-offences’ such as organised crime or 
terrorist acts with the aim of disrupting these (Bacon 2016). This suggests that 
police to a higher degree are working in the field of uncertainties as suspicion of 
potential events and actions becomes their primary line of enquiry. As a result, this 
is not only a conceptual change, but also a revision of the practical approach to 
investigation (I elaborate further on this issue in Chapter 7). As underlined in the 
prior section, proactive policing furthermore changes the fundamental 
understanding of crime prevention in the sense that crime prevention in the 
context of reactive policing would be regarded as a relatively uncontentious activity 
designed to reduce the potential for victimisation. However, in the context of 
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proactive investigation, the prevention and disruption of criminal offences are 
surrounded by more ethical questions, since the subjects of the new type of 
prevention are addressed with punitive methods in the process of preventing 
ongoing and future crimes in contrast to prevent crime to occur at all (Fyfe et al. 
2018; Lomell 2018). 
A New Approach to Investigating Organised Crime 
Proactive investigation in itself is not a new phenomenon within policing. 
Undercover police work and covert tactics such as the use of confidential 
informants has its backdrop in the military field; the protection of the sovereign 
state against external threats and in times of war where spies were and are essential 
for providing information about ‘the enemy’ (Marx 1988; Maddinger 2000; Gundhus 
& Larsson 2014). Brodeur (1983; 2007; 2010) refers to this as high policing, which is 
primarily aimed to protect national security and evolves around intelligence work. 
Brodeur (ibid.) makes thereby a useful distinction between high and low policing 
where the latter is everyday police work performed by uniformed officers and 
detectives. The distinction was originally proposed to remedy the neglect of high 
policing research, but it has since become a valuable analytical concept when 
looking at for example the blurring lines between different types of police work e.g. 
prevention and investigation (see for example Atkinson 2018) and I apply the 
concepts in Part Three of the thesis.  
Thus, it has long been part of various types of police operations to investigate 
potential hidden, victimless crimes and threats against society in the making. 
However, the establishment of proactive investigation as a separate discipline within 
policing is closely linked to the increased drug use in the 1960s and 1970s and the 
emerge of organised crime in the 1980s and 1990s (Marx 1988; Manning 2004; 
Gundhus & Larsson 2014; Bacon 2016). A moral panic (Cohen 1972) arose behind 
‘the war on drugs’ in the United States in the 1990s due to amongst other frequent 
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media representations of young people’s drug use as out of control. In Denmark, 
this moral panic concerned organised crime as a fairly new articulated 
phenomenon in the beginning of the 1990s (Bay 1998a; Strand 2011; Rønn 2012) 
which was linked to open drug sale and drug use at e.g. Freetown Christiania in 
central Copenhagen. It was, however, especially linked to the emerge of violent 
conflicts between organised criminal groups (Hestehave 2013). During the 1990s 
and 2000s the steady appearance of street gangs (bander) and other organised crime 
groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs (rockere) in Europe, as well as in Denmark, 
presented police with a significant challenge. Especially in those countries where 
gangs engaged in violent conflicts taking place in the public sphere (Larsson 2018).  
Furthermore, societal developments such as globalisation and technological 
evolution have complicated the prevention and investigation of organised crime. 
Organised criminals are supposedly becoming more innovative taking advantage of 
less policed borders, open access to European countries and markets, technological 
communication devices such as mobile phones, internet etc. These conditions 
enable them to cooperate and operate worldwide (see e.g. Ekblom 1997; Coyne & 
Bell 2001, Larsson 2008, and Von Lampe 2008; Dean et al. 2010). Historically, there 
has been limited concern for drug trafficking, drug distribution and drug sale, 
which have been highly invisible and perceived as victimless or consensual crime 
(Manning 2008). Frequent shootings in public areas, on the other hand, are agenda 
setters for the general public, politicians, mass media, and consequently the police 
in an otherwise peaceful and safe country such as Denmark. A rather dramatic rise 
in violent conflicts since around 2008 has basically altered the Danish police’s 
agenda and resource allocation and has instigated a more progressive policing 
strategy promoting e.g. offensive (reactive and proactive) investigations into 
organised crime groups and extensive patrolling in geographical areas where 
especially gangs operate (in Chapter 5 and 6 I account for the organisation of the 
police response and analyse the different elements of the strategy).    
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The development within organised crime has therefore not in itself been a lever for 
implementing a new police strategy but is indirectly becoming a focal point. A new 
approach to investigation with a focus on criminal intelligence (see Strand 2011; 
Christensen 2012; Rønn 2012) therefore arose in the late 1990s. This new approach 
to investigation was conceptually based on the ideas from intelligence-led policing 
and the experiences from police’s work on drugs in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Intelligence-led policing is centered around criminal intelligence and crime 
analysis as vital components in creating knowledge about the criminal environment 
for police decision-makers (Ratcliffe 2016). The overall purpose is to allocate and 
prioritise police resources in the direction where they have most effect. In other 
words, the issue is to focus on those crime problems which are the most 
comprehensive and cause most harm and those offenders who commit the most 
(serious) crime. The traditional recipe for drug law enforcement was primarily 
centered around street-level police operations and ‘crack-downs’ against drug 
suppliers based on information from confidential informants. Thus, according to 
Strand (2011: 302, my translation), investigations were conceptualised into an 
intelligence-based investigation in the sense that:  
A kind of proactive, preventive investigation was built which, in contrast to earlier, 
was providing intelligence about individuals and groups’ capacity to commit 
organised crime and on this basis to instigate activities which could prevent this type 
of crime to be effectuated.     
The ideal for the police was to be able to tackle organised crime by instigating more 
strategic (targeted) and proactive (future-oriented) investigations based on a 
national overview of its threats. This spawned a number of changes within the 
police such as altered organisational structures (the establishment of national and 
regional investigation and intelligence units) and work processes (the instigation of 
systematic monitoring of prolific and priority offenders in criminal groups and the 
initiation of investigations using predominantly covert measures) (see Chapter 5 for 
an elaboration). These changes did not merely concern detectives but were 
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fundamental as to how police were required to operate. Suddenly, the collection of 
information regarding e.g. gang members to support the national intelligence 
requirements became a core task for every police officer on the street. The purpose 
with this information gathering was amongst other to identify key offenders in 
organised crime groups who played a significant and strategic role and to make 
them ‘high-value targets’ for investigation—the empirical focus of this particular 
study.  
Exploring the Concept of Proactive Investigation 
When looking at the policing literature and specifically the various introductory 
textbooks and handbooks on criminal investigation, it becomes clear that proactive 
investigation is not described or discussed comprehensively (see e.g. Stelfox 2009; 
Cook & Tattersall 2014; Bjerkness & Fahsing 2018). Moreover, it is a source of 
confusion as proactive investigation is a complex concept which is described in 
many different ways and interchangeably with the terms covert investigation, 
organised crime investigation, undercover policing, invisible policing etc. O’Neill (2018: 6) 
operates with the following definition: 
Proactive investigations concern activities (usually covert) designed to capture a 
suspect in the act of committing the crime, or implicating a criminal in a crime in 
some fashion, whether by association with other criminals in a conspiracy or any 
other reason. 
In defining the conceptual meaning further, I have looked at the term proactive, 
which in the Cambridge Advanced Learners Dictionary is described as “…(of a policy or 
person or action) controlling a situation by causing something to happen rather than 
waiting to respond to it after it happens” and “taking action by causing change and not 
reacting to change when it happens”. These definitions suggest that police are in a 
fairly active role (taking action and causing something to happen) towards criminal 
incidents and not waiting for it to happen or for it to be reported. Implicit lies 
furthermore the understanding that the overall purpose is prevention. 
67
Consequently, in the Danish legal framework, criminal investigation is in The 
Administration of Justice Act (2017, Chapter 67, § 742, section 2) described in the 
following way (my translation and underlining):  
The police launch, after the reporting of a crime or by their own initiative, an 
investigation when there is a reasonable presumption that a criminal act, persecuted 
by the public, has taken place. 
Furthermore, the objective is equally formulated in Chapter 67, § 743, The 
Administration of Justice Act (2017) (my translation):  
The purpose of the investigation is to clarify whether the conditions for imposing 
criminal liability or other criminal sanction are present and to provide information 
for the verdict of the case and to prepare the case for the judicial process at the 
courts. 
As opposed to reactive investigations of homicides, assaults, burglaries, thefts and 
the like (after the fact), proactive investigations are about exploring crime which has 
not yet occurred or is ongoing (before the fact or during the fact). Interestingly, the 
Danish translation of the concept investigation (efterforskning) indeed means ‘after 
research’ (efter-forskning) implying that an enquiry is taking place ‘after’ a certain 
event. The conventional translation of proactive investigation within the Danish 
police is moreover ‘fremadrettet efterforskning’ (translated as ‘future-oriented after 
research’) which in itself is a contrasting concept and directs no attention towards 
the preventive focus. However, the entire process is concerned with the suspicion of 
ongoing criminal actions or criminal actions that have not yet taken place as the fulcrum 
(Rønn 2012; 2013). This rather simple definition leaves, however, an open 
interpretation in the sense that it fails to mention which (criminal) acts can be 
characterised as suspicious and how this assessment is made? (In Chapter 7 and 8 I 
analyse this practice further).     
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Theoretically, proactive investigation can in principle concern all types of crime and 
all types of offenders (O’Neill 2018: 10). The dimensions of criminal investigation 
are, according to O’Neill (2018), concerned with methods, seriousness, and perspective. 
In a practical police context, however, proactive investigation are usually associated 
with drugs and covert measures—perhaps because this is how it originated (see also 
Chapter 6, 7 and 8). Yet, the definition seems to be connected to methods and 
techniques rather than its purpose and aim which initially seems logical as 
suspicion most often is explored by using ‘untraditional’ or covert measures. 
Accordingly, Stelfox (2009) argues that the distinction between reactive and 
proactive investigation lies within the starting point and in the techniques used to 
gather evidence. He says (ibid.: 148):  
Reactive investigations typically start with the report or discovery of a crime. 
Thereafter, the investigation focuses on identifying material from crime scene, 
victims, witnesses and other sources to identify suspects and gather sufficient 
evidence to bring them to justice. 
(…) 
Proactive investigations typically start with the identification through intelligence 
analysis of those who investigators believe are committing offences. These are 
usually offences associated with organised crime such as drug-dealing, people-
trafficking and money-laundering, but can include other types of crime, particularly 
where investigators are focusing on persistent or serious offenders. These 
investigations focus on gathering evidence to connect suspects to criminal activity 
usually through covert techniques such as surveillance. 
The different investigation models are in this representation characterised by 
different investigative measures and moreover, according to Stelfox (ibid.), these 
approaches have much more in common than not. From the detective’s point of 
view, there is therefore no great difference when carrying out reactive or proactive 
investigation, respectively. In fact, Stelfox (ibid.) argues, many investigative 
techniques (e.g. investigative interviewing, evidence preparation for prosecution) are 
similar in the process and exactly the same once a suspect has been arrested. There 
are for that reason only minor differences when it comes to the investigation 
process and the decision-making within that process.  
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Problems Regarding Police Proactivity 
Even though the traditional approaches to policing and the dominant reactive 
policing strategy and standard model of policing have been (academically) rejected 
as inefficient, there are still a number of concerns in connection to the introduction 
of the proactive paradigm which prior research have underlined. I find it relevant to 
include some of the most central themes concerning this in the following sections 
as proactive policing is far from unproblematic according to several perspectives. 
Weisburd et al. (2019) have produced a comprehensive overview of the scientific 
evidence in relation to the introduction of proactive policing strategies. They define 
four different approaches respectively placed-based, problem-solving, person-focused, 
and community-based approaches, which they evaluate in terms of their impact on 
crime reduction, crime prevention and the strengthening of the public’s ties to the 
police. Thus, this research relates to the ‘what works’-dimension.  
First, in terms of proactive investigations which typically target individuals or 
groups and thereby fall into the category of a person-focused proactive approach 
there is no clear evidence on this police action as a single strategy (Weisburd et al. 
2019). Research suggests those offender-focused deterrence strategies of e.g. 
“pulling-levers” (Kennedy 2009) which have been put into practice different places 
in the US looks promising in terms of having positive effects. However, such 
strategies consist of comprehensive programs including many different initiatives 
from the police as well as other authorities. Proactive investigation as an exclusive 
crime control strategy has not found support in research. 
Second, another perspective in research into proactive policing is what I refer to as 
the ‘what matters’-dimension (Van Dijk et al. 2016). On the contrary to efficiency, 
this relates to the impact of policing on democratic aspects. For example, Dupont et 
al. (2017) raise questions about the reach of the state and its use of diverse means of 
power to investigate and prosecute certain types of offences and offenders. In 
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connection with the introduction of multi-agency investigations, they argue that an 
‘ad hoc-instrumentalism’ challenges existing accountability mechanisms and 
remind us that boundaries are often designed on purpose to prevent governmental 
over-reach. Thus, the very idea that police are active agents and initiators of 
investigative actions towards certain citizens are by some scholars perceived as 
potentially problematic—a theme I return to in Chapter 7 and 8. 
Third, an additional concern is directed at the condition that the epistemic ideal of 
reactive policing is more or less directly transferred into proactive policing (Fyfe et 
al. 2018). This becomes clear within intelligence-led policing which strives towards 
providing ‘an objective decision-making framework’ via crime analysis (Ratcliffe 
2008a) meaning ‘absolute truths’ when addressing future threats (Rønn 2012). 
Scholars as Innes & Sheptycki (2004) have emphasised that working with evidence 
in reactive investigation is very different from working with intelligence. The risk is 
amongst other that striving for ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ in proactive policing, which 
evolves around uncertainties, can produce a flawed vision, which can result in the 
illusion that crime is being dealt with in a rational and objective way (Rønn 2012) 
(see also Chapter 7). 
Fourth, a further challenge for proactive investigation is that it is per default 
encompassing hidden activities against the public in the sense that a central 
characteristic is that the subject in question—the investigation target—does not 
know he or she is under investigation (Loftus & Goold 2015; Harfield & Harfield 
2016; Bjerkness & Fahsing 2018). It is in this perspective imperative that the 
practice of proactive investigations is balancing potential conflicting interests such 
as law enforcement, the protection of individual rights, and security of justice 
(retssikkerhed). American sociologist Gary Marx (1988: 12 my adjustments) proposes a 
typology for police work (Figure C) and underlines that although covert or 
deceptive tactics offer a means to discover otherwise unavailable information—the 
deliberate convergence of covertness and deception makes undercover practices 
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powerful, but also problematic. This typology divides overall police work into four 
different categories (open and non-deceptive, open and deceptive, covert and non-
deceptive and covert and deceptive) and can be used to analyse different types of 
police activities (I explore this typology further in Chapter 8 in relation to proactive 
investigative methods).    
Figure C. Typology of Police Work. 
  
Fifth, the demarcation between prevention and investigation in the proactive 
context becomes blurred as these activities are united since the tendency moves 
towards more preparatory acts to become criminalised (Lomell 2012). A risk in this 
connection is furthermore that some categories of people, such as potential drug 
users, outlaw motorcycle gangs, terrorists, sex offenders, and non-nationals are 
more closely monitored and perhaps over-policed compared to others and as such 
subjected to more intrusive state surveillance than others (Fyfe et al. 2018). The last 
and sixth dilemma I will mention here is the tendency to employ logics and 
methods from the field of intelligence into an increasing range of policing tasks; the 
expansion of ‘untraditional’ and covert methods to ordinary areas within policing 
which has traditionally been reserved for serious and organised crime (Larsson 
2014). In other words, the spill-over from the area of high policing to low policing 
(Brodeur 2007). This brings about a discussion of individual rights of the citizen 
versus the general pursuit of security and public safety (Maguire 2000)—and 
consequently the moral theory of policing as mentioned above. A concern regarding 
especially the proportionality of these methods in relation to the offences they 
target can therefore be raised and consequently the police’s accountability is at 
stake, which I analyse further in Chapter 7. 
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Investigating Investigation: Key Studies About 
Reactive and Proactive Approaches  
Research on Criminal Investigation 
One of the most public police activities and the primary focus of police fiction is 
criminal investigation, especially homicide investigation (Brodeur 2010). Since the 
introduction of modern policing in the 1840s, criminal investigation has been a 
fundamental function of the police and its quality is indeed vital for police 
legitimacy (Fahsing 2016; Maguire 2018). To some extent, investigation goes on in all 
areas of policing including uniformed policing as first responders to accidents, 
patrol officers, and traffic cops carry out investigative tasks (Stelfox 2009). As 
mentioned in the thesis’ introduction, a number of studies within police sociology 
and police science have explored reactive police work, especially the work and 
practices of uniformed patrol officers (McLaughlin 2007), but detective work is 
under-researched. Still, there is a small but important body of knowledge when it 
comes to reactive detective work which is relevant to this study (see e.g. Maguire 
2000; Innes 2003; Newburn et al. 2007; Brodeur 2010; Bacon 2016; Fahsing 2016; 
O’Neil 2018 for international overviews). However, research on covert and proactive 
investigations is sparse apart from a couple of comprehensive studies (see for 
example Manning 2004 and Bacon 2016). Brodeur (2010) divides investigation 
research into five main categories: 1) general textbooks, 2) manuals and primers on 
special techniques, 3) studies of criminal investigations in themselves, 4) studies of 
the judicial process, and 5) evaluations. In the following, I will briefly address some 
of the main themes in the bulk of research and present two ruling theories of 
criminal investigation.  
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Research into investigative practices and methods include for example the 
substantial and significant amount of research into investigative interviewing 
(Griffiths & Rachlew 2018). This investigation method is regarded as the core 
element of reactive investigations. During the 1980s in the UK, there were several 
judicial scandals and disclosures of miscarriages of justice which led to criticism of 
the police’s method of interviewing suspects. The interviewing method 
predominantly built on manipulative and deceitful interrogation tactics of suspects 
with the purpose of making them confess (Gudjonsson 2007; Griffiths & Rachel 
2018). The emerging of investigative interviewing was as a result of in-depth 
research and the police interview was converted into an information gathering 
process with a focus on providing comprehensive and accurate accounts from the 
interviewees to support the investigation. In fact, a general condition to understand 
when it comes to investigation processes is, according to British police scholar 
Martin Innes (2003) that investigation is basically information work:  
(…) investigation of crime is fundamentally a form of information work. It is 
concerned with the identification, interpretation, and ordering of information with 
the objective of ascertaining whether a crime has occurred, and if so, who was 
involved and how.   
Innes (2003) furthermore describes the organisation of major investigations (e.g. 
homicide investigations) in five stages (Fahsing 2016): 
1) the initial response: the collection of available evidence from the scene and witness 
accounts 
2) the information burst stage: the activation and active acquisition of the mass of 
potentially relevant (and mostly irrelevant) information 
3) suspect development: the formulation of potential ‘prime suspects’ 
4) suspect targeting: the evaluation of evidence necessary to charge one of the suspects 
5) case construction: eliciting a full and comprehensive account of the crime for use in 
court.  
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Moreover, Innes (2003) operates with a hierarchy of information in investigations, 
which I have attempted to depict in Figure D.  
Figure D. Innes’ (2003) Information Hierarchy.  
As such, criminal investigation—speaking broadly—is about identifying, collecting, 
interpreting and categorising data, which have potential relevance for an 
investigation. In this sense, Innes (2003) argues, it is about distinguishing 
‘noise’ (non-relevant data) from ‘meaningful data’ as it is interpreted and 
understood by the detectives. Meaningful data are often considered to be 
information that can be used as evidence in court, and which therefore, by the 
entire police and judicial system, is labelled as ‘knowledge’. Innes (ibid.) 
characterises this hierarchy as dependent on socially produced definitions by 
individual officers and the police organisation. Thus, the social production of 
information, its interpretations, communication, and use are constituted on the 
basis of how contextually situated social actors (detectives) make sense of their 
actions, interactions, and environment. Whether this also applies for proactive 
investigations I discuss in Chapter 8.   
TYPE DESCRIPTION
Noise ◦ Irrelevant or meaningless data
Information ◦ Subject to multiple interpretations
Intelligence ◦ Analysed information 
◦ Mostly derived from covert measures 
◦ Basis for generate further knowledge
Knowledge ◦ Interpreted information 
◦ ‘Objective’, valid 
◦ ‘Factual’ status 
◦ Basis for police action
Evidence ◦ ‘Knowledge’ in legal terms 
◦ ‘Personal’ or ‘physical’ 
◦ Direct or circumstantial 
◦ Corroborative or indicative 
◦ Can be used in court
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According to Fahsing (2016), the investigation process evolves around instigating 
information collection in various forms with the purpose of answering key 
knowledge questions such as the six W’s; When, Where, hoW, and Why certain 
events have taken place (What), and Who was involved (see Figure E, Fahsing 2016: 
20).  
Figure E. Fahsing’s Investigation Model. 
 
Detectives can therefore, theoretically at least, be regarded as knowledge workers 
whose most dominant assignment is to collect, process, and produce information 
(Brodeur & Dupont 2006; Hald & Rønn 2013). The use of hypotheses to answer 
those key enquiry questions is moreover underlined as a valuable method in various 
textbooks and teaching material on investigation (Cook & Tattersall 2014). However, 
research of investigative practice indicates that it is the complexity of the case in 
itself rather than structured hypothesis-led procedures which determine the 
investigative process. Consequently, detectives tend to classify cases according to 
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the expected difficulties of solving them; this classification, in homicide 
investigations at least, stretches typically from self-solvers to whodunits (Innes 2003)—
from cases where the suspect is caught in the act or gives himself up to genuine 
‘mysteries’ where there are no available clues as to the identity of the offender 
(Brodeur 2010).   
Two Theories of Criminal Investigation 
Innes (2003) and Brodeur (2010) have each proposed a theoretical framework of 
relevance for this study through which to see the work of detectives (O’Neil 2018). 
Innes’ perspective is, according to Brodeur (2010) epistemological as he looks at the 
investigation process and the construction of information and its inherent meaning. 
He says (2003: 178):  
Crime investigations are composed of a number of discrete yet linked investigative 
actions, which are directed towards the production of knowledge about how and why 
the crime occurred. These actions, which are informed by, and part of, the 
investigative practices take place both sequentially and concurrently, with the 
information that they produce used to make sense of the crime, but also to inform 
the ongoing investigative work.  
Brodeur (2010) is critical of Innes’ theory of crime investigation and points to the 
condition that this primarily applies to plain-clothes criminal investigators 
belonging to special units but fails to recognise all investigative work done by other 
police officers outside these units. He underlines that Innes’ theory does not 
consider the darker side of police information work e.g. post-case court processing 
where detectives become courtroom evidence managers, which, he argues, is an 
absolute vital part of detective work. On the contrary, Brodeur (ibid.) proposes a 
pragmatic approach which is a result-oriented theory of criminal investigations. 
This theory focuses amongst other on the diversity of detective work, recognising 
that not all tasks in the investigation process are concerned with information 
gathering (e.g. making arrests, putting up surveillance etc.). Brodeur claims that 
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solving a case is in a great number of instances a brief process that bears little 
resemblance to the painstaking gathering of clues and their clever interpretation. 
He argues further that (2010: 220): 
Detective work extends in time much beyond the simple business of solving crimes, 
which is generally achieved quickly. For many investigators, real detective work is 
accomplished in securing a conviction through a guilty plea or a court verdict, after 
the case has been solved through the identification and arrest of the perpetrator(s). 
Although the two theories of criminal investigation have different outsets, they are 
both central in understanding the conceptual and practical phenomenon of police 
investigations in general and they are accordingly relevant in this connection. 
Granted, Innes’ theory (2003) does not take into account the post-case processing, 
however, it gives us valuable insights into the process of attributing different types 
of meaning to investigative information and concurrently, how this influences the 
various investigative steps taken by detectives. Brodeurs’ (2010) perspective raises 
concerns into the role of detectives reaching further than the common 
understanding of this role, namely as he view them as a kind of co-producers of 
court processes, which influence the question of guilt and sentencing.     
Key Studies on Proactive Investigation  
Although research on criminal investigation is limited and research on proactive 
investigation is even more limited (Brodeur 2010) there are some vital contributions. 
On the nature and conduct of detective work Ericson (1981) and Hobbs (1988) have 
provided seminal contributions to the field by offering alternative models of the 
behaviour of detectives. Ericson (1981) suggests that detectives are ‘makers of crime’  
by bureaucratic case management of incidents which have been into police 
property. Hobbs (1988) analyses the entrepreneurial aspects of detective work and 
their occupational culture emerging from a dynamic interplay with the social 
environment (East End) they police. In Lush Life (2013) Hobbs continues the 
78
analysis of the same ethnographic site now with a focus on ‘professional crime’ as 
supposed to ‘normal crime’ and indirectly he comments on the police’s involvement 
in the invention of and policing of organised crime. In this context, however, I will 
focus mainly on two central studies; The Narcs’ Game by Manning (2003) and Taking 
Care of Business by British police scholar Matthew Bacon (2016) as these have 
generated vital knowledge on these types of police investigations. The studies are 
both concerned with police investigation of drug offences and take on a qualitative 
and ethnographic methodological approach. This research builds on what can be 
labelled as the traditional police sociology, where scholars uncovered and analysed 
street-level police work by using e.g. participant observation of police practice (see 
e.g. Banton 1964, Skolnick 1966; Bittner 1967; 1970, Muir 1977; Manning 1977—see 
Reiner 2010; Brodeur 2010; Bowling et al. 2020 for comprehensive overviews). Early 
police studies were focused on the police mandate and the administration of this 
and common themes in this research were therefore the police role, police discretion, 
police cultures, and police organisations. Thus, police research was initially rather 
critical in its outset and focused specifically on the interplay between the police and 
the public. Accordingly, it focused on different kinds of police practice, conflicts 
between the police and various social groups within society, and took up themes 
such as police misconduct, police corruption, police violence, racism, 
discrimination etc. (Weisburd & Braga 2006b; Bayley 2015). There have been great 
variations in the findings in police studies. Still within the scholarly tradition of 
police science sociological theory and sociological methods are central components 
in analysing police work.  
Manning’s study is situated in the US and he analyses not only police practice at a 
micro level, but explores the social order of drug control, the war on drugs, and the 
societal responses to ‘the drug problem’. He attributes the policing of drugs 
dramaturgical characteristics and concludes that it is primarily symbolic and 
instrumental. Manning calls the structure of drug policing a ceremonial drama of 
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“cops and robbers” (ibid: 260) which encompasses a ritual of affirmation of certain 
values and beliefs. He argues (ibid. 262):  
While crime control serves many functions, as does drug law enforcement, such as 
gathering information, deterrence, and punishment, it has more to do with hopes, 
dreams, fears, myths, and ideologies than with producing any impact on, or evidence 
of any impact on, crime of any kind. It is a public affirmation privately shaped and 
moulded to quiet diverse agendas. Individual careers, security, and rewards; 
organizational expansion, survival, and maintenance; and, in general, autonomy on 
a day-to-day basis supersede concerns for achieving the publicly designated 
mandate. 
Thus, Manning’s rather dim outlook on the policing of drugs reveals that internal 
processes within the police such as organisational demands, constraints, and 
politics together with individual conditions for police officers are determining the 
overall police response. The popular ’war metaphor’, Manning says, is deeply 
misguiding in the sense that the police and drugs dealers are not on different sides
—on the contrary there are great overlap of what he calls ‘analogues between the 
dealing-using systems and the enforcement system’. For example, the pressure for 
sales and production of drugs and the pressure for police to produce cases and 
arrests. The social environment of working ‘undercover’, the concern for security 
and secrecy, and the daily assessment of reliability of information is moreover 
similar. Thus, the police and drug dealers make every now and then alliances as 
there are no unifying and clearly defined aim. In fact, there is no systematic battle 
plans, strategies, and tactics that unify the participating units. I find Manning’s work 
land-marking as well as controversial, and thus relevant in connection to this study 
as it does not merely explore police practice, but does so in the social and political 
macro-context of drug policing. It thereby presents an in-depth and comprehensive 
sociological analysis of not only policing, but also the police as a democratic 
institution. I furthermore built on his theorising of democratic policing and the 
concepts of the police métier, which I present in Chapter 3.  
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Bacon’s work (2016) is a bit closer to home in the sense that he analyses the British 
context which resembles Scandinavian policing more than American policing. 
Moreover, Bacon provides a comprehensive analysis of the promoted changes 
within proactive investigation due to new legislative initiatives, organisational 
reforms, and shifts in thinking about values and norms of policing over recent 
decades. He argues that there is indeed a shift in both agendas and detective drug 
work with the introduction of e.g. The National Intelligence Model (NIM)—especially 
when looking at detectives’ occupational mandate and the organisation of drug 
investigations. Bacon shows how detectives act within their legal and organisational 
parameters because it becomes impossible for them to make cases outside these 
and as a result reforms have altered police practice by limiting decision-making 
autonomy through a concerted top-down programme. However, the changes as a 
whole are poorly received by detectives and thus perceived to have negative effect 
on operational efficiency. Therefore, Bacon concludes, the fundamentals of the 
detective role remain unchanged and the ‘manifest’ continues with older patterns. 
The focus on change in investigation work is especially relevant for this study as I 
look at how the proactive paradigm is translated into (new) investigative practice.  
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Chapter 3: The Drama of Police and the 
Police Métier 
- On the study’s theoretical foundation, prisms, and core concepts 
Theories of policing must in a sense be metaphorical or about something 
rather than referential or about a person, role, or even an organisation. 
Social theory is a way of thinking about one thing in terms of another (…) It 
cannot be reduced to “variables”, “hypothesis”, and tests because theorising 
precedes the process of arguments concerning its truth value. (…) Policing, 
like medicine, should be judged by the extent to which it does the least 
damage to civility.  
- Democratic Policing in a Changing World by P. K. Manning (2010: 97f; 100). 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the study’s theoretical framework. This includes the 
theoretical foundation and the theoretical underpinnings which have informed—
and keep informing—my preunderstanding, and the theoretical perspectives and 
core theoretical concepts, which I apply to analyse the empirical findings. In that 
sense, this chapter is a presentation of a distinct theoretical framework for 
understanding this particular research field. Albeit it also functions as a theoretical 
toolbox containing specific instruments, which I use to interpret and add meaning 
to the analytical findings derived from the empirical material. This particular 
theoretical framework have been helpful in surfacing pivotal fragments of the 
complex and wide-ranging area of proactive investigation in action while crystalising 
analytical interpretations. 
As stated in Chapter 1, I seek in this study to examine how proactive investigations 
unfold in the police and the conditions which impact this and why they do so. I 
explore this from inside a police organisation and this calls for a theoretical 
foundation, which can capture both the dynamic interplay between the police and 
the external societal context in which they operate, and furthermore make sense of 
the internal interplay between formal and informal organisational structures and 
culturally anchored assumptions. Thus, the empirical investigation focuses on both 
the political and strategic frame of the police, the police organisation as an 
institution, individual police officers’ worldview, and their mode of action.  
In accordance with the phenomenological-hermeneutic scientific stance (see 
Chapter 4), theories are never innocent and they continuously inform, shape, and 
determine the analytical conclusions of any given study. The process of analysing 
and interpreting therefore goes on beyond the completion of this study as a process 
and the thesis as a product. This study has for the large part been inductive, and my 
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preunderstanding is constantly in motion in a circular process via a dialectic 
relationship between theory, methods, and analysis (Gadamer 1998). The “guilt” of 
theories therefore lies in the notion that theory A will promote a different analytical 
outcome than theory B or C etc. 
A number of theories from police sociology, police science, organisational studies, 
studies of occupations and professions etc. could be relevant in terms of analysing 
the empirical findings and answering the study’s research objectives. The literature 
points to police culture as a pivotal and obvious research area when investigating 
police practices due to its impact on police work in general and the fact that it has 
been resilient to change (Maguire 2000). Moreover, later contributions to police 
sociology have underlined the relevance of perspectives from the field of 
organisational theory for example new developments within institutional theory 
have been applied and found essential in analysing e.g. police reform and 
innovations in policing (Terpstra 2020) and the dynamics of policing as it combines 
structural and cultural aspects and micro and macro (Scott 2001). As it is neither 
fruitful nor possible to include all of these perspectives, choices have to be made 
when deciding upon theory. The choice of theories in this thesis is unfolded 
throughout the chapter. In sum, the dramaturgical model of policing and the police 
métier are chosen as main theoretical perspectives as they together provide 
theoretical concepts to describe and understand both micro and macro levels, 
cultural and organisational aspects, and individual and organisational action in 
terms of proactive police practice—how it is carried out and why. The theoretical 
framework is therefore instrumental as it provides valuable explanations and 
understandings to the research subject and supports and adds meaning to the 
analytical process. Thus, it brings on a dialectic condition where the theory help to 
conceptualise and confirm the study’s empirical findings, but also where the 
empirical findings contribute to develop a tailored theory concerning proactive 
investigation practice which I present in Chapter 9. 
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The chapter is structured as follows: 
First, I present the two main theories from Goffman (1959) and Manning (2010), 
which function as the primary theoretical prisms through which I view the field of 
proactive investigation in this study. 
Second, I account for the specific relevance, limitations as well as contribution of 
these theories, and how I, in this study, understand and apply them. 
Third, I clarify central and supporting theoretical concepts used to add further 
meaning and which function as analytical tools in analysing the empirical material. 
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The Dramaturgical Model: A Performative View on 
Police Work 
Policing as a Theatre 
Erving Goffman (1922-1982) presents in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(1959) a general theory of social interaction proposing that aspects of social life can 
be viewed as a sort of theatrical drama, which is staged and played out between 
various actors. Goffman’s (1959) focus is on the visible performances which are 
played, how the actors want to present themselves via these performances, how they 
are perceived by the audience, and thereby how they impact the way that others act 
towards them.  
The dramaturgical model is frequently used within social studies to analyse a 
variety of social interaction and professional action (Kristiansen 2000; Jacobsen & 
Kristiansen 2006). Goffman’s theatrical metaphor is as such a useful analogy for 
analysing social life—but the world is not a stage, and, at times, it is not even 
dramatic (Goffman 1959). Organisations are as such not mini theatres, but they 
supply the fronts, appearances, manner, routines, and stimulate the necessary 
teamwork. The idea is that in and through interaction, performances are selectively 
presented, selectively responded to, and selectively adequate to sustaining the 
working consensus on which interaction depends (Manning 2008c).  
Accordingly, Manning (1977: 17) applies the theatre metaphor on police work 
claiming that: “The police are dramatic actors, and they must wrestle collectively and 
individually with the salient dramatic dilemmas of their role and occupation.” In his 
classic study within police sociology, Police Work (1977), Manning analyses what he 
calls ‘dramatic dilemmas’ of police work. A fundamental contradiction is, according 
to Manning, that the police mandate and as such legitimacy is tied to the myth that 
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the police can control and influence crime levels which they cannot. While the 
crime-related law enforcement tasks are widely spoken of and accepted by the 
police, most police work in democratic societies is in fact concerned with helping 
and supporting the public in both public and private disputes and conflicts when 
they call for service (ibid.). These tasks are by police viewed as thankless, 
demanding, onerous, boring, dirty, mundane, and sometimes self-demeaning duties. 
Therefore, Manning argues, the police are forced to instigate symbolic action to 
meet the public’s expectations of being crime fighters. Indeed, the very definition of 
police work and the conceptions of this as presented by the police and reaffirmed 
by the public is therefore inaccurate. Accordingly, day-to-day police work becomes a 
dramatic performance where the police must appear in control of crime and 
disorder. Manning goes on to say about the police (1977: 19): 
By narrowing their attention to something they can apparently control, the arrest 
rate, they have tied themselves to a socially determined process (crime) over which 
they have virtually no control. They have thus achieved success in focusing public 
attention upon an activity that can be seen as explosive and self-defeating. 
In The Narcs’ Game (2004, see also Manning 2008b; 2008c), Manning continues to 
use the dramaturgical model to analyse police’s response to drugs. He argues that 
this type of law enforcement is ceremonial and represents a mode of both 
instrumental and symbolic social control as it is consistently directed at marginal 
and weak groups on behalf of the more powerful groups in society (ibid.: 4-5):  
These little ceremonies, the arrest and humiliation of users, court-based dramas, 
and media coverage, all serve to sustain symbolic virtues, such as the overt 
commitment to still-lurking puritan values of restraint, deferred gratification, and 
denial of pleasure, and shift their foci and groups-as-targets as new threats to the 
status of dominant groups arise. 
Manning (2004) labels drug policing as a ritualised ‘drama of cops and robbers’ 
inferring that this type of police activity, for various reasons, is indeed a ceremonial 
performance which has no impact on crime (ibid.: 261): 
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While crime control serves many functions, as does law enforcement, such as 
gathering information, deterrence, and punishment, it has more to do with hopes, 
dreams, fears, myths, and ideologies than with producing any impact on, or evidence 
of any impact on, crime of any kind.   
Later, in Manning’s work on democratic policing (2010) and on the role and 
function of police (2014) he goes on to develop the theoretical perspective of police 
as a ‘drama of governance’ in the sense that, he argues, the police act in the high 
and low dramas of society. Manning suggests (ibid.) that police in their everyday 
work seek to define and defend social order generally and its alteration as well as 
dealing with everyday risks and concerns called “crime” or “disorder”. Low dramas 
are policing as usual, high dramas, on the other hand, are those which receive a 
considerable amount of public attention via the media. These dramas can, via for 
instance social media, become global-international. Police can therefore, according 
to Manning (ibid.) suddenly be featured as heroes, fools, or villains in unfolding 
international and national dramas as they perform their high and low local dramas 
in their little theatres. Police are as such continuously expanding their stages and 
roles. In this dramatisation of police work, the police have become aware of their 
own social capital and consequently they reproduce by habit and practice notions 
and images of social control. They frame ambiguous events as matters of police 
concern and they are as such the central players in communication dramas about 
themselves. Manning states (2014: 8):  
The police are active actors, making up and playing roles. In this sense, they play 
themselves, acting out, mystifying, idealizing, and cooperating through teamwork to 
produce an imagery of discrete, mannered and stylized control and service. In other 
words, much of their play acting is designed to magnify their own importance and is 
redundant in communicational terms.  
In the following, I will revert to the original source of the dramaturgical model by 
presenting some of its main theoretical concepts. I will hereafter summarise how 
this theory and its adaption to policing informs this study.   
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Goffman’s Main Theoretical Concepts 
Performances and Teams 
The central theoretical concepts, which are connected to Goffman’s dramaturgical 
model, are performances, teams, regions, discrepant roles, communication out of character, 
and impression management (Goffman 1959). The following presentation is 
additionally based on Kristiansen (2000). Performances are activities where 
individuals act in front of each other and try to convince their audience that they 
are in fact who they propose to be. A performance is therefore (Manning 2008c: 
680):
…a ‘seeable’: something one sees, behaviour, not a value, a belief, or an attitude. A 
performance is a sequence of gestures, postures, verbalizations or actions seen by 
others (seen, not talked about) and responded to.
In connection to these performances the individuals have fronts which are their 
‘expressive equipment’—more or less deliberately used during the performance. 
Dramatic realisation illustrates that the actors apply dramatical signs to the 
performance which underline what they want to communicate—these can both be 
facial and bodily expressions. Idealisation is about how the actors present 
themselves as better or more perfect or consistent than the specific actions indicate. 
Idealisation demonstrates that the actors try to hide those expressions which 
conflict with the definition of the situation or the values of society, and to promote 
those expressions which are not. Idealisation is thereby a ceremonial celebration of 
the moral norms in society.  
Kristiansen (2000) underlines that performances are not only concerned with the 
individual actors’ self-presentation. It serves indeed a higher purpose for social 
interaction as a whole. Interestingly, the purpose of the performance is not merely 
to put the actor in a positive light, but that the individual’s appearance and manners 
have a greater significance on a bigger scene. Performances require cooperation 
89
between individuals on a team in terms of defining the social situation and staging a 
single routine. This team tries to sustain a consensus regarding the social situation 
in the sense that individual actors can act accordingly internally within the team, 
but also to keep up a specific front to the audience. 
Two Regions: Front Stage and Backstage 
Goffman (1959) differentiates between two different regions in which the actors 
exist. The front region can be seen as a front stage where all roles are played. There 
is an audience and the actors target their performance after the norms and 
standards which apply for the specific region. On the front stage, individuals are 
occupied with communicating a specific impression and self-presentation which 
means that other aspects are toned down or repressed. These aspects can instead be 
expressed on the backstage away from the audience’s assessment. The backstage is 
thereby used to rehearse the performance and the backstage makes room for 
conflicting or contradicting self-presentations and mistakes can be made. Both 
physical ceremonial equipment can be hidden on the backstage and costumes can 
be tried on. The team can run through its performance, check for offending or 
inappropriate expressions, and the actors can relax, drop their fronts, go beyond the 
script, step out of character, and prepare for a new show (Goffman 1959).  
Goffman (ibid.) discusses discrepant roles illustrating the problem which arises when 
actors are in the situation of being both audience and appearing on the backstage at 
the same time (Kristiansen 2000). Teams are working together to present a specific 
image of themselves to an audience and teams have certain secrets which are 
expressed backstage, but which the audience is not allowed access to. An actor can, 
however, be in a conflicting role where she is positioned as part of the audience and 
as a participant on the backstage simultaneously—on purpose or unwillingly. This, 
most often, concerns the event where an individual disguise herself and sneaks into 
the backstage to disclose secrets which potentially pose a threat to the team’s 
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privileged position. With the term communicating out of character, Goffman (1959) 
describes those expressive impressions which are not natural in the specific 
performance which the team is cooperating about. In these situations, the actors’ 
communication conflicts with the established performance and the attributed roles. 
Communicating out of character can as such function as a signal from the actor to 
the team that she wants to change the current interactional consensus. 
The Art of Impression Management 
Impression management refers to the central element of performing where the actors 
are obliged to control the impression which is expressed during a social meeting to 
avoid embarrassing situations or breakdowns. Impression management is therefore 
used to steer clear of performance disruption and there are several defensive attributes 
and practices which are connected to impression management. These attributes and 
practices concern first dramaturgical loyalty where the actors keep from exposing 
secrets to the audience, and second to keep a dramaturgical discipline where the 
actors are engaged intellectually and emotionally in their actions, but without 
spoiling a successful performance. Third, it concerns being able to show the ability 
to be forward looking and constantly consider how the performance is best played 
(dramaturgical circumspection). The audience also has a part to play in performances 
as impression management also encompasses the audience’s protective practices 
where they try to shield the actors from the embarrassment of making mistakes or 
contradictions. This is a display of tactful inattention where the audience acts as if 
they did not note such situations with the aim to help the actor to save face. 
Contextualising the Dramaturgical Model: Limitations and Potentials 
Goffman’s dramaturgical model can be applied to many aspects of police work and 
actions within the police profession. In this study, I find it accommodating to use 
several of Goffman’s (1959) theoretical concepts when analysing different elements 
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of proactive policing and moreover to analyse my own role as an embedded police 
researcher as I examine police work from the inside (see Chapter 4). However, since 
Goffman’s original theory primarily is developed in the context of understanding 
face-to-face interaction on a general level (Smith 1999), it needs to be 
operationalised and developed further to be applied to understand the specific 
organisational dynamics of policing. I therefore draw specifically upon Manning’s 
framing of Goffman’s theoretical model into a police context, which also include 
police organisations. I also expand on the concepts of e.g. stages to accommodate 
the empirical setting of policing/the police which I explain below.  
Looking through the specific theoretical prism of ‘dramatic policing’ (Manning 
2008c), I view (proactive) policing as a set of continuous performances played by 
individual actors (police officers, detectives, managers, and other police personnel) 
which form a number of crisscrossing teams. In accordance with Manning (1977), it 
seems important to distinguish—at least analytically—between instrumental and 
symbolic actions and thus performances. Although most police action have a 
symbolic element, performance can nevertheless be separated in instrumental action 
(such as actions with the purpose of obtaining a specific objective e.g. creating 
efficiency within the police) and even staged action (such as actions with the mere 
purpose of self-presentation showing e.g. visibility or activeness towards the public) 
(Holmberg 2003)—which I analyse further in Part Three. 
As a supplement to and extension of Goffman’s (and partly Manning’s) original 
theory and understanding, I argue in connection with police work that regions 
unfold in different variations as there is first of all front stage policing, which is 
police work witnesses by an audience (the public) and backstage policing where 
police officers prepare for and rehearse their public performances. An illustrative 
example of this is The Police Academy (Politiskolen) which explicitly use roleplaying 
as an educational instrument in training police officers. However, as policing occurs 
in many (physical) places and on many (organisational) levels, the front stage of this 
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activity is not always obvious and the demarcation between front stage and 
backstage is at times blurred. There are of course situational and physical 
boundaries in the sense that traditional police work is carried out in the public 
sphere and therefore has an apparent audience here. Police work in public requires 
a certain police role for example as police officers in many situations need to act 
firmly and authoritatively and hide their personal and private feelings. In semi-
public arenas, for example in the private homes of citizens, they can however alter 
this role slightly and downplay the authoritative aspects if the situation allows for it 
and where it for example calls for the show of e.g. empathy, understanding, 
compassion providing emotional support. Policing also requires a stable mandate as 
the audience (the public) needs to recognise that the actors performing are in fact 
police officers with the authority to use e.g. force against civilians.  
Manning views Goffman’s work as an “unrealised, contributory potential for the 
organisation studies field” (2008b: 678). Indeed, Manning says (ibid.) Goffman’s 
analyses are interested in responses and resistance which are produced by 
constraints in organisations defined as ecological, material, structural, and cultural 
limits on choice. Therefore, Manning argues (ibid.), organisation is the framework 
for considering trust, order and ordering, framing and performance. To study 
organisations, he says, is to study not only what people do, but how they rationalise 
or explain the why’s and wherefores of that work which is not ‘organisation’ as a set 
of fixed, measured, variable relationships. Thus, Manning interpret Goffman’s view 
on organisations as abstract entities, while organising is the relational process of co-
participants. 
When it comes to the context of invisible policing, I will argue that much police 
work, for example intelligence work and (proactive) investigative work under 
scrutiny in this study, is carried out ‘behind the scenes’, but on an organisational 
front stage. On this front stage—behind the scenes—the audience consists of other 
members of the police organisation who view the performances of for example 
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police management or detectives forming different (professional) teams and playing 
different roles. Depending on the constitution of teams, there are multiple 
backstages within the police organisation. These organisational backstages are as 
such primarily defined by the different teams belonging to these stages. To put it 
more clearly: I propose that there are performances taking place within the police 
which occur on various backstages where police officers in different professional 
roles relax and rehearse their performances before entering the organisational front 
stage. This can for example be informant handlers, police managers, detectives, 
intelligence personnel and so on who are bound together as a professional defined 
team sharing the same manuscript, the same costumes, and the same props used in 
their specific performances. This means that police officers perform different roles, 
on different stages, facing different audiences using different scripts. Generally, as 
Manning argues (1977; 2014), police work encompasses a lot of roleplaying in both 
low level and high-level dramas and police officers are both trained and 
experienced in performing different acts and roles. They are therefore particularly 
skilled in impression management. Consequently, on a day-to-day basis they spend 
a lot of time shifting between different front stages and backstages where they play 
different roles depending on the situational circumstances, the other actors, and the 
audience.  
In connection to carrying out this study, as an embedded researcher investigating 
police work and as an employee within the police, I consider myself an actor 
performing a role on the organisational front stage of the police organisation. Here 
I belong to various professional teams (e.g. other academics, analysts, 
representatives from the national police or NCI etc.) specifically depending on my 
organisational or professional attachment. However, I also consider myself as taking 
on what Goffman labels a discrepant role as I am additionally a participant from the 
audience (the public) visiting the backstage of policing. I even visit the 
organisational backstage of proactive policing as my objective, as a researcher, is to 
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gain information of how things are done and how backstage activities impact front 
stage action (I elaborate further on this researcher role in Chapter 4).   
On that account, I use the theoretical concepts of the dramaturgical model 
analytically both in terms of this study’s methodology and in connection with 
interpreting the empirical findings. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, 
no theories are innocent and the application of theoretical perspectives to empirical 
findings are first and foremost a matter of choice. However, Goffman’s unique and 
enduring dramaturgical perspective together with Manning’s application and 
further development of this have proven particularly relevant in connection with 
this study. The dramaturgical perspective is especially helpful in the first order 
analysis which looks at what goes on? investigating the actions connected to 
proactive investigation and when looking at organisational performance and 
organisational impression management (Shulman 2016).  
Although the dominant view is that Goffman is primarily concerned with 
sociological analysis of situational interaction in demarcated social settings—and as 
such a form of ‘social psychology’—this is, according to Smith (1999b), a 
misconception. Goffman’s work is, on the contrary, decidedly sociological and his 
topic is more broadly ‘social organisation’ which his examinations of total 
institutions, stigma, gender, relations, role distance, and frames testify to (Smith et 
al. 1999a). These diverse topics suggest, according to Smith (1999b), that Goffman 
can be appreciated at several different levels. Thus, in my analysis of proactive 
police practice I do not merely look the interactional context. Instead, in line with 
Manning (1977; 2004), I use Goffman’s theoretical framework to look at patterns and 
systems in police performance trying to deduce the social order and the essential 
drama of proactive policing. According to Manning (2008c) there is no correct, 
proper or even generally sanctioned reading of Goffman and although he favoured 
situational analysis, his theory can be applied to an organisational analysis as long 
as it focuses on how interaction takes place. There is no micro-macro distinction in 
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his work as, Manning (2008c) claims, Goffman’s view is that society is constrained 
interaction; the work of society is interaction. Goffman’s dramaturgical model has in 
accordance been applied by other scholars (see for example McCormick (2007) and 
Shulman (2016)) who operationalise this theoretical perspective to look at e.g. 
organisational change and conflict and people’s experiences in the workplace. The 
potential of Goffman’s metaphors as instruments to understand demarcated 
incidents of social interaction is therefore greater than merely brief encounters 
between people. In fact, in McCormick’s view (2007) the dramaturgical frame allows 
us to examine the more irrational patterns of organisational behaviour—in this 
context the deeper patterning of proactive police action. Additionally, Manning 
(2014) states: Goffman’s proposed organisational analysis of the dramaturgical 
performance of organisations can help us understand how organisations cast 
themselves in the rhetoric and expectations that are formally communicated to its 
members. Another strength of Goffman and his theatre metaphors are that they 
appeal to practitioners and non-scholars as they have the advantage of providing 
the reader with clear mental images of what goes on and as such make complex 
interactions, relations, conflicts, dilemmas etc. to appear as clear and even 
meaningful social constructions. This is perhaps why some argue that Goffman is 
‘common-sense’ and ‘stating the obvious’, however, in my view, the theory’s 
explanatory power is much deeper than on-the-surface interaction. It provides a 
unique instrument to illustrate complex conditions of social organisation in a rather 
simple and visual manner. Or as Smith (1999b) underlines: although Goffman’s 
work is accessible to non-specialised audiences and appeal to beginners it also 
persistently addresses perennial issues in the discipline of sociology which hold a 
complex core deceptively surrounded by a transparent exterior. Access to this 
therefore becomes a test of the reader’s own sociological sophistication.    
This study is neither a study of interaction nor of organisation per se. Instead, I deal 
with the conceptualisation and practice of a specific policing discipline (proactive 
investigation) and via the exploration of this I look at police (inter)action and police 
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organisation. In this sense, police practice is compiled by different types of 
interaction which differ in purpose—and this purpose is to a large extent built by 
obligations and connections to the large social enterprise: the police organisation. 
This is in accordance with Goffman’s (1959) view on formal organisations which he 
characterises as shaping and modifying interactions and thus it places ecological, 
material, structural and cultural limits on choice (Manning 2008c). Manning’s 
analysis in Police Work (1977) was one way in which elements of Goffman’s 
framework entered organisational analysis and Goffman viewed organised action as 
framed by either technical, political, structural, cultural or dramaturgical 
approaches. The dramaturgical model provides as such a dramaturgical perspective 
to social organisation and organisational theory (Manning 2014a; Shulman 2016). 
However, since Goffman’s dramaturgical model does not cover motivations or 
underlying structures per se—but is primarily interested in observable interactions 
in specific situational contexts—I find it necessary to apply an additional theoretical 
framework. For that purpose, I draw on Manning’s continuous work (1977; 2003; 
2010) which besides from looking deeper into explanations of actions has the 
advantage that it specifically evolves around and is developed within a framework of 
policing. Therefore, Manning’s work is intended to support the second order 
analysis in this study and as such the exploration of the question of why proactive 
investigation is carried out the way it is. 
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A Democratic Model of Policing: Composing the 
Police Métier 
A Matter of Justice 
In his paramount book Democratic Policing in a Changing World (2010), Manning 
builds on his previous investigations of police work (1977; 2004; 2008 etc.) and 
develops a theoretical framework for understanding the nature and function of 
(Anglo-American) democratic policing and its impact on social order in modern 
Western democratic societies. The aim is to explore police practices and the police’s 
role in relation to the collective concern of justice as it is assumed to be shaping 
this role and these practices (ibid.). To explore this, Manning draws upon the work 
of American philosopher John Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971, 1999) when he asks 
about the police’s role in distributing rights and sanctioning obligations. Manning 
(2010: iX) argues:  
(…) allocative justice reproduces present inequalities and in fact adds to them 
inevitably. In this sense, it sustains injustice and privilege. Modern societies, 
stripped of traditional religious beliefs, absent binding historical memories that 
constrain, and powerful mythopoetic enactments, require equality as a principle.   
Thus, Manning’s main claim is that democratic policing does not violate the tacit 
assumption or background expectations that agents of the law, and those who create 
it, are acting in good faith, attempting to clarify the meaning of rules, and treating 
crime as criminal and treating similar cases similarly. If it did repeatedly, the 
stability issuing from a shared sense of justice would be threatened. He argues 
further (ibid.: 191): 
(…) if policing fixes on maintaining a stable level of crime control, ignoring some 
calls, responding rapidly to others, narrowing the vision of “success”, dramatising 
the rare gun arrest and crime-suppression tactic, and if it as a result fails to provide 
support and increases inequality by action as well inaction, policing is failing.    
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Within this theoretical framework of democratic policing, which is much about the 
police’s role in society, Manning develops a theoretical concept which is particularly 
relevant in this thesis, as I will explain in the end of this section. It concerns the 
concept of the police métier. This concept is connected to the nature of policing and 
outlines standard police practice and it serves as a prism through which policing 
can be seen and understood. In the following, I will concentrate on this part of 
Manning’s theory and refer to Manning (2010) for a rigorous presentation of the 
framework of democratic policing. According to Manning (2010: 213), the police 
métier is: 
(…) a window into the ways in which policing shapes the social order in which it is 
located. The métier contrasts with how policing manages the mandate publicly. 
Rather, the police métier captures the show occurring backstage, characterised by 
occupational assumptions and practices focused around and reflexively shaping the 
incident. 
The police métier is a bundle of practices and ensembles of practices called 
routines and it reflects conventional wisdom about why and how policing works. 
Accordingly, this concept can be viewed in connection with the dramaturgical 
model of policing as it encompasses the central understanding that the police 
operate both front stage and backstage. The métier can thus be seen as a reflection 
of the backstage of policing comprised of both occupational assumptions and 
practices; the métier seeks to explain the dynamics and processes involved as the 
police shape their social order in ways that often contrast with how the mandate of 
policing is publicly managed. Moreover, Sheptycki (2017) underlines that police 
organisations are differentiated internally, but held together by the police métier—a 
cluster of assumed ideas about ‘police work’ since loose couplings between units 
within the organisation require tacit assumptions about what is processed and why. 
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The Police Métier: a Stabilising Medium  
In Manning’s understanding (2010), there is an endlessly elastic socio-political 
context in which policing operates and this elasticity results in shifting targets, 
deployment of resources, and new rhetoric which shapes the mandate over time 
through the stabilising medium of the métier (ibid.: 205): 
While it is commonly assumed that the police enforce the law, and their core tasks 
surround crime control, this does not capture what they do or why they do it. It does 
not evaluate the consequences of crime control, only the prima facie notion that 
what work is right. The police are a flexible and shifting device that responds to that 
which raises distrust. They are governed by situated actions deemed proper. While 
the targets of action are shifting and shaped by politics, the range of police tactics 
remains much the same, and the unstated purpose remains the same. 
There is as such a dynamic and stable side of policing. The police métier is 
gradually built up over time during the twentieth century and is forged by the 
interactions between police management, front-line officers, and the technological 
infrastructure of police organisations. It is that of an authoritatively coordinated, 
legitimate organisation employing practices aimed at tracking, surveillance and 
arrest and it remains ready to apply force, up to and including fatal force, in pursuit 
of the organisational goal of ‘reproducing order’, ‘making crime’, ‘policing risk 
society’ and ‘governing insecurity’ (Sheptycki 2017).  
Assumptions about Policing 
A central part of the police métier is habits and assumptions focused on the trope 
of crime that envisions only the need to control, deter, and punish the visible and 
known contestants (Sheptycki 2017). According to Manning & Raphael (2010), the 
assumptive world in which the police operate consists of assumptions about the 
politics of the field, the etiquette of treating citizens, mistakes at work, and routines 
and performances required of the practitioners. Within this assumptive world lies 
an assumed practical model or logic in action that informs choices made in line 
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with these assumptions. As such, police practices are verified with reference to the 
several compatible assumptions that produce them and the assumptions about 
policing are consequently the context within which the practices have a life and a 
social reality. The assumptions which are present in the police evolve around the 
police’s knowledge of local areas, people, buildings, places, and their dynamics 
(Manning 2010: 214): 
• The structural features of places, neighbourhoods, corners, and niches, “pockets of 
crime” are largely immutable 
• The people found in problematic areas are incorrigible. If they are drug dealers, they 
are “always dirty” and have no rights because they have forfeited them and can 
always be arrested 
• Long-term “prevention”, “problem solving” or efforts to change the contours of such 
neighbourhoods have no purchase of shaping policing reality 
• Disorder can be altered superficially by local and personalised “treatments” and 
pragmatic, order-based policing 
• It is only possible to disrupt, briefly deter, and make the occasional arrest as needed 
to maintain the essential authority of the officer 
• Policing is differential by targets, time, place, and persons 
• Policing should be personalised in the sense that officers identify with their district 
or beat 
• While it is democratic in the sense of being responsive, policing in local areas, or 
neighbourhoods, is shaped by ethnicity, class, time of day, and the political context. 
There is little one can do to change the economy, schools, family life, or religious 
values; these rarely change.
In this perspective, there are specific assumptions about policing and the social 
world in which they operate which are shaping and informing police practice. 
Hence, there is a mutual dependable relationship between police officers’ 
assumptions of policing and the practice they carry out and thereby provide a social 
reality. This means that the viewpoints of police officers to a high degree influence 
the work they do, which the vast literature on police occupational culture also 
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points to (see e.g. Chan 1997; O’Neill et al. 2008; Brodeur 2010; Loftus 2010; Reiner 
2010; Cockcroft 2012; Bowling et al. 2020).  
The Incident Focus 
The theatrical core of the police métier lies, according to Manning (2010) in police 
patrol work and the work of detectives. The occurrence of crime and disorder—‘the 
incident’—is therefore its ‘sacred centre’. The métier is displayed in the cynosure of 
the incident which is grounding everyday policing. The incident is a microcosm of 
sensible, thoughtful, rational individualistic choices. Within the police organisation, 
the incident is framed and viewed exclusively as the officer at the scene describes it, 
unless otherwise known (Manning & Raphael 2010). ‘Otherwise known’ refers to 
potential later reviews by supervisors, media or photo documentation as it is not 
accustomed to question police officers’ statements or individual action (Manning 
2010). As the incident is the theatrical core of policing, it is seen as responsiveness 
to public demands and a way to show activity to supervisors and managers. Still, it 
is seen as a low-visibility matter metaphorically through the eyes of the police 
officer (Raphael & Manning 2010).   
  
The Shaping Forces of the Métier 
Manning & Raphael (2010) describe four shaping forces, which serve as sustaining 
practices of the police métier—visualised in the illustration Figure F (Manning 
2010: 216).  
The Police Organisation 
The first shaping force is the authoritative patterning of relationship called the 
(police) organisation. Manning & Raphael argue (ibid.) that police work is 
institutionalised, structured, routinised, unquestioned and done as if there was no 
other way to do it. It is as such taken for granted in terms of effectiveness, purposes, 
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and means. The basic foundational assumption is that this organisation is functional 
and rational. The organisation is designed to allocate officers to randomly patrol, to 
react and respond to calls, and to investigate “founded” calls. The police 
organisation structures and concentrates its resources at the bottom of the 
organisation primarily around ‘the incident’. Therefore “policy” is set on the ground 
by lower participants’ situated practices resulting from decisions made quasi 
independently and ad hoc by loosely supervised police officers. In other parts of the 
police science literature, this latter element is referred to as police officers’ wide 
discretionary powers (Kleinig 1997).  
Figure F. The Shaping Forces of the Police Métier. 
Interpersonal Tactics 
The second shaping force is interpersonal tactics in the incident. The sanctioned 
interpersonal tactics of policing are those thought to guarantee successful asserting 
of authority, taking control, closing the incident in some fashion, and returning to 
service. These tactics are learned ‘on the job’ from experienced police officers and 
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especially field-training officers. Academic aspects of police training are viewed as 
irrelevant and even an obstacle for doing good police work. Consequently, good 
policing and good police work has the following features and as a dramaturgical act 
it requires (Manning 2010: 218): 
• Sizing up the incident quickly 
• Dealing with the current situation in a parsimonious fashion 
• Avoiding violence or extended arguments 
• Deciding what to do and how to do it with dispatch 
• Minimising paperwork 
• Producing solutions that facilitate returning to “service”—that is becoming 
available for patrolling 
• Reducing considerations about eventual guilt or innocence of the parties  
• Eliminating remedies that are extensive, rehabilitative, educational, or 
transformative. 
The belief is that the incident has the social reality attributed to it by the officer and 
thereby it takes organisational shape as the officer defines and describes it. An 
epigram of ‘you-had-to-be-there-to-understand-what-was-done-why-it-was-done-
and-the-results-produced’ rules the occupational culture as it protects and elevates 
judgements on the scene from criticism or punishment. The epigram and the 
associated stereotype thereby reinforce the inviolate and sacred centre of the work
—the reasonable, thoughtful, rational, cogitating individual officer, on the street 
deciding things. Indeed, the officer’s account is virtually the rule of thumb and this 
provides flexibility of action and freedom from close supervision. Since police work 
is not defined in concrete terms or in terms of the content of the interactions 
involved, but rather is defined as a social form what is done is open-ended and can 
be described using the conventional rhetoric sanctioned within the culture 
(Manning & Raphael 2010).  
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Modes of Deploying Resources 
The third shaping force is ritualised, repetitive modes of deploying resources which 
ground ‘order’ and ‘ordering’ in places and doings rather than in categories of 
crime, law, and morality. In this sense, policing is more about the control of territory 
and the symbolisation of that control. The deployment of resources is in accordance 
with the assumptions about policing and the understandings that police know 
where crime is occurring, which groups of people who commit crime, during what 
hours, days, and months of the year. The records, which are kept about these issues, 
sustain the validity of this practice as they are based on the same assumptions.  
Rewarded Activities 
The fourth shaping force is the cluster of rewarded activities. These are the 
organisational inducements and the distribution of these on how to perform 
policing. These are based on assumptions about how the social world operates as 
well as what practices which are necessary to cope with this world. They generally 
revolve around stops, arrests, and other visible interventions, while rewards for 
other activities such as problem solving, developing partnerships, working with 
community groups are absent. As such, the police organisation is continuously tied 
to its symbolic crime-control focus and ritual attachment to performance (Manning 
& Raphael 2010). As mentioned, the incident can be seen as a window in which 
police practices are displayed and when looking at the proposed shaping forces 
above underlines its ceremonial position for repeating what is valued and 
recognised in policing. The subjective and objective forces that govern police 
performance are, according to Manning (2010), mobilised in the incident. The 
activities surrounding the incident builds on a ‘fuzzy logic’ in the sense that they 
resemble coherence while this is not verbalised or described in nuance, but they 
are recognisable as ‘police work’ in the here and now. They are as such known 
despite of their emergent properties and complexities and these practices 
reproduce the modes of policing so frequently observed (Manning ibid.). 
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Contextualising the Police Métier: Limitations and Potentials 
Since this study focuses on how proactive investigations unfold in the police and 
the conditions which shape and impact this and why, I find it imperative in my 
analysis to apply the police métier as a theoretical concept as it reveals deep 
patterning of police action and its shaping forces regardless of the overt 
manifestations and impression management. As Manning (2010) argues, it is 
important to step back from the obvious labels and rhetoric and step closer to the 
patterning of policing. In accordance to Manning, my aim is to examine the actual 
practices of the police on the ground, rather than inferring these from aggregated 
data as ‘crime’ and ‘crime control’ which are not things, obdurate matters, but 
rather shifting relational icons that change the meaning and consequence by place, 
by time, and as a result of changes in criminal and civil law. This ambition is indeed 
in accordance with the methodological approach of this study, which I present in 
detail in the following Chapter 4. 
As police work in general—and covert and proactive investigation specifically—are 
practices built on tacit knowledge and subterranean assumptions, it is essential to 
analyse these informal aspects. This has since early police sociology often been 
addressed as an exploration of police occupational culture (e.g. Banton 1964, 
Skolnick 1966; Bittner 1967; 1970, Muir 1977; Manning 1977) which has been seen 
as a primary influencer of police action (see e.g. Maguire 2000). Manning does not 
use the word culture as a central theoretical concept. In fact, he raises critique of 
police studies of police culture as, he argues (2010), they lack taking into account 
the more formal impacting aspects of policing such as the organisational and 
societal context which he finds imperative. Manning builds on Goffman when he 
formulate organisation as (2008b: 687):   
…an actor, or performer, a social object to which motives, purposes, aims and social 
features are attributed to and responded to by other actors. It could create and 
disseminate impressions to its advantage. It could create a sustaining imagery to 
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compete in an organisational environment. It could produce a line and create order in 
its audiences. 
Thus, Manning labels (ibid.) his own sketch of police work in Narcs’ Game (2003) as 
a kind of drama which passes for an organisationally based theory of modern 
policing since policing can be seen as engaged in a kind of dramatic game of 
impression management or effort to persuade audiences via strategies, tactics and 
information of the quality of its actions. The police organisation is an actor, it 
interacts with other actors in symbolically articulated games and its actions have 
consequences for other actors. Police practices—understood as what is done in the 
name of the police organisation—require therefore, according to Manning (ibid.) 
visible display of involvement in policing as an organisation. Therefore, Manning’s 
continuous work—and ultimately his comprehensive theory of democratic policing 
(2010)—can as such be understood in part as organisational theory. This theory also 
builds on concepts from organisational studies such as Van Maanen’s and Schein’s 
organisational socialisation (1977) and Weick’s sense-making (1995)—although he uses 
these concepts more or less indirectly. The theoretical anchoring of the concepts 
which Manning presents in connection with the police métier is therefore a little 
unclear besides his loyalty to and extension of Goffman’s work. 
  
Still, I view and interpret Manning’s concept of the police métier as an effort to 
capture aspects and perspectives of both culture and organisation, micro and 
macro, formal and informal, individual and institution as it refers to the dynamics of 
policing where both external and internal conditions impact police practice and 
result in specific modes of action and routine practices determined by the shaping 
forces as presented above. The concept of the police métier therefore goes beyond 
the concept of (police) culture and (police) organisation as the police métier 
provides a broader understanding of what goes on in policing and why in the sense 
that the concept tries to capture not only the microcosmos of a specific 
occupational field and its goings-on, but contribute with meaning to the cycle of the 
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police profession within the police organisation and police within society. This study is 
neither an explicit study of police culture or police organisation as these concepts 
and scopes are too narrow in my view to capture the research question. Instead, by 
applying the concept of the police métier it becomes a study of proactive 
investigation work in the core dynamic in policing; the societal external structures 
in conjunction with the organisational internal conditions in line with my 
knowledge ambition (presented in Chapter 1). 
I will additionally apply the concept of epistemic culture which stems from Austrian 
sociologist Knorr Cetina (1999) who analyses the epistemic cultures of science as 
the premier knowledge institution in modern society. Epistemic culture is 
conceptually different from the concepts of organisational and occupational culture 
and the police métier as it refers specifically to the specific aspects of cultures that 
create and warrant knowledge (Cetina 1999: 1):  “(…) those amalgams of arrangements 
and mechanisms—bounded through affinity, necessity, and historical coincidence—which, 
in a given field, make up how we know what we know.” The epistemic notions of 
detectives seem relevant to investigate especially when looking at the introduction 
of a new policing paradigm where knowledge production is a core task and a 
precondition—and since two epistemic rationales (experience-based and 
knowledge-based) are competing within the police. In this study, it therefore 
becomes central to examine how detectives come to know what they know about 
crime as a phenomenon and policing as a practice generally speaking and 
specifically in relation to evidence production in proactive investigations. As 
Manning (2010) argues, the research knowledge of detective work is limited and 
especially that of specialised proactive units. This study, therefore, also becomes a 
further exploration of the dramaturgical model and the concept of the police métier 
as it investigates the mode of actions and the practical logics of organised crime 
policing and as such tries to capture what I refer to as the dramaturgical performance 
of proactive investigation and the (proactive) detective métier which are presented in 
Chapter 9.   
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PART TWO: FRAMING THE STUDY  
 

Chapter 4: Friend or Foe? 
- On the study’s embedded approach to exploring police’s 
investigation practices 
I participated rather freely, but remained an anthropologist.  
- Stranger and Friend by Hortense Powdermaker (1966: 115). 
Introduction 
Operation Goldilocks was initiated in the Springtime in Alpha Investigation Unit 
(AIU) located in Metropolis City. The main target was a ‘usual suspect’—a longtime 
member from an organised crime group, Nigel Smith, who was known by the alias 
“Jerry”. By chance, I joined the investigation team the same day the operation began 
and the manager of AIU, Chief Superintendent Brett Oakley, underlined this 
fortunate situation in my morning meeting with him at the central police station 
where the investigation unit operated.   
“I’m gonna set you up with Sandy from today”, he said, “he’s gonna be the SIO 
(senior investigating officer (sagsstyrer)) on this operation we’re starting today 
targeting Jerry”.  
“Oh, yeah, I heard about that”, I said, as I recently had been talking to some 
detectives in NCI (National Centre of Investigation) about the launch of the 
operation. I had also attended the strategic coordinating meeting 
(koordinationsmøde) between the police districts, the national and the regional 
units where investigation targets (efterforskningsmål) were discussed and 
prioritised.  
Jerry was almost a legend within the police; his (criminal) activities could be traced 
back through decades and he was a noticeable figure in the environment. 
“He’s tough, but we’re gonna get him this time”, the chief superintendent continued.  
“This time we have a confidential informant (kilde) close to him, it already looks 
promising. We’re gonna solve this case.”  
I nodded, sitting in a chair at the meeting table in the chief superintendent’s office 
with my handbag on my lap, still with my coat on. I had arrived ten minutes before 
by train and was met by the smiling and welcoming chief superintendent in the 
reception downstairs, which also served as the police station’s service centre where 
people came to report crimes or to sort out various administrative matters. 
“This one will be a good case study for you”. The chief superintendent looked 
enthused: “It has everything! We’re already setting up a formal JIT (joint 
investigation team) with another European police service.”   
“So—should we go meet the team?”. 
I hadn’t checked in to the hotel yet and carried a small suitcase and dragged a small 
trolley behind me as we walked down the hall to the staircase, going through a glass 
door using an admissions card. The entire investigation unit was placed on the 
second floor of the building on a hallway with about a dozen offices and around 25 
working stations. The investigation team shared the space with the districts’ 
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informant handlers who had their own office but used the big meeting room to eat 
their lunch and drink coffee. I placed my luggage and coat in the office of the 
superintendent (efterforskningsleder) and the clerk. The office was empty, and the 
Chief Superintendent said: 
“I think they’re having breakfast in here”. He knocked on the door across the 
hallway and opened it to go in.  
Around 15 people were gathered around a long table set with bread rolls, butter, 
cheese, deli meats, big coffee pots, plates, and plastic cups. The crowd turned their 
heads and stopped talking. 
“Morning everyone.”  
We entered the room and the conversation continued sporadically. There was an 
informal and relaxed atmosphere although I sensed I was being watched and found 
myself observing every little move and sound in the room. My heart rate was 
increasing as I was feeling a growing nervousness; in the coming months, I and the 
research I was carrying out depended on this group of people and their attitudes 
towards me and willingness to let me be a part of their everyday work. Moreover, no 
matter their sentiments they were forced to tolerate my physical presence as it was 
already decided upon by management. There was however no guarantees that this 
would be a peaceful co-existence. The first meeting would indeed be vital for the 
nature of the relationship the team and I was going to have in the time to come.  
I found an available chair around the table between the detectives and the Chief 
Superintendent sat down on a chair at a desk alongside the wall. 
“So, this is Nadja from NCI. She’s gonna stay with us for a long period of time. A few 
months to begin with. She’s doing a research project on proactive investigations, 
which is very exciting.” 
I continued:  
“Yes, I’m happy to be here. I’m employed at NCI and at the same time I’m a PhD 
fellow at Aalborg University. And I’m here to learn about how you carry out 
proactive investigations, which methods you use and what challenges you meet. I 
hope you’ll share your knowledge and experience with me.” 
“I’m putting her on Jerry”, the Chief Superintendent said, “so she can see how we 
start up our cases.” 
The detectives remained silent, carrying on with their breakfast. 
“It’s a godsend for us that Nadja’s here to look into our work. It’s not a bad thing that 
all the good work we carry out in this unit is called attention to.”  
The room was still silent, a couple of nods around the table. 
“Don’t think we have this type of breakfast every day”, a Detective remarked. 
“Yeah, I was wondering, it looks cosy…”, I smiled without finishing my sentence. 
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“No, it’s really a hardworking group of people”, the Chief Superintendent said in a 
sarcastic, but friendly tone of voice, “they don’t spend any time drinking coffee at 
all.”  
“Or with our feet on the table”, a Detective sitting in the corner replied.  
Mumbled laughter. 
“All right, I’ll carry on…Sandy, can you coordinate with Nadja?”  
The Chief Superintendent left the room and the detectives began talking to each 
other without any particular attention towards me. 
“So, you’re from NCI.” 
It was more a statement than a question from the detective sitting right opposite of 
me.   
“Yes, it’s the national police, John”, another detective replied rolling his eyes while 
he was stretching his arm to get a piece of cake from a tray on the table. 
“Alright, alright, I’m just finding out if you’re friend or foe!” John said. 
He did not sound annoyed nor enthusiastic.  
“Yeah, that’s an important thing to find out,” I replied smiling. 
A Detective sitting next to me turned around and said: 
“Alright, but here’s the most important question: do you drink beer?”   
The situation above took place when I began my fieldwork at AIU two years after 
having started my PhD research. As an employee at the Danish National Police for 
seven years, I had already a fair amount of experience with policing and with the 
police organisation. I had been teaching at The Police Academy (Politiskolen). For 
two years, I had headed up a research working group about gang crime at the 
police’s Knowledge and Research Centre (Politiets Videnscenter). I had carried out 
several analyses of the organised crime phenomenon and policing practices in 
relation hereto. I had travelled across the country to nearly all police districts to 
observe and evaluate more than a dozen operational responses towards outlaw 
motorcycle gangs. I had been a member of the National Strategic Staff on Gang 
Crime (Rigspolitiets Nationale Følgestab Vedrørende Bandekriminalitet) since the 
beginning of my employment, and I had contributed to various strategies and 
response plans within that area. I had visited Nordic and European countries and 
police services to look at police organisations and attend conferences about police 
research and best practices in law enforcement. I had written a number of policy 
documents (notater), articles, and reports about gang crime and policing models. 
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And I had written a textbook on proactive policing for police officers (Proaktiv 
kriminalitetsbekæmpelse for politifolk (2013)) based on an evaluation of Copenhagen 
Police’s operational and investigative response to gang crime. In other words, I had 
already been in contact with several hundred police officers, police managers, 
prosecutors, teachers, administrative and judicial staff from different police 
districts, departments, and units serving in different functions within the Danish 
police. Consequently, it was not the first time I was carrying out fieldwork and being 
in the policing environment was familiar to me. I was not a newbie coming straight 
out of a research environment meeting the world of policing for the first time. 
Because of this, I found myself reasonably prepared to join AIU—well aware that it 
would be a demanding task both professionally and personally.   
In this chapter, I introduce this study’s methodological framework and provide the 
reader with a detailed account of how this study is framed and designed, how 
information is collected, how the empirical material is analysed and interpreted—
and on which basis these choices are made. As unfolded in Part One of this thesis, 
police work is by many scholars regarded as a practice build on tacit knowledge and 
silent work experiences (Finstad 2000; Gundhus 2006; Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012; 
Hald 2015; Bacon et al. 2020). This is indeed the case for invisible policing (Loftus & 
Goold 2012) and therefore proactive investigation which is covert and surrounded 
by a high degree of secrecy. Practices and procedures seem obvious for and are 
rarely questioned by detectives and members of the police organisation and are 
poorly defined and described (Hartmann et al. 2018). Additionally, the literature on 
police culture underline that the police are notorious skeptical of outsiders and 
their potential critical view on the organisation. The main argument of this chapter 
is therefore that in order to capture informal conditions of policing such as 
subterranean structures, assumptions, rationales, and logics it is necessary to study 
the police organisation and police practice empirically and up close (Manning 2005; 
2010; Bacon et al. 2020). Moreover, to gain insight into a hypersensitive area such as 
covert policing and consequently proactive investigation it is vital to study this from 
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within. In accordance with Manning (2005; 2010) (see Chapter 3), I view the role of 
police research as being primarily to build up in-depth knowledge about how 
police operate in its social context and the implications of this for society in 
general. For that reason, police research should focus not only on different aspects 
of police work, but also on police as a social institution and its agency in relation to 
the greater structure of crime control (Garland 1990). To support this ambition and 
thereby contribute with profound knowledge and meaningful explanations of how 
police through proactive investigation respond to organised crime and why, this 
calls for a qualitative approach and the use of a variety of research methods, and 
empirical material stemming from different sources in order to shed light on this 
research query.  
There are a substantial amount of pioneering police ethnographies from Banton 
(1964), Skolnick (1966), Westley (1970), Bittner (1972), Cain (1973), Reiss (1973), Van 
Maanen (1973; 1978a), Manning & Van Maanen (1978) to Punch (1979) and more (see 
e.g. Brown 1996; Brodeur 2010; Manning 2005; 2010; 2014a; 2014b; Reiner & 
Newburn 2008; Innes 2010b; Reiner 2010; Fassin 2017; Karpiak & Garriot 2018; 
Bacon et al. 2020; Bowling et al. 2020 for overviews). Additionally, there are even 
central as well as essential insider ethnographies in police studies (see e.g. Young 
1991; Waddington 1993; Holdaway 1980; 1989; Moskos 2008) which have pointed to 
imperative and unavoidable conflicts and dilemmas, advantages and difficulties of 
conducting police research. These scholars have set the agenda and standard for 
police research and constitute continuous sources of inspiration and must-reads. 
Their contribution to our understanding of policing is profound as they offer 
insights into the processes, structures, and meanings of the police (Fassin 2017; 
Bacon et al. 2020).    
However, for me and my colleagues Hartmann, Høgh, and Rønn these contributions 
have not been sufficient in order to provide a comprehensive and clear 
methodological recipe for all aspects of the delicate insider position. For that reason 
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we have, in the article Knowing from Within: Making the Case for Embedded Police 
Research (2018), proposed the conceptualisation of or even a manifest for embedded 
police research. In this thesis, I continue the development of this concept to 
encompass a specific stance in relation to philosophy of science, researcher 
position, research ethics, choices of research methods, methods for analysis, and the 
overall purpose with and application of the research not only to support 
organisational development, but also to build theory. More precisely, my ambition 
and main errand with this chapter is to propose a comprehensive embedded 
methodology for police research which constitutes this study’s methodological 
contribution. 
The embedded researcher position builds naturally on the works of prior police 
research as mentioned above, but an important distinction from other insider 
positions is for example that the embedded position is not merely defined by the 
researcher’s attachment/disattachment to the police organisation under scrutiny, or 
by the researcher’s professional background (academic/police practitioner), 
backstage knowledge, or the research topic (operational/structural) (Brown 1996). I 
understand embedded as an object which is implanted or put firmly and deeply in a 
surrounding mass. It is per default an implant (and therefore not a natural habitat) 
and it is not something which blends in with this mass over time; it stays 
encapsulated without leaking into its surroundings and preserve a continuous 
outsider perspective in its embeddedness. This is an important characteristic of the 
embedded researcher as the objective of providing critical, but constructive 
analyses of any police activity and its implication for society should never be 
departed. Further, I define embedded police research as a comprehensive 
methodology for sensitive empirical research in closed and powerful organisations 
or social institutions, which are usually omitted from public insight and thereby 
holds an endemic secrecy (Fassin 2017). The methodology builds moreover on distinct 
principles from phenomenological and hermeneutic science in terms of both 
ontological and epistemological world views where the researcher engages with the 
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research field as an active agent. In sum, the embedded methodology encompasses 
clear ideas of how scientific knowledge is produced and understood, how the 
researcher is positioned, what research methods to use, how to apply theory, and 
how to analyse and interpret empirical findings. As other insider positions, the 
position of the embedded police researcher is therefore a unique position for better or 
worse; a privileged position and at the same time a very lonely endeavour. 
Concurrently, it is regarded both as a high status and low status position within 
police and within academia. As an example, I am within the police by some 
regarded as a specialised expert with a privileged and independent task. By others, I 
am regarded as not even being worth the payroll money (Hartmann 2014 has similar 
examples). In academia, I am often envied the “easy” access to information and 
informants, but also perceived as a dirty researcher (Hunt 2010; Hartmann et al. 2018) 
doing inside or so-called government research (myndighedsforskning), which is 
regarded as too entangled into the research field without the ideal scientific 
distance (Sheptycki 1994; Holmberg 2014; Davies 2016).  
The positions described above are of course extreme and seldom expressed in such 
rigid categories. However, they capture quite well the most prevalent and persistent 
dilemma which an embedded (police) researcher doing (police) research in the 
organisation she is employed in has to tackle. Sociological research is all about 
sound and sober analysis of the social world’s various phenomena, structures, 
behaviours, interactions etc.—which seldom are what they appear to be (Berger & 
Kellner 1982). Such research is not only in risk of being critical of the issues it 
investigates. It is in fact critical per default as it thoroughly scrutinises specific parts 
of the social world through strict methodological processes. This study, for example, 
looks at inherent conflicts and paradoxes, and ideals versus practices in the case of 
proactive investigation. This condition presents dilemmas and risks for both me as a 
researcher and for the organisation in which the research is carried out (the Danish 
police). As the embedded researcher, in Goffman’s (1959) terms, can be viewed as a 
an actor playing a discrepant role by being both a member of the performing police 
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organisation and a member of the audience observing this performance there is a 
possibility that she will get access to secrets from the backstage of policing. So, what 
if the research turns out to be critical of ‘the way we do things’? What if the findings 
point to a need to do things differently or to rethink concepts, processes, values and 
the like?  
As I have accounted for in Part One, two epistemological rationales are currently 
competing within contemporary policing: experience-based policing and 
knowledge-based policing. These rationales are central for understanding the way 
this study is carried out and why it was carried out this way. When I began this 
research, there was an increasing anti-intellectualism (as Granér 2004 similarly 
describes) or at least a growing resistance amongst police officers within the Danish 
police towards academics entering the field of policing. This resistance was partly 
based on discontent with the fact that other professional groups were included as 
members of the police, and on a more or less well-founded fear that such groups 
would take over important functions which earlier had been occupied by police 
officers. My employment and subsequently my engagement in this research project 
therefore mirror some of the police’s attempts to transform from one paradigm to 
another, which I will elaborate in Part Three. On that account I indeed find myself 
being an active agent in this process. Consequently, I have named this chapter 
Friend or Foe? as it sums up rather well the essential dilemma in my research 
specifically and perhaps of police research in general: There is no recognised 
position for an embedded police researcher within the police organisation. 
However, based on the experiences from this study it certainly makes sense to 
embed yourself in a ‘middle-position’—between friend and foe as a critical friend 
(Finstad 2000). This embedded position, however, does not reduce the professional 
and personal dilemmas, on the contrary. It raises distinct methodological and a 
variety of practical, and professional concerns about research ethics, researcher 
positions, research methods, knowledge production, and the appliance of research 
into practice. 
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In this thesis, special attention is therefore given to unfolding the embedded 
methodology in this rather extensive chapter which might seem immense compared 
to a more conventional prioritisation of methodological issues in other academic 
products. However, my intention is to operationalise the methodological framework 
and the theoretical concept of the embedded police research methodology into 
practice. The ambition is to give a detailed account of this by embedding the reader 
into small vignettes of empirical examples, as the one in the beginning of this 
section, my reflections in connections with these, and how they correspond with the 
embedded methodology. Accordingly, I discuss and unfold prospects and pitfalls of 
the embedded approach through an introduction to specific circumstances 
concerning this study and how I dealt with them with various degrees of success. 
An important notion to underline in this preliminary stage is that certain ethical 
considerations have to a large degree determined the methodological framework—
here understood as the process from formulating the initial research question to 
writing up the last conclusions. This study deals with a research area, policing in 
general and investigation in particular, which can be labelled as a form of sensitive 
sociology (Jacobsen et al. 2005). This type of sociological research is characterised by 
amongst other a sensitive relationship between researcher and research field. 
Within this sensitivity lies notable methodological and ethical dilemmas concerning 
sensitive empirical material, and distinct demands for anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
Based on these grounds, I have processed and used the empirical material in this 
thesis with great carefulness and consideration concerning the ethical conditions. 
As such, the empirical examples might seem to have a more passive role than in a 
conventional qualitative study. In accordance with Manning (1977), the study is 
based on extensive fieldwork and combines both sociological and anthropological 
methodologies, and the empirical material stems from many different sources, and 
are collected in different ways. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, it is not a 
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traditional ethnography nor is it a description of day-to-day investigation work. The 
empirical material function as a comprehensive backdrop which guides the main 
analytical findings. These findings are supported by illustrative examples and quotes 
from interviews which I have carefully selected and put forward as representations 
of the main findings—rather than being a study where I rigorously disseminate and 
actively and continuously review the empirical material. As the chapter will 
demonstrate, a fundamental principle of the embedded methodology is that the 
researcher is embedded—not only in the field of study, but in the process of 
producing knowledge. The scientific stance of the embedded methodology thereby 
proscribes that I as an embedded researcher becomes a part of the hermeneutic 
circle (Gadamer 1998) in interpreting and actively using preunderstandings and 
understandings in order to get insight into the field of proactive policing. Moreover, 
the analytical method is an ongoing circular process where additional layers of 
interpretations are added—and this is progressively done through each chapter. 
Every part of the thesis therefore becomes a contextual frame for analysis and for 
that reason this chapter concerning the study’s methodology in itself becomes a 
(new) contextual analytical frame with independent analytical findings. The chapter 
therefore serves as a preunderstanding for the coming (analytical) chapters. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
First, I begin drawing the counters of the embedded approach and identify the 
ambition for developing the methodological framework. I present the perspectives 
from philosophy of science and theoretical aspects of qualitative research which 
constitutes the phenomenological-hermeneutic worldview behind the embedded 
methodology and consequently this study. This includes underlying epistemological 
assumptions and preunderstandings of the field of study and a clarification of the 
embedded stance and its researcher positions.  
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Second, I give a brief introduction to the field of study—the Danish police 
organisation as a research arena—and provide a detailed overview of the study’s 
empirical material and unit of analysis. I account for and discuss choices 
concerning research methods through an introduction to fieldwork as a primary 
research method for embedded research—including its different components such 
as participant observation, qualitative interviewing, and document research. 
Third, I introduce different circumstances regarding the practical conditions of 
carrying out this study through an elaboration of embedded researcher positions 
and various embedded researcher roles—and consequently the interactional 
dynamic between me as researcher and the research field. I explore different types 
of embedded role engagements and discuss these in terms of access and the 
constant negotiation between researcher and the research field and the implications 
of this for the study.  
Forth, I present the study’s method for analysis which combines a four-step 
phenomenological and hermeneutic approach together with the use of first order 
and second order analyses as vital components of embedded research. I discuss a 
central element of the embedded methodology which is the circular process 
between preunderstanding and understanding in interpreting and creating 
analytical findings. Moreover, I propose a number of central principles to assess the 
embedded study’s quality and limitations. 
Finally, I discuss the sensitive position of being an embedded researcher who 
produces critical-constructive research, and the most pivotal ethical issues in 
relation hereto. Moreover, I discuss censure and self-censure in embedded police 
research. 
1 This was expressed informally, but also officially from the Danish Police Union (Dansk 
politiforbund) in e.g. articles and point of views from the police union’s president (formand) see 
https://politiforbundet.dk/english 
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Designing Embedded Research: Philosophy of 
Science and Researcher Position 
The Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Embedded Stance 
The central research question guiding this study is explorative in nature as the 
study is concerned with presenting an in-depth analysis of how proactive 
investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in police and 
which conditions impact this and why? For that reason, I employ a qualitative, 
exploratory, and inductive methodological approach where questions such as how 
and why can be answered. Danish sociologists Kristiansen & Krogstrup (1999: 13, 
my translation) have a useful distinction between methodology and methods as 
methodology is seen as: 
…a fundamental epistemological and scientific level which amongst other has to do 
with the relation between theory and empirical material, how one achieves valid 
knowledge, and what scientific knowledge actually is.  
Methods are on the contrary seen as “…the practical approaches which are taken into 
use in connection with collecting data”. Accordingly, I separate the concepts of research 
methodology and research methods; the research methodology in this study is 
framed by respectively phenomenological and hermeneutic research traditions 
founded by German scholars as Alfred Schütz (1975) and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1998) in the sense that social life and human behaviour is understood as a dynamic 
everyday practice driven by the subjective meanings of its social agents. For me, as a 
researcher, this means that in order to explain and understand behaviour and 
actions in the social context of proactive policing it is vital to understand detectives’ 
interpretation of their life worlds—motives, thoughts and feelings—as they are 
driven by these (Kristiansen & Krogstrup 1999). This position contrasts with a 
positivistic and empirical-analytic scientific position claiming that social life can be 
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observed objectively and value-free (Robson 2002). As Weber (1982) claims, the 
researcher is always shaped by her own conditions and preunderstanding, and 
social phenomena will always be products of human rationales. Hence, there is no 
such thing as objective scientific analysis attached from the cultural setting. The 
researcher will choose her field of research and observe her surroundings from 
subjective criteria of relevance. 
Thus, this study is equally influenced by my preunderstanding, beliefs, experiences, 
and lifeworld—from the process of selecting the research topic to the interpretation 
and analysis of the empirical findings. However, this condition should not to be 
seen as a disadvantage or obstacle, on the contrary. The phenomenological ideal of 
researching social phenomena from the inside (Månson 1996) in order to obtain a 
current understanding (aktuel forståelse) and an explanatory understanding 
(forklarende forståelse) is in this study for example pursued through the embedded 
researcher position and as such the interaction between the researcher (me) and the 
research field during the fieldwork (the world of policing). As an embedded 
researcher, I therefore become a co-creator of the knowledge I generate.  
When searching for understanding and meaning of e.g. police practices, the 
hermeneutic approach moreover prescribes that different parts of a field can only 
be understood if they are seen in connection with their unity whole while the unity 
can only be understood through the different parts which create the unity 
(Gadamer 1998). According to Gadamer (ibid.), in order to obtain this 
understanding, the subject and object are not parted. In fact, the researcher 
becomes a part of the hermeneutic circle (instead of standing outside of it) in 
interpreting as preunderstanding and understanding are mutual dependent. This is 
similarly the central scientific theoretical stance of the embedded methodology and 
it means e.g. that I actively use my preunderstanding and prejudices in order to get 
insight into the field of proactive investigation practices. In the following section, I 
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account for the concept of embedded police research by exemplifying the 
methodological choices in this particular study.  
Unfolding the Embedded Stance 
The embedded approach draws upon different traditions from philosophy, 
sociology, and anthropology. It is not merely characterised by using qualitative or 
ethnographic methods to investigate the field of policing or by taking on an insider 
position in order to get better access to information. It encompasses a distinct and 
comprehensive methodology and its different elements cannot be parted. There are 
some apparent similarities to ethnographic research, but there are also some 
differences which I explain in the following.  
The typical approach in police sociology has been the ethnographic approach and 
the use of fieldwork in police settings (Manning 2014b; Fassin 2017; Karpiak & 
Garriott 2018; Bacon et al. 2020). An ethnographic research design has the purpose 
of providing descriptions and interpretations of the culture and social structure of a 
social group (Spradley 1979). Ethnography is traditionally rooted in anthropological 
science and adapted by sociologists from amongst other the Chicago School in 
their study of social deviance in urban settings in the 1940s and 1950s (see e.g. 
Becker 1963; Whyte 1943). The purpose is to produce ‘thick descriptions’, which 
allow others to understand the culture from the inside (Geertz 1973). As Hartmann 
(2014) argues in her study of police innovation in the Danish police: the purpose is 
to provide dense descriptions of some of the contextual meanings and cultural 
fragments within the police as these do not lend themselves easily to be interpreted 
by a researcher. An ethnographic approach is additionally considered useful when 
wanting to gain insight into an undiscovered area or field, and where depth rather 
than breath is the norm (Robson 2002).  
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The classic anthropological tradition of ethnography and the method of fieldwork is 
to some degree skeptical of theorising and is more concerned with being 
explorative, open, and guided by the research field over a very long time (Robson 
2002; Kristiansen & Krogstrup 1999). This is very much in line with the 
phenomenological research position as it is occupied with understanding human 
actions and behaviour in the subjective perspective of the agents and, by Weber’s 
statement (1982), to avoid any normative or value-based conclusions. A number of 
police researchers (see e.g. Gundhus 2006; Loftus 2010; Holmberg 2014) agree to the 
notion formulated by Norwegian police researcher Liv Finstad (2000: 342) that 
fieldwork is the “…obvious method for doing police research.” Similarly, British police 
researcher Bethan Loftus (2009) argues that an ethnographic approach is 
undoubtedly the most appropriate available to access the inner world of policing 
and goes on quoting Van Maanen (1973) to say (2009: 201):  
Ethnographic approaches are particularly appropriate for studying the deeper level 
assumptions of police officers because such assumptions invariably operate beneath 
the presentational canopy of police organizations (…) By immersing themselves in 
their host society, the job of the police researcher is to pierce this structure and 
capture the informal face of the organization.     
British police scholars Reiner & Newburn (2008) suggest that much policing is 
dangerous ‘dirty work’ which proposes that police research might uncover 
information which the agents of the research field wish to keep secret (backstage 
activities). Police work has historically had low visibility and in order to gain insight 
into the world of policing (culture, working practices, daily routines) it is imperative 
to observe it up close and over time. Ethnographic police research, however, has 
mainly focused on front-line police work and as such patrol officers doing everyday 
tasks in the public sphere (Reiner 2010), but to a more modest extent explored the 
area of covert policing and detective work such as this study (although see e.g. 
Ericson 1981; Marx 1988; Hobbs 1988; Innes 2003; Manning 2004; Hobbs 2013; 
Loftus et al. 2015; Bacon 2016).
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 Another reason for the value of doing fieldwork over a longer period of time 
compared to other research methods is that the police organisation by many 
managers and police officers is viewed as ‘a bureaucratic Kafkaesque 
nightmare’ (Moskos 2008), or ‘a Monty Python nut case factory’ as Hartmann (2014) 
refers to. Hartmann was continuously made aware that “nothing is what it seems to be” 
concluding that a lot goes on in large police bureaucracies that lie beyond the 
perspective capacity of any individual. These logics of the police organisation refer 
to both the implications and unpredictable political/bureaucratic concerns and the 
condition that decisions and processes are not transparent.  
The Importance of Backstage Knowledge 
As the section above has pointed to, the researcher’s ethnographic approach is 
indeed essential when wanting to explore police practices and underlying and 
informal structures of policing (Fasson 2017; Bacon et al. 2020). Specific backstage 
knowledge important as it serves as a way to access other or additional information. 
Backstage knowledge is, however, difficult to get access to if you are merely a visitor 
within police—even as a long-term ethnographer. Below, I provide a couple of 
examples of the informal world of policing: 
The term that I have heard the most over the years is the description of the police 
as being ‘a sheltered workshop’ (beskyttet værksted)—implying that it is not an 
ordinary workplace. Police officers will often use the phrase “policing is just for 
fun” (vi er her kun for sjov) in frustration referring to the notion that one should not 
take one’s work too seriously (as no one else does); it will only give you grievance. 
Another example addresses the issue that many police officers in fact have a second 
job (for example farmer, photographer, gym trainer, plumber, carpenter etc.) and 
some of the most dedicated and committed police officers will at times be 
encouraged to “carry out police work in their leisure time”. This implies that they 
involve themselves too much in the job and care too much about the outcome of it 
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rather than just coming into work and serving no more than the obligatory eight 
hours. Getting to know police officers have made me realise that many joined the 
police with an idealistic purpose of ‘making a difference in other people’s lives’, 
‘securing law and order for Mr. and Mrs. Smith (hr. og fru Jensen)’ and so on. 
However, over time many police officers become disillusioned in the sense that they 
loose faith in the organisation, management, and the value of their own job.  
As I accounted for in Chapter 3, a host of examples support the notion that a fair 
amount of policing on the front stage is symbolic (Goffman 1959) and has to look 
good rather than be good (Holmberg 2003). This has become an organisational 
embedded line of action and as such an established inherent logic that this 
performance is unavoidable, but also a natural part of modern policing (Manning 
2013). Examples of decisions, initiatives, and measures without any (rational) 
meaning such as the purchase of things without any application, the lack of 
cooperation between two units due to personal matters between managers, the 
instigation of various processes or projects when already launched in other 
departments etc. is additionally a part of this performance. This underlines the 
notion of roleplaying as expressed in the organisational saying “we’re only 
playing” (det er bare noget vi leger); the staging of an act on the front stage (police 
business in public) while the backstage is used for putting on costumes and props 
(uniforms and equipment) and where the true self is shown. A former co-worker at 
the Police Academy told me: “We spend time on digging holes with the purpose of filling 
them with dirt again” (vi graver huller for at fylde dem op igen) implying that the 
work we did was performative and just for show. Metaphors such as ‘circus’ and 
‘freakshow’ are often used to describe organisational life within the police, which 
points to the presumption that decisions and actions to a large extent lack 
rationality and sometimes even sanity. “Why do it the smart way, when you can do it the 
police-way?” as a Superintendent with 30 years of service once remarked and 
explained: “You can rely on one thing; if there is a smart, flexible, and inexpensive way of 
doing things, the Danish police will always choose the opposite solution.”   
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I mentioned earlier that it is an unobtainable ideal to produce high quality 
qualitative research if one upholds a distant researcher position to prevent 
impacting the field of study. As an inside researcher, I had backstage knowledge of 
the field and had been taking part in backstage activities (Manning 2009; Chan 2013) 
in the organisation through several years. Such backstage activities, hidden 
conditions, implicit understandings, and collectively shared logics of policing and 
organisational life would be impossible to capture or to at least capture the 
significance of at a distance. This study relies on the assumption that police work in 
general and proactive investigation specifically to a large extent is context 
dependent and sensitive to situational factors. To explore the meaning of context 
and situational factors it is important to understand the lifeworld, informal norms, 
and values of policing as these conditions have vital implications for e.g. 
investigation practices. Gaining insight into these requires a close participation in 
everyday activities both front stage and backstage. Consequently, I will argue that 
this calls for an explorative qualitative research design taking on an ethnographic 
and even embedded approach.  
Diverse Methods to Capture Impression Management 
The embedded methodology promotes the use of varying methods such as 
including participant observation, field interviews, qualitative research interviews, 
and document research, which produce different kinds of empirical material such 
as field notes, transcriptions of conversations, case notes, policy papers etc. This is 
partly connected to the condition that a substantial amount of impression 
management (Goffman 1959; Manning 1977; Manning 2014a; Van Maanen 1978a) 
takes place within the police. Police work requires daily interaction with many 
different members of the public—often illustrated with stereotypical examples of 
the homeless alcoholic or the wealthy CEO as representatives for different social 
arenas. Sometimes these individuals are encountered by police officers in everyday 
situations, sometimes in extreme circumstances stretching from ordinary traffic 
130
violations to violent deaths. A police officer needs to perform the role of being a 
police officer rather well and needs to find an appropriate front suitable for all 
these different situations and people, and impression management therefore 
becomes a vital skill (see Chapter 3 for an elaboration). For researchers, this 
impression management can turn into a serious problem in the sense that one will 
rarely be told the whole story or even occasionally be told untruthful stories with 
the purpose of presenting a specific impression or front of a certain person or 
group (Goffman 1959; Jacobsen & Kristiansen 2001). In this case, the police 
community can be seen as a separate performing team managing a specific 
impression of the police organisation, or police officers as a professional group.  
As I will account for in Part Three, an organisation which is preoccupied with 
impression management and presenting a polished front does not wash its ‘dirty 
laundry’ in public. Like in many organisations, there is within the police a great 
difference between what is presented in the official statements, strategies, and 
operational plans, and how police in reality prioritise and allocate resources. This 
discrepancy, which is presented in detail in Chapter 6, is uncovered by combining 
document research with participant observation. There are additionally variations 
between what police officers say (expressed in interviews) and what they do (how 
they act observed through participant observation). I examine the connection 
between the strategy for organised crime and proactive investigation practice by 
comparing strategic policy documents (document research), accounts from 
management and detectives (interviews) with everyday performances both front 
stage and backstage such as daily activities, meetings, and informal conversation etc. 
(participant observation and field interviews).  
The Current Embedded Study 
In this embedded study, I have followed several lines of inquiries and visited 
different social arenas in order to gather empirical material from different sources 
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and places including national, regional, and local level. I have moreover looked at 
both the strategic, operational, and tactical level in relation to the police’s response 
to organised crime and I have done so over a number of years (2013-2018). 
Altogether, this study’s empirical material derives from many parts within the 
police, which I have examined through a combination of different perspectives and 
methods. This study is therefore not—to use Van Maanen’s (2011) term—a ‘full-
blown’ traditional ethnographic or phenomenological study. Instead it combines the 
anthropological occupation with looking at phenomenon through the members of a 
social group or culture with the sociological focus on the structural mechanisms 
and the interplay between organisation and its agents. The ethnographic approach 
and fieldwork in this connection is therefore used as an instrument to obtain 
detailed knowledge of the phenomenon proactive investigation. This stands in 
contrast to a more conventional ethnographic study where the purpose is to let 
oneself be driven by the field and experience new cultures and unpredictable 
events (Kristiansen & Kroghstrup 1999). The study also differs from typical 
ethnographies, which etymologically refers to “writing about culture” (Van Maanen 
2011; Manning 2014b; Bacon et al. 2020), in the way that the empirical material is 
presented. This study is not reduced to looking at cultures or social groups (Walters 
2007; Cunliffe 2010) and it is not particularly concerned with ascribing a voice to 
those who are researched (Bacon et al. 2020) by presenting a holistic portrait of the 
social group of organised crime detectives through multiple stories and voices in 
the text and tales from the field (Cunliffe 2010; Walters 2010; Van Maanen 2011). 
This embedded study is occupied with investigating, understanding, and 
demonstrating the complex world of proactive policing and how it is performed and 
why in the dynamic interplay between external and internal structures and cultures 
and the shaping forces (Manning 2010).   
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Generating Empirical Material: Research Arena and 
Embedded Research Methods 
The Danish Police 
Before presenting an overview of the study’s empirical material, I will briefly 
introduce some central aspects of the Danish police and the organisation of its 
response towards organised crime. The Danish police are a unity police service with 
a police force consisting of around 11,000 police officers (Politiforbundet 2019).1 
The entire police organisation has around 15,000 employees, including 
administrative personnel, prosecutors, criminal forensic technicians, IT-consultants, 
analysts, psychologists, teachers etc. The police’s and the prosecution service’s 
budget is around 10 billion Danish kroner per year (Justitsministeriet 2019), and the 
Minister of Justice (Justitsministeren) is overall responsible for the police and the 
prosecution service. The Danish National Police (Rigspolitiet) is the highest 
authority within Danish police, and The National Police Commissioner 
(Rigspolitichefen) is overall responsible for operational and administrative 
management. The Danish Police have 14 police districts including Faroese Police 
and Greenlandic police (Politi.dk 2020). Every year app. 330,000 criminal offences 
are reported to the police, and additionally app. 600,000 are charged with traffic 
offences (Politiet og Anklagemyndigheden 2018). 
The Organisation of Organised Crime Policing 
The Danish police’s organisation of its response towards organised crime has varied 
over the years, but since around 2009 it has primarily consisted of a national, 
regional, and local organisation. In Figure G, I have primarily illustrated tasks and 
responsibilities in relation to proactive investigations (I will elaborate further on 
this in Chapter 5, 6, and 7). 
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Figure G. Organisation of Response to Organised Crime. 
 
As illustrated in Figure G, the national unit is responsible for having a national 
overview of organised crime groups and gangs and violent conflicts between them. 
They assist regional and local level with e.g. coordination and information. The two 
regional units are operational and carry out proactive investigations at a regional 
level, whereas the police districts handle both reactive and proactive investigations 
towards organised crime offenders who operate on a local level. To explore as many 
of these processes and practices as possible, I circulated between the national, the 
regional, and to some extent the local level in different phases of the study. An 
overview of the empirical material and the unit of analysis is presented next.  
Empirical Material 
The time period for collection of empirical material in this study ranges from 
Spring 2013 to Summer 2018. Still, in my document research I include material 
going back to 2008 and onwards until 2019. I also refer to a few situations, which 
took place before Spring 2013. The reason is that some documents and situations 
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are significant to describe in order to understand the backdrop and implications of 
the development of e.g. performance measures, which I analyse in Chapter 6. The 
study’s empirical material consists of the following:   
• I have carried out extensive participant observation with an overall duration of 
approximately 900 hours at a regional investigation unit (AIU) over a period of eight 
months consisting of field visits lasting from three days to three months.  
• I have used participant observation (around 50 hours) in coordination meetings 
(koordinationsmøder) and target selection meetings (måludpegningsmøder) which 
took place at both national and regional level.  
• I have used participant observation in three international meetings outside 
Denmark with police agencies from two other countries concerning collaboration in 
a specific investigation operation.  
• I have carried out 29 semi-structured qualitative interviews with managers, 
detectives, analysts, police officers, prosecutors from both national and regional 
units, and the police districts.  
• Document research includes case files from primarily one specific investigation 
(Operation Goldilocks) composed of all official documents (included in the official 
investigation’s report material) and unofficial documents (excepted from the official 
investigation’s report material), which are produced during a criminal investigation.  
• All policy documents, strategies, and operational action plans for the police’s 
response to organised crime and in regards to proactive policing are included along 
with meeting minutes from all meetings I have attended, as well as intelligence 
products such as investigation proposals (efterforskningsoplæg) and target profiles 
(måludpegningsoplæg), which were presented at these meetings.  
Participant Observation and Ethnographic Interviewing 
As one of the main objectives of this research is to provide a contextual framework 
for how proactive investigation is carried out, participant observation is particular 
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useful as this research method has enabled me as a researcher to look at processes 
where people act routinely and with certainty (Finstad 2000: 342). As Hald (2015) 
argues, and as the analysis will explore further in Chapter 8, there is a 
methodological gap between the legal framework, procedures, and techniques 
within the field of criminal investigation. This makes (proactive) investigation a 
‘silent’ practice building on tacit knowledge and silent work experience which 
presents the researcher with a challenge trying to describe, analyse, and interpret 
what detectives actually do in their everyday practice. Participant observation in this 
study is therefore as a research method not only a way to look at informal aspects of 
policing, such as police officers’ values, norms, beliefs and as such ‘uncover hidden 
truths about police assumptions’ (Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Manning 2010). It is 
also used as an almost mandatory procedure in documenting, describing, and 
explaining concrete working practices and hence uncovering the ‘black box’ of 
proactive investigation, which is in accordance with the knowledge ambition 
presented in Chapter 1. 
Figure H. Overview of Research Methods and Empirical Material. 
The characterisation of proactive investigation as a tacit practice implies that it is 
similarly a rather unpredictable practice to study scientifically—and the type of 
participant observation which I have applied can be labelled as unstructured 
observation in natural surroundings (Kristiansen & Kroghstrup 1999: 48). Clearly, I 
used my backstage knowledge to prepare and plan the fieldwork, however, an 
RESEARCH METHODS EMPIRICAL MATERIAL
Participant observation Field notes of app. 950 hours
Qualitative interviewing Audio recordings and transcriptions of 29 
semi-structured interviews (36 hours)
Document research App. 3,000 pages of policy documents, 
strategies, operational plans, reports (case 
files), meeting minutes, investigation 
proposals, target profiles.
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important part was to go along with the field of study and try to be open to where it 
might lead me. This approach is in line with the phenomenological approach, which 
suggests that human action should be viewed from the agents’ subjective 
perspectives and the researcher needs to participate in the lifeworld of the agents in 
order to investigate the socially constructed common sense-thinking of it (Burgess 
1984) (see Chapter 8). To put it another way: I had prior knowledge and thereby a 
general impression of how proactive investigations are carried out, but my 
observations gave me the possibility to explore in more detail what the different 
phases in the investigation process consisted of, and what techniques detectives 
used. In this sense, I was constantly reevaluating my preconception and developing 
my understanding of the field in accordance with hermeneutic interpretation (the 
hermeneutic circle) (Gadamer 1998).  
Participant observation includes in this study interviews in the field or ethnographic 
interviews (Spradley 1979) understood as the countless conversations with 
detectives, analysts, and managers I had during field visits and daily work activities. 
These conversations sometimes resembled a ‘structured questioning’ where I 
inquired about many of the same topics and asked some of the same questions as I 
did during the formal interviews (merely in an informal setting). I never took notes 
when observing and participating in the daily activities in AIU, which was a 
deliberate decision. The processes surrounding Operation Goldilocks were very 
informal besides the afternoon briefing which was held every day at 2 PM. During 
this meeting, and in meetings with the prosecutor or management, detectives 
seldom took notes or even brought a notebook. It would therefore be noticed if I 
were to take notes (this issue seems to be a general condition within policing and is 
similarly discussed by several police researchers see e.g. Finstad 2000; Hartmann 
2014; Valland 2014). Instead, I spent a couple of hours every day after office hours 
writing up field notes and trying to reproduce the events of the day—and my 
understanding of what I have experienced. This is a very demanding task as it is 
quite difficult to recall details in conversations, meetings, interactions etc. 
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Sometimes I had to wait until a couple of days after the actual events and 
conversations, as my working schedule was very tight and this of course influenced 
which events I remembered and how I experienced them. In contrast to the 
informal investigation meetings at tactical level, the meetings at management level 
(target selection meetings and coordination meetings) had a more formal setup and 
a clerk was there to take minutes. In these meetings, I could easily bring a notebook 
or even my computer and I always sat around the meeting table together with the 
other meeting participants. Sometimes I was even invited to participate in the 
conversation if I could contribute with knowledge about the international or 
national context. In the investigation meetings at AIU I had a more neutral role as I 
always sat in the periphery of the meeting table and never participated in the 
conversation.   
  
Qualitative Interviews 
I carried out a total of 29 qualitative interviews using a semi-structured interview 
guide (see Appendix X). The main topics and what they were supposed to uncover 
are depicted in Figure I. My aim for the qualitative interviews was to get insights 
into how detectives, managers, and analysts viewed their work, the police’s response 
to organised crime, and the circumstances in which they operated. The choice of 
themes for the interviews was guided by the research question and sub questions, 
but also influenced by my backstage knowledge and preunderstanding of the field 
as described primarily in Chapter 2. 
All interviews were audio recorded and I presented an informed consent form and 
confidentiality agreement (Appendix Z) which all interviewees signed. Additionally, 
I had interviewees to fill out a small questionnaire—primarily about their formal 
function, years on the job, and educational background (Appendix Y). The shortest 
interview lasted 21 minutes and the longest lasted almost three hours—in total 36 
hours of audio recordings. Interviewees were chosen differently, and the interviews 
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were carried out under different conditions. Some interviewees were chosen as I 
knew these people possessed specific knowledge (for example a specialist), and 
some were chosen due to their function (for example a detective in a specific unit). 
Interviews were sometimes planned beforehand (I usually travelled through the 
country to meet the interviewee), sometimes I spontaneously asked a person after a 
meeting if he or she had the time and wanted to give an interview. 
Figure I. Overview of Interview Topics and Content. 
The interview situation was almost always informal and relaxed. Sometimes it 
resembled a typical conversation as I most often spoke ‘the police lingo’ (for 
example understood abbreviations) and had backstage knowledge of people from 
the criminal environment or within the police or specific (criminal) events or cases 
they referred to. I consider this to have been a great advantage as the process of 
building rapport did not require much effort and did not take very long even with 
those interviewees I had just met for the first time (Moesgaard 2013 underlines a 
TOPIC CONTENT
Career in policing Warm-up, opener, the interviewees’ 
individual background and experience.
Organised crime and the 
organised crime environment
Views and assumptions regarding the 
phenomenon the work is directed at, views 
on (organised crime) offenders and their 
associates
The police organisation The organisational frames and structures 
as enablers/preventers of carrying out 
investigation practice
Proactive vs. reactive investigation Differences in mindset, approaches, 
methods
Target selection Processes and methods before and after 
the new organisational set-up
Investigation management Management of investigations—differences 
from management and detectives p.o.v.
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similar experience in her research on private and state intelligence actors). The 
embedded researcher position was in this connection a great advantage and I 
experienced much less resistance or skepticism towards me or the research project 
during interviews, than what I expected. As I interviewed different professional 
groups (detectives, managers, police officers, analysts, informant handlers, 
prosecutors) this also enabled me to get different perspectives on the police and 
police work. In Figure J, I present an overview of interviewees. 
Figure J. Overview of Interviewees. 
I realised early on that ethnographic interviews in the field were to some extent 
more valuable in terms of getting elaborate information about investigation 
practices. The informal setting of everyday life within the investigation unit seemed 
more comfortable (at least for some detectives) than the formalised situation of 
giving an interview in a closed office with an audio recorder. For that reason, I 
changed the research design and downgraded the number of interviews that I had 
initially planned (approximately 50). Although I made this decision, the use of 
qualitative interviews as a research method still serves the methodological purpose 
of gaining knowledge of the social world of policing through interpretations of 
narratives of police managers, detectives, analysts, informant handlers etc. These 
individuals possess key knowledge and insights about a range of topics e.g. 
investigation, crime analysis, intelligence work, and the police organisation. One of 
the strengths of this method is that it can capture the variety of people’s 






furthermore difficult to obtain through ethnographic interviews in the field were 
other people for example might be present and can influence the interviewee in 
different ways. The two types of research methods therefore provide different types 
of narratives which can shed light on the issues from different perspectives and as 
such in this study they came to complement each other rather well.  
Document Research 
As part of my daily function as senior advisor within the police, I had access to all 
official documents such as strategies, operational plans, analyses, intelligence 
reports, legal briefs etc. connected to the area of organised crime. Additionally, I had 
access to the police’s internal databases containing intelligence information and 
case files on criminal investigations and I used this access to search relevant 
information connected to the operations in AIU or the work with investigation 
targets at NCI (see Chapter 7). The purpose of investigating such documents 
analytically has been to explore the police’s framework for proactive policing and 
examine the use and operationalisation of various concepts and to look at the 
police’s self-representation; idealisation and impression management (Goffman 
1959). These documents can all be characterised as documents in use (Duedahl & 
Jacobsen 2010) and they are therefore not solely to be regarded as historical 
documents. Many of them are still active in the sense that they are continuously 
being reviewed. Due to sensitivity and confidentiality issues, I only refer to 
documents which are public, and many documents are used indirectly and serve as 
a backdrop for my preunderstanding and overall analysis.  
The Centrality of Operation Goldilocks 
The above overview of empirical material and research methods suggests that there 
are many different sources and types of information stemming from different 
organisational levels and agents within the police collected in an extensive time 
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period which are included in and provide the basis for this study. Such a diversity 
of empirical material and research methods is crucial in embedded research as it 
allows one to analyse both formal and informal parts of police practice in this case 
proactive investigation. The intensive and coherent fieldwork carried out at AIU has 
supplied me with deep insight into the proactive investigation Operation Goldilocks 
which therefore serves as an illustrative case example throughout the thesis. One 
reason for the dominant focus on this case in the thesis is that I had the 
opportunity to observe the investigation first-hand from start to finish, which has 
made me familiar with all its operational content details and the investigation 
process as well as the detectives who worked the case. This does not mean that this 
study falls into the category of case studies (Walters 2010; Yin 2014). On the 
contrary, I am not interested in this particular case or its specific details. The case 
was randomly chosen for me to follow by police management since it was a new 
start-up and since they had high hopes for the success of the case. I have no 
indications that this operation is unique in any way in comparison to other 
investigations in specialised organised crime units or other cases in AIU. The case 
was launched with great optimism and large-scale resources and ambitions, but to 
my knowledge this is typically the case in connection with high-value priority 
offenders. The case of Operation Goldilocks as a phenomenon is not the unit of 
analysis in this study; instead it is the approaches, practices, priorities, decisions, 
assumptions etc. that police management and detectives display which are of 
relevance as it tells us a story of how police investigate organised crime and why 
they do so in that particular manner. In connection with my participation in 
strategic police forums, my work in relation to target selection, and during my 
fieldwork in AIU, I acquired additional knowledge about a number of other 
investigation operations, but I have decided primarily to use examples from 
Operation Goldilocks.This decision is primarily due to concerns regarding sensitivity, 
confidential information, and informed consent. However, by unfolding a single 
case I get to present the different and significant layers of complex meaning which 
it encompass and I can hereby build a comprehensive argument. The devotion to a 
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single case give me both pragmatic, contextual, and situational insight and provide 
me with a condensed, embedded understanding of its content and circumstances. 
which I have used to present a complex and layered analysis. 
Consequently, I assess that Operation Goldilocks is quite the illustrative case example 
of proactive investigations in the empirical setting of the Danish police. This 
assessment is founded on the basis of the assessment of the case itself, but also 
since it was prioritised, launched, and investigated by quite specialised and 
experienced police managers and detectives who were carrying out ‘business as 
usual’ as they transferred and repeated their extensive experience and modes of 
action into this case.    
1 The total population of Denmark is 5.8 million citizens per January 2020 (Danmarks Statistik 2020). 
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Studying Proactive Police Practices: Embedded 
Positions and Role Engagements 
Some of the most central elements when carrying out embedded (police) research 
are researcher positions and researcher roles. In this study, they have impacted how 
I was able to explore and understand as many aspects of proactive investigation as 
possible—and how I was received in the world of policing. In accordance with the 
phenomenological-hermeneutic stance, it is necessary to present both 
methodological and ethical conditions and dilemmas in detail. The hermeneutic 
tradition prescribes an interpreting method (Dahlager & Fredslund 2008), which 
suggests that the interpretation always depends on the social context and the social 
agents in them and build on the researcher’s preunderstanding, expectations, and 
backstage knowledge. Consequently, the researcher becomes an active rather than 
passive or neutral agent in the social research arena. The accounts of my meeting 
with the research field in this embedded study are therefore not objective 
presentations or ’truths’—they are interpretations anchored in my biographical 
situation (Schutz 1975).    
I differentiate between researcher positions and researcher roles. Positions are 
characterised by the researcher’s scientific anchoring and fundamental world view 
in combination with the choice of research methods. It is moreover conditioned by 
the researcher’s perspective—an inside or outside perspective for example. Roles 
can and will, on the contrary, vary during the research process and can be used 
actively to promote certain agendas and purposes. Roles can be taken on and off 
and can either be given by the research field or taken by the researcher (I will 
return to these matters later in this chapter).  
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Researcher Positions 
A common debate amongst both international and Scandinavian police researchers 
evolves around the ideal researcher position in order to take an objective/neutral 
stance. This discussion exists primarily on a macro-level discussing outside-inside 
perspectives and government research versus independent research etc. (Reiner & 
Newburn 2008; Høigård 2011; Holgersson & Knutsson 2012; Holmberg 2014; Davies, 
2016; Hartmann et al. 2018). A popular reference in this connection is British police 
scholar Brown (1996) who places police researchers in four categories:  
1) inside insiders: police officers conducting police research (can be referred to as 
‘cross- overs’) 
2) outside insiders: police officers conducting research after having left the police 
service in the pursuit of an academic career (can be referred to as ‘cross- overs’),  
3) inside outsiders: civilians employed by the police or in official roles within the police, 
carrying out research for government departments etc. (can be referred to as 
‘pracademics’) 
4) outside outsiders: independent academics not employed or commissioned by the 
police or other governmental bodies.  
As American sociologist Joseph Styles (1979) points out, practical problems can 
turn into professional problems and vice versa during the research process. There 
are furthermore no privileged researcher positions, no positions stripped from 
biases and preunderstanding about the social group one is studying. It is therefore 
difficult to claim an ideal researcher position as they all come with pros and cons. 
The embedded position, which is primarily situated within the first and third 
category as inside insiders or inside outsiders, however, is privileged in the way that it 
makes access to information easier than for outsiders. Even so, being a ‘researcher 
in one’s own organisation’ (Wadel 1991) and indeed an embedded researcher is 
connected to a variety of specific methodical conditions and ethical dilemmas 
which I will account for in the following sections.  
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The Professional Stranger and the Embedded Friend 
The dichotomy of stranger and friend (Powdermaker 1966) in qualitative research is a 
typical reference and it can be said to concern both researcher positions and 
researcher roles. One of the most common police researcher positions is thus 
described by Finstad (2000: 344, my translation) as she labels researchers as 
‘professional strangers’ and says:  
A professional stranger can be regarded very differently depending on where one is 
placed on a scale from being seen as a spy and to be an adopted mascot. The ideal, as 
I see it, is to get a position in the environment to such a degree that they do not think 
too much (about the fact, my addition) that the researcher is there (meaning a 
person one should be tactical aware of) while the researcher feels so much at home 
that it does not become too personally tiresome (meaning being rejected and 
neglected).   
Furthermore, she argues (ibid.), that the biggest challenge of fieldwork is how the 
researcher can avoid influencing the interaction which plays out. This so-called 
ideal researcher position is in the embedded methodology not viewed as possible or 
even desirable to obtain for a number of reasons. Taking on different researcher 
roles and the ability to carry out fieldwork very much depends on the professional 
and personal characteristics of the researcher and the researcher’s biographical 
situation (Schutz 1975). Finstad (2000) describes how having a ‘local history’ as a 
researcher is significant for the entire fieldwork. In her case, her activist 
background and profile as a ‘critical criminologist’ which was publicly known at the 
time of her research, turned out to be both an advantage and a disadvantage. My 
situation was a little different as my ‘local history’ was that I was in fact employed 
within the organisation and knew or knew off many of the police officers and 
detectives in the field from my daily job—or they knew me by name. In that sense, I 
could definitely not be characterised as a ‘stranger’ in the organisation. I was, 
however, still not considered a colleague along the lines of other police officers. Due 
to my employment in The National Police and my academic background I was 
viewed as a kind of stranger in some settings and with regards to professional 
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differences. There are many different cultures and sub-cultures within most 
organisations and the social dynamic can vary even in two different investigation 
teams working door to door. As such, on a micro-level the insider-outsider roles 
change dynamically depending on the organisational setting and the people who 
are present. In Goffman’s (1959) terms this can be labelled as having a discrepant 
role. 
Still, the inside-embedded researcher position makes it difficult to fully impose 
typical researcher roles such as ‘the interested apprentice’ (Wadel 1991), ‘the naïve 
outsider with a numerous of explorative questions’ (Hartmann 2014; Valland 2014), 
or ‘the neutral observer who tries to tag along’ (Finstad 2000). Many researchers take 
on these roles in order to get the agents to act as they usually would in their social 
arena and gradually talk about their work and thereby articulate e.g. a tacit practice. 
The ideal of trying to be neutral or invisible in the classical sense of ‘being a fly on 
the wall not attracting too much attention’, as Finstad (2000) describes it, was not a 
possibility during my fieldwork. Access to the field of covert police work (and what 
that the possibility of generating information) is in general difficult to obtain for any 
researcher. My assessment is that the access I was granted was to a high degree 
depending on my local history and experience and position within the police. As 
such, access was connected to my biographical situation; personal characteristics 
and the fact that I was known by the agents in the field rather than for example the 
police organisation’s assessment of my professional capacity or interest in the 
research topic. Participating and joining in the proactive investigation community 
was therefore required in a number of ways. This condition can be regarded as the 
anthropological condition of going native (Powdermaker 1966) although in this 
context it becomes a little more complex as the inside position as employed within 
the organisation results in the researcher position as being native at least in a formal 
manner (Kanua 2000).   
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Wadel (1991) argues that doing fieldwork in one’s own culture requires one to study 
a part of one’s own social life. This can have some (practical) advantages as it gives 
the researcher easier access to e.g. study sites, information, and informants. 
However, it also has some (professional) disadvantages as it becomes more 
demanding for the researcher to notice the content of mutual knowledge (Giddens 
1976) and as such discover the obvious (Wadel 1991). For an insider, it is per default 
impossible to take on Simmel’s (1972) archetypical role of the stranger which 
purpose is to strengthen the researcher’s objective stance via the outside-
perspective, and gradually become familiar with the social world of a specific society 
or group in order to describe and analyse their behaviour and cultural patterns. 
Thus, for me as a researcher it was an ongoing reflection how to remain critical 
towards a known culture which I myself was a part of. I will elaborate on this 
reflection in the following section.  
Closeness and Distance 
In accordance with many qualitative researchers, a neutral or objective position in 
an embedded study would be impossible in the classic meaning of the concept. 
However, both Schutz (1975) and Weber (1982) are critical towards such a 
rationalisation of reality and underline that social phenomena are not solely 
analysed by objective technical methods, but are influenced by values and norms, 
and the researchers themselves. The notion of being ‘objective’ is, in the context of 
this study, therefore not considered particularly important, whereas, the ability to 
create methodological transparency is. This transparency can for example shed light 
on the active use of different researcher roles with the intention of getting 
embedded into the field and thereby achieve a greater insight and understanding 
(see also the discussion of accessing the quality of this study later in the chapter). 
Another important issue has been the creation of analytical distance to the 
empirical material especially in the process of formulating the analytical findings 
and writing up the thesis. I had long breaks (months and even years) from my 
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fieldwork (while still being embedded) and this helped me to revisit and view the 
empirical material with ‘new’ eyes challenging the views of my initial assumptions 
and understandings. This revisitation and reinterpretation of my preunderstanding 
lasted throughout the analytical process including during the completion of the 
thesis. The distance to the field has thereby not only been a physical and temporal 
one—it has indeed been an analytical one. As a result, the theoretical perspectives 
and concepts which are activated during the analytical phase have for me become 
essential instruments to uphold an analytical outlook towards the phenomenon of 
proactive investigation. Continuous feedback from and discussions with my 
supervisors, research groups, and co-readers have been an additional way to ensure 
analytical distance and a constant assessment of my preunderstanding and 
interpretations.     
My argument in this regard is twofold: the embeddedness in the field has given me 
a fuller and more comprehensive picture of things at stake within the world of 
proactive investigation than a more detached and distant researcher position would 
have done. In fact, it gave me the possibility of being even more critical towards the 
strategies and practices of proactive investigation which I observed in daily 
interactions or found in organisational documents and statements from managers 
and practitioners. The fact that I for a long period of time have been a daily 
observer of and active agent within the world of (proactive) policing has made me 
understand and interpret analytical findings in a contextual frame which I am quite 
familiar with. As such, I would argue that this study provides an example of how 
some part of Academia’s fear of and concern about inside/government research and 
researchers serving as advocates for their own organisation can be diminished. 
Disengagement does not mean disentanglement (Hartmann et al. 2018) and 
backstage knowledge and insights can serve as the researcher’s instruments to get 
close to and to disclose more in-depth aspects of organisational habits, 
assumptions, and established practices.  
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As mentioned before, there are of course several ethical concerns and pitfalls 
related to this type of embedded research both in connection with getting access to 
information, generating information, and analysing findings. More importantly it 
therefore seems to be able to exercise auto-ethnography (Hayano 1979) and become 
what Wadel (1991) labels as “being a sociologist with regard to oneself”. Wadel (1991: 59, 
my translation) puts forward three criteria of this:  
(1) being conscious of one’s own repetoire of researcher roles and which roles one at 
any time takes or is given by one’s informants. This requires moreover that one is 
aware of one’s informants’ roles. 
(2) being able to use yourself as an informant at any time. In any fieldwork the 
researcher will take/be given a number of local roles. These local roles can be used in 
the sense that the researcher becomes one’s own informant. 
(3) being aware of one’s own cultural categories and not one’s informants’ categories 
often dictates what one is observing. This is more the case with the study of own 
societies than strange societies.  
In the methodological analyses of this study, I have used these three criteria actively 
both when I was generating information and when I systematically analysed the 
empirical findings. This process builds on the hermeneutical stance that there is a 
mutual influence between researcher and field (Giddens 1976) and that the 
researcher often shifts between an inductive and explorative approach being 
respectively a total or partial participant (Kristiansen & Kroghstrup 2004). This 
creates an inconsistent and sometimes conflicting feeling as one shifts between 
closeness and distance. In this sense, the researcher is bound to take on several 
researcher roles where the researcher awareness can momentarily be ousted (Steffen 
1995), which I accordingly experienced on/off during my research. Albeit an 
embedded researcher can engage in a process which involves one’s personal 
identity deeply, but without loosing one’s professional identity. The researcher 
awareness will always lie underneath and influence the researcher’s perspective and 
behaviour and can return when needed—for example in writing up the analytical 
findings. As such, the degree of involvement into the field and the degree of 
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nativeness should not be seen as solely a risk or a pitfall. Rather, as in this study, it is 
used as an active instrument to gain closeness or distance towards the field and the 
empirical findings. In the following sections, I will elaborate on some of the various 
researcher roles and how I have navigated in these. I discuss the pros and cons of 
‘being’ one or the other—different types of role engagements and their centrality to 
the embedded methodology.   
Role Engagement 
As mentioned earlier, researcher roles play out on a day-to-day basis. According to 
Wadel (1991), these roles often vary and are developed and transformed over time 
during the fieldwork. A role as an observer of conversations can for example be 
converted to a role as a participant and vice versa. An underlying predicament is 
continuously: how much must, can, and should the researcher involve herself in the 
research field?  
Being an Organisational Member 
Formal Access 
The formal access to information and interviewees in this study was of course made 
easier by the fact that I was employed within the police. Due to my daily function, I 
already had the required security clearance and access to relevant databases, and as 
an employee of NCI, I had access to more databases and information than the 
average detective given the obligations of NCI to have a national overview of the 
development within organised crime, intelligence gathering, and criminal 
investigations. There were as such no formalities which stood in the way of getting 
(formal) access. Another advantage was that I for several years had been a member 
of The National Strategic Staff on Gang Crime. This staff had the task of developing 
strategies, overviewing the police’s response to gang crime nationally, and to serve 
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as an advisory board to the Police Directorate and the Ministry of Justice in the 
process of policy development and decision-making. My function within the staff 
was primarily to provide an overview of academic research and experience-based 
knowledge from other police agencies concerning gang crime and police responses. 
Furthermore, I participated in a number of working groups producing policy paper, 
strategies, operational plans etc., and carried out evaluations of specific operational 
and investigation concepts and initiatives on request of the head of staff 
(formanden). Consequently, this gave me insights into the current status of 
organised crime policing in the Danish police and via the staff I also had access to 
several key decision-makers at national level and in the police districts. The 
fieldwork at AIU came about very informally as I one day after a staff meeting more 
or less just asked the head of the regional investigation unit if I could visit his unit 
and follow an investigation in process, which he willingly agreed to. I had been 
working in the police for six years when I began my fieldwork at AIU and besides 
knowing the Chief Superintendent I had also on several occasions worked together 
with one of AIU’s Superintendents and investigation managers 
(efterforskningsledere) on tasks related to the organised crime field. Moreover, I 
knew some of the detectives, analysts, and managers from other units within the 
police district in which the headquarters of AIU were situated. For a period of 
about five months prior to the fieldwork, I had continuously been participating in 
monthly coordination meetings. 
For those reasons, I was recognised as an organisational member with at least some 
degree of legitimacy. I define an organisational member as a part of the 
organisational context, and as such an observer of and participant in everyday 
activities within the police, but without necessarily being a police officer. It differs 
from an insider in the sense that organisational members count all employees 
whereas the inside/outside categories specifically seek to place researchers by their 
different functions and institutional belonging. Nevertheless, in contrast to 
Hartmann (2014) who was welcomed as a ‘member of the family’ by her manager in 
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the police, I do not view this ‘familiar’ position as a genuine possibility for other 
staff than police officers—let alone academic researchers. Individuals with other 
professional backgrounds than police are tolerated and sometimes even 
appreciated, but not accepted as members of the police family. I therefore regard 
the notion of being an organisational member as a temporary position and to some 
degree characterised by being on a ‘sustained stay’ (på tålt ophold). As an analyst 
expressed it: “It’s like being an artificial organ which is gradually repelled from the body.” 
This fits quite well with my prior definition of the embedded researcher as an 
‘object which is implanted or put firmly and deeply in a surrounding mass’, but 
which is per default an implant and therefore not a natural habitat, but stays 
encapsulated without leaking into its surroundings. 
The membership of the police family is in contrast not defined by an organisational 
employment, but rather by other formal requirements and informal conditions and 
is regarded as a permanent or long-term ‘tribal membership’ which lasts beyond 
organisational retirement. The formal demands are of course first and foremost 
attached to police officers’ terms of employment (tjenestemandsansættelse) and the 
fact that they have completed more or less the same training (the police’s basic 
education). Informal factors include the possession of collective value systems, joint 
beliefs and ways of doing things—in other words: cultural-cognitive guiding 
principles and assumptions about the world of policing which reflects e.g. epistemic 
notions (see also the presentation of Manning’s (2010) shaping forces of the police 
métier in Chapter 3). As Hartmann (2014: 97) argues: “…‘real membership’ of the 
police is something you earn on the street, not something you receive together with your 
police ID plastic card.” However, the fact that civilians lack police authority 
(politimyndighed) means that this particular experience cannot be obtained, and 
real membership is consequently unattainable (for further discussion see also 
Chapter 7).    
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The informal exclusion of other professional groups within the police is expressed 
in many forms and ways. The most dominant exclusion is however through the 
constant articulation and reproduction of a specific police identity. This contains 
amongst other elements the notion of a shared experience-based knowledge of 
‘what it’s like to be a police officer’ and the expression of a shared attitude towards 
‘what capabilities the job/function requires’. Accordingly, within the organisation 
there is a strong collective mindset of being police rather than carrying out police 
work. This is expressed in for example the retelling of tales of the streets; a shared 
police history which consists of anecdotes serving as both concrete and symbolic 
illustrations of the endeavours of policing such as the management of stressful and 
dangerous situations, conflict mediation between citizens, the pursuit of bad guys, 
and heroic actions related to accidents. Individual characteristics are often 
presented as collective traits such as the possession of specific executive functions; 
the ability to make fast decisions and take action when needed, and being a person 
with ‘people skills’ (at have menneskekundskaber) e.g. being able to intuitively 
detect and sense suspicious or illegal behaviour (I elaborate on these issues in 
connection with the analysis of police epistemic culture in Chapter 7, 8, and 9.) 
The construction and reconstruction of police identity is accordingly not defined by 
the nature of the work (carrying out tasks which qualifies as police tasks) or by the 
overall purpose of policing (providing helping and supporting functions to the 
general public and keep law and order), but instead who this work is carried out by. 
The term colleague therefore does not refer to a co-worker, but rather a fellow police 
officer. I experienced an illustrative example of this when I was attending a staff 
seminar a few years ago and the Assistant Police Commissioner of our department 
gave a presentation on the current state of affairs. She spoke of the importance of 
recruiting academic competences and underlined that police officers who were 
present needed to get used to this condition as there were new (political) winds 
blowing within policing. She looked around in the room and made a gesture 
towards me and said: “Well Nadja, you’ve been here for such a long time, you’re almost 
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one of us”. The sentiment was no doubt friendly, perhaps even complimentary. 
However, the condition of being regarded as merely a partial member (of the police 
family) creates a continuous in-group/out-group situation where I—together with 
other professionals within police such as clerks, administrative staff, analysts, 
academics—are constantly reminded of our out-group position despite the fact that 
we might perform actual police functions or operational support which can be 
characterised as police work (I discuss this further in connection with the concept 
of the detective métier in Chapter 9).   
Informal Access 
The position of being an organisational member has clearly given me the advantage 
of getting easier formal access to information about the research field. However, as 
ethnographers agree—formal access is not necessarily the hard part. In order to 
provide thick descriptions (Geertz 1973) of the complexity and common sense actions 
of everyday life (Schutz 1975), the researcher needs to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of it both in regards to asking the right questions about and in the 
field, but also to be able to interpret the answers. The degree of embeddedness and 
thereby the amount of backstage knowledge is for that reason decisive for the 
development of a comprehensive understanding; building rapport and gaining trust 
to get informal access is consequently crucial. Hartmann (2014) remarks that she 
constantly had to negotiate access and legitimise her presence and the potential 
value of her research during her fieldwork. Although I was generously granted full 
access by strategic management, it became likewise clear to me that informal access 
could be revoked on a daily—sometimes hourly basis—depending on various 
external conditions and my own behaviour, as I will explain further in the coming 
sections.  
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Being Part of the Group 
In this study, the position of being an organisational member is not enough for me 
to get close to the field. As an embedded researcher, I still needed to be accepted as 
a member of the specific social groups I frequented within organised crime 
policing, and the terms of acceptance were not necessarily the same in each group. 
Consider the following example:  
On the first day when I began my fieldwork at AIU, one of the detectives repeatedly 
encouraged me to make coffee and thereby ‘make myself useful’. The sentiment was 
friendly and teasing. I made coffee just before a meeting in the afternoon between the 
investigation team and the prosecutor.  
As the meeting started one of the detectives took a sip of coffee, spat it out in a bin and 
cried:  
“Oh my God, who made this coffee? It’s awful!”.  
Overwhelmed with a mixture of surprise and guilt, I quickly responded:  
“I made that coffee!”.  
The entire room laughed—including me.  
Afterwards, they began their meeting.   
The example above is an excellent illustration of how detectives in the early part of 
my stay with AIU tried to test me and explore the limits for their behaviour towards 
me. The purpose with the coffee-framing-event was of course to test my reaction to 
such a stunt; would I be sad, mad, or find it funny? It was a friendly and innocent 
joke and it made me laugh. In fact, it made me feel welcome and included in the 
group. I drew the conclusion that this kind of attention would probably not be 
given to a person who was unwelcome—such people are most often ignored within 
the police. In my field notes that day I wrote: “Thankfully it seems as if I will 
experience a quick acceptance!” Later, I revised this conclusion as the notion of 
acceptance is much more complicated. The less peripheral you become, the more 
you know, and your interpretations of the social interactions patterns change—
sometimes quite dramatically. However, the situations where I felt most welcome 
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and enjoyed most acceptance was at times when I was ‘being useful’ and had an 
actual function to the investigation team. This could include cleaning up the table 
after a meeting, making coffee, or translating an investigation report from Danish 
into English. The ‘being useful’ role was a way to create a natural place for myself as 
a researcher with the purpose of blending in with the investigation environment 
and making detectives and myself feel more relaxed. At one point, I volunteered to 
make travel arrangements for a large group of detectives going on a three-day 
formal visit in a cooperating European country. Such an administrative task was not 
very popular amongst the busy detectives and they were happy for me to take over 
and it fortunately provided me with an invitation to come along—I thereby earned 
inclusion through scout work.    
Testing 
Testing is a typical process when individuals are approaching a new social group 
(Simmel 1972). As a civilian and especially an academic employee in the police, this 
testing is close to being a daily event until the time comes when one’s presence is 
more or less accepted or at least tolerated. I also experienced this intensive testing 
when I was doing fieldwork with an operative gang unit in 2009 in Copenhagen 
Police. At that time, the police officers seemed worried that I was a management spy 
(as Hunt (1984) and Hartmann (2014) similarly explain). Police officers in the gang 
unit would insinuate that I was stationed in their unit by The National Police 
Commissioner to report back to him about problems within the unit: “You can tell 
‘Commissioner Joe’ (‘RigsPeter’—a nickname for every sitting National Police 
Commissioner within the Danish police) that we’re doing our best down here to keep 
the troops (gangs) from killing each other each day”. This was of course said in a joking 
tone of voice, but the sentiment was genuine: they feared their work was under 
scrutiny and that it perhaps would result in a budget cut or reorganisation if some 
elements of their work were (mis)represented in a certain way. Rumours of 
consultants from private firms who enter the police to carry out hit-and-run 
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calculations of so-called efficiency potentials are thriving. Years of reductions in 
budgets and the subsequently odd organisational changes have made staff averse to 
such processes which are regarded as superficial and pseudo and with the purpose 
to undermine “good” police work. Thus, police officers often tested my attitudes 
towards various topics and both directly and indirectly assessed my loyalty: “What 
do you think about what we do here, you’re not one of them defending the assholes 
(røvhullerne) feeling sorry for them are you?” a police officer would ask. Another 
frequent situation was that police officers would speak to each other remarking 
things like: “Guess we have to do it properly now we have such posh company (fint selskab 
fra de bonede gulve), we wouldn’t want our observer to get the wrong impression of police 
work”—but where the statement was obviously directed at me. This could indicate 
that police officers actually have backstage practices they do not wish to reveal, or 
wanted me to think they have, or just wanted to see my reaction. 
Testing has the purpose of finding out if newcomers fit in or, if not, can be 
assimilated to the group taking over the dominant values, beliefs, and behaviour. In 
other words, to be absorbed into the lifeworld of the group. As mentioned before, 
many social groups and also different occupational cultures exist within the police; 
some are defined by the professional field (e.g. patrolling or investigation), some by 
function (e.g. rank and file or manager), some by age, gender and so on. Some 
groups are more cohesive than others. Within AIU, I detected a strong group 
identity derived from a shared organisational community. The unit was first of all a 
high-status unit which received significant attention from both political, national, 
and local level. Moreover, all employee had actively applied for a job in the unit and 
were as such quite dedicated to this work and no one was transferred against their 
wishes which is otherwise quite common within the police. A Detective explained:  
Honestly, we can’t complain, we’re quite spoiled. Look at those poor bastards in 
other divisions who have to go on night shifts and assist patrol units every other day 
while their case files are piling up. Thankfully, we are excused from those kinds of 
tasks and can concentrate fully on our investigations. 
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This statement reflects the fact that the unit was regarded as an independent 
resource detached from the usual obligations within the police districts. The unit 
had its own budget and a clear politically defined scope, but at the same time they 
had a high degree of autonomy. These conditions seemed to strengthen the 
attachment to the group and the sense of belonging amongst detectives. The group 
identity was further underlined by the group as a performing team and their self-
presentation and impression management where collective features rather than 
individual features were highlighted (Goffman 1959). This was for instance 
expressed via the way detectives talked about ‘we’ saying things like: “We are a crazy 
and friendly group of people, but don’t believe a word we’re saying!” implying that they 
shared common characteristics, behaviours, and sense of humour.  
Personal friendships within the group also seemed to enable a strong group identity 
as detectives spent time together both at work and in their sparetime. They would 
help each other out with practical things such as garden work, house maintenance, 
construction work, baby sitting and the like. Socialising with their respective 
families provided insight into each other’s private circumstances and they knew 
each other very well—some of them through decades. As such, there was no clear 
demarcation between front stage and backstage as the professional work 
environment and private zones melted together (Goffman 1959). This condition 
enabled a familiar tone of voice and a relaxed atmosphere. However, as I discuss in 
Chapter 9, it also inhibited professional development within the unit in terms of 
improving investigative practices and create a systematic learning structure 
(Bjørkelo & Gundhus 2015) since the solid group identity and the personal relations 
became a hindrance for critically scrutinising the unit’s work. The participation in 
group activities such as social events, parties, after hours socialising (fyraftensøl) was 
something I regard as essential for the “success” of my fieldwork and stay at AIU. 
Detectives’ attitudes towards me seemed to a high extent affected by my 
participation in these events in a positive way. I was, for example, invited to their 
Summer party held in one of the detectives’ private home. At the end of my stay at 
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AIU, they gave me a present and took me out for dinner and a night on the town to 
say goodbye. I also participated in their Christmas party a few months after I had 
left the unit. Such social events were an important part of this group’s occupational 
culture and therefore their cohesiveness. My experience was that participation in 
these events made the demarcation between me as a researcher and them as 
practitioners more blurred which improved my position as part of the group.  
Being Loyal 
Loyalty and trustworthiness in different versions are qualities that are viewed as 
absolutely essential within the police and as a precondition for carrying out police 
work (see e.g. Valland 2014). Signs of loyalty therefore becomes an instrument to 
measure both police officers and police researchers. If the researcher is not able to 
show loyalty towards the social group in the field, access to information becomes 
difficult. Hunt (1984) speaks about how she experienced the informal testing of 
police-like-behaviour such as her willingness to lie and cover up corruption as a 
measurement of her loyalty towards the police. In my research, I did not find testing 
as extreme or even explicit as for example Hunt (1984) did; the test of loyalty is 
primarily connected to one’s attitudes towards the organisation or the dominant 
police discourses and thereby assumptions of various occupational groups. Loyalty 
is commonly divided into professional loyalty and organisational loyalty, horizontal 
loyalty and vertical loyalty (Valland 2014). Kleinig (1997) argues that even though 
these are often practically connected they need to be analytical differentiated to 
better understand the practice observed (Valland 2014). Hence, the demonstration 
of loyalty is equally important for an embedded researcher on different levels.  
Within the group of rank and files and detectives, the aversion towards (top) 
management is quite dominant and even though I had a strong network at 
management level, I felt I could not spend as much time and affiliate with managers 
as I had before becoming attached to the investigation unit. At ground level, police 
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officers are famous for being critical towards management decisions and are 
notoriously complaining about the general state of the police. They are as such 
more loyal to the profession than the organisation and often more loyal horizontally 
than vertically. For me as a researcher, this meant that I had to limit my contact with 
management as I did not want detectives at ground level to get the impression that I 
would report back or speak about what I experienced to management. This 
represented a significant ethical dilemma as I first and foremost needed to continue 
to have the approval from management to carry out my research—and the 
management perspective of proactive investigation was equally important to my 
lines of inquiry as the tactical perspective. Moreover, I did not see myself as on 
anybody’s side and in that sense, I wanted to be seen as a neutral party between the 
two groups. This was of course impossible. My access to people and meetings at 
strategic and national level meant that I often knew more about resources, future 
plans, and strategies—even information about individual detectives which was 
discussed in those management meetings I attended—than the investigation unit. I 
did not get the impression that management was concerned about this dilemma as 
they carried on as before I began my studies. Perhaps they had difficulties 
differentiating between when I was a researcher and when I was an employee. 
However, I was very much aware that I did not breach any levels of confidence and 
talked about the content of different meetings or what I had discussed with 
individual officers to others. When detectives now and again asked about the 
meetings, I had attended, I most often responded vaguely and in general terms, and 
after a while it seemed as if both managers and detectives had come to terms with 
my double role. Still, I tried to handle the demand for loyalty by ‘being authentic’ 
and showing a certain amount of vulnerability, as I will explain next. 
Authenticity and Vulnerability 
The informal world of policing is indeed dominated by ‘the game of internal 
politics’ and different strategic agendas connected to different groups and 
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individuals (Cockbain & Knutsson, 2015). One of my first lessons when I began 
working in the police was given to me by my first manager and mentor who told me 
to learn to ‘play the game of police politics’ in order to survive. An analyst describes 
this as “a game of chess on 27 levels” and underlines the game’s lack of rationality and 
logic and thereby the impossible condition of trying to predict it and consequently 
participate in it. People who are detached from agendas and game playing are seen 
as more dependable and trustworthy and as such loyal to the police profession 
rather than loyal to one’s own position or agendas.  
‘Being authentic’ in this context therefore means being honest and trustworthy as a 
person—not covering up one’s opinions about specific (policing) issues or other e.g. 
political issues which are debated, and not voicing different opinions in different 
arenas. Being authentic includes showing vulnerability and as such to interact 
backstage and not performing on the front stage with a high degree of impression 
management (Goffman 1959). Backstage performances tend to reveal less appealing 
aspects of one’s persona or at least less controlled presentations of the self. In a 
practical sense, this involved in my case for example participation in situations 
where I would experience loss of self-control and thereby making myself vulnerable 
for example in connection with the intake of alcohol. Participation in social 
activities within police is important as it continues the socialisation (Van Maanen & 
Schein 1977) and cultivation of police identity and supports the police 
organisation’s cohesiveness. One of my episodes with limited impression 
management was to drink too much alcohol at a party at AIU with the consequence 
that I walked directly into an “invisible” glass door. The incident was afterwards 
referred to by detectives several times and they laughed about it, mainly because I 
had managed to safe my G&T without spilling it. This apparently gave me some 
credit as detectives admired my concern for the alcohol rather than for my own 
safety. The situation is a clear example of vulnerability (as I was potentially a 
laughing stock), but at the same time authenticity as it showed another side of me 
than just the ‘academic’, ‘the researcher’, ‘the representative from the national unit’, 
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and perhaps it diminished some of the detectives’ perception of me as a nice-young-
girl-straight-of-out-university-with-no-life-experience-always-doing-the-right-thing—a 
classic stereotypical representation of police officers’ perception of newly hired 
academics.   
Being in an Organisational Function  
As mentioned earlier, being an organisational member is a temporary position in 
contrast to being part of the police family, which is a permanent position. A part of 
my job as senior advisor, I held an organisational function which was directly 
connected to my doctoral work as I was given the task to review and evaluate 
existing processes and practiced for identifying and selecting investigation targets 
and to develop a new analytical methodology. Thus, during 2012-2015 and again in 
2017-2018, I followed the police’s process for targeting priority offenders in 
strategic fora (coordination meetings) and at operational level (targeting meetings) 
and held formal interviews with a selection of the key agents involved. I also 
reviewed documents related to targeting such as meeting minutes, prime target 
shortlists, target profiles, investigation proposals etc. In 2017-2018, I was 
furthermore instrumental in the launch of the new model for strategic targeting as 
coordinator for an analysis team which was established to compose strategic threat 
assessments on organised crime groups as part of an initial phase of strategic 
targeting. Moreover, the acceptance of one’s presence as an organisational foreign 
body is dependent on one’s professional and/or personal characteristics or status 
within the organisation. On several occasions, I was recognised by some of my most 
dependable gatekeepers who spoke in positive terms about me to others, which 
thereby heightened my organisational status, but also made sure that negative 
narratives were contained. An example of this was when I had been participating in 
a couple of police operations in relation to monitoring gang members as I was 
carrying out an evaluation of the police’s response model in this area. A couple of 
police officers had complained and asked why an academic suddenly was present at 
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a police operation, just walking around observing without having any (operational) 
function. A police officer told me that one of my gatekeepers—a well-respected and 
highly experienced police officer—immediately had shut down their protests saying: 
“She’s on our side, she’s been helping us out the last year, if it wasn’t for her we couldn’t get 
things passed on a national level”—referring to my position in The National Gang 
Crime Staff.  
The approval from gatekeepers and the informal access is underlined earlier as 
essential. At one point, I asked a detective in AIU what it had meant for them and 
their reception of me that local management had spoken about me in positive terms 
and had decided that I should have ‘full access’. The detective laughed and said: 
“We couldn’t care less about that. If we didn’t like you, it wouldn’t have been easy for you.” 
As such there are issues connected to one’s personality, professional competences, 
or status within the organisation which influence (both positively and negatively) 
one’s possibilities within the police—as a researcher and otherwise. To possess an 
organisational function is essential for an embedded researcher, however, this does 
not always makes one popular. Therefore, when one’s work is depending on social 
acceptance, it becomes important to have gatekeepers, and on the contrary, gate-
closers can impose a significant problem, as I will explain in the coming section.   
Gate-closers 
During the time when I was collecting information in regards to the internal 
evaluation of the police’s approach to identifying priority offenders for 
investigation, I was met with a couple of gate-closers who were managers at 
superintendent level. In the beginning, I was not sure if it was a personal or 
professional issue, but I experienced a number of times that I was not invited to 
relevant meetings or given the information I needed. I had to ask around and check 
calendars to find out when specific meetings were held. When I asked these 
managers why I had not received a meet invite, I was told that it was merely an 
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oversight. In the corridors, I heard differently. Explanations such as: “she shouldn’t 
interfere with police work which she knows nothing about” and that “she makes very 
academic (langhårede) suggestions which have no operational value (kan ikke bruges til 
noget)” was supposedly proposed by various managers and staff, but they were 
never said directly to me. One day I asked one of the managers for a lift to a 
meeting across the country, but he dodged the question saying something about 
driving there on the day before. The resistance from some managers and staff in my 
own department made me uncomfortable and frustrated: I had been given a task by 
the head of The National Gang Crime Staff, and my doctoral work was 
commissioned far up the chain of command. But I was in a difficult bind as I feared 
that making noise or any type of conflict would make it worse. At some point, I took 
it to my current boss:  
“I can’t carry out my work if I don’t get access to the information I need.”  
My boss sighed.  
“Can’t you work out your differences?”, he said.  
“I’m not sure about these differences,” I said, “I’ll be happy to discuss the different 
approaches, but I’m not given the chance to explain my point of view.”  
My boss was reluctant to step in.  
“I’m sure no one is trying to keep you from doing your job. I think they’re (the managers, 
my addition) just worried that there’ll be a lot of changes in the way they do things and 
they’ve been used to doing things the old way.”  
I did not take the matter any further but tried to collect the information I needed 
through other channels. Still, I reflected over the reasons as to why these things 
were happening and my own role in them. Although I felt very isolated, I did not 
get the sense that it had much to do with me as a person or even my professional 
background. In fact, the explanation my boss had provided was probably more 
accurate: they tried to exclude me as they feared I was pushing for changes moving 
e.g. the process of selecting investigation targets from the meeting table of 
investigation managers (superintendents) into a systematic analytical process where 
targets were to be prioritised from certain analytical criteria (I elaborate on this in 
Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the gate-closers presented a consistent obstacle to my 
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information gathering. Moreover, it underlined my position as an isolated and 
temporary member of the world of policing. In the coming section, I elaborate on 
how isolation can even happen in friendly environments.    
   
Being Too Much 
Consider the following example: 
We were sitting in the car on our way to a meeting with cooperative partners. The 
atmosphere was good and as always humorous. Sandy and Fred were in the front seat and 
I was sitting in the backseat with Clem. The conversation moved over to one of the chiefs 
in The National Police and an ongoing project about the future organisation of the 
investigation units. Sandy complained: 
“Please”, he said, “what does he know about investigation, really? Has he ever investigated 
more than a stolen bicycle? Roaming the halls of The National Police all his life…” 
“He's actually been a manager in three different districts over the last five years”, I said. 
“Both as head of the investigation unit and the local police”. Sandy snorted: 
“So what?? It doesn’t mean that he knows anything about investigation!” 
There was silence for a while. The others did not say anything. I considered my response 
briefly and then suggested: 
“Just because one isn’t a detective—does that mean one doesn’t know anything about 
police work or investigation?” I continued:  
“I mean, you can have knowledge about a field but from a different perspective. A doctor, 
for example, doesn’t need to have experienced an illness himself to understand it…” 
“Oh, come on!”, Sandy interrupted me and raised his voice clearly annoyed and 
potentially angry, “please, stop that!”—Fred made a supporting sound (stemte i). 
An awkward atmosphere arose in the car and no one spoke for quite a while. Clem 
avoided looking at me and took out his computer from his briefcase and started working.  
I realised that I had overstepped the line—upsetting Sandy who was always in a good 
mood and he had never talked to me that way before. I suddenly felt very much as a visitor, 
an inconvenience, a burden to the entire group. The rest of the trip, I tried to be almost 
invisible, keeping a low profile.  
The day after the meeting with the cooperative partners, we were on our way down the 
stairs in the headquarters and we passed some posters on the wall displaying uniformed 
patrol officers with handguns. Sandy was in front of me. 
“Ha! Guns,” he said, “I don’t even know where my gun is. I wouldn’t even know what kind 
of guns we have nowadays!” 
“Don’t you have Glocks?” I asked. 
Sandy stopped on the stairs. He turned around and shook his head. 
“No, not Glocks,” he said, “and really—what do YOU know about that?”. 
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He carried on down the stairs and I walked quietly behind him without saying anything, 
but with a clear sense that I might have overstayed my welcome. 
The next day when I returned to work, I walked down the hall to Sandy’s office where the 
detectives usually drank coffee in the early hours of the morning and held informal 
meetings about the investigation and whatnot, the door was closed. I didn’t knock but 
walked back to the desk that had been assigned to me in the meeting room and waited for 
them to finish.   
Apart from being one of the least pleasant experiences of my fieldwork, the example 
above underlines the essentials of ‘friend or foe’. It reveals how fragile the 
relationship between researcher and field can be—and how fast the access you are 
given can be revoked if you behave in a manner that your gatekeeper does not like. 
However, the narrative above also mirrors at least one ongoing more or less latent 
discussion within the police which I explained in the beginning of the chapter. The 
discussion very much concerns the competing rationales of experience-based and 
knowledge-based policing as accounted for in Chapter 2: who ’knows’ about police 
work and what does it take to be an ‘expert’ in police work—a doer or a knower? 
(Gundhus 2012). The issue also relates to the question of the cultural notion of 
being ‘real police’, which means having learned police work ‘on the job’ and on the 
streets of the ‘real world’ rather than reading a book at university far away from real 
people and real problems (I elaborate on this in Chapter 6). Moreover, it relates to 
the issue of knowledge monopoly. The struggle of knowledge within the police equals 
the struggle of organisational power. Knowledge is in many ways a strong currency 
within the police as Hartmann (2014) equally underlines (see Chapter 7 for further 
analysis).  
As I will address in Chapter 6, the police can be seen as a hybrid organisation 
(Granér & Kronkvist 2014) with hierarchal rule governing and formally centralised 
decisions, but also where many discretionary decisions are taken in the front line 
implying that formal structures are less important (Granér & Kronkvist 2014; Lipsky 
2010). Day-to-day knowledge about ‘how things are done’ is implicit and it therefore 
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requires both experience and a considerable amount of legwork to comprehend. 
Knowledge about current issues (for example criminal incidents, ongoing 
operations or investigations or the latest “news” from the criminal environment), is 
equally important and this requires a large network throughout the organisation 
which can provide reliable, but more importantly fast information. Therefore, ‘being 
knowledegeable’ or ‘being in the know’ is not only crucial for police officers—but 
also for a police researcher and her prospects in the field (see Chapter 7 for further 
analysis). Yet, occasionally this knowledge can be a hindrance as we saw in the 
example above: the detectives grew tired of my ‘claim to know’ or at least claim to 
have knowledge of specific aspects of policing and as such threaten the dominant 
narrative that such knowledge is reserved to police officers. Yet, other instruments, 
such as humour, can be used to get acceptance and closeness, as I will account for 
next. 
Being Funny 
An important feature of being tolerated/accepted within police is having funny 
bones; a sense of humour. I devote an entire section to this theme, as I continuously 
see this as determining for one’s organisational survival since the characteristic of 
having a sense of humour is symbolically transferred into another feature namely 
stamina or robustness (how much one can stomach). Humour is moreover used as a 
coping strategy for many members of the police organisation. In job listings from 
the police there is generally referred to ‘an informal and jovial tone of voice’ and 
the ability for applicants to ‘be in good spirits’ and contribute positively to the 
social atmosphere is much appreciated. The social unity and laughs are typically 
what is emphasised as one of the most positive aspects of the police as a workplace 
and I will propose that humour is a cultural trait of the police.  
For an embedded researcher, the handling of police humour is as such significant. 
Police research shows (see Granér 2014 for an overview) that humour is typically 
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used: 1) to express resistance towards the official police world, 2) as a coping 
strategy to tackle stressful and frustrating parts of police work, including challenges 
within the police organisation, and 3) as a way of creating social cohesion within the 
group of police officers. Although humour obviously is not a formal requirement, 
researchers have pointed to the fact that in a practical sense it almost is (Finstad 
2000; Granér 2004; Wieslander 2021). Humour is connected to the police’s 
backstage and characterises the social convention with colleagues internally. As 
such, it is rarely expressed on the public front stage and is even toned down on the 
organisational front stage or in the presence of (certain) managers. Typically, police 
humour is characterised by being politically incorrect, sarcastic, sharp, and 
dominated by masculine and anti-intellectual values. There are elements of the kind 
of humour which goes by the Danish expression blue collar humour 
(værkstedshumor) referring to a kind of humour which can be both sexist and 
racist. The degrees of the brusqueness vary; from affectionate teasing to hostile 
provocations, bullying, or the diminishing of individuals or certain professional/
minority groups (for instance civilians or ethnic minorities). A common 
denominator is, however, that the acceptance of the dominant humour is a basic 
requirement within the police. The general attitude is that employees who are 
sensitive towards this should find another job (hvis man ikke kan lide lugten i 
bageriet, må man finde et andet sted).  
As such, humour is used as glue to create group cohesion and thereby strengthen 
the unity between police officers. This is certainly necessary as much police work 
depends on collaboration, teamwork, and mutual trust in e.g. critical incidents 
(skarpe situationer) where officers need to walk in line and ‘have each other’s 
backs’. However, it is also used as an instrument to create a strong in-group/out-
group condition and thereby promote a demarcation between those who are 
considered to be in and out respectively. This distinction is between e.g. the 
stereotypical profile of a police officer (white male) contrary to e.g. the stereotypical 
profile of an academic (young female) each with group specific physical 
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characteristics, social background, norms, values, and world views. Humour is in 
such cases used both as a friendly and warm indication of inclusion and sense of 
community, but also to indirectly confront latent organisational conflicts such as 
differences between professional groups (cf. the competing epistemological 
rationales of knowledge and experience). The latter part goes on under cover of a 
convenient reference to the need for employees to be robust (understood as not a 
’sissy’) and ‘endure the tone of voice’ (understood as having a sense of police 
humour) in order to fit in. In this regard, police humour can be seen as an 
important symbolic gatekeeper for organisational acceptance or exclusion as other 
researchers similarly have underlined (Granér 2014 gives an overview). This is the 
case for the average employee, but certainly for an embedded researcher as well. 
Context and character of the social interaction are of course key in interpreting 
police humour’s function.  
In the following, I will provide some examples of police humour and analyse the 
function of it both in relation to organisational life in general and specifically 
related to my fieldwork. An important finding is that police humour is a part of the 
testing process of organisational members’ characters and abilities to fit into 
specific groups and surroundings. Also, it is used as a coping strategy to deal with 
organisational instability and absurdness. For me as a researcher, I used humour as 
a way of building rapport and establishing social bonds and trust in order to get 
access in the field. Over time, I have furthermore found myself applying humour as 
a coping strategy for organisational endurance. Consider the following example:  
It had been arranged that I should accompany the surveillance team on one of their shifts 
during the day. I had many times followed surveillance tasks from the detectives’ point of 
view at ‘the base’ (basen) at the police station where detectives on duty were directing and 
supporting the surveillance team via radio communication. Now, I was given the 
opportunity to see the viewpoint of the surveillance officers whose work in many ways laid 
out the groundwork for the investigation. The task was to follow (skygge) the main targets 
of the investigation and map and record their movements and meetings.  
The detectives had in advance set me up with Eric who was a young, outgoing type whose 
visits to AIU almost always involved an extra coffee break and friendly conversation about 
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this and that with the detectives. It was obvious that he was well-liked and perceived as a 
capable surveillance officer (observatør). 
“You should ride with Eric”, Fred said, “he’s the best.” 
When Eric came to pick me up that day in the office—which also served as a lunchroom—
Fred and a couple of other detectives were present eating their lunches. 
“So, are you ready to ride with Eric?” Fred asked. 
“I am”, I said, “the question is: is Eric ready to ride with me?” 
“That I can promise you!”, Fred said. 
Eric smiled:  
“You’re most welcome.” 
“Did you take a motion sickness pill?” Fred wanted to know, “he drives like a mad man in 
his big, flashy car. I’m afraid that you’ll most definitely vomit.” 
“Oh, I don’t drive that fast,” Eric said joking, “only a couple of hundred kilometres per 
hour.” 
“I actually did take a pill”, I said, “I know the old police trick of getting civilians on the 
backseat of their car driving recklessly to make them vomit. So, Eric, I hope, I don’t fall 
asleep as they are a bit numbing.”  
I had in fact tried this a couple of times when accompanying police patrols and heard 
stories from other civilians who had experienced the same. Patrol officers were testing how 
much one could ‘stomach’ going on ride-alongs.   
“Ha!”, Fred said, “I don’t think Eric will mind if you fall asleep at the backseat—he’s tried 
that many times, and I promise you, you won’t feel a thing, just a tiny sting (et lille prik), 
isn’t that right, Eric?” 
We all laughed. 
“Well,” I said, “sounds like I should take precautions?” 
Eric smiled and shook his head. 
“Don’t listen to them. I’m honestly a gentleman.” 
The example above illustrates typical daily social interactions of my fieldwork. The 
subtle sexual innuendo could be perceived in the span from innocent to 
inappropriate. The context determined whether I considered it to be funny or 
uncomfortable. The importance of participating in the daily dialogue, play along 
and be active in jolly ping-pongs cannot be stressed enough in terms of being 
tolerated and accepted. Depending on the specific group dynamic, it required me 
sometimes to go along and contribute further to the conversation or sometimes to 
challenge various statements and thereby draw a line. It was now and again a 
difficult balance. As a participant observer, my main priority was to be able to stay in 
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the field without making too much noise, but also, if possible, to contribute 
positively and actively to the group on their terms as this would bring me closer to 
their life world and thereby to be able to understand it better. I did not fool myself 
by thinking that my presence would be forgotten at any time and an active 
engagement was therefore in-evident. My tolerance of potentially (in my view) 
inappropriate comments such as sexist or racist remarks would again vary 
depending on the situational contexts. The tone of voice could be rather harsh and 
sometimes overstepping my personal boundaries, yet my purpose was to 
understand the proactive investigation community and not to scold them. This 
purpose was therefore more important than the consideration of my own personal 
boundaries. Plus, I myself have a rather dark and boundary pushing sense of 
humour. As I was only once in a while the direct object of police humour the 
observations I did primarily involved others. Two examples:  
One of the few ethnic minority police officers in the police district would often 
come to AIU and eat lunch or have a coffee break or take care of administrative 
tasks. He was often met with comments referring to his ethnic minority background 
and religion. On one occasion he was asked by a detective if he wanted a cup of 
coffee or perhaps a pork chop?—a remark which some would find rather offensive. 
But the police officer laughed and made a rapid and sarcastic response to the 
detective. When I spoke with him on another occasion he brought up the subject 
himself:  
I love coming to AIU, it’s my favourite section in the police. It’s so vibrant and fun 
compared to some of the other sections. They give me a hard time here and I find it 
amusing, it makes me feel very much at home.  
An appendix to the story is that the officer had a high status within AIU and was 
well respected not only for his skills as a police officer, but he was well-liked as a 
person, which the detectives often expressed. A female detective was also subjected 
to a number of amongst other sexual comments, e.g. a suggestion from a detective 
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to move her computer screen so he could have a better view of her “tits”. A remark 
that would make at least some people feel uncomfortable. But the detective herself 
was rather foul-mouthed and coarse in her communication and laughed and 
responded with a sharp and humorous comment. She never gave the impression 
that she was offended, on the contrary, she was regularly actively engaged in 
conversations with sexual content and it is genuinely my feeling that she was quite 
happy in this working environment, which she also underlined many times.  
Thus, situations which isolated can be seen as improper, badging, or overstepping 
the boundaries of conventional social norms were instead used to create a specific 
dynamic and to make specific members of the group feel appreciated rather than 
harassed and to underline the cohesiveness of the group. Other less controversial 
examples include the detectives putting up posters with collages of pictures and 
paper clippings of each other, to put glue on each other’s desks, or to duck tape 
each other’s phones and the like.  
Being an Object of “Humour” 
In regards to social contexts as being significant for assessing various statements as 
funny/not funny, there are some examples where I believe that humour is also used 
to express an organisational dissatisfaction with e.g. academics as a professional 
group in police. Consider the following examples:  
The notes (Picture A and Picture B) were observed at different bulletin boards 
within Danish police. A was observed at NCI, where I was employed, and B was 
observed in a lunchroom in a police district. Cf. the knowledge-based vs. 
experience-based rationales, it is quite common that academics as a professional 
group are highlighted as ‘enemies’ of the police (e.g. ‘djøffisering’). 
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Picture A: 
Text translated (my translation): “Academic: A person who finds pleasure in taking a plain 
idea and making it complicated.”  
It is not seldom that critique of academics (including many different academic 
backgrounds) are put forward openly in daily conversations, formal meetings, and at 
social events. A fellow academic remarked at one point: “It seems like the hunt is on for 
academics” (der er fri jagt på akademikere) implying that he felt as a kind of outlaw 
in police settings. When I was transferred from my old unit to NCI one of the police 
officers in the section commented: “Oh, so you’re one of those who let the police pay for 
an expensive PhD and then you’re off to get a job outside the police where you can get a 
high salary” implying that my job motivations were only driven by career wishes and 
financial gain and that I was taking advantage of the organisation.  
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Picture B: 
Text translated (my translation): “- You! What is an academic? 
- It is when you’ve studied what other people already know!” 
At a lunch in the canteen with my department, a senior clerk spoke about my 
former colleague who was hired as an analyst and said: “I don’t know why they hire 
people like her (academics) when they could hire three like me (clerks) for the same salary!” 
supporting the claim that academics are paid (unreasonably) high salaries which do 
not reflect their value for the police. At a staff meeting with about 100 persons 
present, the spokesman from the police union complained openly that an overload 
of academics “who knows squad about police work and the real world” were hired 
taking jobs from police officers. In my fieldwork one of the detectives constantly 
referred to me as the ‘seismologist’ or ‘geologist’ in a teasing tone of voice as he 
claimed he had never heard of a criminologist before. Still, he never asked me 
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about my professional background or what my work actually consisted of. 
Comments regarding academics are not exclusively negative or disparaging. Often 
police managers will in some arenas talk more respectfully about academics and 
give credit to their professional competences saying for example “we need an 
academic to solve this task” (often referred to as a person ‘who can write’ (en 
skrivekarl)). Once, I participated in a strategic meeting about a new strategy and 
operational action plan with managers from the districts, the regional units, and the 
national units. For a while, they had discussed a particular problem regarding how 
to define the new strategic goals without being able to solve the issue, and I was 
eventually given the floor and proposed a solution. The room was quiet for a while. 
Then the Assistent Police Commissioner who was sitting at the end of the meeting 
table facing the whiteboard turned towards the others and said: “Are you listening, 
boys? This is why she’s here.” The compliment was not directed at me but seemed to 
be more of a comment for the others to step it up.  
My point regarding the examples above is that they reflect real and current, but 
latent conflicts within police in a somewhat passive agressive manner. In written 
form (such as the two pictures) they prevent the sender from engaging in an open 
conflict about the matter or even having to elaborate or explain any further. Thus, 
examples A and B refer to (some) police officers’ resistance towards academics as a 
professional group in the police. As these are written examples, they lack the social 
context and dynamic between sender and recipient which can normally be analysed 
and interpreted during verbal interaction. The reader of these notes must therefore 
‘fill in the gaps’ herself. Moreover, I will argue that the placement of these 
statements on more or less official bulletin boards turn them into a continuous 
component or even an uncontradicted “truth” in the working environment and 
thereby legitimise these as cultural artefacts. A parallel can be drawn to Danish 
social scientists Baarts & Mortensen (2018) who through their research of medical 
working environments have concluded that some groups of doctors and nurses use 
‘humorous bullying’ in their informal social power struggle. They create a social 
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dynamic where they feel continuously humiliated by a derogatory teasing from each 
other and at the same time they participate in this as they fear to be socially 
excluded. On the surface health personnel seem accordingly to accept and condone 
this social dynamic but digging a little deeper it shows that they are aware of its 
constraining and detrimental nature (which the authors formulate as killing 
themselves with laughter). Some of the same conditions can be observed within 
police; a way of being able to participate in the social dynamic certain minority 
groups (academics, women, ethnic minorities, homosexuals etc.) as well as police 
researchers need to tolerate a specific police humour reflecting hyper-masculine 
values in order to be accepted. Humour within the police is a contributor to 
suppress organisational conflicts and thereby prevent them from being handled and 
diminished. This fear of dealing with conflicts interestingly dominates the police 
internally which encompasses a paradox and stands in contrast to police’s status as 
conflict workers (konfliktarbejdere) (Mosebo 2012) and as such their responsibility to 
handle conflicts in the surrounding society. However, in connection with my role as 
a researcher, I used humour as a way to negotiate and achieve organisational access 
and acceptance.  
In conclusion, with the purpose of embedding myself sufficiently into the research 
field to provide access to information and in-depth understandings, I have engaged 
in different roles of ‘being’ as presented above. These roles play out on a day-to-day 
basis, they vary continuously, and are developed and transformed over time. Some 
of these roles were given to me by the field and some I took myself. This role 
engagement is a central part of the embedded methodology; it depends on my 
ongoing analyses of the research field and the varying social contexts and my active 
engagements in these. Backstage knowledge in this regard is essential as it provides 
the contextual foundation on which I carried out these analyses. In this process, I 
continuously revised my preunderstanding and understanding and used these 
actively to direct my agency.     
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Wrapping Up: Analysing and Rendering Proactive 
Investigation 
Method for Analysis 
Explorative studies which primarily employ qualitative methods are in constant 
development and circles between theory, methods, and empirical information 
(Wadel 1991). The research process cannot be planned in advance—the researcher 
might not get the access she had hoped for, or the empirical findings might not be 
as interesting as she had expected etc. Hence, as a researcher one must be willing to 
revisit one’s initial expectations (preconceptions) and impressions 
(preunderstanding) of the field and even change the research question. The scope 
in this study changed constantly as I got wiser (expanded my preunderstanding) 
and found new themes of relevance. This impacted consequently the way I analysed 
the empirical material. In accordance with the hermeneutic tradition, the method 
for analysis can be understood as a way of organising one’s observations (Gundhus 
2006). Danish sociologists Lisa Dahlager & Hanne Fredslund (2008) present some 
important aspects of analysing empirical findings namely:  
1) to be aware of one’s own preunderstanding 
2) the willingness to put this preunderstanding at risk throughout the study 
3) to be able to put oneself in other’s place with the awareness that this process is 
influenced by one’s own understandings.  
My embeddedness—and continuous stay within the police—challenged on a daily 
basis my preunderstanding and helped to broaden my horizon (Gadamer 1998). 
This process goes beyond gathering empirical material and analysing findings. In 
practice, I tried for example to pressure test some of my observations or findings in 
discussions with colleagues—police officers, detectives, analysts etc. For a long 
period of time, I had viewed the constant shift between academia and police 
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practice as exhausting as these two worlds are fundamentally different and I had to 
navigate in them in different ways. Though, in the final analytical stage of my 
research it became instead an advantage to shift between the two worlds, and I used 
this actively in the analytical process. As such, my link to both police practice 
(police staff) and the academic world (my supervisors and fellow police researchers) 
enabled me to put my ideas and findings forward and discuss them with competent 
people who had insight into both the practical and scientific world of policing. This 
process has continued throughout the work with this thesis until the very last full 
stop. 
The empirical material in this study is extensive and builds on seven years of 
research. The official documents represent more than 3,000 pages (case files, 
policies, strategies, operational plans), the audio recordings of interviews last more 
than 36 hours, and my field notes from approximately 950 hours of observation 
exceed a couple of hundred pages. This calls for a structured and thorough 
approach, which consists of many repetitive processes and enables the empirical 
findings to come forward in the initial phase. My method for analysing the 
empirical material is therefore inspired by the recipe proposed by Dahlager & 
Fredslund (2008). It combines a phenomenological and hermeneutic approach and 
consists of four steps:  
1) General impression 
2) Identifying meaning-bearing units 
3) Operationalisation 
4) Recontextualisation and hermeneutic interpretation.  
In the first step, I have looked at the entire empirical material to create a general 
impression of it and to generate an overview. In the second step, I have tried to ask 
‘what goes on’ by systematically identifying themes and categories which appeared 
including both the ones I expected cf. my preunderstanding (e.g. themes from the 
179
interview guide), and the ones which I did not anticipate (e.g. issues which were 
brought up in interviews or during participant observation). I did not use any 
computer programme for this coding process. While reading through my field notes 
and listening to interviews, I wrote additional notes and scribbled down important 
quotes, but I ended up transcribing almost all interviews fully to ensure a full 
overview. The initial operationalisation and meaning categorisation which 
represents the third step was done manually with different colour post-its, which I 
used for different themes and put on a wall. The themes were, for example, 
organisational frames, “real” police work, technological challenges, top-down 
management, political steering, performance measures, creative accountancy, 
investigative competences, conflicts between national and regional level etc. Themes 
and categories were subsequently put together and organised bringing down the 
number of themes and adding to the richness in the remaining themes. Although 
this process was probably more time consuming than using a computer software, it 
gave me a graphic overview which appealed to my need to be ‘hands on’. 
The last and fourth step concerns recontextualising and interpretation of the 
organised categories. As my research purpose is to investigate how proactive 
investigations unfold in the police, I revisited the literature on proactive policing 
and used it as a guide to look systematically after the (theoretical) characteristics in 
the representation of proactive investigation and the operationalisation of it into 
specific actions on both strategic and operational level. As the analytical process 
proceeded, I revisited the empirical material continuously while writing up the 
analytical chapters. The writing process in itself gave new insights and changed my 
preunderstanding over and over—which has ultimately resulted in a constant 
circular movement between the four stages presented above. Consequently, I often 
returned to e.g. step two and looked at meaning-bearing units, recontextualised 
these and proposed an additional layer of hermeneutic interpretation to the 
empirical material. 
180
First and Second Order Analyses 
During the analytical process—the ongoing interaction between theory, methods, 
and empirical findings—the purpose has been to move from specific situational 
characteristics of actions or statements concerning the proactive phenomenon (the 
individual empirical parts) to a general level looking at the phenomenon as a whole 
(the entire empirical material) (Dahlager & Fredslund 2008). In relation to the 
analytical process, Van Maanen (1979) proposes a distinction between first order 
constructions and second order constructions (derived from the work of Schütz (1963)). 
Therefore, I regard first order analysis as the process where the empirical material 
comes forward as raw information and for example maintains so-called emic 
concepts; the language of the field such as terms and expressions used by informants 
and participants (Headland et al. 1990). Second order analysis represents, however, 
what Van Maanen (ibid.) refers to as ‘interpretations of interpretations’—the 
researcher’s theoretical constructions of the empirical material—which also lies in 
the concept of recontextualisation.  
During these analytical phases, it became clear that instead of a comprehensive 
narrative about and methodology of proactive investigation in the theoretical frame 
of proactive policing, I was looking at empirical findings which showed a 
continuation of a reactive policing paradigm. The reason was that the characteristics 
of ‘proactivity’ in police actions and the assumptions they were based on could not 
be identified. Instead, both in conceptualisation and practice I observed clear 
elements from reactive policing. This realisation became a turning point in my 
analytical phase and I had to alter my entire understanding of the phenomenon—
proactive investigation—which I had studied. In all analytical chapters, I draw on 
the theoretical framework, presented in Chapter 3, concerning the dramaturgical 
model of policing, and the police métier. These theories have provided a prism 
through which I have looked at the proactive phenomenon—but they have at later 
stages in the analytical process also served as analytical instruments in the 
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hermeneutic interpretation of empirical findings. The re-activation of these theories 
has therefore provided new insights and understandings in each circular motion. 
Additionally, I will underline that the entire thesis and specifically the thesis’ 
analysis (Part Three) is built progressively in terms of both knowledge and 
understanding. Each chapter encompasses an analytical context which serves as 
analytical instruments in the coming chapters. The chapters encompass in 
accordance with the hermeneutic principle independent analyses of specific 
individual parts of the proactive phenomenon which contribute to understanding 
the phenomenon as a unity. This means that the order of the chapters is important 
in terms of understanding the individual conclusions and the analytical narrative as 
a whole—each chapter serves as a preunderstanding and precondition for 
understanding the sequential chapters. In fact, in accordance with the hermeneutic 
approach, all chapters serve as (new) layers of contextualisation and interpretation 
and represents as such (new) hermeneutic circles of interpretation—and thus 
circular movements between preunderstanding and understanding.  
To answer the research question of this study—namely how proactive investigations 
as part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in police and which conditions 
impact this and why—each analytical chapter (Chapter 5, 6, 7, 8) encompasses both 
first order and second order analyses. Thus, each chapter is first concerned with 
answering the question of “what goes on?”, and second “why does it go on this way?”—
in relation to their specific topics and sub questions (see Chapter 1). Still, the 
progression of the analysis provides deeper insights and understandings as I unfold 
the layers of the proactive phenomenon. In this sense in Chapter 8, for example, I 
build on the conclusions from Chapter 5, 6, and 7 to allow deeper interpretations. 
Finally, Chapter 9 collects the findings of each analytical chapter and serves as a 
cohesive narrative of a collective second order analysis as it theoretically explores 
the underlying mechanisms of why the proactive phenomenon unfolds the way it 
does by proposing a specific proactive performance and the detective métier.      
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Getting it ‘Right’: Assessing the Quality of the Study  
The concepts of generalisability, reliability, and validity are widely recognised within 
social sciences and viewed as the parameters for assessing the quality of research. 
Nevertheless, these concepts stem from quantitative research and (often) positivist 
paradigms which make it difficult to transfer them into qualitative 
phenomenonological-hermeneutic research (Kvale & Brinkman 2015). For example, 
as every researcher’s preunderstanding is unique and as every researcher is given a 
unique position/role in the research field—it does not make sense to talk about 
reliability as the specific study cannot be repeated by another researcher. Or as 
Richardson (2000: 253) argues in connection with evaluating ethnography:  
The ethnographic life is not separable from the self. Who we are and what we can be—
what we study, how we can write about that which we study—is tied to how a 
discipline disciplines itself and its members, its methods for claiming authority over 
both the subject matter and its members. 
The findings in qualitative research are, however, critiqued by some scholars as they 
view them as biased or unreliable and since they have concerns about 
generalisation from single or small number of cases (Bacon et al. 2020). This is often 
the case when concepts such as ‘evidence’ and ‘data’ from positivists research 
traditions are applied. In this connection, Tracy (2010) argues that qualitative 
research should avoid a policy of consent to a public atmosphere that favours broad 
quantitative studies and thus quantitative standards when assessing qualitative 
research. Accordingly, Fredslund (2001: 86-90, my translation) has for example 
proposed three criteria for quality which can be used to assess this study: 
1) The researcher presents her preunderstanding explicitly and thereby makes the 
researcher visible as a subject 
2) Every step of the research process is accounted for and justified 
3) The study’s interpretations are discussed in regards to their transferability to other 
situations.    
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In order to accommodate these criteria, I have taken a number of steps. Part Two in 
this thesis is overall my attempt to meet the first and second criteria. I have tried to 
give a detailed account of all phases in this research process—from the planning of 
the study to writing up the thesis. The practical circumstances, my reflections, 
considerations, and feelings I had underway and during specific situations e.g. in 
the field or afterwards are put forward with the purpose of providing transparency. 
In other words, the nature of my preunderstanding and how it changed along the 
way is accounted for and justified and I have made myself visible as a subject.  
Tracy (2010: 840) has furthermore suggested eight criteria for excellent qualitative 
research: 1) worthy topic, 2) rich rigor, 3) sincerity, 4) credibility, 5) resonance, 6) 
significant contribution, 7) ethical, and 8) meaningful coherence. In order to 
accommodate these criteria in the thesis, I have both in Chapter 1 and 10 
accounted for the relevance and importance of the research topic and the specific 
research question. Throughout Chapter 1-4 I have tried to create transparency and 
sincerity by continuously displaying self-reflexivity accounting rigorously for both 
theoretical framework, the research process, and my preunderstanding and 
continuous deliberations as well as considering ethical aspects. In Part Four I have 
sought to build meaningful coherent narratives about the study’s findings by 
providing a number of analyses on both micro and macro level based on a variety of 
empirical material derived from different research methods. I have thereby strived 
to provide a significant and credible contribution both empirically, 
methodologically, and theoretically. The assessment of the quality of this 
contribution can hereby determine the study’s future and potential resonance, 
influence, and implications which I present in Chapter 10. Quantity (for example 
the number of cases or participants) is accordingly not a central or even relevant 
quality criteria in this connection.  
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Knowledge is organised information (Hastrup 2004). This means that knowledge is 
both selective and reductive as the production of knowledge clarifies and organises 
mess and empirical complexity, but also limits it as it leaves out information (Baarts 
2015). Knowledge cannot be objective or detached from judgements. Knowledge 
about proactive investigation practice which is depicted in this thesis is socially 
constructed and context dependent. It is situated in a specific time and space, and 
created and produced in the simultaneity in the span between a practical and 
theoretical knowledge field and anchored in my (the researcher’s) preunderstanding 
and autobiography and as such backstage knowledge, perspectives, norms and 
values (ibid.). Knowledge production in the context of this study and within the 
embedded methodology is therefore never descriptive nor neutral, but will always 
reflect the researcher’s idiosyncrasies since ‘the self’ becomes a research instrument 
(Bacon et al. 2020). Accordingly, this thesis does not represent the truth about the 
world of proactive investigation as this would be impossible. I have a certain 
preunderstanding of this field, and I impose a specific perspective on this field in 
order to try to understand it. Instead, the thesis poses an interpretation of the world 
of proactive investigation and suggests possible theoretical explanations and as such 
represents a snapshot of what goes on seen through a particular set of spectacles. 
However, the study builds on scientific methods and quality criteria which means 
that the proposed analysis and conclusion are based on systematic and rigorous 
professional academic standards and should be judged accordingly. Therefore, 
’getting it right’ does not refer to the depiction of objective facts in the world ‘out 
there’; facts which can be collected and passed on (Wadel 1991). ‘Getting it right’ is 
about being loyal, honest, and authentic towards the field of study (Hastrup 2004), 
but also in terms of passing on the analytical findings with both engagement and 
respect. Or as Gundhus (2006) argues; conscious subjectivism is better than 
unconscious objectivism. 
Van Maanen (1988) categorises various forms of tales of the field in his classic work 
on ethnographic writing. In accordance with the embedded approach, I find 
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inspiration in the techniques of confessional and impressionist tales where fieldwork 
or participant observation is sought to be demystified and where an intimacy is 
developed between the author and the reader. The author is in this tradition an 
active agent; not in order to be centre of attention—but with the purpose of giving 
the audience a fuller picture of the endeavours of the fieldwork to better 
understand the field of study. The author’s ’I’ is therefore not an ‘I’ as the person 
(me), but as a reflexive and reflecting writing subject. The subjects/‘I’s presented in 
the thesis are therefore different and transformed via the process of writing and in 
the meeting with the reader (Baarts 2015).  
Thus, this thesis as an end product is not to be viewed as a final interpretation of 
the empirical material. Other interpretations and explanations can be proposed 
through different perspectives, in different times, by different researchers. However, 
I will argue that the systematic scientific process in which this research has become 
suggests that it is valid to talk about scientific knowledge. This implies that the 
analytical findings can be lifted to comment on a more general level and be 
transferred to other parts of e.g. policing and police organisations. The robustness 
of this knowledge and thereby its ‘truthfulness’ and ‘rightness’ is for that reason 
based upon its concrete empirical anchoring which is qualified through theory and 
the attempt to meet Fredslund’s (2001) first and second criteria of quality. I will 
discuss this in connection with the third criteria for quality which I unfold in 
Chapter 10.  
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Being a Critical Friend: (Embedded) Ethical 
Dilemmas 
Confidentiality, Anonymity, and Informed Consent 
There are three main concerns when it comes to ethical obligations in connection 
with presenting this study.1 The first has to do with the sensitivity of the empirical 
material as it deals with covert police action and hidden organised crime activities. 
This means that I have been obliged to leave out a considerable amount of 
information from e.g. casework and strategic decision-making. Specific details are 
moreover camouflaged throughout the thesis to prevent the recognition of specific 
events, individuals, investigations and so on. This decision is founded in both a 
demand for confidentiality in regards to specific individuals and investigations which 
are not publicly known, but it is also an ethical consideration to both the Danish 
police organisation and the police officers involved. As a consequence, only the 
most necessary empirical examples are put forward to illustrate and support the 
analytical findings. All other “intriguing matters” and ‘thich ethnographic 
descriptions’ which would serve as a general backdrop to get closer to an 
understanding of the field of organised crime policing are omitted.  
In regards to police tactics, I have not portrayed any actions or lines of inquiry 
which are not described in the general legal framework of policing or proactive 
investigation or have been made public in connection with the general news 
coverage, or via court cases. Perhaps this condition has the consequence of making 
the thesis’ overall narrative of proactive investigation a little narrow and anemic 
compared to a rich ethnographic study with a generous portion of ‘tales from the 
field’ (Van Maanen 1988). However, this has been inevitable with considerations to 
sensitivity and confidentiality. 
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The second issue has to do with anonymity of agents within the field. This has been 
secured by the use of aliases and most often the alteration of time and place. I have 
only included titles and ranks of police officer when it seemed relevant for the 
events which played out or for the specific context. In those situations where the 
circumstances were particularly delicate, I have reconstructed the empirical 
examples in such a way that it should be difficult to recognise places, events, and 
individuals both by the people involved and by others within the police. For 
example, I have in a few cases merged different events together which took place 
some time apart, and I have typically changed the location of the setting or added a 
person, a vehicle or the like. In regards to the material from casefiles, I have altered 
the characteristics and made them as generic as possible.  
The third issue is an ethical dilemma which is persistent for most ethnographers—
but indeed to embedded researchers. The matter is informed consent and concerns 
information generated through observations of a third party (see e.g. Lundgaard 
2019). In this context, it first has to do with the individuals who are being policed—
meaning individuals from the organised crime environment and the people e.g. 
family around them. They have been unaware that their actions for example aspects 
of their private life have been exposed to a researcher through wiretapping, covert 
observation etc. while I followed the covert investigation towards them. Indirectly 
these peoples’ actions have influenced the action of the police and thereby 
informed the study of investigation practices. Second, it has to do with those 
individuals within the police who were not at all times aware that I was a researcher 
carrying out participant observation. Although being an embedded researcher 
certainly has advantages, the position can also be problematic as it is not clear at all 
times and to all people. Sometimes I attended meetings in the capacity of my job 
function within the police and sometimes in the capacity of being an embedded 
researcher. Although people in general within police knew that I was carrying out 
doctoral research I have not asked all the people I have observed to sign a consent 
form or a confidentiality agreement. Such forms have only been used in connection 
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with formal interviews. The reasons have overall been practical in nature. For 
example, when I was doing fieldwork at AIU, police officers and civilian employees 
would often come by the unit to talk or to solve various tasks. As such, they were 
interacting with the detectives I was intensely observing and have thereby indirectly 
been participants in this study. On those occasions, I did not ask them to sign an 
informed consent form as this would quite frankly have been inappropriate in the 
specific social context. They have therefore not been able to give their informed 
consent to participation which is otherwise a general rule in research ethical 
guidelines with reference to protection of personal data. 
Although recognising that this is a difficult ethical dilemma, Norwegian police 
researcher Geir Aas (2009) still argues that there are and must be exceptions to the 
use of informed consent in police research. He provides a number of examples of 
practical and ethical nature where informed consent cannot be applied. There is, 
however, a greater issue regarding the purpose of the research which possibly can 
set aside the demand for informed content. For example that the specific research 
indeed has the purpose of investigating police action which has great consequences 
for individual citizens and the general public’s trust in the police. Police research 
can thereby function as an instrument to create reflection and support 
improvement of police work through professionalisation to the benefit of society as 
a whole. In relation to this study, I therefore concur with Aas’ (2009) arguments 
above. It would not have been possible to obtain the insights in this study if I had 
not at certain times put aside the demand for informed consent. Criminal justice 
research, and specifically research concerning a vital societal institution such as the 
police, has significant political and therefore also ethical dimensions as knowledge 
produced by researchers has potentially real consequences for criminal justice 
practices and those who are subjected to these (Chan 2013). Thus, I find this study 
of great importance as it tries to uncover parts of covert policing—an area which 
lacks knowledge and transparency in order to secure democratic principles.  
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Additionally, I have the following reflections: Since I was already employed within 
the police, my position gave me on a daily basis insights into information about 
crime, offenders, victims, next of kins, and police responses, investigations, police 
practices, and tactics which I have a general obligation to keep secret. The 
information that I encountered during my research did not in that respect differ 
from the type of information which I usually have access to and am bound to keep 
confident. Within this thesis I have, as mentioned, deliberately omitted a vast 
amount of information in regards to its sensitivity. During the extent of Operation 
Goldilocks, I did for example experience an interconnected dilemma as I came 
across some information in my capacity of working in the national unit which had 
particular relevance for the investigation. This information which is too sensitive to 
specify here had implications as to how the investigation was carried out, and how 
AIU detectives would allocate resources and interpret certain information. In this 
situation I had no choice but to keep the information to myself despite the fact that 
I knew the investigation team struggled with this throughout the investigation. 
Consequently, I have tried to navigate in this by respecting the different 
confidentiality considerations in connection with information sharing.  
The Blue Code of Silence 
As mentioned earlier, a debate continuously goes on within police research about 
government research versus independent research (see e.g. Høigaard 2011; 
Holmberg 2014; Davis 2016; Hartmann et al. 2018). Some scholars are concerned 
that inside/government research will be too loyal towards the organisation on the 
expense of being critical. When promoting the embedded approach earlier, I 
underlined the condition that critical perspectives are in some ways easier to 
impose as an organisational member as the backstage knowledge permits the 
researcher to question common-sense actions more in-depth. However, when it 
comes to presenting critical views internally or publicly the embedded position can 
be rather difficult, and this presents an additional ethical obligation in connection 
190
with presenting research findings. I have argued that police organisations to a high 
degree are occupied with front stage work; impression management, keeping up 
appearances, and putting up polished fronts (Goffman 1959; Manning 2004; 2010; 
2014a). This is also the case with the Danish police as Holmberg (2014) amongst 
other implies. To publish the organisation’s ‘dirty laundry’ is perceived as a disloyal 
action and can result in organisational suicide. Besides from the haphazard support 
from sporadic individuals, there exists an informal blue code of silence (Holgersson 
2019) within the police which dictates that criticism internally, but especially 
externally is neither encouraged nor welcome despite of what the formal policy 
about freedom of expression for public servants states (Moderniseringsstyrelsen 
2017).  
Initiatives regarding whistleblowing within the police have been launched within 
the last couple of years on the backdrop of various concerning issues which have 
received extensive critique from the media, citizens, and politicians in the police’s 
handling of these (e.g. e.g. the police’s handling of demonstrations for Tibet in 
connection with state visits from China, and the use of cellphone data evidence in 
the courts2 (Teledata-sagen)). However, it is still early days; The Independent Police 
Complaint Authority (Den Uafhængige Politiklagemyndighed) which investigates 
possible police misconduct and breaches of the law is similarly quite new 
(established in 2012) and a dominant perception amongst police officers is that this 
institution is an enemy which seeks to undermine and make life difficult for honest 
and hardworking police officers. In other words, the resistance against critical 
voices is not just to serve management convenience. It has to do with the entire 
police history from recruitment, to socialisation, and the development of police 
identity, and specific organisational practices over time. The police organisation is 
traditionally not a place where critical assessments and up front professional 
discussions—‘on one side’ and ‘on the other side’—about various aspects of police 
work are taken. As some police officers underline: “It’s not a debating society!”. It is 
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on the contrary a rule of law-organisation where people are expected to walk in line 
and follow orders without questioning them. As an Analyst explains:  
My impression is that within the police culture the demand for loyalty is from the 
moment that you are hired. It’s about the collaboration there needs to be in an 
operative unit—we have to stand shoulder against shoulder when they throw bricks 
at us or when we take down an apartment. We need to be sure that number two goes 
in when number one has kicked the door in. We need to trust each other; we need to 
be loyal. 
As such, the duty of loyalty is regarded as binding as a Police Officer explains: 
“When we’re in a critical incident (skarp situation) no one has an opinion besides the 
operational manager (operativ leder)—opinions come after at the debrief.” Although 
police officers are no strangers to complaining or voicing their opinions, this is 
done carefully and most often in an informal setting or at least very context 
dependent.The different characteristics of the competing epistemological rationales 
of experience-based and knowledge-based policing become clear: The implicit 
organisational expectations in the police stand in opposition to those values of 
scientific research and academia where public scrutiny, debates and criticism are 
obligatory. As I have heard Swedish police researcher Rolf Granér remark on 
several (informal) occasions: “When participating in an academic event you will be 
disappointed if no one critiques your work. It is the opposite within policing.” In fact, 
divergent perspectives and opinions are seen as a threat to the cohesive structures 
within the police (Granér & Holgersson 2012).  
For that reason, it certainly takes a brave organisation to engage in an (embedded) 
research study as there is a strong possibility of exhibiting its most sensitive and 
least appealing aspects. The organisation’s ‘dirty laundry’ is in other words in risk of 
being washed and hung out to dry in a semi-public arena such as Academia. The 
maturity of the organisation in terms of being occupied with organisational learning 
and development is therefore essential for its ability to process and operationalise 
(potential critical) research findings. At the same time, it calls for a bold embedded 
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researcher with an adequate amount of stamina. Loyalty towards the research and 
its findings together with considerations for the organisation’s needs and interests 
should be balanced in a sensible way. This balance is crucial when it comes to 
communicating and perhaps applying the research findings in a constructive 
manner. My experience with and thereby preunderstanding about the police was 
that there is an imminent risk that the researcher suddenly stands alone with her 
research conclusions in the organisation.  
As an embedded police researcher, I have therefore found myself in a burdensome 
tension between the world of Academia and the world of policing: on one hand the 
requirements to deliver and publish critical and sound research, and on the other 
hand to be considerate of a command-and-control system in the police organisation 
hypersensitive of critique (see e.g. Hunt 2010; Holmberg 2014; Holgersson 2015; 
2019; Knutsson 2015). For those reasons, I will be frank about the fact that I for a 
long time have been anxious and worried about going public with this study as I 
first and foremost fear the reception within the police. Without being close to 
solving this issue, I expand on the statement provided together with fellow 
researcher colleagues (Hartmann et al. 2018) that this calls for the position of a 
critical-constructive friend. 
Critical-Constructive Embeddedness 
The idea of the researcher positioning herself as a critical-constructive friend 
(Finstad 2000) assumes that the identification and analysis of organisational 
potentials and challenges are required before the police are able to promote 
professional development as mentioned in Chapter 1. My role as an embedded 
police researcher is therefore twofold: first I need to be a diagnostic providing 
constructive criticism in the shape of scientific knowledge, and second I need to be 
an active agent engaging in making an actual impact on policing. The principles 
within the embedded methodology therefore support the promotion of honest 
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critique without burning any bridges in the police organisation and indeed without 
‘selling out’ in terms of my professional integrity as a researcher. The critical-
constructive embeddedness should ideally promote critique that invites and 
enables joint reflection and action, rather than simply exposing defects and 
pointing fingers from a safely distanced ‘armchair’ position (Hartmann et al. 2018). 
This calls for an additional task of me as an embedded researcher, namely the active 
engagement in and willingness to assist in creating change with the police in a 
friendly and respectful environment. As such, the critical-constructive role in the 
police also includes taking up advisory positions in e.g. formal settings and 
meetings, and moreover to be available for informal dialogue with both managers 
and co-workers about policing in general, the police profession, the organisation, 
and the challenges it faces. Together with Hartmann et al. (2018), I argue that the 
mere presence of embedded researchers/critical friends have an independent value 
as it often opens up important discussions about organisational development which 
are not usually taken in the routine-focused police organisation. On many 
occasions, I have indeed been acknowledged by a variety of police officers who 
appreciate the presence of non-police personnel who commission reflections and 
discussions and a more diverse professional environment. Embedded police 
research comes with a responsibility and an obligation for me as a researcher to 
support constructive change for the benefit of society. Still, the process of bringing 
about changes is not the sole responsibility of the researcher as knowledge sharing 
cannot be enforced by the researcher alone. Likewise, the researcher does not hold 
much control of how the research is interpreted (Hartmann et al. 2018). Thus, 
considerations for a critique-sensitive police organisation or political agendas 
therefore come in second when producing police research. 
Self-Censor-Ship 
The issues which are treated analytically and debated in this thesis might possibly 
be regarded by some as a process of ‘washing dirty laundry in public’. Self-censor-
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ship has on that account been an important and pertinent dilemma for me as a 
researcher during this PhD process especially when I was writing up the thesis. 
Identifying problems and being critical towards one’s own organisation and the 
work being carried out is not an easy or pleasant task. I am deeply respectful of the 
complex task of policing and very much admire police officers’ ability to be 
committed, engaged, and carry out their work with great dedication and strong 
ideals about justice and fairness to the benefit of the general public—despite of 
difficult working conditions, stressful situations, political demands, and 
organisational dysfunctions. It is difficult to find comparable jobs with the same 
degree of diversity and complexity as policing and with such significant 
consequences and implications for those individuals receiving end needing help or 
support or being policed. Consequently, I have been guided by two overall 
principles in regards to this thesis’ analytical findings. These are as follows:  
First of all, I take my job as a researcher seriously—just like policing is a serious 
business and just like police officers are serious about their work. Both Hartmann 
(2014) and Holmberg (2014) point to the contradiction that police officers 
themselves are quite critical towards the police although they do not like this 
critique to be voiced externally especially when it comes from the outside. Still, not 
being critical enough will be regarded as merely having a superficial knowledge 
about policing matters and/or not having the guts to tell it like it is. In this situation, 
the researcher’s reliability and trustworthiness is thereby diminished.  
Second of all, the critical analysis in this thesis is systemic and not individual or 
personal. The purpose is not to identify and critique specific people or units, but 
rather to discover systemic factors which influence the frame in which proactive 
policing is carried out, how it is carried out, and why it is carried out this way. In 
that sense, this research could have been conducted in any organisational context, 
not just within the world of policing. Thus, the above principles guide the next part 
of this thesis in the sense that it proposes an in-depth, critical scrutiny of proactive 
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investigation and its conditions with the purpose of identifying and analysing 
systemic factors and make us wiser on this complex phenomenon. 
 
1 I have overall followed the principles from Aalborg University’s ethical guidelines for social 
research (2018): https://www.fak.samf.aau.dk/digitalAssets/513/513149_retningslinjer-til-fremme-af-
ansvarlig-forskningspraksis-e18_.pdf 





PART THREE: BEHIND THE SCENES  
 

Chapter 5: Police in Times of Turmoil 
- On external and internal events shaping and impacting the 
contextual frame of the Danish police 
The police organization acts, has an audience, and is a social object that people 
understand as real, constraining, important and standing for something other than 
just a person in a blue coat and funny hat. The organization has legal status and is a 
legal actor. It is thus a “social unit” that has collective meaning, consequence, and 
symbolic significance. It performs. People respond to an animate the organization 
as real and doing things—fighting crime, being patriotic, issuing statements, and 
being an expense. It is in this sense a social actor with a social role in the game that 
is society. This is not a playful or whimsical notion; it is a way of considering the 
multifaceted role of the police in society.  
- The Role and Function of the Police, Peter K. Manning (2013: 6). 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I provide the reader with a broad contextual frame of the Danish 
police. I select and examine an assortment of external and internal ‘shaping’ events 
from the last decades which I consider to have significantly influenced the current 
state of the Danish police organisation and contemporary policing as a whole. I 
analyse: how have these events impacted the police organisation and the conditions for 
proactive police work?  
These shaping events are both external and internal and concern social and 
political structures, governance, strategic priorities, criminal incidents as well as 
internal matters and occupational conditions within the police. Such events must 
be explored in order to understand how they have influenced the police 
organisation, policing generally, and proactive police work which is under scrutiny 
in this study. Social and political structures are indeed important to a social 
institution such as the police (Garland 1990), which react to and interact with the 
different stimuli it is exposed to. Even the microcosmos of proactive investigation is 
connected to macro-oriented politics and societal developments which have 
significant direct and indirect influence on how police work is organised and 
carried out. 
As I argued in Chapter 2, it is fair to speak of an international paradigm shift 
within policing in the last decades which has proposed a move from a traditional 
law and order and response focus (the reactive paradigm) towards a more problem-
oriented, analytical, proactive service (the proactive paradigm). This paradigm shift 
is certainly mirrored in the strategic commitment to its ideals in e.g. the 
reformation of organisational structures and education, and a change in the 
strategic direction to analytical and intelligence-led policing (see e.g. The Police’s 
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Business Strategy (Politiets virksomhedsstrategi), The Political Agreement of the 
Police’s and the Prosecution Service’s Budget (Flerårsaftale)). The question I raise at 
the end of this chapter is, however, if this shift has manifested itself in police 
practice or if this practice is even returning to the ‘old’ paradigm as a consequence 
of specific crime challenges, political agendas, and organisational matters. 
Regardless of this, the Danish police have indeed experienced considerable turmoil 
within the time frame of this study (2013-2020), which I find relevant to account for. 
The chapter does not provide an exhaustive systematic review of historical events or 
organisational changes in the time period from 2001 until today. Instead, in the 
historical review of events I have selected those which I consider to be principal in 
terms of having impacted the current state of the Danish police and the conditions 
for carrying out police work. My selection is based on a broad variety of 
documentation and empirical material such as research studies, newspaper articles, 
internal policy documents, accounts in interviews, and field observations. Many of 
these events have not been assembled and analysed by scholars yet, and I recognise 
that the selection and analysis presented in this chapter is incomplete.        
For a thorough examination and comprehensive analyses of the history of the 
Danish police, I refer to three Danish historians: First, Henrik Stevnsborg (2010) 
who presents the development of the Danish police from its origin in 1682 to the 
recent police reform in 2007, and the historical scrutiny of the Danish police in the 
period 1945-2007 (2016). Second, Mikkel Jarle Christensen (2012) who provides a 
historical-sociological analysis of different ideologies within the Danish police 
(from a traditional force-oriented to a more project-oriented idea of police). Third, 
Fredrik Strand (2011) who focuses entirely on the historical development of 
criminal investigation and the shifts in investigative paradigms from 1863 to 2007. 
The time period from 2007 until today has not been examined systematically. 
Moreover, I refer to five central studies of the Danish police which I also draw upon 
in the following analysis, namely Flemming Balvig, Lars Holmberg and Maria 
Nielsen’s study (2011) of the police reform in 2007, Rex Degnegaard’s study (2011) of 
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change management in connection with the police reform, Camilla Hald’s study 
(2011) of the production of evidence in police’s criminal investigations, Kira Vrist 
Rønn’s study (2012) of intelligence work in relation to organised crime, and Mia 
Koss Hartmann’s study (2014) of police innovation. Despite these studies different 
foci, they all provide important analyses of and insights into the contextual frame of 
the Danish police. 
My main argument in this chapter is that although the Danish police have been 
underway with a transformation from a reactive response organisation to a modern 
police service guided by ideals of proactive policing specific external and internal 
events have reactivated the reactive policing paradigm and impeded a genuine 
paradigm shift.  
The chapter is structured as follows: 
First, I identify and analyse at some of the most imperative crimes and crisis the 
police have experienced and their impact on the police organisation and the long-
term consequences they have generated. 
Second, I examine a variety of reforms and initiatives which have been launched 
internally within the police and have altered the organisational context and 
reorientated the strategic direction.  
The chapter ends with a summary of its key findings together with a discussion of 
the conditions for a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive policing. 
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Crimes and Crises 
Waves of Terrorism (from 2001) 
Some of the most decisive events for police and intelligence services all over the 
Western world in this century have of course been the different terror attacks 
carried out in Western countries. The first wave began with the attack on World 
Trade Center 11. September 2001 (US) followed by a line of attacks in e.g. Madrid 
2004 (Spain), and London 2005 (UK). The second wave included the terror attack 22. 
July 2011 in Norway, and the attacks in Paris 7. January, and 13. and 14. November 
2015 (France). These events together with others have had a profound significance 
for the way police and intelligence services have prioritised and organised their 
work in the years after. The terror attacks on the culture community centre 
Krudttønden (which ironically means ‘the powder keg’), and the Jewish synagogue in 
Copenhagen (DK) 14. and 15. February 2015 meant that the Danish police came to 
experience this international wave of terrorism firsthand. 
The various evaluations of these attacks and the authorities’ responses to them (see 
for example Kripos 2011; NOU 2012; Rigspolitiet 2015a and 2015b; Johannessen 
2015; Renå 2019) have underlined a number of areas within policing (in 
Scandinavia) which suggested alterations and improvements both in terms of 
organisational structures, management, coordination, training etc. These incidents 
therefore raised both public and internal discussions about the Danish police’s 
preparedness for and ability to handle terror attacks and other major unannounced 
incidents (større uvarslede hændelser). Comprehensive analysis of the Danish 
police’s ‘operational preparedness’ (Beredskabets operative parathed), strategic 
contingency plans, crisis management etc. were as such instigated and 
recommendations implemented both after the attacks in Norway and in the 
aftermath of the Danish attacks.  
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Yet, organisational changes were already made within the Danish police not long 
after 9/11 as The Danish Intelligence and Security Service (Politiets 
Efterretningstjeneste (PET)) was strengthened and on several occasions given extra 
resources both in terms of staff and technological equipment. New anti-terror 
legislation was additionally implemented in 2002 and 2006, and personnel resources 
(about 150 police officers) were transferred from The National Investigation Unit 
(National Centre of Investigation (NEC)) to The Intelligence & Security Unit (PET) 
(Strand 2011; Christensen 2012; Heiberg 2016). As Christensen argues (2012), the 
police’s intelligence service thereby became a central component in the anti-terror 
response and as such their scope was widened as they became a fulcrum to 
intelligence gathering and intelligence coordination—also when it came to 
international working partners. The strengthened anti-terror agenda has derived a 
vast amount of resources at the ‘closed’ police organisation1 to support high 
policing activities (such as covert policing). This has, although perhaps necessary, to 
a large extent been at the expense of the ‘open’ police organisation and low policing 
activities (everyday calls for service, volume crime such as property crime etc.) as 
resources such as personnel were allocated to the anti-terror agenda.  
After 2015, new training initiatives were furthermore launched within the Danish 
police including the certification of all operational managers (vagtchefer) and a new 
training programme for the use of firearms together with a range of other initiatives 
and operational concepts with the purpose to strengthen the police’s operational 
capacity and preparedness. The police’s daily operational response was moreover 
expanded to include new ‘response patrols’ (reaktionspatruljer) in all police districts
—these were specially trained to handle the first police response to critical 
incidents such as school shootings, terrorism etc. All these initiatives were 
developed and implemented while the police’s crisis and emergency level 
(beredskabsniveau) was at ‘increased emergency level’ (forhøjet beredskab) (level 3 
of 5) or ‘elevated emergency level’ (markant forhøjet beredskab) (level 4 of 5) since 
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the Copenhagen attacks. This challenged the Danish police tremendously in terms 
of both resources and personnel. 
       
Gang Conflicts (from 2008) 
Even though crime in general has decreased within the last decades (Balvig 2015; 
Rigspolitiet 2017), the tasks for the police have not been fewer and the complexity 
of these tasks seems to have increased. Especially new and diffuse threats from 
terrorism, organised crime, mobile offenders from Eastern Europe, and new 
criminal arenas (such as cyberspace) have presented the police with severe 
challenges and have redistributed police resources internally. Furthermore, in 
August 2008 a violent gang conflict arose on the organised crime scene in 
Copenhagen. A homicide on a young man from a loosely organised street gang can 
be characterised as a symbolic catalyst to a number of violent incidents taking place 
in the following years. These incidents are connected to conflicts primarily between 
outlaw motorcycle gangs and ethnic minority street gangs (Hestehave 2013). The 
violence included shootings, assaults, attacks with hand grenades, knife stabbings 
etc. Between 2009-2018 there have been 345 shootings related to gang conflicts in 
Denmark, 361 people have been injured, and 31 people have been killed (internal 
statistics). Over time, the conflicts have become widespread and intricate as new 
gangs and crime groups have risen and have blurred the picture due to their 
somewhat complex mutual relations. Moreover, these conflicts have gone from more 
local and territorial conflicts to national conflicts with international connotations.  
Consequently, these crime problems and their threat to public safety have become a 
critical issue in the public and political discussion of the police’s service level and 
legitimacy. As a result, the police’s response to gangs was singled out as the number 
one priority in political agreements about the police and the prosecution service 
and in the overall strategies from 2012-2019 (Holmberg 2019). This moreover meant 
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that the police re-organised their police response and their strategies as I will show 
later in this chapter and in Chapter 6.  
Migrants and Refugees (2015) 
As the police were still struggling to keep up the enhanced operational presence as 
a consequence of the increased emergency level (beredskabsniveau) and thereby 
carry out day-to-day tasks in the police districts with reduced personnel, some 
rather dramatic events took place at the Danish-German border during the early 
fall of 2015. Thousands of refugees mainly from Syria traveled through Europe by 
busses, trains, and on foot. Their primary goal was supposedly Sweden due to 
Sweden’s rather liberal asylum legislation. Between 6. September to 15. November 
2015 about 64,500 people are believed to have passed the Danish border, whereas 
about 20,000 of these had applied for asylum in Denmark (Holm 2015). The Danish 
police’s political mandate was initially blurry due to both complex EU legislation, 
the Schengen cooperation on open borders within Europe, and the rather 
extraordinary circumstances. The police’s mandate was as a consequence vague, and 
ultimately the Danish government decided to violate the Schengen agreement and 
install temporary border control at the Danish-German border to prevent 
thousands of migrants and refugees from entering Denmark and overloading the 
Danish asylum system. This temporary border control has now become permanent, 
and the police are consequently present at the border carrying out random stops 
and passport control supported by the Danish military and the national guard 
(Hjemmeværnet).  
1 Within the Danish police a distinction is made between the ‘closed’ police organisation (The 
Intelligence and Security Service, PET) and the ‘open’ police organisation (the police districts and 
The National Police). PET is an independent unit and PET’s Police Commissioner is directly 
subjected to the Minister of Justice (Justitsministeren) rather than The National Police 
Commissioner (Rigspolitichefen). 
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Internal Reforms and Initiatives 
Police Reform (2007) 
Although I first began working in the police in the beginning at 2009, one of the 
most frequent conversational topics amongst both managers and police officers 
were the police reform, which was launched in 2007. This reform is by historians 
Stevnsborg (2010) and Christensen (2012) considered to be the most comprehensive 
change within the Danish police since 1938 as it was not only a structural reform, 
but most of all as it represented a new idea of police. The police reform was based 
on a report from an expert group The Vision Committee (Visionsudvalget) (2005) 
called The Future of Police (Fremtidens Politi).  
The report recommended amongst other a new organisational structure of the 
Danish police as the current structure was considered to be outdated in a modern 
context and presented police with significant barriers and difficulties in terms of 
coordinating and cooperating across police districts (Stevnsborg 2010). The Danish 
police was therefore reduced from 54 to 12 police districts with an elimination of 
the regional level. The aim was to build notable stronger and independent districts 
and to decentralise the regional tasks to new bigger districts, which were now 
believed to have the resources and staff to fulfil these. At the same time, a new 
organisational model for the districts was implemented. Although the 
argumentation was to decentralise regional tasks, according to Balvig et al. (2011), 
Christensen (2012), and Holmberg (2019), the overall theme of the reform was in 
fact centralisation. Another important component of the reform was that the 
traditional divide between uniformed patrol police (Beredskabet, tidligere 
Ordenspolitiet) and plainclothes detectives (Kriminalpolitiet) was moreover 
abolished (at least in a formal sense) as this division was considered to be an 
artificial boundary between police professions and a distinct barrier to solve tasks 
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and work efficiently and flexible (Christensen 2012). The Vision Committee 
presented on the contrary the idea of a unified police service with generalists, and 
outlined a future working method building on an analytical and problem-oriented 
approach where teams should be deployed across different skills and professions 
within the police.  
Initially, the 2007 police reform was considered to be rather uncontroversial (at least 
politically), but shortly after the implementation of it a massive critique was put 
forward in different newspapers and other media outlets where a series of police 
neglect (politisvigt)—specifically the police’s fail to respond to calls for service—
were uncovered through several months. This impacted the public’s trust within the 
police in general and questioned the police’s effort to implement the reform 
specifically (Balvig et al. 2011; Christensen 2012; Holmberg 2019). The idea that the 
police reform would enable a better police service and a more efficient police 
response to the public’s needs and high demands for service was consequently 
questioned both outside and inside the police. Meanwhile, a rather comprehensive 
budget deficit around 800 million DKK was “discovered” in the police’s budget in 
2008, which consequently led to the dismissal of the former National Police 
Commissioner (Rigspolitichef). A number of budget analyses were hereafter 
initiated and the police—which traditionally had been spared financial cutbacks, in 
contrast to other public areas such as health, welfare, and education—were now in a 
position where they were forced to find additional 300-500 million DKK in their 
budget and at the same time had to improve the level of police service and 
efficiency. Therefore, for several years after the launch of the police reform it had an 
enormous impact on the police organisation and on the way police work was 
organised and carried out. Thus, the organisational structures and frames proposed 
in the reform are still framing the Danish police organisation (there have been 
various organisational changes since, but minor ones compared to the reform). The 
external criticism from both politicians, the media, and the general public 
combined with the internal chaos of the implementation process shook the 
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organisational robustness and confidence (see e.g. Degnegaard 2010; Balvig et al. 
2011)—a condition underlined by a statement from a former Superintendent: “It 
was like getting buckets of cold water thrown at you from all angles and you just had to 
move forward”. As a consequence, the police reform left the Danish police in a 
rather unstable condition. I will argue that external events and (new) crime 
problems—such as gang conflicts—meant that stability was never really established 
since the police had to tackle these problems in an already turbulent time and 
unsettled organisational environment.  
Furthermore, strategic management researcher Rex Degnegaard (2010) argues that 
the implementation of the police reform was based on change management 
technologies developed and based on premises other than those of the police 
organisation. Instead of turning to resources and informal relations within the 
police—which are essential to law enforcement organisations—the police turned to 
external consultants and advisors. This meant that the reform process did not take 
into account the positive aspects of the organisation and its working practices, 
structures etc., but focused solely on implementing new initiatives from the reform. 
Moreover, Degnegaard argues (ibid.), the reform was based on a functional-rational 
logic, which disregarded the relevance of symbolic action and therefore created 
confusion within the police as they as a public institution are confronted with 
demands of both providing genuine security for the public and having to create the 
‘feeling of safety’ (tryghedsfølelse) e.g. visible presence in the communities. Another 
important factor was an over-focus on implementation of technologies rather than 
enhancing the necessary skills to handle these technologies within the police, and 
the implementation therefore became extremely complex to control. Ultimately, the 
police reform and its derived ramifications presented the Danish police with 
significant challenges long after it was considered to be implemented and 
operational. The idea of a generalist police service working problem-oriented across 
organisational boundaries was moreover little by little abolished as I will explain in 
the following sections.  
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New Public Management 
Along the lines of management styles in other Scandinavian and Western police 
services (Hoque et al. 2004; Wathne 2018; Holmberg 2019), a new governance model 
and thereby management style was introduced in the Danish police namely New 
Public Management (NPM). This governance model had considerable support from 
the Treasury Department (Finansministeriet) and was already introduced to other 
parts of the public sector in Denmark during the 1980s and 1990s (Christensen 
2012). Inspired by the private sector, NPM was considered to be a more efficient and 
modern way to govern public institutions. As such, ideas of rationalisation and 
streamlining were implemented via a strict financial management and the 
introduction of a market inspired system of performance measurement (Wathne 
2018; Holmberg 2019) (I will return to this in Chapter 6).  
The strengthening of NPM within Danish police was also rooted in the significant 
deficits in the police’s budget and as a consequence of both public and political 
demands to produce more visible and tangible results for policing. Performance 
measures have (as well as in other Nordic countries see e.g. Holgersson & Knutsson 
2011, Johannessen & Glomseth 2015; Wathne 2018; Holmberg 2019) been 
thoroughly criticised, for example by the police union, as it is viewed as 
undermining the police service’s ability with its focus on the quantification of 
police work. In January 2014 the former National Police Commissioner, Jens Henrik 
Højbjerg, gave an interview where he said (Kejser 2014, my translation): 
I think that performance measurements make sense when we organise them so that 
people can see the reasoning behind them. It also helps when we plan from the 
beginning of the year so that everything doesn’t need to be gained in November and 
December. Besides that, you have to remember that it’s a very small part of our 
activities, which are based on performance measurements. (…) There is a tradition 
in the Danish police of providing an enormous commitment and I don’t see that as 
disappearing. That being said, I do understand that we need to focus on the core 
tasks of policing. I understand completely that people need stability and there have 
211
been big changes within recent years. We have experienced pressure in terms of the 
economy and demands for efficiency. But we are close to the goal.  
The statement can be seen as in support of the critique of the one-dimensional 
focus on ‘efficiency’. However, NPM still persists within the Danish police as well as 
other Scandinavian and Western countries six years after the dominant governance 
model (Fyfe et al. 2013; Holmberg 2019). This focus have amongst other resulted in 
the on/off instigation of internal analyses of police efficiency over the last decade 
carried out by external consultants with the purpose of controlling budgets and 
identifying necessary resources to secure the future challenges of policing (Kejser 
2013). Moreover, these analyses were instigated as The National Police ultimately 
wanted more centralised control and overview of police activities in the districts 
and as the organisational structure and the role of The National Police in relation to 
the police districts was still unclear. It was argued by top management that further 
centralisation and efficiency would lead to more streamlined and homogeneous 
policing, however, along the lines of Christensen et al. (2018), many police officers 
saw it merely as an old-fashioned budget cut.  
Management Reform 
Along with the implementation of the police reform and NPM a new management 
model was introduced in 2007 proposing an executive board (koncernledelse) and 
line management (linjeledelse) throughout the organisation from The National 
Police to the districts. The purpose was amongst other to professionalise the 
governance of the police and to make responsibility and transparency clearer. The 
previously autonomous management within the police districts from the deputy 
national police commissioners (politimestre) was minimised, and 12 police 
commissioners (politidirektører) were appointed in the newly established districts. 
Together with The National Police Commissioner constituted The Executive Board 
(Christensen 2012; Holmberg 2019).  
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From 2012-2014 the Danish police initiated a process to lay down a new 
management foundation (ledelsesgrundlag) as various consultant reports since 2005 
had uncovered unclear roles and responsibilities within management, a lack of 
collaboration across management lines, and a gap between expectations and 
managerial space for each manager. The management philosophy leadership pipeline 
(Dahl & Molly-Søholm 2012) was introduced to clearly define and delimit specific 
tasks and responsibilities at every management level and across the management 
group. To support this management foundation, new recruitment and training 
processes were instigated, and two operational concepts were additionally 
developed: corporate management (virksomhedsledelse) and front-line management 
(føringsledelse). These concepts can be seen as two different worlds meeting each 
other; a modern management thinking, where dialogue and staff involvement are 
seen as necessary measures to attain strategic goals, motivations, and quality, and a 
traditional ‘command and control’ police management where a direct and 
authoritative management style is used to ensure the provision of certain operative 
and risky tasks (Cockcroft 2012). Thus, the practical implementation of these 
management styles seems to have challenged the police—a traditional bureaucracy 
with many years of command and control governing is not easily transformed into 
an involving and collaborative organisation. Such a critique is likewise raised within 
the academic field; Dahl & Nielsen (2014) for example claim that leadership pipeline 
contains opposing management styles and that this particular mangement model is 
therefore sensitive to the complex, dynamic, and distributed management which 
many modern organisations are in fact characterised by. Despite great 
organisational efforts, this is perhaps why daily management within Danish police, 
as Wathne similarly finds in Norwegian police (2018), does not seem to have 
changed fundamentally as a consequence of leadership pipeline. As a Police Officer 
remarks:  
It’s just a hurray-word (hurra-ord) they use to make it sound better than before. But 
everything is top down anyway (topstyret), so managers down the line don’t have 
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any space to make their own decisions and what good does leadership pipeline do 
then? They just call it something different, but we don’t see the change.  
In addition, as a part of the management reform (Lederreform 2.0), the number of 
managers was reduced by 25 per cent1 in 2014. Some managers were offered other 
positions within the police and some where given notice. The National Police 
Commissioner (Jens Henrik Højbjerg), stated in a press release (Rigspolitiet 2013, 
my translation):  
We are challenged by a rapid changing crime picture and demands and expectations 
from the public and politicians to provide more for the same amount of money. At 
the same time, staff within the police expect—in a modern organisation—
management who can create an appealing and modern workplace. This requires an 
effective and professional united management with clear roles and responsibilities, 
and short chain of commands and fast decision-making. (…) The purpose is to 
secure that managers in their daily work promote a high professional quality, show 
trust, and make staff responsible and develop the organisation as a whole.  
Short chains of commands was one of the primary arguments for the reduction of 
the number of managers and for removing the entire chief police inspector level 
(vicepolitikommissærer). As such, many young, aspiring managers were either 
transferred to other functions or let go—and the process was equally badly received 
amongst managers and police officers. My observations indicate that the general 
perception internally within the police is that the principles of front-line 
management are still dominant and that the management mandate is to a high 
degree assembled at the top of the organisation (topstyret). Although these 
management reforms may not have had the desired outcomes in terms of 
transforming the entire management model within the police and significantly 
impacting management styles at all levels, these efforts have contributed to 
organisational unrest for a number of years and as such can be seen as a 
component to a shift in the police’s strategic focus, and the preoccupation with 
performative change (I elaborate on this in the coming chapters).  
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Task Forces (from 2009) 
As mentioned earlier, violent conflicts within the gang environment constitute a 
tremendous problem for the police in terms of trying to prevent, control, and 
investigate the conflicts. The organisational frames and the amount of staff available 
were not at all sufficient to staunch the conflicts and as a result it was difficult to 
employ a preventive and proactive strategy towards the problem. Hence, the 
organised crime unit within Copenhagen Police was transferred into a gang unit 
(Bandeenhed) in the spring of 2009 and was given both operational and 
investigative resources. The unit consisted of approximately 100 police officers; 
detectives with investigation tasks and uniformed staff who were initially supposed 
to perform so-called public safety and preventive patrols (tryghedspatruljeringer). 
However, the conflicts continued and the public and political pressure to stop the 
violence increased and in the fall of 2009, The National Police Commissioner 
released a statement (politi.dk, 24. October 2009, my translation):  
The police’s efforts have so far provided good results (…) Unfortunately, despite of 
an intensified police response shootings continue especially within the capital region 
and in Zealand. The police have charged offenders in every third of these cases, but 
they are extremely difficult to solve as victims and witnesses typically will not 
collaborate with the police. As a result, the police response must be further 
intensified (…) It has been decided to establish a specialised unit to strengthen the 
proactive investigation against those people who directly or indirectly are key 
players in these conflicts.  
A new specialised unit, Task Force East (Task Force Øst) was established and 
became operational in November 2009. It consisted of approximately 75 staff 
recruited from all police districts in Zealand (Sjælland). The task force was a 
collaboration between the police districts on Zealand and the National Centre of 
Investigation (NEC). The organisational set up was that it remained a ‘shielded 
resource’ (skærmet ressource) in the sense that it had an independent operational 
plan, independent economy (a separate government appropriation), independent 
management, and an independent prosecution service. The task force was kept from 
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other police tasks in the districts and was omitted from the daily police operation, 
which meant that they could concentrate entirely on gang crime and gang conflicts.  
Regardless of these additional efforts, the problems with violent conflicts 
continued. The Western part of Denmark had since the 1990s been influenced by 
outlaw motorcycle gangs, Hells Angels and Bandidos, which to a large extent 
controlled the drug market. However, ethnic minority street gangs began to appear 
in various forms and structures and a strained relationship between the groups in 
Western Denmark became a considerable concern for the police. Thus, the political 
agreement of the police’s and the prosecution service’s economy from 2011 
included the establishment of a second task force, Task Force West (Task Force Vest), 
in the Western part of Denmark to further intensify the police response to gangs. 
Task Force West was implemented in the beginning of 2012 and consisted of 
approximately 100 employees; primarily detectives, prosecutors, and administrative 
staff. Along with complex violent gang conflicts a problem with burglary started to 
occupy the general public and the media. Together with stories in the press about 
the police’s failure to respond to calls for service when it came to burglary, the 
police were once again under great pressure from both the public and at a political 
level. Yet another task force, Task Force Burglary (Task Force Indbrud), was therefore 
established in the spring of 2012 in the Northern part of Zealand. Its purpose was 
to investigate organised burglary and the purchase of stolen goods, and the former 
Minister of Justice, Morten Bødskov, said on April 24, 2012 (my translation): 
The police response and a consistent legal policy will contribute to all citizens feeling 
safe in their everyday lives. The anti-burglary response is therefore important. 
People feel unsafe when strangers have broken into their homes. As such, burglary is 
one of the prioritised areas of response, which I as the Minister of Justice has 
identified. I’m happy to note that we can see from the figures that the police have 
intensified their response to burglaries.    
In conclusion, five years after the launch of the most revolutionary police reform 
since 1938, specific crime problems and external pressure resulted in the above 
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presented alterations in organisational structures and division of task. The large-
scale reform was to some degree abandoned. First, the idea of a unified police with 
police generalists who could solve a broad variety of tasks and duties within policing 
(whether it was uniformed patrol work and response to calls for service or 
investigative work in complex organised crime cases) was in some ways rejected. On 
the contrary, specialised profiles (such as detectives with organised crime 
experience) were suddenly in high demand in order to cover the areas of 
responsibility within the task forces. Second, the new big police districts were not 
thought to be sufficient in terms of providing the necessary organisational frames 
and the cooperation across police districts did not go as well as expected in terms of 
meeting (new) crime challenges such as organised gang crime and organised 
burglary.  
An internal evaluation of the three taskforces (established in 2009, 2011 and 2012 
respectively) was instigated in 2015-2016. The conclusion from this evaluation was 
that these taskforces had been successful in terms of providing good investigative 
results (measured in cases, arrests, seizures, convictions etc.). However, a stronger 
strategic focus, a clear national steering, and more transparent prioritisation and 
decision-making were identified as required in the future to meet the complex 
crime challenges. The evaluation recommended that two large regional 
‘investigation communities’ (Efterforskningsfællesskaber) were to be established in 
the two largest police districts—one in Copenhagen (Regional Investigation Unit 
East), and one in Aarhus (Regional Investigation Unit West) by January 2017. The 
new regional investigation units were to replace the existing taskforces and cover 
their tasks and crime areas, and additionally include the police response towards 
mobile offenders and organised burglary. These regional investigation units were 
established to provide a permanent and sustainable solution to the complex area of 
organised crime. Once again, the organisational structure for the Danish police was 
altered and a regional level between The National Police and the local police 
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districts was reinstated—an organisational structure which was abandoned with the 
police reform in 2007.       
Police Education 
Other important changes over the years (from 2007 and forward) include, in my 
view, various reforms and alterations of the police education as this makes up the 
recruitment foundation for most human resource in the police. For an in-depth 
analysis of changes of the police education I will however refer to Diderichsen 
(2017). Still, a couple of things deserves to be highlighted. First, in connection with 
the police reform in 2007 it was recommended that the police education should be 
transferred into a three-year bachelor’s degree in policing (professionsbachelor) 
instead of a non-credited education (etatsuddannelse). The new police education 
was proposed for mainly two reasons: 1) to ensure that future police officers had the 
qualifications needed to handle more complex crime problems and satisfy the 
increased demands from the public, and 2) to harmonise the police education with 
the established educational system in Denmark and internationally (Diderichsen 
2017). The rationale behind the police reform was moreover that police officers 
needed a more analytical approach to police work with the implicit need for every 
police officer to be reflective and make independent and professional decisions in 
many different and difficult situations based on general knowledge rather than 
individual experience. This is in accordance with the ideals and aims of the 
proactive policing paradigm and indeed the rationales of knowledge-based policing. 
The alteration of the police education (training) was implemented in 2011 and the 
first class of bachelors graduated from The Police Academy (Politiskolen) in 2014.  
However, in the aftermath of the terror attacks and the migrant crisis in 2015, it was 
decided in the political agreement about the police’s and the prosecution service’s 
budget that the intake of police aspirants at The Police Academy should be 
increased by 900 over four years. To accommodate the critical resource problem, it 
was additionally decided to alter the formal police education again. The political 
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agreement in 2015 therefore proposed a non-credited two-year police education. 
The overall purpose was to produce new police officers fast so that they could 
engage in the resourceful tasks of primarily target protection and border control. 
The internal argument was moreover that the bachelor’s degree was not flexible 
enough to meet new educational needs and requirements due to political demands 
and altered crime trends.  
The public and political response to this alteration was surprisingly uncritical, 
which probably had to do with the fact that the Danish police were seen as being in 
a crisis, but the internal critique of this decision within the police was massive 
(Diderichsen 2017). The police were in this political agreement furthermore bound 
to raise the overall qualifications for police officers in general which meant that in-
job training (efter- og videreuddannelse) was to be developed on a variety of themes 
and areas in order to compensate for shortening the basic police education. 
Moreover, a year later in the fall of 2016, a six-month police training programme was 
introduced for ‘police cadets’ (politikadetter) to provide additional operational 
resources as fast as possible. The reasons for these reforms and alterations of the 
police education are many and complex and include political, structural, and union-
related explanations (see e.g. Christensen 2012; Stevnsborg 2016; Diderichsen 2017 
for further elaborations). My overall argument in the context of this study is, 
however, that it mirrors the competition between the epistemic rationales of 
knowledge versus experience. Throughout the coming analytical chapters (Chapter 
6, 7, 8, and 9), I analyse police epistemic culture and the consequences for the 
possibilities of a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive policing, and for the 
practice of proactive investigation in particular.  
1 The overall number of managers was reduced from about 1,400 to 1,050 across the national police 
and the police districts (internal statistics). 
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Summary & Discussion: From Force to Service and 
Back Again?  
In this chapter, I have identified and analysed some of the most significant events 
within and around the timeframe of this study which I argue have shaped and 
impacted the current state of the Danish police organisation and thus the 
conditions for carrying out proactive police work. In the current section, I account 
for the central findings and discuss the implications of these. 
Some overall conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the years from the beginning of 
the millennium until current days have been rather turbulent for the Danish police. 
The political and public pressure on the police has increased remarkably, and the 
new ministerial governance, including the introduction of NPM, means that the 
police are no longer an unchallenged authority. Moreover, the police’s priorities, 
dispositions, work processes etc. are increasingly being examined and critiqued by 
both the media, at a political level, and by the general public (for example via social 
media). This includes the earlier mentioned examples of the police’s response to 
calls for service, and the police’s handling of crime issues which are seen as 
particularly important to the public (burglaries, violent conflicts etc.). Additionally, 
high-level political and delicate issues such as the police’s handling of 
demonstrations supporting Tibet in connection with state visits from China (Tibet-
sagen), and the use of cellphone data and DNA evidence in the courts1 (Teledata-
sagen) have further questioned the police’s accountability (Holmberg 2019). For the 
police, this pressure has resulted in a condition were different parts of day-to-day 
policing are a subject of political interference reducing professional decision-
making and prioritisation within the organisation.  
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Second of all, even though the general crime level is decreasing, the assessment of 
risks, threats, and potential harm to society in general, depict a more diffuse and 
complex crime picture (Rigspolitiet 2017). The perception of risk and the 
implications of postmodern risk society (Beck 1992) and culture of control (Garland 
2001) propose great challenges for police to plan and carry out police work in order 
to meet public demands. Moreover, it raises questions to police’s capacity and 
capability to meet these challenges in terms of organisational robustness, 
leadership, competences, equipment, training etc. Due to single crime events and 
isolated threats and risks (especially terrorism, gang conflicts and migration), the 
Danish police are spending a vast amount of resources carrying out reactive law and 
order-related tasks such as target protection and border control, which remove 
resources and staff from day-to-day policing and complex crime investigation (see 
also Christensen 2012). As such, the police are struggling to keep up a minimal 
service level in terms of aiding and assisting the general public and carrying out 
basic tasks of low policing such as service duties, preventive work, traffic controls, 
and investigating volume crime (this is in accordance with a finding within 
Norwegian police (Wathne 2015)).   
Third of all, the amount of internal processes such as structure reforms, 
reorganisations, budget adjustments, implementation of information technologies, 
changes within management, demands for certified personnel in specific functions 
etc. have created a great deal of turbulence within police and interfered with daily 
tasks. As Degnegaard (2010) argues in relation to the police reform in 2007: the 
implementation process created confusion at a time when it was necessary to create 
cohesion. There was not a clearly defined strategy to lean upon in turbulent times, 
which acknowledged the specific characteristics of the police organisation. This 
seems to be true not only for the implementation of the police reform in 2007, but 
is rather becoming an organisational trait of the police, which therefore continuous 
to be a recurring problem in all processes of change (this is moreover an 
observation in police organisations internationally see e.g. Fyfe et al. 2013). For both 
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managers and staff this condition results in an unclear general direction of the 
organisation and generate concerns about the tasks of tomorrow. This instability 
seems to a large extent to have affected the degree of cohesiveness within the 
organisation, which is an indispensable part of any police organisation both in 
quiet times, but especially in crises. Terpstra et al. 2019 introduce the concept of 
‘abstract police’ when explaining the increasingly abstract character of police due to 
unintended changes of police organisations—a similar condition to the situation 
presented here.   
Accordingly, a central finding is that both external and internal conditions have 
indeed influenced the police as a public institution and have indirectly negotiated 
the role of police in society. This discussion, however, has been under the guise of 
‘what kind of tasks should the police solve?’ and ‘by whom’—an indirect discussion 
of plural policing (Rogers 2017). Furthermore, I argue that this discussion is often 
related to ‘what can be prioritised within the budget’ whereas other pertinent issues 
which relate to the role of police in society are to a minor extent included in the 
political and public debate as well as internally within the police. The police are in 
fact a value-based social institution in society operating on a social mandate 
(Gundhus 2012), which make issues such as legitimacy, ethics, accountability, public 
trust, legal equality, and professional ethics etc. important (Manning 2010). However, 
such matters are at risk of becoming secondary at the expense of rationality and 
effeciency which is reflected in new management ideals in terms of performance 
measurement, and tight control of police budgets. As I will present in the coming 
chapter these new forms of governance and management have to a high degree 
meant that police work is seen as definite processes, tasks, or services in a 
production line, which can be examined and standardised individually. The process 
of policing as a broad activity—including the complex span between prevention, 
enforcement, and the provision of service to the general public—is as such minor in 
this management focus. This presents a problem for the police, a so-called human 
service organisations (Granér & Kronkvist 2014), with all its interdependencies if not 
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taken adequately into account. The basic principles of policing are easily overruled 
in the current climate as the focus in processes of change is to a large extent on 
how current—and sometimes acute—problems are dealt with in the here and now 
instead of how these tasks fit in with the general idea of policing, which enjoys 
democratic legitimacy and therefore both publicly and political support.  
  
The above analysis has shown that there has been considerable efforts to reform 
and thus move the Danish police towards the new proactive policing paradigm 
focusing on analytical problem-solving and prevention rather than merely law and 
order-oriented reactive responses to isolated incidents. However, there are also 
indications that this paradigm is continuously constrained. Although the police 
reform in 2007 introduced a new governance and organisation model and a new 
police education along with the idea of a unified police, a few years later the police 
already began moving from the generalist education towards more specialisation, 
and the reinstatement of regional units (taskforces). The present resource situation 
in the Danish police puts pressure on both everyday policing and specialised tasks. 
This means that e.g. preventive tasks are downsized and that proactive perspectives 
on police work are set aside as for example border security and guarding physical 
objects are continuously prioritised. The current police education is moreover too 
basic to specialise any police officer and this results in a situation where police 
officers need a considerable amount of subsequent advanced education (efter- og 
videreuddannelse). The conversion between different strategic directions for the 
police (proactive/reactive), organisational structures (regional/local), approaches to 
recruitment and education (generalist/specialist) covers areas which usually require 
long term strategic planning and years of development work in order to be 
successful—however, this does not fit the time frame of political demands.  
Consequently, my main argument in this chapter is that the Danish police due to 
both external and internal conditions dowse between different policing paradigms, 
organisational models, management styles, and educational programmes with such 
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a pace that the ideas and the implementation of them seem to be abandoned before 
their potential positive outcome manifest themselves in the practical world of 
policing. Within the organisation there is therefore discussions about a move from a 
police service to a guarding police force (bevogtningspoliti). The move from a police 
service to a guarding police force can also be illustrated by a move from a proactive 
to a reactive operational model and thus from proactive to reactive policing. 
Although the discussed events concern primarily the political and structural level, 
they also impact everyday policing. Thus, the ideals of proactivity and 
modernisation reforms are difficult to sustain due to both external and internal 
conditions as discussed above. 





Chapter 6: The Measure of Success 
- On police’s instigation of rapid responses towards organised crime  
Something-ought-not-to-be-happening-about-which-something-ought-to-be-done-
NOW! 
- Egon Bittner’s definition of ‘police’ (1974: 30).  
Introduction 
Just after New Year’s, on the first official working day, I called Sandy, the senior investigative 
officer in the Alpha Investigation Unit, to get an update on how the investigation, Operation 
Goldilocks, had proceeded during the Christmas holidays. 
“We’re closed down.” 
It took a while before I understood what he had just said. 
“Excuse me?”  
Sandy laughed briefly. 
“I’m sitting here…we’re sitting here, and we’ve been talking about it for hours now. We don’t 
understand it!” 
“But why?” I asked. 
“Due to the lack of expected progress in the investigation.” 
I could sense that he was quoting management language. 
“But didn’t you carry on over the holidays…didn’t you tend to the wires (passede 
aflytningerne)?” 
“We did. We had a whole team in here…the surveillance team too, we were going for Justin. 
A few more days, maybe, we would’ve had a case.” 
Sandy laughed once again, he sounded bewildered. 
“So, what happened?” 
“I think they—Brett Oakley and all those people up there (on the management floor, my 
addition) - sensed that this wasn’t getting us Jerry (the prime target of the operation, my 
addition). It’s no longer a winning case (vindersag). We’re far out in the circles with Justin. 
It’ll take forever to get Jerry. BUT we’re starting a new case tomorrow. A bit closer to home, 
thank God. A usual suspect (en gammel kending) called Rob from downtown. He’s 
supposedly dealing a large amount of cannabis in the neighbourhood. At least we don’t 
have to drive so damn far each time we have to put up that damn equipment.”  
Sandy was referring to problems related to wiretapping in open air (aflytning i det fri). 
During Operation Goldilocks the detectives had experienced a number of difficulties when it 
came to placing technical equipment in strategic places to record sound and conversations 
between suspects in different public spaces for example streets and parking lots.   
We talked for a while about the matter. Sandy and the team were frustrated about the 
shutdown of the operation. Especially after a holiday break with around the clock staffing. 
Apart from the lack of progress in the investigation the Chief Superintendent had pointed to 
the fact that there was a general lack of resources due to the situation regarding increased 
border security as a consequence of an escalating migration from the south. Moreover, there 
were uncertainties regarding another imminent reorganisation in the police districts. These 
were put forward by management as additional reasons for terminating the investigation. 
On the other hand, the team was growing weary as the investigative measures they had 
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initiated did not really succeed. As Sandy had declared on many occasions: “Everything 
we’ve tried in this investigation has failed.”  
Another disturbing issue was the growing impatience from police management when it 
came to providing tangible results. 
“We’ve told them from the beginning: Jerry’s not gonna be easy. They’ve started several 
investigations against him before (har kørt på ham før)—it’s not something you just wrap up 
overnight. We’ve made that clear from the very beginning!” 
I asked if they were going to gather the team and have a session to evaluate the investigation 
process as I of course was eager to participate in such a session. 
“Hm, it’s not been discussed”, Sandy said, “I don’t know if we’ll get around to it as we’re 
starting Operation Close-to-Home right away. Tommy is already in court today (to get a court 
order for interception in communications, my addition), but I think maybe Jed is writing up a 
summary. Don’t worry. We’re still the same team carrying on.” 
The paraphrased conversation above took place exactly eight months after I was 
introduced as a researcher, a participant observer, to AIU and the launch of 
Operation Goldilocks. The investigation’s prime target was Nigel Smith also known 
by the alias “Jerry”—a usual suspect connected to the organised crime environment 
and a specific criminal group. Jerry was suspected of being responsible for the 
import and distribution of large amounts of illicit drugs. He had been an active 
offender in the drug environment through decades and was in some ways regarded 
as a legend within organised crime. Besides that, many police officers had followed 
his “career” alongside their own. He was considered to be a very influential person 
in the criminal environment, a key player (en stor spiller), and one of his greatest 
resources was his international connections.  
In the investigation proposal for Operation Goldilocks1 (presented in Chapter 1), the 
estimation of the operation’s duration was 18 months. The investigation was from 
the beginning allocated substantial resources; the team consisted of eight detectives 
from AIU and four detectives from an adjoining police district. Additionally, two 
detectives from the former Serious Crime Squat (Rejsehold) at The National Centre 
of Investigation (NCI) were assigned to the operation. Moreover, the operation had a 
clear and prioritised international angle. For that reason, considerable resources 
were put into establishing both official and bilateral agreements with cooperating 
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law enforcement partners in two European countries through Eurojust. The 
purpose was to create a joint investigation team (JIT). No official agreement about a 
JIT was ever made in connection with Operation Goldilocks, but bilateral 
cooperations were established which meant that the two detectives from the 
national unit were stationed in one of the cooperating countries to coordinate the 
investigation with local law enforcement through several months. In other words, 
the investigation was launched with great ambition and confidence.   
As the months passed, however, the investigation team grew frustrated and tired as 
their attempts to get close to Jerry and his presumed criminal activities (the import 
and distribution of illicit drugs) did not seem to lead anywhere—or at least not to 
Jerry as a prime culprit. Meanwhile, management was becoming more absent and 
seemed less and less interested in the investigation as other investigations were 
prioritised and launched alongside. Three weeks before the shutdown of Operation 
Goldilocks one of the internationally stationed detectives was redirected to another 
assignment for a period of three months. The general understanding amongst the 
detectives was that management was realising that the current investigation set up 
did not get any of the desired operational results (seizures and arrests). The 
continuation of the investigation would as such require a vast amount of resources 
over a considerable amount of time which management apparently were not 
prepared to allocate. As such, the rather dramatic resource situation regarding the 
strengthened border security (as discussed in Chapter 5) was used as a plausible 
explanation for shutting down the investigation.  
The example above illustrates a number of important themes, core challenges, and 
not least dilemmas when it comes to proactive investigation. As it evolves around 
crime which is ongoing or yet to be committed there is no specific criminal event to 
investigate, but instead suspicion as the primary line of inquiry. For that reason: 
when should a proactive investigation be launched or closed down? How many 
resources should be invested, and when are the efforts enough? When does a 
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proactive investigation qualify as a success, and how is this success measured and 
by whom? And further: which external and internal circumstances impact these 
conditions?  
In this chapter, I explore the formal frame and informal aspects of the world of 
proactive policing. The chapter is concerned with the political and social context 
and organisational framework of the police’s response to organised crime in which 
police managers and detectives operate and where proactive investigation is carried 
out. I examine both political and strategic demands for the police together with 
culturally anchored assumptions and rationales about what makes up good police 
work. Thus, I explore the dynamic between discourse and practice and the 
performance and impacting mechanisms of proactive investigation as it is carried 
out both front stage and backstage (Goffman 1959). Overall, I ask the question and 
analyse: how is successes of proactive policing measured?  
  
In accordance with Manning (2010), the aim with this chapter is to demonstrate 
how and why the connection between macro politics and micro practices is 
particularly important. In accordance, I analyse strategic and operational objectives 
and key performance indicators which are described in policy and steering 
documents for the police (e.g. political agreements, strategies, action plans etc.). I 
unfold how political and strategic demands and expectations are operationalised 
into two response models—respectively a broad response model and a narrow 
response model. These two response models are my analytical take on how political 
expectations are operationalised into modes of (police) action, and thus create 
meaning within the police organisation. I focus further on how the political 
demands and expectations are perceived (primarily by police management) and 
consequently dealt with in the police organisation. I examine the informal 
structures by looking at the assumptive world and epistemic culture of proactive 
policing specifically by investigating the culturally anchored perceptions of good 
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police work and the police’s criminal counterpart and as such the impact of these 
collectively shared assumptions on police practice.  
My main argument in this chapter is that the police’s response towards organised 
crime is formally guided by a tough-on-crime approach prompting repressive, 
punitive, and reactive efforts measuring successes in multiple arrests, seizures, and 
incarceration of offenders. This, in combination with an informal organisational 
preference and preoccupation with providing fast and visible results, contributes to 
a police response which is primarily characterised by reactive police work solving 
‘problems of the day’ and thus delivering a rapid response to organised crime. 
Accordingly, this mirrors the persistent dilemma of instigating reactive responses 
dealing with short-term problems at hand or proactive long-term responses 
focusing on subversive structures of organised crime.  
The chapter is structured as follows: 
First, I look at the political backdrop and the underlying notions of the police’s 
organised crime strategy and thus the formal frame. I scrutinise the strategic and 
operational objectives and key performance indicators in policy documents, action 
plans etc. to identify the formal measures of success and the presumed logic model 
behind these.  
Second, I identify and analyse two different response models which operationalise 
the strategy into police action. I unfold how the political and strategic demands and 
expectations plays out on the front stage and are perceived internally within the 
police on the backstage, and how these are dealt with at an organisational level. 
Furthermore, I look at the various challenges and dilemmas it creates and what the 
implications are for police work in connection to organised crime and proactive 
investigation.  
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Third, I begin to examine parts of police epistemic culture and assumptive world of 
proactive policing which is expressed both front stage and backstage. I specifically 
look at the culturally anchored perceptions of good police work and the criminal 
counterpart and as such the impact of this epistemic culture and collective 
assumptions on police practice.  
The chapter ends with a summary of the key analytical findings together with a 
discussion of how the political level concretely affects everyday policing—proactive 
investigation in particular—and how the difficulties connected to organisational 
predicaments and discrepancies between ideals and aspirations, abilities and reality 
influence the police’s overall response to organised crime. 
1 Such a document functions as the foundation for strategic and operational decision-making 
regarding the launch of proactive investigations. 
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Politics and Strategy: Introducing the Formal Frame 
for Policing Organised Crime 
Strategic Objectives and Performance Goals 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there has been an intensified public and 
political focus on problems regarding organised criminal gangs in Denmark since 
2008. As a result, the number one priority for the Danish police from 2009-2018 has 
been the response to organised gang crime and violent conflicts linked to this 
environment. The total population of this environment varies over the years but is 
believed to consist of approximately 1,100-1,800 focus persons which the police 
systematically monitor (internal statistics). These individuals are attached to 
different gangs, criminal groups, and loose criminal networks. The number of 
individuals who are under systematic police monitoring varies a great deal due to 
different circumstances such as legal grounds and practices for the police’s 
monitoring and registration of these suspected offenders (see e.g. Klement et al. 
(2010), Klement (2016) and Pedersen (2018) for further details).  
The process of systematic information collection about suspected organised crime 
offenders and their affiliated groups was established in the late 1990s as a 
consequence of the Great Nordic Biker War (Strand 2011). This violent conflict 
between outlaw motorcycle gangs (Hells Angels and Bandidos) indicated the need 
for police to develop an overview of the organised crime environment and its 
members and to obtain a more structured approach to dealing with these. A decade 
after this conflict, both biker and street gangs (rockere og bander) have caught 
police attention mainly due to their involvement in violent conflicts and their 
involvement in drug related offenses. Justified or not, the issue of organised crime 
in Denmark has historically largely been synonymous with this specific group of 
people and drug offences broadly (Bay 1998a; Strand 2011; Rønn 2012). At a 
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political level, in the public and media, and within police organised crime is 
therefore regarded an equal to the biker and gang environment (rocker- og 
bandemiljøet). The police’s response towards bikers and gangs is therefore seen as 
the police’s response towards organised crime—even if it does not capture the 
problem of organised crime as a whole. The formal framework and demands for the 
police’s performance are defined through strategic and operational objectives, 
resource allocation, priorities, performance goals, and key performance indicators in 
several policy documents:  
1) political agreements (flerårsaftaler, politiforlig, mål- og resultatkontrakter) 
2) strategies for the police and the prosecution service (virksomhedsstrategier, 
Rigspolitiets og Anklagemyndighedens strategier) 
3) national and local strategies and action plans for various crime areas (operative 
strategier og operationsplaner).  
These documents constitute the political and strategic frame for the police’s 
response towards organised crime, including proactive investigations and the 
organisational premisses. In this context, I put aside the specific details of the 
strategy and action plans and focus primarily on the main strategic objectives and 
performance goals which have been most significant for the police districts’ work in 
the time frame of this study. Some of these details are moreover classified and 
specific tactics of the operational plan cannot be disclosed. 
From 2012-2018, specific strategic objectives, demands for lines of action, and 
performance goals operationalised into a national strategy and action plan 
(operationsplan) for biker and gang crime. Building on the analysis that I have 
carried out, I divide this plan into two main parts; a broad police response model and a 
narrow police response model with two supporting and varying perspectives and foci
—a short-term and long-term perspective and a reactive and proactive focus.  
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As I illustrate in Figure K, the broad response model was meant to tackle the 
organised crime environment as a whole, whereas the narrow response model was 
targeting a small group of offenders within this environment. The short-term 
perspective was aimed at urgent problems such as violent conflicts between 
competing crime groups and had a reactive focus. The longterm perspective was 
aimed at the accumulating criminality and underlying structures of the organised 
crime environment and had a proactive focus. In support of this strategy two key 
performance goals were set. The police should:  
1) continuously incarcerate between 225-300 members of organised criminal gangs/
groups 
2) select 15-25 priority offenders for proactive investigations.  
As such, proactive investigation was throughout this time period an instrument to 
obtain these performance goals but was also a goal in itself. In Figure K, I clarify 
and compare the two response models’ different perspectives, focus, aims, and 
performance measures.   
Figure K. Response Models. 
Strategic objectives and performance goals have over a decade focused primarily on 
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crime-approach has consequently guided the police’s response to this crime area. My 
analysis of the political process and the judicial ground work (juridiske forarbejder) 
leading up to legislation and the different statements from the Minister of Justice 
(Justitsministeren) and representatives from various political parties, it becomes 
clear that there has been a constant political desire to instigate initiatives which 
focus on enforcement rather than e.g. prevention. The latest example of this is the 
political agreement entitled “Gangs Behind Bars” (Bander bag tremmer) from 2017. 
Former Minister of Justice, Søren Pape Poulsen, stated on the launch of it (press 
release from The Ministry of Justice, 24 March 2017, my translation): 
With this gang legislation (bandepakke) we want to make Denmark a more safe and 
secure country. The purpose is to put an end to the bikers’ and the gangs’ 
unacceptable and mad behaviour. I’m proud to have a majority behind me so that we 
can get some action behind all the words and put a massive pressure on the bikers 
and the gang members.  
The political majority, which the Minister referred to consisted of the governing 
coalition parties (Venstre, Liberal Alliance, Det Konservative Folkeparti), as well as 
two opposition parties (Socialdemokratiet and Dansk Folkeparti). The political 
agreement proposed moreover (2017, my translation):  
With this agreement we act firmly (sætter hårdt mod hårdt). The objective is clear: 
the safety and security of the public has to be assured. Bikers and gang members 
must be kept inside the prisons as long as possible so that they cannot harass, threat, 
or shoot ordinary citizens. It must have far-reaching and comprehensive 
consequences if you turn your back on the community to become a biker or a 
member of a gang.   
The rhetoric from various politicians has over the years been quite similar in the 
public debate; over a broad political spectrum it has continuously been underlined 
that it is important to ‘send a clear message’ to organised crime groups that 
especially violent assaults and gang related shootings in public will be punished 
severely. The tough-on-crime-approach is apparent in the three legislative acts 
(Bandepakker) respectively entitled Enforced Response Against Gang Crime (Styrket 
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indsats mod bandekriminalitet) from 2009, Firm Grip of the Gangs (Fast greb om 
banderne) from 2014, and Gangs Behind Bars (Bander bag tremmer) from 2017. This 
legislation primarily consists of enforcement initiatives granting the police and the 
prosecution service (and other authorities such as the prison service) extended 
powers to target both organised crime groups, and the individual members of these 
groups. These initiatives include more restrictive rules for imprisonment 
(afsoningsvilkår), limited or no probation for gang members, increased sentences 
for certain crime types e.g. violence and the possession of guns etc. (see 
Retsinformation 2009; Retsinformation 2014; The Ministry of Justice 2017). One of 
the most altering initiatives in terms of the standard judicial practice (retspraksis) in 
Denmark is perhaps the launch of ‘double penalty’ (dobbelt straf) in connection 
with the first anti-gang legislation from 2009. The legislation says (Retsinformation 
2009 § 81 a my translation): 
The penalty (…) can be doubled if the violation arises from a mutual confrontation 
which takes place between groups of individuals and where as a part of the 
confrontation either firearms or other weapons or explosives have been used which 
on the basis of their extreme dangerous features are suitable for causing substantial 
harm or committed arson included in this law’s § 180.  
  
This means that individuals who are associated with the gang environment (on the 
account of certain criteria composed by the police) risk getting their penalty 
increased to a double prison sentence if the offence they have committed is 
connected to inter-crime group rivalry. The underlying assumption is that a double 
prison sentence will serve as a deterrence or at least keep people away from ‘the 
streets’ and work as an instrumental preventive measure. Despite political 
differences and changing governments the various initiatives have over the years 
been launched with broad political support from the Danish parliament 
(Folketinget). Prevention and proactive police work are pinpointed as central 
components of the police’s strategy—however, only a small proportion of political 
and legislative initiatives are actual preventive measures or other approaches such 
as initiatives aimed at pulling out people from gangs (exit strategies). Thus, over the 
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years preventive efforts have only to a limited extent been reflected in the 
performance measurement (målopfyldelsen) in the strategic framework. Emphasis 
has predominantly been on repressive and punitive measures and in this sense the 
formal frame and thereby the political expectations and demands to the police’s 
performance in this area are highly focused on an ideological and political 
perception that sanctions such as incarceration are effective instruments in solving 
crime problems (Balvig 2000; Garland 2001; Matthiesen 2005; Larsson 2018; 
Holmberg 2019, Smith & Uglevik 2017).  
Response Models 
The Broad Response Model 
I view the first performance goal regarding the continuous incarceration/
imprisonment of approximately 300 gang members as supporting both the short-
term and the long-term objectives of the strategy: first, it is meant to stop violent 
conflicts in the public arena, and second to reduce crime levels. This performance 
goal is achieved through a broad response model involving everyday police work 
including traditional street-level operational work, traffic controls, and reactive 
investigations initiated on the basis of crime reports of burglaries, assaults, 
homicides, drugs, weapon offences etc. It is by its outset primarily reactive in nature 
as it deals with past events. The nationally monitored organised crime groups (often 
referred to as bikers or gangs in the press or by politicians) typically consist of 
habitual offenders who commit crimes on a regular basis. Research suggests that 
this population is around 40 per cent more criminally active compared to other 
prolific and persistent offenders in Denmark, and they commit a variety of offences 
e.g. property crimes, traffic violations, violent crimes, drug crimes etc. (Klement et 
al. 2010; Klement 2016). Moreover, due to their habitual offending and the strategic 
focus within police they are identified, categorised, and labelled as focus persons in 
the police’s databases. Consequently, they receive a lot more attention from police 
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than other offenders or citizens for that matter. Thus, the analysis shows that the 
rationale behind the broad response model is that it can be incorporated within the 
‘traditional’ police response model and everyday policing.  
It is underlined by many managers and police officers down the ranks that the 
broad police response and hence a general focus and pressure from the authorities1 
on the organised crime environment brings about a positive result when looking at 
changes within this environment and specifically when it comes to deescalating 
violent conflicts between different competing groups. The repressive initiatives—
and the continuous ‘policing’ these individuals experience—are believed to 
diminish their (criminal) activities and as such prevent crimes as it complicates 
their everyday life and diminishes their organisation and crime business. An 
Assistant Police Commissioner explains: 
I see that now…it has great value that we have a basic population (grundmasse) 
incarcerated no matter who they are. Because it weakens their organisation all the 
way down that people are taken out of circulation. Because everyone on the front has 
some kind of task otherwise they wouldn’t be there. In that sense we’re disturbing 
their business by constantly doing this. So on those grounds it has a value that a 
large percentage of them (members of crime groups, my addition) are imprisoned 
constantly. It inhibits their business.    
A Police Officer elaborates:  
They must sense that we’re breathing down their necks (ånder dem i nakken). That 
we’re constantly in the area that we know what they’re up to and who they socialise 
with. Otherwise they think they’re free to do stuff and it escalates. If we hadn’t been 
there you know on a day to day basis I’m sure they would have taken over much 
more territory and bothered many more people. They need to feel that being a 
member of this crime community (gå til narko) has great consequences and is not 
something which is taken lightly by the authorities. 
The continuous focus on a particular group of people in which the police have 
specific interests (focus persons) is moreover believed to provide the added bonus 
of producing systematic information (data and documentation), which can be used 
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in other areas of policing for example to serve analytical purposes within the 
intelligence area:  
There’s a reason why we have such a good overview of our outlaw motorcycle gangs 
and street gangs compared to other countries. We have consistently followed these 
people since the early 1990s—we have gathered information about them 
systematically and in that sense, we have a unique overview which is not seen in 
other places in the Western world that I know of.    
  
The statement from the police officer above refers to the intensive policing of the 
organised crime environment’s focus persons and thereby information concerning 
these which is gathered through everyday police work. This information can e.g. be 
about individuals’ geographical movements, who they are accompanied by, how they 
behave, which vehicles they drive etc. This process is seen not only as instrumental 
in supporting specific investigations or meeting the 300-performance goal, but as a 
vital component of the entire intelligence process. 
The Narrow Response Model 
The second performance goal mainly supports the long-term objective of the 
strategy, namely the disruption of the underlying structures and criminality of the 
organised crime environment and is accordingly proactive in its outset. This results 
in what I identify as a narrow response model in the sense that it is aimed at a small 
number (15-25) of priority offenders who are to be identified as key targets for 
proactive investigations. These priority offenders are seen as kingpins, money men, 
and ‘shot callers’ who are not necessarily prolific in terms of offending, but who 
enable and facilitate other individuals’ offending, and the maintenance and 
development of criminal organisations (in Chapter 7 I analyse in more detail these 
processes). In other words: these offenders are believed to be of high value to the 
criminal environment and to the police accordingly. Due to their experience and 
skills they are furthermore viewed as specialists who require the police to instigate 
240
so-called high-end police work. From most strategic managers’ point of view, this 
group of people was believed to be ‘the right one to target’ and the prioritisation of 
offenders and the instigation of proactive investigations as ‘the right thing to do’—
from a policing standpoint (Dean et al. 2010). This perception was as such expressed 
at many different meetings at strategic level (such as meetings in The National Gang 
Crime Staff and in the national and regional coordination groups). In fact, it is 
quite clear that this stance is seen as ‘the right stance’ for a strategic manager to 
have as it clearly supports a proactive approach, which for a long period of time has 
dominated strategic management language within the police. The central argument 
of proactive policing is, as mentioned in Chapter 2, to allocate police resources 
based on knowledge of where they are most effective and as such becomes 
competitive policing (Dean et al. 2010). Several proactive policing models, 
approaches and philosophies such as problem-oriented policing, intelligence-led 
policing, hotspot policing and the like are as such based on criminological research 
pointing to the fact that it is often a small group of offenders who are responsible 
for the vast amount of offending when looking at for example volume crime and 
property crime (Sherman 2013; Ratcliffe 2008a).  
The logic model behind the narrow response model is therefore that a focus 
directed at a small group of prolific offenders will diminish the overall amount of 
crime. Although research concerning serious drug crimes such as import and 
distribution of illicit drugs are sparser, the rationale of prolific offending can still be 
continued and make sense when it comes to financial kingpins 
(bagmandsvirksomhed). One of the reasons is that such offending is dependent on 
a certain degree of specialisation and criminal entrepreneurialism and therefore 
can be seen as something which is built over a long time period (see e.g. Dean et al. 
2010). The knowledge and competency level of such individuals must therefore be 
seen as relatively high and they are as a result not easily replaced and thus of high 
value to the criminal environment. If police manage to be competitive and thereby 
weaken or incapacitate these offenders this will as a result, following the argument 
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above, have a significant impact. Consequently, the presumed logic model behind 
the narrow response model is therefore that an investigative focus directed at so-
called high-value targets/priority offenders (bagmænd) will be more effective in 
terms of destabilising crime groups as these are believed to be dependent on strong 
leadership and stable organisations (Kennedy 2009; Dean et al. 2010; Ratcliffe et al. 
2014). The justification is therefore that a police response disrupting significant 
individuals will lead to e.g. internal conflicts, destability, and a general weakening of 
the groups, and hence their ability to govern the criminal environment (see Figure 
L). I will therefore argue that the narrow police response can in some ways be seen 
as a representation of the principles within the proactive policing paradigm both in 
terms of its focus, but also its methods as it encompasses the ideal of a knowledge-
based approach and targets a small amount of carefully selected offenders. A Chief 
Superintendent explains:  
Take for example Kevin from “Falcons”. He’s sitting there playing all the aces. If 
we’re to catch him we can’t do it through a traditional investigation we need to be 
more advanced and use all the possibilities that we have even if it’s gonna take a year 
or two (…) before we ever get close to him. But maybe it’s value for money (hele 
investeringen værd) because if they can be toppled maybe the house of cards is 
overrun (så vælter korthuset måske) for the people who are left there, because these 
people are so much in charge as they are (så styrende som de er). I think it’s very 
much a hierarchy. It’s specific people who controls it. If they are not there who’s 
gonna control it?   
This process is therefore seen not only as instrumental in supporting specific 
investigations or meeting the 300-performance goal, but as a vital component of the 
entire intelligence process. Figure L illustrates in comparison the broad and the 
narrow response models and their components.   
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Figure L. The Broad and Narrow Response Models. 
 
1 This include the tax authorities, local governments, and social services and other cooperating 
public institutions which are included in the police’s strategies and additionally have their own 
focused responses towards organised crime groups and gang members. 
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Playing the Numbers’ Game: Implementing Formal 
Demands 
Handling Political Expectations 
When performance measures concerning specifically biker and gang crime were 
introduced in 2012, they were initially not considered to be particularly demanding 
or problematic or requiring for example a specific organisational set up. In fact, 
senior management within police were instrumental in the design of these 
performance measures and key performance indicators as this was a way of getting 
more operational control of the police districts and thus more consistent policing 
nationally. The need for uniformity was a result of the 2007 reform, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, and The National Police certified as the national directive and 
controlling unit over the 12 police districts which grew larger and more powerful 
and competent due to amongst other their new size (Holmberg 2019). With regards 
to the 300-performance goal, one of the Chief Superintendents on The National 
Strategic Staff on Gang Crime (Den Nationale Følgestab for Bandekriminalitet) said 
at a meeting in the beginning of 2012:  
I’m not worried about that particular performance goal (the 300-number, my 
addition). They can’t help themselves; they are committing crimes to survive; they 
don’t have a penny to their name (Kongens mønt)! And we are there to catch them 
just doing normal police work. Everyone is happy. 
The statement expressed the assessment that police’s efforts to meet the 300-
performance goal was seen as a joint effort between all police districts and an 
outcome of everyday policing. However, it became clear for strategic management at 
both national, regional, and local level during the first couple of years that this was 
not a straightforward task. During meetings in the national strategic gang crime 
staff in the period of 2012-2016 it was a returning subject how performance 
measures were to be met as they constituted a continuous challenge for the police 
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districts. Police’s resources both in the special units (task forces) at regional level 
and locally within the districts were first and foremost allocated to obtain the 300-
performance goal—and this proved to be a more resourceful task than initially 
anticipated as an Assistant Police Commissioner explains:   
We had huge problems meeting that performance goal (the 300-number, my 
addition) even though we had our organisation changed (…) The reason was that so 
many people (members of crime groups, my addition) were released as they were 
imprisoned in the period of 2009-2011. There were a large number of “conflict 
people” (konfliktfolk) who were arrested in times of conflict and they are the soldiers 
in the front (frontsoldater) who commit violent assaults (personfarlig kriminalitet) 
and they are put in jail for a couple of months or maybe 1-2 years and then they are 
released. So we were really under a lot of pressure (på hælene)…we had to meet the 
number…  
As a result, the police’s primary focus when it came to the response towards 
organised crime was to ‘meet the number’. The police districts and the regional 
units provide monthly reports to the national unit on their performance as a part of 
the general performance measurement. The regional units and the police districts 
are allocated individual and local performance goals which are specified in the 
contracts between The National Police and the district’s police commissioners 
(politidirektørernes kontrakter) and thereby regulate these contracts and the 
commissioners’ individual performance dependent bonuses. Besides being a part of 
the internal competition of the allocation of resources between police districts and 
regional units, it can also be regarded as an image issue. The ambition for most top 
managers is therefore to have their individual district to perform well on a national 
level as low performance is generally embarrassing. At a seminar lunch a top 
manager commented on the issue:  
Everyone want’s to be top of the class in the eyes of the national police. Of course, we 
want our district to be the best and to have the other 11 districts to envy you…it gives 
a certain degree of respect even though the performance measures are mad…we all 
know that. But that’s not what it’s about.  
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In this sense, police management appears quite conscious of the use of, in 
Goffman’s terms (1959), expressive equipment and they use impression 
management to idealise their own front stage performance even internally. 
Consequently, much is at stake when it comes to organisational performance and as 
such a lot of effort are put into obtaining the performance goals and the front stage 
performance on the organisational stage.  
However, the politically set performance goals were, as implied by the Assistant 
Police Commissioner, not entirely in accordance with the reality of the police’s 
capacity or the available resources. Although it was seen as a part of everyday 
policing, the incarceration of e.g. gang members did not just happen without a 
targeted effort—especially in times after violent conflicts and times of rivalry where 
a decidedly downturn were taking place in the criminal environment. Various crime 
groups hereafter often keep a low profile, regrouping, changing strategies, or even 
licking their wounds after periods of stress and battle and a massive police response 
to follow. Thus, this presented a problem for police as they were lacking focus 
persons who were actively committing offences and as such could be arrested, 
prosecuted, and incarcerated. This condition led to the phenomenon of 
organisational decoupling—that is the gap between strategy and practice and thus 
what is said and what is done—which is a fairly well-known phenomenon in most 
large organisations (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). As such, the instigation of so-
called ‘innovative initiatives’ which is broadly known within the police as creative 
accountancy (kreativ bogføring) to meet the performance goals. An Assistant Police 
Commissioner reports: 
We didn’t know what to do…we were sitting here in this office and we did not want 
to blow this one (bomme målet). And then there’s one of them (a member of a crime 
group, my addition), he has so much ‘on the book’ (stående) on traffic violations and 
driving without a license (kørsel med frakendelse) that he can expect to serve a 
sentence (afsone) and if we catch him ‘on wheels’ (på hjul) he’s to be put inside. And 
we did. We used the surveillance team from the regional unit, and we took him on 
wheels, and he was put inside and we met the number and everyone was happy. 
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Thus, as it was a significant challenge to meet the 300-number performance goal a 
considerable amount of resources was put into this, but resources were also put 
into the process of creating the illusion that the police were actually meeting ‘the 
number’—an idealisation of the performance (Goffman 1959). Gradually, 
throughout the police and down the ranks performance measurement and political 
demands were seen as an obnoxious interference with police work and with no 
regards to the actual circumstances in which policing is carried out. In this sense, 
political initiatives and performance measurements are especially on ground level 
not taken particularly seriously and creative solutions to work around them and 
various forms of creative accountancy are present in all areas of policing. Not just in 
relation to meeting performance goals: reports of manipulation with numbers or 
‘making the shoe fit’ in terms of providing the strategic or political level with an 
adequate response to avoid any further investigation or with the purpose of meeting 
demands of performance measurement are not rare. On the contrary, creative 
accountancy is on many levels considered to be necessary to instigate as the gap 
between political demands and the reality of policing is per default too big—a 
conclusion which a number of international police researchers have already drawn 
(Eterno & Silverman 2006; Eterno & Silverman 2010; Hartmann 2014; Wathne 2015; 
Eterno et al. 2016). There are several reasons for this, which I will unfold in the 
following.  
Conflict Creating Demands 
Despite some degree of support for a broad response model, including arrest and 
incarceration as an instrument to reduce crime, frustrations about ‘playing the 
numbers game’ within the police where quite clear. An Assistant Police 
Commissioner explains: 
But the downside is…did he (the last offender who was apprehended to meet the 
performance goal, my addition) really make a difference? Or was this just to meet 
the performance goal? And we have to conclude that he did not make a pressing 
247
difference, but he made us meet the performance goal which was agreed upon by the 
National Police, the Ministry of Justice and the Government (Regeringen). 
A Chief Superintendent elaborates further:

There’s a difference between 10 men in prison…it’s not the same as 10 other men in 
prison when we talk about bikers and gangs. There’s a performance goal that we 
need to have a number of people in jail, but this is to the best of my knowledge 
irrelevant because it’s about getting the right people in jail to establish a certain 
degree of stability (ro). And to get those who commit the most organised crime held 
accountable. And not the people who roam the streets acting like minions 
(håndlangere).     
 

These statements mirror the constant debate about the ‘audit regime’ (målregimet) 
and its obvious blind spots which has as such been present within and outside the 
police since the introduction of NPM (Wathne 2015; Stevnsborg 2016; Hartmann et 
al. 2018). This is in accordance with most police services across the Western world 
which have experienced a political agenda of measuring ‘what works’ and ‘value for 
money’ in terms of controlling the public sector and its resources. The police have 
as many other public institutions been characterised by a strive towards cost-
efficiency and “objective” and strategic allocation of limited resources (see also 
Chapter 2). A tighter control with police’s budgets as a consequence of dramatical 
fiscal changes due to financial instability all over the Western World and historic 
examples of overspending (as we saw in Chapter 2) seems both necessary and 
rational and police officers are not per se against a more focused allocation of police 
resources. My analysis shows that their concerns are more directed at the risk that 
what can be counted in a rather simple and quantitative manner initially gets to 
count for police activities as a whole. Or as a Superintendent once remarked at a 
strategic meeting: “People dance where the lights are shining (der bliver danset der, 
hvor lyset skinner)”.  
Resources and energy are consequently primarily put where the performance gets 
measured. A Police Officer observes: “The problem with performance measurement is 
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that it will never get to measure what we really do. All the things which prevents things 
from happening, it’s impossible to measure.” Measuring crime prevention initiatives is 
difficult and does require specific efforts and competences, albeit the argument 
here is perhaps more that this type of measuring does not capture the complexities 
of policing. Moreover, from the perspective of police officers it threatens the notion 
of autonomy in the job and the degree to which they can use their individual 
discretion. The increased use of performance measurement has also resulted for 
instance in more management interference and control—at least on the front stage. 
Most detectives are usually skeptical towards police management becoming a 
central part of their investigative work, and they express they over the years have 
experienced more top-down and micro-management especially from senior 
management. During Operation Goldilocks it became clear that strategic 
management were meddling on and off with operational and tactical investigative 
decisions which frustrated middle managers and SIOs and detectives as it made the 
hierarchal chain of command unclear (I return to this issue in the end of this 
chapter). The introduction of performance measurement and KPIs in relation to 
proactive investigations therefore create new conflicts between (top) management 
and detectives as every investigation can potentially become a (political) success or 
failure which top management feels imposed to deal with.  
Trying to Change Demands  
As mentioned earlier, police management overall supported the organised crime 
strategy and tried to implement it loyally. However, in connection with negotiations 
of political agreements, strategic objectives, and performance measurement between 
the national police, the police districts, and the Ministry of Justice both formal and 
informal internal processes were initiated on several occasions over the period of 
2012-2017 with the purpose of changing the specific performance goals and key 
performance indicators. As an example, under the auspices of the national strategic 
staff on gang crime, I was involved in a working group in 2012-2013 tasked with 
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reviewing the entire model for performance measurement in relation to bikers and 
gangs which indicated that there were several challenges regarding performance 
measures. One of the problems which had been identified was that some 
performance goals were counterproductive or even conflicting. As a consequence, 
different parts of the police worked in different directions. For example, those 
sections working with anti-recruitment and gang exit had the overall objective of 
crime prevention whereas the operative and investigation sections had the task of 
investigating and arresting gang members. The target group for these two objectives 
were essentially the same group of individuals, but performance points were given 
primarily in connection with arrests, not anti-recruitment. The same offender would 
therefore potentially shift category from one of the ‘225 imprisoned gang members’ 
to the category of ‘former gang members involved in an exit programme’ and the 
police could therefore lose credits in the ‘imprisoned’ category by instigating 
preventive initiatives. The absence of crime (or prevention) and the perceived safety 
in local communities were as such not performance indicators or police activities 
which produced a lot of performance points. Consequently, the motivation within 
the organisation to prioritise preventive activities was not overwhelming. However, 
one of the performance goals during the time period 2012-2017 was that a certain 
percentage of the group of gang members must be screened for their eligibility to 
engage in the police’s exit programme. A conflict therefore presented itself in the 
sense that such a performance goal competes with the number of incarcerated.  
Moreover, the technical issues in relation to the systematic monitoring of focus 
persons and the assessment of when a specific person was qualified to be put on or 
taken off ‘the list’ meant that there was a risk that the pressure to reach the 
performance goal could lead to a variation of creative accountancy in terms of 
registering or keeping focus persons in the database as they would produce points 
if they were apprehended for an offence. Furthermore, the total population of this 
group of people would be larger and thereby pose ‘a bigger pool to fish in’. That 
being said, attempts to influence the nature of performance measurement were 
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directed first and foremost at making the performance goals much more attainable 
when looking at capabilities and resources within the police. The performance goals 
should, according to the aforementioned working group, therefore shift in favour of 
a more qualitative nature and support a more proactive and targeted police 
response, and hence mirror the activities that the police were actually carrying out. 
The working group ended up with a proposal to direct the performance 
measurement and thereby the police response in a way where the efforts matched 
the outcome. At the same time, the proposal tried to accommodate the political 
preference for incarcerating a specific number of gang members as this was 
announced from the political level as a nonnegotiable performance goal. A new 
model of performance points was developed suggesting e.g. that an investigation 
against a high-value target (e.g. a kingpin) would produce twenty times as many 
points as a randomly apprehended gang member. The rationale was that certain 
police activities, such as proactive investigations of e.g. the crime groups’ underlying 
organisational structures, are more demanding in terms of time, resources, and 
competences than reactive response activities.  
The proposal was put forward in a memo which was handed over to the chairman 
of the national strategic staff who brought it into the political negotiations via the 
police top. The feedback (verbal) was that a new model for performance 
measurement in relation to gang crime did not fit the political preference of being 
able to communicate and present a simple message of e.g. incarceration of X 
number of gang members to the public. It was considered too complex. Throughout 
the years, I observed that the subject of alternative performance goals from time to 
time was brought up as a theme within the political negotiations by police 
management. However, although there were minor alterations of the performance 
goals within the time period (2012-2018), the broad police response model1 was 
maintained and the request for new performance goals was rejected. 
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The police were locked in the sense that they were to loyally pursue the political 
agenda and align strategies and allocate resources to support the politically 
performance measurement. However, frustrations regarding the one-sided focus to 
meet the performance goals lay just beneath the surface in both strategic and 
operational settings within the police. Gradually, a certain degree of alienation 
towards the entire strategy could be detected on many levels in the police. 
Moreover, additional problems regarding the second performance measure and the 
narrow response model presented themselves as I will account for in the following 
sections.   
Further Challenges 
Even though a focus on a small group of (priority) offenders received broad support 
from strategic management there is wide awareness within police that it requires 
both time and resources to investigate ‘on the top shelf’—meaning high value 
targets with significant influence and impact in the criminal environment. The 
experience within the organised crime units in the police districts and the regional 
task forces/investigation centres is that such investigations are often resourceful and 
long lasting. They have consequently historically presented a problem for the police. 
A Chief Superintendent states:  
We can instigate all kinds of investigations, but are they the right investigations who 
target the right strategic goals? To get the strategic intention translated into the 
right investigations—that’s always been our big problem. Because we’ve always 
investigated someone where we more or less randomly had knowledge and 
intelligence that they were committing crimes. And then we’ve started investigations 
and have continued until we’ve proven that fact and then put them in jail.   
Accordingly, the second performance goal regarding investigation of a small group 
of priority offenders was seen as an organisational hassle since the introduction of 
it—but for other reasons than the ones concerning the 300-performance goal. First, 
it continued to be a rather difficult and resourceful task to identify priority 
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offenders using analytical approaches rather than traditional approaches (such as 
target selection led by ongoing investigations or driven by information from 
confidential informants which I unfold and discuss in further detail in Chapter 7). 
Second, targeting and instigation of such ‘substantial investigations’ (tunge sager) 
were not prioritised in situations where: 1) the first performance goal was not 
obtained, and/or 2) in times where violent conflicts required all police attention. 
Third, substantial investigations targeting high value targets were not producing the 
same kinds of fast and visible results and as such successes as the broad police 
response and consequently meeting the first performance goal.  
I will leave the first hassle to be discussed in Chapter 7, but in relation to the 
second and third hassle I will draw attention to several relevant conditions. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there had been a number of violent conflicts, gang related 
shootings, homicides, and injured victims since 2008. Such a situation was quite 
rare and dramatic for an otherwise safe and peaceful country as Denmark. The 
situation had of course undivided attention from politicians, the media, and the 
general public. As a result, the police were spending a substantial amount of 
resources tackling these issues. On one hand, the police were investigating all the 
different incidents; violent assaults, homicides, and attempted homicides. On the 
other hand, they were trying to prevent new incidents from happening for example 
by ‘being present and visible’ (synlig tilstedeværelse) and increasing the number of 
police patrols and community police officers (nærpolitibetjente) in the affected 
areas. This was first and foremost a political demand as the public in these areas 
were startled and required more police presence. Within the police, this was albeit 
primarily seen as a symbolic performance (Manning 2004) which had no significant 
impact on gangs’ behaviour.  
During the spring and summer of 2009, I visited Copenhagen Police’s gang unit for 
three months to learn about their police response to the gang situation. As a 
consequence of the circumstances, they had established a large specialised unit 
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including both an investigative section and an operative section which had the sole 
task of handling gang-related issues. The situation continued to be chaotic over 
time and the complete overview of the situation was not obtained until a few years 
later. In one weekend for example, there were two homicides and four attempted 
homicides at three different gang related shootings in Copenhagen—an immensely 
demanding and unusual situation for the Danish police. A typical sum up from the 
Superintendent chairing the morning meetings in the gang unit was: “So let’s hope 
they don’t shoot each other today”. During those years, not many people questioned 
why the police were busy trying to sort out these issues and extensive resources 
were spent on reactive investigations. 
Another thing which kept police busy and therefore represented an obstacle for 
instigating substantial proactive investigations against priority targets was in times 
where the 300-performance goal was not obtained. A Chief Superintendent 
explains: 
The entire idea behind targeting priority offenders was that we’ve been pressured to 
produce a number of incarcerations (antal fængslede) which meant that in the 
beginning at least 2/3 of our time was spent meeting that performance goal (the 
300-number, my addition). In those situations, we don’t start up substantial 
investigations (tunge efterforskninger) which might take half a year or a year. But 
alongside having put some people behind bars (ind at sidde), our investigations have 
made it possible to release some resources to put into something long-lasting. So 
that we could get the right people. That we didn’t get to do this in a large scale is a 
different matter but it was the original idea; instigating a long-lasting response to 
get some of the biggest ‘players in the field’ (spillere på banen) out. That was the 
ambition.   
Violent conflicts are clearly seen as circumstances which with good reason nullify 
all other police priorities. Moreover, from a strategic management point of view, the 
broad response model targeting low-level offenders were considered necessary to 
obtain the 300-performance goal. However, a straightforward calculation of the 
available resources will point to an obvious fact: the more resources that are 
allocated into the broad police response in order to meet the quantitative 
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performance goal the less resources are available to support strategic objectives 
directed at disrupting and destabilising kingpins and crime facilitators. As such, the 
instigation of proactive investigations targeting priority offenders were to a large 
extent conditioned by fulfilling the 300-number. From the viewpoint of many police 
managers and detectives a substantial amount of ressources were put into policing 
low-value targets and to grab what was referred to as ‘low-hanging fruits’ which 
were not believed to have a significant position in or influence on the organised 
crime environment as a whole. In general, the perception was that this type of low 
policing should not  be this highly prioritised. A Chief Superintendent explains: 
In our attempts to fight bikers and gangs, we need to be careful not to forget that 
there are other things happening, for example economic crime. (…) We need to be 
careful so we don’t just run after the obvious targets. It’s a danger. But it’s not 
strange that we do so because it’s where the focus is, especially the political focus.   
Some strategic managers express great concerns about the issues concerning 
limited resources for proactive initiatives. However, the general overview of 
resources in police are overall sporadic and sparse and only recently the police have 
begun to look at spending, staffing etc. in connection with criminal investigations 
and for example providing rough estimations of costs and duration when suggesting 
instigation of proactive investigations (for example in investigation proposals). The 
sustainability of strategic decisions is moreover limited as it is seen as something 
which can be altered on a day-to-day basis. Police management therefore see 
themselves as being bound by both considerable political interference and political 
constraints mirrored in the introduction of NPM. An Assistant Police Commissioner 
explains: 
It’s a farce. We don’t have any room to manoeuvre in terms of managing this shop 
(butikken). Everything is decided by the Ministry of Justice (Justitsministeriet) and 
a couple of specific officials (embedsmænd) who know absolutely nothing about 
police work and have an agenda of communicating fast political statements. They 
have no real interests in resolving problems for Mr. and Mrs. Smith (hr. og fru 
Danmark) or making conditions better for the police. That’s what it has come to.   
255
The political steering of the police and even interference in police operational 
decision-making was by management viewed as having increased over the years. 
Besides being a management trend across the entire public sector since the major 
budget deficit within the police’s 2008 budget, there has been a zealous scrutiny 
and oversight from the Ministry of Finance (Finansministeriet) into the area of 
policing (see Chapter 5 for an elaboration). Both public and political demands are 
put forward to produce more visible and tangible results for policing (cf. the latest 
political agreement). Political agreements are no longer negotiated between the 
police and the Ministry of Justice—but between the police and the Ministry of 
Finance and these are driven by somewhat practical questions of which police 
activities and results can (easily) be measured in a quantitative way. Moreover, 
examples of political involvement in more tactical police decisions include amongst 
other the political demand for the launch of mobile police stations, and the increase 
of police patrols in certain geographic areas and the like. At the same time, the 
amount of reporting on the police’s performance on a variety of subjects has 
intensified. The National Police are answering an increasing number of official 
questions from The Danish Parliament (folketingsspørgsmål) on a variety of police 
related matters. What’s more, the Ministry of Justice is continuously requesting 
detailed reporting of police performance on both a strategic and an operational 
level. Thus, police managers see political managing and involvement as a basic and 
inevitable organisational condition within the police. My observations of the 
conversation at strategic level are at times dominated by notions of reducing the 
overall strategies for the police or making them more ‘dynamic’ and ‘adjustable’ so 
they do not take up too many resources and can be moved if they are needed 
elsewhere from day-to-day. As a result, there would no longer be a clear strategic 
direction. 
Although a lot of effort has generally been put into producing and shaping e.g. the 
police’s strategies and action plans aimed at a number of vital areas such as gang 
crime, burglary, mobile offenders, such strategies are within the organisation mainly 
256
seen as pieces of papers holdning all the ‘right words’ and good intentions, but 
without any operational value whatsoever. The processes are often perceived as a 
so-called ‘tick in the box’-task implying that if anyone should ask, police 
management would be able to say that something had been done about the matter. 
The general perception within the police however is that such strategies have no 
impact in the real world of policing.  
The Impact of NPM 
Considering the presentation of the political and strategic framework above, I will 
argue that the governing of the police as a politically driven bureaucracy 
encompasses more and more components from the area of NPM where control and 
efficiency are central values (Wathne 2018). Police organisations are, according to 
Granér & Kronkvist 2014 and Bjørkelo & Gundhus 2015, moreover people service 
organisations and hybrid organisations as their overall mandate, duties, and tasks are 
both broad and diffuse including the complex span between prevention, 
enforcement, and the provision of service to the general public. The quality of 
police work or even its purpose—such as preventive police work including 
elimination of threats or handling escalating situations between two parties, 
controlling violent conflicts between gangs, or the patient build up of relationships 
between police and communities—is not easily measured. This was also viewed as a 
predicament in relation to the review of the model for performance measurement, 
which I discussed earlier.  
In this situation it is often politically convenient rather than knowledge-based 
arguments which decide the content of police work, the allocation of resources, and 
the measure of success. For example the very idea that the police’s first performance 
measure is bound to the ‘success’ of another public institution of which they have 
no control (it is the courts and not the police who decide if people get incarcerated 
or not) seems rather counterproductive in terms of the police’s possibility of 
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meeting their demanded goals. The consequences of the implementation of NPM as 
a governing model, the production line-thinking, and consequently the increased 
political interference with police work therefore goes beyond political and strategic 
decisions as they to a certain extent frame operational police work. This (new) police 
reality results in problems regarding organisational decoupling and conflicting, 
inadequate or misleading performance measures which incite to manipulation and 
work as a counterproductive motivation for doing ‘what counts’ in policing in 
favour of ‘what is countable’ (Hartmann et al. 2018). NPM has as such introduced a 
form of commercial accounting practices which are not only vivid within Danish 
police, but through police services all over the Western world (Hoque et al. 2004). 
Police therefore become occupied with impression management and idealisation of 
the police’s front stage performance, which becomes symbolic rather than 
instrumental, as the consideration for political demands are perceived as 
unavoidable (Manning 2004). Let me elaborate further: 
Organisational decoupling and hence the gap between strategy and practice and 
thus what is said and what is done is a fairly well-known phenomenon in most large 
organisations—public as well as private (Boxenbaum & Jonsson 2008). In this 
context, the gap between strategy and action becomes clear when the practical 
problems present themselves in the implementation of the broad and narrow 
response model. Several international researchers have examined the implications 
of introducing NPM in police organisations (Silverman 2006; Eterno et al. 2016; 
Wathne 2018). They draw among other the conclusion that the divergent idea of 
rational management of private companies focusing on raising profits collides with 
steering of political controlled organisation such as the police, which is basically 
sustained by (democratic) values and dependent on the public’s confidence and 
support (Gundhus 2012). The implementation of NPM within the police has 
therefore been viewed as undermining the police service’s ability to focus on: what 
is good police work, how should it be carried out and eventually measured in the 
best possible way? (Loader & Walker 2001). Creative accountancy and as such 
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manipulation with numbers in relation to performance measures are thus 
considered to be a frequent and common consequence due to e.g. the shift in focus 
from democratic principles and as such the police's accountability to internal 
control and administrative routines in a form of accountancy (Reiner 2013).  
The numbers’ game and the energy being put into impression management and 
idealisation of the front stage performance therefore inhibits a long-term focus and 
as such long-term planing and resembles a symbolic rather than an instrumental 
performance (Manning 2004). In this context, the introduction of the two specific 
performance goals in terms of organised crime dominates the police’s response in a 
sense where it impounds resources and captures the strategic agenda and as a 
result steer the police response into a more reactive rather than a proactive 
direction. This is reflected in the focus on arrests, and incarceration as the primary 
measures of success—derived from the reactive paradigm and consequently a 
reactive logic employing measures from the standard model of policing (see also 
Chapter 2).  
1 The narrow response model was maintained until 2018 when it was omitted as an performance 
measurement, see also Chapter 7. 
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Good Results, Good Police Work: Identifying 
Informal Assumptions 
Internal Discrepancies 
In national meetings some strategic managers would from time to time shake their 
heads resignedly and express great concern when some of the political initiatives 
and legislation was discussed. They perceived for example the broad response 
model and the 300-performance goal as a limited model in order to affect the 
organised crime environment in the long run. The sense was moreover that first of 
all prevention initiatives from social services were to hinder recruitment into the 
crime and the gang environment since ‘there’s only so much we can do…’. A Chief 
Superintendent states: 
We cannot meet the requirements by putting people into jail. I think that everyone 
who’s researched or knows something about organised crime would say that it is 
doubtful what works on hardened gang members. There are of course exit-
programmes in the prisons, but basically, I don’t think there’s any evidence that 
imprisonment helps to reduce crime. So there are other tools that needs to come 
into play. (…) I believe that if we don’t put on our crime prevention glasses and 
really puts resources into this…we won’t be able to win the battle in the long run. It 
won’t happen in five years, but perhaps in a generation’s time if we really commit 
ourselves to do the right things concerning this environment.     
Another concern was the lack of a ‘follow-the-money strategy’ to counter e.g. money 
men, kingpins, and crime facilitators in connection with e.g. money laundering. A 
Police Officer says: 
We’ve never really got into the game of disrupting their businesses, their finances. 
We usually give up because it’s too complex and overwhelming with all the 
information. And the people in the organised crime units…they might not be the 
right people to immerse themselves to this kind of paperwork…for the duration. 
They’re more into seizing drugs, being on the road (på farten).   
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A Detective explains: 
We don’t use it enough (investigation of economic crime and finances, my addition). 
But that’s what hurts them the most. It would be a good idea to have the unit of 
economic crime who could help us with the cases. And the tax agency (Skat) in terms 
of their companies, money laundering and the like. But it’s a hassle. And it can be 
very complex and that’s why it’s often removed from the case (skåret fra i sagen). 
But it’s obvious to unite those two lines of inquiry. As it says in § 191: you need to 
make money.    
The critique of a one-sided enforcement focus and the broad response model 
seems, however, to a certain extent to be rather superficial: it is presented 
sporadically and incomprehensively primarily in interviews with managers. It 
appears to be a genuine concern and organisational dilemma, but I also view it as a 
way of trying to manage the impression of the police (and the managers themselves) 
and support of the modern and innovative approach rather than being traditional 
and reactive. As mentioned earlier, the proactive paradigm, knowledge-based 
policing, smart policing etc. is overwhelmingly congratulated and idealised by most 
managers as ‘the right thing to do’, whereas the support becomes more diffuse at 
ground level and amongst detectives.  
There are as such at least two front stage performances in this regard—the public 
front stage performance where the police support the political demands and create 
public notions of security and safety by being action-oriented, making arrests, and 
meeting the 300-number. Internally, on the organisational front stage police 
management rhetorically perform the act of being critical towards the enforcement 
focus and call for a more proactive approach. On the organisational front stage, the 
rhetorical performance about the ideal of proactivity is as such convincing 
(Manning 2014a). However, as I will demonstrate in the following section, when 
observing especially the police’s organisational backstage and the dialectic dynamic 
between front stage and backstage performances—the rhetoric concerning 
proactivity becomes superficial without depth. In its substance, the principles of the 
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proactive paradigm and knowledge-based policing are not inherent, but rather 
seem to be reduced to ‘management lingo’ expressing a variety of memorised 
sentences. And in depth knowledge of what the proactive paradigm encompass and 
requires in order to function is not expressed neither in interviews nor otherwise. 
This is in accordance with other research looking at for example the 
implementation of problem-oriented policing programmes where the components 
of analysing and assessing crime problems are often omitted or treated superficially 
(Gundhus 2009; 2012; Fielding et al. 2020). Moreover, decision-making and action in 
support of the proactive paradigm is moreover limited, which I will show in 
Chapter 7. The vast number of criminal incidents, reactive investigations, and 
political pressure to provide fast results seem to impact the police response in a way 
so it becomes predominantly reactive and short-termed. However, this is not the 
sole explanation. In fact, although these conditions do seem to hinder the police in 
instigating a more proactive approach, my analysis shows that along the lines of 
Gundhus (2006; 2012) there are some culturally anchored informal conditions 
within the police which contribute to the continuance of a reactive paradigm. These 
informal conditions are amongst other made up by collectively shared conceptions 
and assumptions amongst police managers, police officers, and detectives about: 
1) organised crime and organised crime offenders 
2) the role of the police and proactive policing of organised crime. 
Accordingly, these informal conditions are about what constitutes good police work, 
and what are the successes in organised crime policing which I discuss in the 
sections below. 
Good Coppers, Bad Suspects 
It seems fairly obvious that the perception of what a crime problem looks like is 
closely linked to the perception of how it is identified, defined, and reacted upon. 
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The notions of the police role, the police mandate, and the individuals being 
policed are therefore strongly influencing and even dominating police action. This 
is underlined by many researchers of e.g. police culture (see e.g. O’Neill et al. 2007; 
Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012). Such culturally anchored notions can be said to 
constitute the informal world of policing. As such, this informal world is where 
police officers make sense of their work and create meaning around it. It is the 
organisational backstage of policing where police officers speak freely about police 
matters and rehearse and prepare for their performance front stage in their team of 
actors (Goffman 1959). Sense-making and creation of meaning (Weick et al. 2005; 
Van Hulst 2013) are important motivational drivers which provide a logic model for 
action and thus a comprehensive performance. Recalling Manning (2010) from 
Chapter 3, this is what he refers to as the assumptive world of policing in which the 
occupation operate and as such which informs habitual choices and action—a 
central part of the police métier (I develop this concept further in Chapter 9). 
In accordance with Bacon (2016), my analysis shows that organised crime policing, 
particularly the policing of bikers and gangs, is both within and outside the police 
regarded as a high-profile and high-status occupational environment for several 
reasons. First, this type of policing brings about a considerable amount of political, 
public, and media attention, and is probably the second most valued type of 
policing next after anti-terrorism (Innes & Levy 2017). Consequently, organised 
crime policing is often prioritised in terms of fundings and resource allocation and 
hence regarded as important police work (se also Chapter 5). Second, the internal 
acknowledgement of this occupational field is linked to the perception that 
organised crime policing and proactive investigation specifically is specialised 
police work which requires certain skills and extensive experience (see also Bacon 
2016). Third, the field is surrounded by secrecy and mystery and people working 
organised crime have certain security clearances—they are privy to information 
other police officers are not. As a result, organised crime policing and consequently 
the community of organised crime detectives is one of the highest-ranking 
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occupational fields within the informal status hierarchy in the police and thereby 
enjoys a privileged position (Finstad 2000; Gundhus 2009; Loftus et al. 2015; Bacon 
2016). Furthermore, I find that the high status of organised crime policing is indeed 
connected to the internal perception of it as being ‘real’ police work (Holmberg 
1998; Finstad 2000; Granér 2004; Gundhus 2012; Loftus et al. 2015). This is also 
attached to the fact that it targets what Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (1986) 
characterises as ideal offenders committing ideal offences, as I will elaborate in the 
following section. 
The (Typical) Counterpart 
Although proactive investigations are a police activity mostly regarded as targeting 
victimless or consensual crimes, such as the distribution and sale of narcotics, the 
analysis shows that both managers and detectives view these as ideal crime types as 
they regard them as serious and subversive to societal cohesion. In accordance with 
Bacon (2016), an explanation of this might be that it typically takes place in a classic 
criminal environment with social agents who are regarded as being on the bottom 
of society both socially and morally. Regarding the question of why the field of 
proactive investigation interests him, a Detective explains:  
Because you can get the people who are worth getting. Because you can put people in 
jail for many years (…) I think it’s more fun to go after these (offenders, ed.), they 
deserve it more than Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their traffic violations.  
Thus, organised crime offenders are not perceived as people worthy of protection 
from the police, but on the contrary, as people who have earned negative police 
attention as they are per default criminals and wrong doers. This is in accordance 
with Holmberg (1998; 2003) who explains how police divide citizens into 
‘customers’, ‘assholes’ and ‘good Danish citizens’ based on stereotypical 
categorisations. Organised crime offenders such as bikers, gang members, drug 
dealers are generally amongst police staff referred to as ‘assholes’ (røvhuller). These 
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offenders fall into the category of police property (Holmberg 1998; Finstad 2000; 
Granér 2004; Reiner 2010) in the sense that they belong to a distinct social group 
with whom the police have a long history of dealings and who are considered 
problematic or distasteful by the public.  
Historically, the police have been occupied with especially the outlaw motorcycle 
environment (rockere) since the 1980s and street gangs from the 2000s (Christensen 
2012). Some active police officers have been working with outlaw motorcycle gangs 
their entire careers and have over time even developed an almost personal 
relationship with some of these individuals. In some ways, their own careers in 
policing are mirrored by the criminal careers of their counterparts. Proactive 
investigations and especially covert surveillance often provide a window into 
people’s lives including private and intimate details such as personal health issues, 
love lives, family relations, state of finances etc. Through surveillance and 
wiretapping detectives therefore get to know these people and their life 
circumstances quite well over the years. At national assemblies in the police or in 
the everyday lunch setting in the canteen it is not uncommon to hear detectives’ 
anecdotes about ‘the usual suspects’ (gamle kendinge) and events from the past or 
present; biker wars or investigations where these individuals have been active. 
These stories are often told with somewhat condescending remarks exposing these 
individuals’ failures and their “sad” lives, but interestingly, these anecdotes are also 
in some connections told with some degree of admiration or at least acceptance of 
these individuals’ life choices: occasionally anecdotes describe a proper counterpart 
in an ongoing battle between good and bad (Shearing & Ericsson 1991). The war 
metaphor (the war against drugs) is commonly used in for instance British and 
American drug policing (Manning 2004; Bacon 2016), whereas ’the game’ (gamet) is 
more often used as an expression within the Danish police to define the criminal 
environment. The ‘drama of cops and robbers’ therefore seems to define the general 
performance with a team of police and team of offenders enacting their respective 
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roles which are preconditioned by strict role descriptions and thus a strict script 
(Goffman 1959; Larsson 2015) (see Chapter 7 for further elaboration).    
Observations of police practice and conversations with organised crime police 
officers reveals that the classic ‘counterpart’ is a predetermined role. It refers 
broadly to the entire population of organised crime offenders who are generally 
speaking considered to be persons of interest, focus persons, and persistent, prolific 
or priority offenders within the organised crime environment. For historical and 
other reasons, it therefore fits with general stereotypical characteristics. The classic 
counterpart is by police officers and detectives perceived to be a (male) individual 
who:  
• is a member of an outlaw motorcycle gang or a street gang 
• wears visible patches and insignia 
• has a criminal life style (committing primarily drug offences and recreational 
violence) 
• is highly visible in specific social settings (e.g. the nighttime economy 
(værtshusmiljøet), the inner city party scene, and at certain VIP sporting events) 
• through illegal means acquires and displays status symbols such as expensive cars, 
motorcycles, jewellery etc. 
The counterpart’s visibility in the public consists of both a quantitative measure in 
terms of frequency and a qualitative measure in terms of the appearance and 
behaviour; for most of these offenders promoting status symbols, causing disorder 
and insecurity in certain social settings or in the local community is a vital part of 
being associated with a strong and powerful crime group. These crime groups’ 
activities are both officially and informally by police perceived as primarily focused 
on generating profit and secondly focused on the collectiveness of the subcultural 
‘brotherhood’. The community of these subcultures are therefore believed to be 
superficial promotion for recruitment purposes, and the proposed values of unity 
rather fragile. A Detective explains: 
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We see it time and again. The club (the crime group, my addition) is not there for 
them when they need it. If they get into trouble…privately or financially they can’t 
expect to get help. They’re on their own and the club doesn’t give a damn (vil skide 
dem et stykke)…if they have good personal relationships with people in the club they 
usually get their help…but if they don’t produce any money to the club, to senior 
members, and provide new business (…) All that talk of brotherhood and community 
is a scam. 
Moskos (2008) and Manning (2010), as explained in Chapter 3, describe the police’s 
assumption about people from ‘problematic areas’ as incorrigible and for example 
drug dealers as ‘always dirty’. Accordingly, in this study, police overall view the 
organised crime counterpart as a ‘criminal of choice’ anchored in a rational choice 
perspective of crime. Here cost/benefit assessments of individual action including 
the risk of getting caught and the subsequent police action are central aspects 
(Felson 2014). The counterpart’s use of violence is explained as either instrumental 
action to support organisational concerns or objectives of the crime group, as part 
of the criminal code, or as a result of limited impulse control, or excessive drug 
consumption. The association with the criminal environment and gang membership 
is perceived as a rational choice that provides a sense of belonging, protection, 
status, and privileges. Still, some police officers recognise that some offenders, in 
accordance with various research on the matter (see Pedersen 2018), join gangs in a 
fluid process which takes place over a long period of time as opposed to an active 
recruitment process or individual (rational) decision over night.  
Pity and sympathy are from time to time expressed by police officers as for example 
the low-ranking gang members such as ‘hangarounds’ and ‘prospects’ are 
considered to be “sad” people leading “sad” lives. Such lives are revolved around 
hunting profit and business, providing services for other group members, and at the 
same time being hunted by police and by rival groups. It is especially on the wires 
(aflytningerne) it becomes clear just how chaotic, unstructured, and unpredictable 
lives some of these individuals live, and how they deal with constant conflicts and 
problems both inside and outside their groups. However, detectives usually 
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conclude that they should have made different life choices instead of opting for a 
life of crime (gå til narko). 
Ingrained in these notions is the deterministic assumption that these offenders 
cannot change. They are seen as notorious career criminals with flawed morals and 
deep-rooted deviant behavioural patterns. As such, police regard them as either on 
the streets committing crime or in prison. The conclusion drawn is therefore that it 
is the job of the police to make sure that these people spend more time in the 
prisons than outside (see also Manning 2004). The prediction is that they are ‘in the 
game’ per default as they “cannot stop being criminals”. Some police officers even 
propose these offenders to have ‘a criminal mind’—a particular criminal way of 
thinking. Exit programmes which have been a persistent part of the police’s 
prevention strategy are not considered to be a viable alternative. On the contrary, 
these are by many police officers viewed as a free ticket (badebillet) to privileges 
rather than a genuine attempt to seek a life without crime. In this sense, the 
counterpart is judged in advanced (dømt på forhånd). If it is a question of 
continuous crime and harm to society or incarceration of these offenders, then 
arrest and prosecution is the logical objectives for the police to pursue. This is 
indeed in accordance with the political expectations mentioned in the beginning of 
this chapter, demanding “the continuous imprisonment of a certain amount of gang 
members”. As the crime this group of offenders commits and certainly the lifestyle 
they lead is morally rejected by the public they are prepared to turn a blind eye to 
the manner in which the police deal with them (Manning 2010), or as Reiner (2010: 
123) explains: “The prime function of the police has been to control and segregate such 
groups, and they are armed with a battery of permissive and discretionary laws for this 
purpose…”  
In the Danish context, this legal framework includes tailored laws specifically aimed 
at targeting members of organised crime groups (bandepakkerne), as presented 
earlier in this chapter. Due to the historical interest in bikers and gangs and the 
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continuous political attention, the members of organised crime groups are actually 
a well-defined group of people of which the police have much information. They 
are continuously and routinely identified and targeted through the police gaze 
(politiblikket) (Finstad 2000), which describes the police’s ability to spot what 
deviates from the norm. This ability is based on experience and collectively shared 
assumptions about ‘bad guys’ and ‘average citizens’. Consequently, what is sought 
after is what is found: the circle of information gathering for intelligence purposes 
and the identification of focus persons and potential suspects etc. are as such 
deeply dependent on who catches the attention of the police’s eye and why? 
Therefore, due to the police’s assumptions about the counterpart and ‘the bad guys’ 
there is a risk of reproducing organisational anchored stereotypes. In Chapter 7, I 
discuss how this narrow perception of organised crime represents a problem in 
terms of looking at the broader field of organised crime both in regards to crime 
areas and groups of people. 
Crusaders Against Crime 
Building on the section above, the notions and assumptions about the counterpart 
can be said to shape and support ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ (Manning 2004)—
a play where the police are assigned the role as coppers (protectors) of society and 
their counterpart perform the role of notorious criminals (Bacon 2016). This drama 
with its fixed role description of the counterpart furthermore reflects the collective 
views on the police’s role and mandate in society and thus the aim for proactive 
policing. As a Detective says: “My job is to make sure that as few as possible are harassed 
by bikers and gangs. And we have to do something about those people running around 
shooting each other in the streets.” And another Detective remarks: “We are in fact 
employed to put people in jail. I know that not all see it that way, but in my world, we are 
here to put people in jail.” 
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In accordance with Gundhus’ findings (2012), detectives perceive themselves 
fundamentally as experts in crime fighting and law enforcers instead of e.g. crime 
preventers and knowledge workers. Interestingly, they typically use the phrase 
‘putting people in jail’ about their mission and task although this task is definitely 
not within the police mandate as it instead lies within the courts. The rationale of 
‘getting gang members off the streets’ as a preventive measure for further violence 
and offending is firmly mirrored in many managers, police officers’, and detectives’ 
perceptions of crime and offenders. In this perspective, the notion of putting people 
in jail truly makes a difference as incapacitation discard them from committing 
further crime (Reiner 2010). As such, prevention is seen as a goal which is fulfilled 
through repressive enforcement measures such as investigation and incarceration, 
along the lines of the politically defined strategy. A Superintendent argues:  
The success of each case is measured by whether or not the perpetrator goes to 
prison. And yes, if there are more of them (arrests, my addition.) it might have the 
consequence that the entire group closes down. It’s effective. If it’s done in a 
targeted way. And you need to keep pushing when they’re lying down, you need to 
give it time, years, to finish the work. (…) If you remove some of the important ones, 
things will fall apart. 

That being so, the overall effort against organised crime is viewed as pointless. It is 
primarily portrayed as tiring Sisiphos work:  
It has no impact on society. Mr and Mrs Smith will never notice it. There would be 
unrest in the market (of narcotics, my addition.) for a while. But new people will just 
come along and start selling. It doesn’t mean anything. 
A Detective argues further: “It’s futile in terms of drugs (som at slå i en dyne). But if the 
police were to sit back it would go completely nuts (balalajka). There has to be a price to 
pay.” Detectives therefore seem to find purpose and meaning in the investigation 
process rather than in its (societal) impact, as a Superintendent says: “We’ve learned 
that we cannot save the world. But you can get high from running a case…”. A Senior 
Detective continues:  
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I couldn’t care less who they are. It’s the case! I have no interests in gangs. What 
interests me is that someone’s going to jail. It’s the case which is important to me. 
And there are enough of them! 
Although police officers are concerned about the impact of the overall police 
response, in contrast to Gundhus’ findings (2009), the notion of enforcement and 
proactive investigation as effective countermeasures against organised crime is still 
maintained—at least when talking about the individual offender. My analysis shows, 
that during casework, the offender—the investigation target—is therefore by 
detectives transferred into the role of the classic counterpart who holds the 
stereotypical characteristics of a bad guy. In this sense, each case is still perceived as 
meaningful, despite the recognition of the dim prospects of the police’s overall 
efforts. Thus, the performance of the drama of cops and robbers relies on consistent 
role descriptions and a predictable script; it becomes a ritual where uncertainties 
are reduced to well-known categories (for example of good guys and bad guys) 
which function as a way to maintain stability and motivation to continue the work.  
Real Police Work 
The findings above regarding the ritualised performance of investigative work seem 
to be closely linked to one of the strongest cultural notions within the police: the 
idea of “real” police work and “pseudo” police work. Real police work has to do with 
catching ‘bad guys’ while protecting ’the innocent’ (Holmberg, 1998; Granér 2004; 
Loftus 2010; Cockcroft 2012)—a notion strongly associated with the perception of 
ideal offenders and ideal victims. Moreover, within this assumption is the belief that 
real police work is carried out ‘on the streets of the real world’ and as such is in 
sharp contrast to ‘pseudo police work’ defined as office work, where police officers 
and other personnel are “pushing papers back and forth” or providing an 
(unnecessary) support function such as management support, human resource 
support, or analyses. Most strategic work focused on long-term police responses or 
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preventive work automatically falls outside the category of ‘real policing’. Recalling 
Chapter 3, Manning (2010) argues that patrol duties and detective work are at the 
core of the police métier where the occurrence of crime and disorder—the incident
—is its sacred centre. Gundhus (2005) for example finds that police officers working 
in the streets label the analytical staff as ‘the passive PC-police’ working on ‘the 
valley of death’ illustrating that this type of work is not regarded as meaningful or 
relevant. Several police researchers have identified such perceptions amongst 
particular rank and files and detectives (Gundhus 2005; Loftus 2010). Another 
important feature of the notion of ‘real policing’ is that it is an action-orientated 
endeavour and therefore encompasses the assumption that policing requires 
officers who are able to handle stressful or dangerous situations without hesitation 
and to solve immediate conflicts between parties through their function as first 
responders in accidents, deaths, violent fights etc. Additionally, this feature is 
identified as a universal, stable feature across countries and police agencies (O’Neill 
et al. 2007; Brodeur 2010; Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010; Cockcroft 2012; Gundhus 2012; 
Bowling et al. 2020). Action-orientation supports the view of policing as a masculine 
occupation where the ability to take action is highly valued together with the 
execution of what is perceived as common sense-decisions (Granér 2004). This 
definition of ‘real policing’ is, according to Finstad (2000), the highest ranging in the 
status-hierarchy in police culture. Of course, patrol duties fit the description of 
being real police work rather well, however, criminal investigations, detective work 
and the process of solving crimes are moreover seen as key functions within real 
policing. This is the case especially when it comes to crimes with a high degree of 
severity (for example homicide) and when it comes to offenders and victims 
respectively who fit the profiles of ideal offenders and ideal victims.  
Since proactive investigation practice, as I will explain in Chapter 8, in the practical 
reality first and foremost takes place within the office, behind the computer screen, 
and in front of the wiretapping devices, detectives interestingly refer to this work as 
operative and action-oriented. With its components of covert measures; observation, 
272
covert searches, surveillance, informant handling etc. it might be considered from 
the outside as a predominantly operational discipline and organised crime 
detectives are additionally successful in their description of this work as being 
carried out ‘on the streets’. The narrative about proactive investigation is therefore 
that it is indeed ‘real police work’. This is also reflected in the view of policing as an 
essentially masculine occupation counteracting a tough social environment such as 
the organised gang environment which is often grounded in hyper masculine and 
violent subcultures. The ability to handle—and handle oneself in—such an 
environment is therefore per default regarded as masculine since it often requires 
both physical strength and courage. Perhaps for that reason, detectives in proactive 
investigation teams are often recruited from operational street-level work such as 
plain clothes specialised units or task forces working in the nighttime economy, 
with drug offences, informant handling or the like. Knowledge about this type of 
offenders and the local community in which they operate is regarded as one of the 
most important skills in the organisational recruitment. A Superintendent once 
described this as “having the blood of the streets inside oneself” (at have gadens 
blod i sig) pointing to the capability to understand how these offenders think and 
act. A Senior Detective explains: 
The lack of local knowledge is a huge problem. We’ve been investigating all over the 
country and the surveillance team has taken more than 1,000 pictures (of the 
suspects, my addition) and we don’t know who they are. But along come Peter and 
Thomas (officers from the special operative unit (‘Uroen’), my addition) and in more 
than a few hours, we’ve identified all of them, because they know them (from the 
environment, my addition).  
In this sense, proactive investigation is primarily viewed as a continuation of action-
oriented street-level operational work, rather than information-oriented 
investigative work. This is an important aspect of the epistemic culture of proactive 
investigation, which I will return to in Chapter 7, 8, and 9. 
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Perceptions of Proactivity 
Along the lines of Manning’s findings (2004; 2010), my analysis shows that the 
general perception of ‘good’ police work amongst managers, police officers, and 
detectives concerns classic police activities, patrol duties, and detective work carried 
out on street-level. The measure of success evolves around the amount of arrests, 
the number of conviction years, and the seizures of illicit goods. This includes the 
measure of success for proactive investigation as an Assistant Police Commissioner 
explains:  
When there have been gang conflicts in many different geographical areas we have 
been looking at criminal agents. Not because their crimes have been immense, but to 
find out: who are the conflict instigators? On those grounds, we have sat down and 
looked at: who should we try to control when they are out roaming the streets, who 
should we activate a targeted police response towards, and who should we definitely 
demonstrate our clear presence towards? Broadly speaking there are some of these 
people in contrast to others who are able to secure law and order in the local 
community if we put them in the can (spjældet). So, we are looking at a criminal 
agent who might be more or less criminal. And then we begin activating our 
informants (kildeindhentning), we try to get information about that person’s 
criminal activities with the purpose of building a criminal case and getting a 
conviction. Out of the picture, right?  
Proactivity is understood as a way of being ‘one step ahead’ of the criminals (være 
på forkant med) rather than to ‘run behind’ them (halse bagefter dem). The logic 
model is that if the police are ahead, the more people can be arrested and 
prosecuted (incapacitation), and the police will thereby gain more control of the 
organised crime environment. Some, but not all, police officers connect this to a 
way of creating deterrence and thereby preventing further crime and violent 
conflicts. At operational level, however, the most common understanding between 
detectives is that proactive investigation has the same purpose as reactive 
investigation: to identify a perpetrator, seize drugs and money, arrest the culprit and 
prosecute him with the aim of incarceration and this becomes a goal in itself. 
Gundhus (2012) has a similar finding in her study of a Norwegian organised crime 
unit, where intelligence-led policing was translated into ‘rounding up the drug-
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trafficker’. Preventing crime is not a high-status task in police and specifically not 
for organised crime detectives. This is amongst other reasons due to the notion of 
‘real policing’, but it also has to do with an organisational preoccupation with fast 
and visible results which create immediate gratification, a version of short run 
hedonism—a concept Cohen (1955) uses in relation to delinquent boys. Preventive 
efforts do not produce the same visible and tangible results as reactive efforts—the 
arrest of a perpetrator is a satisfying and concrete outcome of police work, whereas 
the prevention of a potential crime event seems rather abstract. 
The case of Operation Goldilocks clearly shows that the aim of the police operation 
was collecting and producing enough evidence for the seizure of illicit drugs or 
perhaps dirty money and consequently the arrest of the prime target. This was both 
the objective amongst detectives, but also the directive from strategic management 
as the investigation was to produce ‘a number’ (seizure or arrest). This points to the 
condition about how difficult it is to instigate proactive approaches in the police 
and in these types of investigations with preventive aims such as disruption or 
destabilising of organised crime groups (Bacon 2016). Such investigative efforts 
simply do not produce fast and visible results capable of meeting political 
expectation and performance goals while at the same time fitting organisational 
perceptions of ‘real policing’. On the contrary, instigation of for example substantial 
investigations such as the investigation of the money trail, the business economy 
surrounding the organised crime groups, money laundering and the like are 
complex, resource demanding investigative tasks. An Analyst explains: 
Now new winds are blowing (nye vinde blæser) within the organisation—new 
strategies are needed in terms of how we use our resources and there has to be a 
focus on cost-benefit. It requires stamina for a manager to sit with an investigation 
proposal (efterforskningsoplæg) that, if taken on, will require a great amount of 
resources and overtime—and which might lead to bigger seizures than they usually 
get and which might remove some players from the game they don’t usually get. And 
it is easier for managers to get results by focusing on low-hanging fruits. There has 
to be an overall strategy and prioritisation—but the problem with this strategy is that 
even though it is the most appropriate in terms of resources it is difficult to ‘feel it’ 
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right away. It is difficult to explain to people that in six months we will eradicate one 
of the top players (within the organised crime environment, my addition).  
Initially, the shutdown of Operation Goldilocks therefore might look like a pragmatic 
and rational decision on the basis of cost-benefit assessments. However, when 
taking a closer look, my analysis shows that it also mirrors an organisational 
preference. Decision-making within the police seems to only support the proposed 
ideas of a proactive paradigm contingently. In the general run of things, both 
strategic and operational decision-makers seem to a great extent to rely on the 
familiar course of action and thereby a reactive approach to policing. This is 
amongst other illustrated in at least two conditions which I will elaborate in the 
following:  
First, the condition that proactive policing is per se not seen as an entirely different 
paradigm for police action. The organisational conversation indeed speaks of 
implementing ‘a different mindset’, but proactive approaches are primarily seen as 
the application of new methods and technologies which are believed to support 
existing police responses and police action (Chan 2001; Manning 2008d; Gundhus 
2009; Gundhus 2012). This includes the introduction of ‘smarter’ and often 
technologically substantiated approaches to patrol work (for example apps to 
function as platforms for structuring police reports or advanced technology to 
predict crime hotspots and direct patrols), and to investigation (for example the use 
of larger data platforms to collect and categorise information from various sources 
or the introduction of new “analytical” tools such as social network analysis to 
identify offenders in a more systematic and “objective” way). Interestingly, such 
measures and the implementation of them are in themselves seen by police as 
proactive which distance them from a more traditional and reactive experience-
based approach (I will discuss this finding further in Chapter 7 and 8). Still, the 
police response overall is not altered radically (Manning 2010; Bacon 2016). To put it 
bluntly, the perception of proactive policing is that it is a smarter way of doing 
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police work, and it therefore becomes an instrumental understanding instead of a 
revolutionary paradigm shift. My analysis shows in regards to proactive 
investigation that this is predominantly seen as a categorisation of covert measures 
and the instigation of specific investigative techniques (such as interception in 
communications and observation) belonging to a specific legal framework. The 
objectives, however, remain the same as in reactive investigations and the notion of 
prevention is therefore not central (see Chapter 8 for further discussion). The aim, 
as I showed earlier, is not specifically to disrupt ongoing or crime in the making, but 
to hold priority offenders such as kingpins responsible (see also Gundhus 2012). 
Second, there seems to be a continuous organisational need to reduce complexity: 
the police seem notoriously preoccupied with ’quick-fix’ solutions which can be 
planned and applied fast and without too much organisational change. As well as 
promoting easily understood and easily communicated quantitative performance 
goals, strategic management are as mentioned above continuously on the lookout 
for new technological equipment and tools in the solution of various crime 
problems. Massive investments in data systems and software have been undertaken 
due to decades of neglecting this area, but it also has the purpose of modernising 
the police as an organisation and to professionalise and make the police more 
proactive through technology. The ambition to meet the challenges of modern 
policing through the development of technological tools, standardisation, checklists, 
and improved software reveals a somewhat superficial understanding of police work 
and all its complexities and a tendency towards reducing intellectual aspects of 
police work. This reductionist position can moreover be seen as a mangement style, 
which I label one-page management (Hestehave 2018) as it refers to the general rule 
within police that information regarding analytical findings, evaluation results, 
current issues-statements and the like should preferably be accounted for in no 
more than one page as no one in the police will read ‘lengthy academic reports’. 
From top management to front line officers there is a fatigue when it comes to 
written material, which they are in fact bombarded with on all sorts of issues. 
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Consequently, this leaves often complex crime problems, societal threats, and 
internal organisational challenges to be comprised and minimised to fit the one 
page-form preferably in a ‘plainspoken format’ presented in ‘bullet points’ if 
possible. Important nuances and complex causal explanations are therefore in 
constant danger of being neglected.  
Epistemic Rationales 
The above analysis shows that the epistemic rationales of experience-based policing 
and knowledge-based policing once again compete in defining and understanding 
good results, and good police work. In analysing the implementation of knowledge-
based policing in Norwegian police, Gundhus (2006; 2012) develops a competence 
hierarchy—a useful ideal type model of police’s perceptions of professionalism and 
high- and low-ranking knowledge within police. I have put these together in Figure 
M (derived and assembled from Gundhus (2012). 
Figure M. Ideal Types of Professionalism and Knowledge Hierarchy. 
Gundhus (2012) argues that in order to become knowledge-based implies a 
particular view on knowledge; a logic based on evaluation of codified, standardised 
information systems rather than an experience-based, action-oriented collegial 
logic. Still, useful information is within police regarded as ‘thick’ information based 
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on informants whereas ‘thin’ information is viewed as more abstract knowledge 
which is valued by management and leading to external forms of regulation and 
performance measurement. Several police scholars refer to an anti-intellectualism 
as a cultural characteristic within police, where e.g. theoretical education/thinking is 
seen as an obstacle to action orientation (Granér 2004; Loftus 2010; Manning 2010; 
Cockcroft 2012; Ratcliffe et al. 2014). In this study, police management accordingly 
seems to return to familiar modes of action where fast solutions, experience-based 
knowledge, and ‘gut feeling’-decisions are applauded in opposition to ‘academic 
roundtable discussions’ where matters are made ‘unnecessary complicated’. 
Although, academic skills within the last decade have been increasingly requested 
and employed within the (Danish) police, especially by strategic management, it is 
still in certain situations clear that police management to a high degree carries and 
values experience and knowledge from the world of operational policing into the 
world of strategic management. Examples of this include high-ranking strategic 
managers (e.g. assistant police commissioners) who involve themselves in 
operational decisions on an everyday basis rather than prioritising strategic issues. 
A Superintendent once explained: 
Apparently, they (strategic management, my addition) have a very long screwdriver 
which goes all the way from the top office down to the operational machinery (helt 
ned i maskinrummet) and makes all kinds of disturbance.   
This prioritisation can be viewed as an expression of these managers being 
promoted within the police from ground level and as such wanting to remain in a 
domain that they know and feel comfortable in and basically are passionate about. 
In connection with a discussion about the targeting of priority offenders, I 
presented the argument to a former manager at NCI that we needed to carry out 
thorough analysis of the various crime groups in order to prioritise between them. 
He asked if there was no easier way to make this prioritisation and said: “You know 
what, no one gets any wiser reading 30 pages about “Falcons”. I’m an old copper (strisser)
—I just want to see people go to jail”. 
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This way of making sense of policing reflects Gundhus’ (2012) competence 
hierarchy from above and seems to make police officers, both managers and rank 
and files, to return to their familiar mode of action and familiar perception of role 
categories. The purpose of arrests and seizures is therefore much more concrete 
than diffuse aims of avoiding criminal events to take place—an example of the 
much-valued experience-based and concrete ‘thick’ knowledge as opposed to the 
more abstract ‘thin’ standardised knowledge. A central characteristic of the job is 
indeed to constantly perform through arrests (Maguire 1994; Fahsing 2016). The 
above conditions present a fundamental paradox for proactive policing: the 
proactive domain is dominated by reactive notions of police work and how it is 
carried out. Although proactive policing promotes prevention per default this is not 
a central aspect of neither perception nor practice.  
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Summary & Discussion: A Rapid Response to 
Organised Crime? 
In this chapter, I have explored the political, organisational, and strategic context of 
the police’s response to organised crime and how the police perform and measure 
their success in this context. I have analysed both formal and informal conditions, 
organisational structures and culturally anchored assumptions with the purpose of 
identifying what shapes and impacts this performance. In the current section, I 
account for the chapter’s central findings and arguments and discuss some of the 
difficulties connected to the organisational and cultural predicaments and 
discrepancies between ideals, aspirations, abilities, and reality in terms of 
responding to organised crime, and thus how these conditions impact the overall 
police response and proactive investigation specifically. I return to the empirical 
example presented in the introduction of this chapter and discuss the 
circumstances surrounding the shut-down of Operation Goldilocks with an outset of 
the analytical findings in this chapter.  
Some vital conclusions can be drawn. The formal frame for the police’s response to 
organised crime is constituted by a number of policy documents and 
operationalised into a strategy and action plan which is intended to have both a 
long-term and a short-term perspective, and a reactive and proactive focus. The 
police’s response is trying to deal with urgent crime problems and conflicts as well 
as accumulating crime and the underlying structures enabling the organised crime 
environment. The logic model behind this strategy reflects primarily criminological 
theories of rational choice and deterrence. This leads to the instigation of what I 
identify as two different response models; 1) a broad response model targeting the 
members of the organised crime environment as a whole through everyday police 
work, and 2) a narrow response model targeting a small group of priority and high-
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value offenders by instigating proactive investigations. Although prevention and 
proactive police work are pinpointed as central components of the police’s strategy, 
this is only to a limited extent reflected in the politically determined objectives and 
performance goals. These have, on the contrary, through a decade been guided by a 
tough-on-crime approach prompting repressive and punitive efforts, such as 
multiple arrests and incarceration of offenders. The formal objectives and measures 
of success for the police’s response, including proactive investigation, are as such 
reactive per default. The police try to implement political demands and initiatives 
loyally and to the best of their abilities. Still, police management has some genuine 
concerns about this strategy’s ability to provide a comprehensive police response 
towards systemic and persistent crime problems from the organised crime 
environment.  
In the practical world of policing, however, police are under significant pressure to 
allocate their time and resources into primarily reactive investigations and 
operational responses focusing on damage control, and dealing with criminal 
incidents and conflicts here and now whilst trying to meet the political 
performance goals. Accordingly, these conditions come to capture the strategic 
agenda and as a result tie the police’s time and resources to the short-term 
perspective and the broad response model. Consequently, police’s response to 
organised crime is primarily characterised by reactive police work and solving 
‘problems of the day’. This stands in contrast to the inherent notion of the proactive 
paradigm which e.g. prescribes a knowledge-based police response focusing on a 
long-term perspective and a problem-oriented operational model targeting the 
underlying structures of organised crime and as such ‘problems of tomorrow’. This 
is reflected in the focus on multiple arrests and incarceration as the primary 
measures of success which employ measures from the standard model of policing.  
There is a constant organisational battle of police’s strategy and action plan as the 
police are forced to choose between what they identify as a focus on violent 
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conflicts here and now and on underlying structures of the organised crime 
environment which are believed to pose the foundation for the root causes of 
organised crime. Accordingly, it mirrors the persistent dilemma of being either a 
reactive response service dealing with the short-term problems at hand or a 
proactive police service with a focus on instigating problem-oriented responses 
with a long-term focus. Yet, from my analysis of the informal and assumptive world 
of policing it becomes clear that managers, police officers, and detectives evolve 
around some of the same measures of success as presented in the formal strategy. 
The general perception is namely that ‘good’ police work is ‘real policing’ focusing 
on catching and arresting ‘bad guys’ who fit certain stereotypical characteristics. 
The success is as such measured in the amount of arrests, the number of conviction 
years, and the seizures of weapons and illicit goods. On strategic level, the 
immediate impression of how proactive investigation is interpreted is that it is 
rooted in the ideas of the proactive paradigm understood as a strategic and 
knowledge-based policing approach focusing on analysis of crime problems and 
with prevention as an overall purpose of the police’s activities. Although this 
perception to is some extent expressed in management language and reflected in 
the various policy documents, it appears as a rhetorical and on-the-surface 
performance to accommodate the front stage of policing where the ideal of 
proactivity and smart policing lives. On the backstage, however, the informal world 
of policing dominates which is compelled by collectively shared assumptions about 
police work and the criminal counterpart in support of the reactive paradigm.  
With its offset and embeddedness in a reactive response service and an experience-
based epistemic culture ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ is performed relying on 
consistent role descriptions and a predictable script. It becomes a ritual where 
uncertainties are reduced to well-known categories (for example of good guys and 
bad guys) which function as a way for detectives to maintain stability and 
motivation to continue their work. Each case is thereby perceived as meaningful, 
despite the broad recognition within police of the dim prospects of the police’s 
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overall efforts to impact organised crime. The front stage performance of proactivity 
therefore becomes symbolic celebrating the ritual subculture of patrol (Manning 
2010). The main argument here is that the reactive approach indeed seems to mirror 
an organisational preference of being a response service focusing on delivering a 
rapid response to criminal incidents sanctioning those offenders involved as it is 
prescribed in the standard model of policing (Sherman 2013). Proactive 
investigation is viewed as having the same purpose as reactive investigation: to 
identify a perpetrator with the aim of prosecuting and arresting him. Although 
proactive policing promotes prevention per default this is not a central aspect of 
neither perception nor practice. The fact that prevention of crime is not a high-
status task within police is connected to the notion of real policing, but also to an 
organisational preoccupation with fast and visible results which create immediate 
gratification and short-run hedonism (Cohen 1955). In the general run of things, 
both strategic and operational decision-makers seem to rely on the familiar course 
of action as proactive policing is not regarded as a different paradigm for police 
action, and since there seems to be an organisational need to reduce complexity in 
police work and instigate ’quick-fix’ solutions without too much organisational 
change. Thus, these conditions present a fundamental paradox for proactive 
policing: the proactive domain is dominated by reactive notions of police work and 
how it is carried out. Furthermore, experience-based policing is the highest-ranking 
professionalism within the status hierarchy as it is based on concrete ‘thick’ 
knowledge as opposed to more abstract ‘thin’ standardised analytical knowledge. 
The police response overall is not altered radically—the perception of proactive 
policing is that it is a smarter way of doing police work, and it therefore becomes an 
instrumental understanding instead of being integrated into a knowledge-led and 
wide-ranging revolutionary paradigm shift.  
Returning now to Operation Goldilocks: this investigation was launched as part of the 
narrow response model with the purpose of diminishing the influence of one of the 
(assumed) most significant priority offenders in the criminal environment and as 
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such a high-value target for the police. A proactive investigation should thereby 
uncover the suspect’s criminal activities and provide enough evidence to build a 
criminal case leading to arrest and prosecution. This should lead to the 
disempowerment of the offender with great consequences for his criminal 
organisation. The operation was in the beginning viewed as part of ‘the long 
haul’ (det lange seje træk) targeting the underlying structures of organised crime. It 
had been launched with great ambition and was allocated substantial personnel and 
resources. However, as displayed in the introduction, the investigation was shut 
down when it had run for eight months. Over time, police management lost interest 
in Operation Goldilocks and became impatient with the investigation process for a 
number of reasons. First, there were other imposing priorities such as new 
(political) and more publicly visible priorities including terrorism, immigration, and 
border security. But also new investigations which were assessed by police 
management to demand an acute investigative response (a coincidental discovery of 
a large amount of illicit drugs). This mirrors indeed the organisational habitus of 
focusing on problems of the day. Second, the investigation lacked the expected 
progression and seemed to stomp as one line of enquiry after another did not lead 
to incriminating evidence. The amount of resources needed to carry on with the 
investigation was supposedly not considered to be a good investment. Many of the 
investigative measures were of a technical nature, but technology kept failing which 
impacted the investigation’s potential for identifying evidence. Third, Operation 
Goldilocks is an illustration of one of the most central issues regarding proactive 
policing (and proactive investigation towards organised crime): high-value targets 
such as crime facilitators and kingpins (bagmænd) as counterparts (modstandere) 
are always several steps ahead of the police. There are two main reasons for this.  
The first and most obvious reason is that criminal agents are inherently not bound 
by laws, regulations, bureaucracy, technological, and economical restrictions and 
ethical considerations for democracy, privacy, and human rights. In contrast to 
police, criminal agents can operate freely which gives them a huge advantage. The 
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other reason is of a methodological nature. It is a difficult and complex task to build 
a criminal case against a high-value target. Especially those who are characterised 
by being criminal entrepreneurs with high degrees of criminal knowledge, years of 
experience, and criminality as both a lifestyle and profession (Dean et al. 2010), as it 
was apparently the case in Operation Goldilocks. Such offenders are very aware of 
employing safety measures as they have years of experience with police action and 
can therefore protect themselves against e.g. investigation techniques. Additionally, 
they often have a supporting network both internationally, in the organised crime 
environment, but also within the legitimate part of society such as legal and 
financial advisors (lawyers and accountants). This gives them competitive advantages 
and makes them capable of e.g. blurring their own involvement in criminality (for 
example import and distribution of illicit drugs) and abilities to keep the profit 
without having it traced back to illegal activities (for example via money laundering) 
(Dean et al. 2010). In sum, the operation, as I will show in Chapter 8, presented the 
investigation team with difficulties, and police management were not prepared to 
prolong the investigative resources despite of the belief that proactive investigations 
towards high-value targets was the right thing to do. The operation was at risk of 
not attributing to the numbers’ game and the political and organisational demands. 
Moreover, the investigation team started to become frustrated and impatient as they 
were not seeing any immediate results of their efforts and they began to loose 
motivation and interest in the case. 
The case of Operation Goldilocks is far from unique when it comes to proactive 
investigations, and it illustrates quite well how difficult it is for the police both on a 
structural and individual level to maintain focus on and make long-term 
investments in proactive efforts as these are generally not rewarded when 
measuring both political and organisational success. The ‘drama of cops and 
robbers’ where the police perform the roles of crime fighters and crusaders against 
ideal offenders include a script where the counterpart makes mistakes for the police 
to pursue. This performance can be seen as a rerun from uniformed patrol policing 
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with underlying assumptions which stem from the standard policing model and 
promote a logic of responding rapidly to events and acting upon them (Sherman 
2013). According to the script, this performance should according to the script end 
with the arrest of the offender, which is applauded by the political and public 
audience.  
Summing up this chapter, both the formal, organisational structures and aspects of 
the informal world of policing altogether seem to commission the instigation of an 
enforcement strategy which focuses on the emic concepts of low-hanging fruits 
rather than the long haul. This is understood as catching and prosecuting ‘easy 
targets’; prolific offenders who indeed commit serious and organised crime on a 
continuous basis, but at a low-level scale. These offenders do not require the same 
efforts or present the same difficulties from a policing or investigative standpoint as 
individuals with a more strategic and as such valuable function within a crime 
group such as e.g. crime facilitators, kingpins, and ‘money men’ (bagmænd). The 
police response overall is as such not altered radically; proactive policing is viewed 
instrumentally as a smarter way of doing police work, and this hinders a 
revolutionary paradigm shift. Due to these conditions, it seems uncertain if the 
police can instigate long-term, proactive, and high-end police work targeting high-
value offenders who do not fit the role description of the typical counterpart and 
where the script for the performance is unknown. The question is if this approach 
can be altered? The identification and targeting of offenders is the theme of the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 7: The Drama of Cops and Robbers  
- On police’s instigation of random investigations towards priority 
offenders 
The police, by surveillance and tracking selected groups of people and known 
suspects, making arrests, traffic stops, and sweeps of areas, keeping a jail, and 
applying street justice under the disguise of “discretion” can radically alter life 
chances, enhancing some, and rarely even ending life. They act as a redistribution 
mechanism in the context of the present inequalities of even a wealthy society. 
- Democratic Policing in a Changing World by Peter K. Manning (2010: xiii).  
Introduction 
“So you see—we’re not doing target selection ‘the academic way’ yet… but it’s much better 
now than when we started.”  
Superintendent Carlyle had come into my office and sat down on the small meeting table, 
leaving his feet dangling in the air.  
I had just attended my first targeting meeting where high-value targets—priority offenders 
from the organised crime environment—were selected and prioritised for proactive 
investigations. The meeting had representatives from the national unit (NCI), and from the 
police districts, primarily superintendents from local organised crime units. The meeting 
lasted about two hours and the participants from the districts each had their own list with 
names of individuals in the organised crime environment whom they wanted to start an 
investigation towards. A shortlist with ten names was decided upon at the end of the 
meeting. The superintendent from the national unit was the meeting chair sitting physically 
at the end of the oval meeting table. I was there as an observer, but sat together with the 
others around the table. A clerk sat in the far end and took minutes. She only interrupted 
when she needed someone to spell out a name.  
Especially the gang environment consists primarily of people with ethnic minority 
background and as such Arabic, African, Middle Eastern names which—for a Dane—are 
hard to spell and pronounce. Names are difficult, but crucial in this kind of setting. Also, the 
organised crime environment uses a lot of nicknames and the police use them too. If you 
don’t know who Fat Joe is, you are not getting the latest information from ‘the 
sources’ (kilderne) or off ‘the wire’ (‘lytteren’/the wiretap). The conclusion can fast enough 
be that you haven’t been around for a very long time and as such you are not ‘in the know’. I 
find myself constantly impressed by the fact that many police officers and detectives can 
remember names and faces of so many different individuals. I have wondered how much 
time they spend going through the pictures in the police databases and rehearsing these 
names. Some can even remember the social security number of some of the 'key players' 
who have been around for a long time. A portion of these offenders have been known by 
police for more than 20 years—some of them grew up together with police officers who 
started to ‘police’ them later on: street-level work, investigations, surveillance, wiretapping 
etc. Still, new faces appear all the time, and police officers must really have a good memory.   
I smiled at Superintendent Carlyle. 
“It’s okay,” I said, “you don’t need to take a more scientific approach to targeting just to 
please me. You should do it because it makes sense to you to be more systematic in the 
targeting process, and because we want to look at more comparable features than we 
usually do. No point in changing things if you feel you’re doing it the best way possible 
already.” 
The Superintendent looked at me without commenting. He said: 
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“You should have seen how it was done in the beginning. We only targeted the ones that 
were already prime targets of our inquiries. To please the KPIs,” (the key performance 
indicators in the national strategy, my addition).  
I got a sense that Carlyle was apologising for the way they had handled the meeting. It made 
me think of the day before where a former colleague at NCI, Peter, dropped by my office to 
chat and ask me about the unit and the tasks I was currently working on. I told him about 
the review I was doing of targeting practices and we discussed the issues regarding how 
targets for proactive investigations were chosen.  
“Oh, they investigate exactly who they want to! Ha! You cannot get these old boys to change 
their priorities, and they’ll do what they want no matter what management decides.”  
We discussed this for a while and came up with a couple of suggestions as to why this might 
be the case—that detectives were reluctant to try new approaches to targeting or 
investigations. 
“It’s the culture!” Peter said, without specifying his comment further. 
A Norwegian book called Investigative Methods (Etterforskningsmetoder) was lying on my 
desk. Peter looked at it and said: 
“Be careful that you don’t become a spearhead of the kind of thinking where one believes 
one can learn about investigation by reading a thick book. You can’t!”  
Peter smiled and raised his arm in a salute while leaving.  
Although, I did not perceive the comment as a distinct critique, merely as Peter stating an—
from his point of view—obvious fact, the situation was present in my mind when speaking 
to the superintendent. It made me chose my words carefully. I did not want to offend 
Superintendent Carlyle by saying something he would perceive as a critique of the 
established approach. My experience was that when different approaches or issues were 
discussed e.g. at meetings or simply around the coffee machine it quickly went in the 
direction of heated discussions which rarely had a constructive outcome. I wanted to 
present my views in a way that did not overrule the viewpoints of the superintendent, but to 
put forward an alternative to the established approach. 
“It could give us an advantage if we looked at the groups (organised crime groups, my 
addition) first and their individual members afterwards. You know; trying to determine who 
has which functions and who is most influential in terms of crime, but also the 
organisational issues within the groups.” 
“But we know that already from the sources (confidential informants, my addition) and the 
investigations,” Carlyle said, “I don’t think an analysis can tell us something we don’t know.” 
“That might be,” I said, “but wouldn’t it be useful to have a more systematic overview of this 
knowledge which is already out there? Writing it down on paper, backing it up with relevant 
data? If we look at the long-term, it might help us in three or six months if we’ve tracked the 
different developments within the groups. It might also be relevant in relation to violent 
conflicts for example?”. 
“But there’s a lot of work in it and I’m not sure it’s gonna be worth the effort…writing 
something down we already know…”  
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Carlyle stayed on for a while and we continued to talk about the different approaches to 
targeting, but also the shortlist with ten names—the suggested high-value targets for 
proactive investigations. Before he left, Carlyle commented on the list which was composed 
at the end of the targeting meeting: 
“There’s no question that these people are very influential (toneangivende) in the 
environment. If we could eliminate them (tage dem ud af spillet), it would really make a 
difference.”  
The incident above took place about the time when police management wanted to 
instigate a new model for targeting—that being the identification of priority 
offenders for proactive investigations. The narrative above illustrates quite well 
some of the organisational hassles and dilemmas which are at stake in the police—
especially for police management—when it comes to identifying high-value 
investigation targets, and in terms of prioritising investigation resources for 
proactive investigations. On one hand, police management holds the ambition to 
get a better overview of threats from organised crime, and a more strategic way of 
allocating resources. The conventional targeting practice within police was believed 
to be insufficient in terms of targeting high-value offenders operating ‘on the top 
shelf’ as prescribed in the narrow response model. Additionally, strategic 
management called for a more top-down process which left reduced powers to 
managers at an operational level, and detectives and informant handlers at a tactical 
level. On the other hand, the analytical-based model for strategic targeting proved 
to be a challenge to implement for a number of reasons—but mainly as it did not 
suit organisational habits and ways of doing things. Therefore, despite of several 
attempts being made, strategic targeting was never fully implemented and 
established as a practice within police. Instead, what police managers referred to as 
an interim targeting model—which predominantly relied on conventional and well-
known measures to targeting—was launched and eventually made up the 
permanent model for targeting.  
The example above therefore draws attention to the two different rationales of 
experience-based policing and knowledge-based policing as discussed in the 
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previous chapters. These rationales are competing in many different areas of 
contemporary policing and especially in regards to proactive investigation and the 
targeting of priority offenders. The rationales reflect the ultimate concern about 
how police work should be carried out and what type of knowledge this practice 
should build on. So, in relation to the launch of proactive investigations; who can 
be regarded as priority offenders in organised crime? Which methods should be 
used to identify these high-value targets? What constitutes the information base of 
these offenders’ threats, and how is this information produced? And further: how 
do police handle both external and internal demands for implementing more 
knowledge-based methods within the frame of the narrow response model and at 
the same time considering organisational preferences to sustain established 
experience-based practices? 
In this chapter, I explore the circumstances under which proactive investigations 
are initiated. The chapter is as such concerned with the preparatory phase leading 
up to the launch of proactive investigations in which (suspected) offenders are 
identified, selected, and prioritised as high-value investigation targets. Such 
proactive investigations are primarily launched within the counters of the narrow 
response model, which I presented in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I 
analyse two different approaches to targeting namely the conventional and 
established approach within police and a new analytical-driven approach which is 
sought implemented—and I identify these as reactive and proactive models for 
targeting respectively. Further, I explore the organisational competition between 
these two approaches and the underlying explanations for and consequences of 
this. Overall, I ask the question and analyse: how are prime targets for proactive 
investigations identified and prioritised? My main argument in this chapter is that 
due to organisational preferences and habitual thinking, proactive investigations 
often target priority offenders for proactive investigations using predominantly 
conventional and experience-based approaches such as informant-driven targeting. 
This can be compared to the approach of random patrolling from the standard 
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policing model which mirrors a narrow perception of proactive policing both as a 
concept and as a practice (Bacon 2016). Inherent in this approach lies a practice 
where offenders are randomly identified through the police gaze as they meet the 
criteria of being highly visible, usual suspects who police can easily recognise and 
moreover prefer to deal with. It mirrors as such the performance of the street-level 
drama of cops and robbers between good and bad (real police catching real 
criminals) where police identify and round up usual suspects as a ritual revolving 
around a well-known script and well-known role descriptions. On the contrary, the 
performance of targeting hidden populations has no predefined role descriptions or 
predictable script and therefore—despite a strategic inclination to instigate a 
knowledge-based approach—it is difficult to replace standard routines in police 
practice. Proactive investigation therefore becomes an informant-led police activity 
rather than a component to intelligence-led policing. 
First, I investigate the conventional and established practices for targeting and their 
historical origin within the police with the purpose of exploring their inherent 
principles, assumptions, and logics.   
Second, I examine how and why new methods for targeting are sought to be 
instigated as part of the narrow response model, and the challenges these processes 
meet when encountering the police’s organisational and cultural frames and ruling 
practices. 
Third, I explore the organisational battle between these reactive and proactive 
models for targeting and consequently the competition between the rationales of 
experience-based and knowledge-based policing.  
The chapter ends with a summary of the key analytical findings together with a 
discussion of the impact of police’s targeting practices towards the overall response 
to organised crime and as such the field of proactive investigation 
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Rounding Up Usual Suspects: Conventional 
Approaches to Targeting 
The Good Old Days 
Investigation-led Targeting 
Historically within the (Danish) police there have been two dominant ways to select 
targets for proactive investigations. The first approach I identify as investigation-led 
targeting. This refers to the practice when an ongoing investigation uncovers 
suspicion of further criminal activity related to individuals in the periphery of the 
investigation. These individuals are omitted from the initial investigation for 
different reasons e.g. lack of resources, or decisions made by the prosecution 
service in terms of ‘modelling the case’ (skære sagen til). A new investigation is 
therefore initiated subsequent to the first investigation and the periphery person is 
transferred into a prime target. This is a form of ‘snowballing practice’ where one 
investigation ‘snowballs’ into another so to speak.  
Detectives talk about this approach as being dominant in ‘the old’ narcotics units 
which were run more or less autonomously by plain clothes detectives and 
operative personnel (operativt personale) with little interference from police 
management. A Detective explains: 
Often, we would come across an ‘asshole’ when investigating others. If we were 
liking a guy for his activities (fik et godt øje til en), we would remember him (vi skrev 
ham bag øret) and once we’d finished the investigation we would go right after him. 
No problem whatsoever, we were never jobless! Sometimes we would sit drinking 
coffee and decide: who needs to be taking care of now (hvem skal have en tur for 
lopper). This guy—okay, let’s begin tomorrow. As long as we produced results, 
management was happy. I don’t think they cared much about what our unit did as 
long as we didn’t cause any problems and could keep street activities to a somewhat 
satisfying level. 
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Street activities refer, in this connection, to the open drug market (åbenlyst 
gadesalg) and the crime and the violence it brings on. A Chief Superintendent 
further states: 
Back in the day you looked at a case for the sake of the case. When you launched an 
investigation there was no trailing edge (bagkant). And we didn’t have a budget. We 
instigated an investigation and saw where it brought us. There was no plan 
whatsoever. And it didn’t lead to anything big. We continued to investigate into 
infinity! (…) And you were not held accountable to anyone. No one asked: what are 
you actually spending your money on? Because we knew better! No one should 
interfere with the police’s work. (…) Management didn’t have an overview. It wasn’t 
the manager who decided that we needed to launch an investigation. A very 
competent and powerful detective would come into unit N (afdeling N, the old 
narcotics unit in the national police, my addition) and say: “This is a good case.” 
And then they said: “allright, let’s just launch that one”. Today there’s a very 
different management focus. 
The autonomy and bottom-up decisions in terms of drug policing are described by 
many detectives and is often referred to as ‘the good old days’ in the 1980s and 
1990s. These were times where performance measures were yet to be introduced 
and where detectives and police officers working in street-level narcotics units were 
free agents who received little attention from police management (see also Wathne 
2018). During the 1990s and as a consequence of amongst other the events 
connected to the Great Nordic Biker War (as described in Chapter 2 and 5) 
organised crime as a phenomenon received more and more political and public 
attention (Bay 1998a; Larsson 2015). As a result, drug policing and organised crime 
policing experienced increased management supervision due to escalating demands 
from the political level and strategic level within the police. In this time period, the 
most common approach to launch proactive investigations was through a 
snowballing practice stemming from existing investigations. Targeting was as such 
investigation-led.   
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Informant-driven Targeting 
The second targeting approach I identify as informant-driven targeting. It builds on 
the use of information from police’s confidential informants which calls attention to 
specific criminal activities carried out by specific people (see also Manning 2004 and 
Bacon 2016). This information is usually compelled in an intelligence report 
(kilderapport) which provides the basis of a concrete suspicion of criminal activity 
(mistankegrundlag). A common estimate amongst detectives within the Danish 
police is that nowadays 90 per cent of all proactive investigations begin on the basis 
of information from ‘a source’—however, a systematic overview or specific 
documentation of this estimation does not exist. The launch of all proactive 
investigations has to meet certain legal criteria of suspicion (mistankegrundlag) (see 
The Administration of Justice Act 2017) and the police’s use of specific covert 
investigation techniques (indgreb) (such as interception in communications) are 
conditioned by a formal permission, a court order (retskendelse), from the local 
court. An intelligence report containing information from a source is usually 
adequate to get a court order—this is in accordance with Bacon (2016) who 
similarly finds that a single piece of information from a reliable informer was 
sufficient grounds for drug warrants (see also Chapter 8). Informant-driven 
targeting was by 2013 (when I began this research) the dominant approach to 
targeting, and in 2018 (when I finished collecting information), this was still the 
predominant approach, which I explain later in this chapter. 
In this analysis, I will primarily pay attention to the use of informant-driven 
targeting as a basis for launching proactive investigations, and as such I omit the 
practices surrounding investigation-led targeting. The reason is that informant-
driven targeting is considered to be the most commonly used approach within the 
Danish police, and since it was also the set off in Operation Goldilocks. The centrality 
of the informer in drug investigations is moreover underlined by Ericson (1981), 
Manning (2004) and Bacon (2016). In the following section, I will briefly examine the 
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historic origin of the police’s use of confidential informants and the implication for 
current practice in relation to targeting priority offenders. If around 90 per cent of 
all proactive investigations are typically launched on the basis of source 
information, the professional quality of this area of police practice indeed sets the 
standard for proactive investigations. In relation to the proactive paradigm which 
proposes to do things smarter—in terms of methods and resource allocation—
informant work therefore becomes a central element. 
Informant Work: A Necessary Evil 
The use of confidential informants has historically been and is central for (covert) 
police work, and the systematic use of this covert tactic has its backdrop in the 
military field and is viewed is essential for providing information about ‘the enemy’ 
to protect the sovereign state against external threats (see e.g. Dunnighan & Norris 
1996; 1999; Maddinger 2000; Gundhus & Larsson 2014; Larsson 2014; 2015). Before 
the police took up various technical aids to support information gathering, the use 
of confidential informants was the most important way to get information about 
criminal environments, the local drug scene, the products, prices, and purities, 
knowledge of ‘key players’; their backgrounds, street names, last known 
whereabouts, routines activities etc. (Bacon 2016). Therefore, specifically in 
connection to drug cases it is often by police suggested to be essential and even 
necessary in order to provide a successful case (Maddinger 2000; Manning 2004; 
Bacon 2016). 
In this context, I refer to confidential informants (or merely ‘sources’), as individuals 
from the criminal environment with whom the police establish a “professional” 
relationships. Confidential informants possess or have access to specific knowledge 
regarding a certain crime area or criminal environment and police pay them to 
provide this information (Rachlew 2009). In Greer’s (1995) terms an inside multiple 
event informant. The ‘classic’ source is as such a career criminal who possibly risks a 
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great deal when ‘narc’ing out’ other criminals, but who is also a person with various 
motivations for providing the police with information. The confidential informant’s 
own position in the criminal environment is thereby a corner issue when assessing 
this information as e.g. reliable/not reliable. According to the narrative within the 
Danish police, the practice of informant work stems from street-level operational 
divisions and vice squads (narcotics and other special units dealing with drug 
offences, illegal weapons, prostitution etc.). Police officers in these units would as 
such ‘handle’ a number of ‘snitches’ (stikkere), sources, who could provide details 
about people in the criminal environment and their (illegal) activities. This would 
then lead to ‘crackdowns’ and searches (ransagninger) where drugs and other illegal 
goods were seized, and the people possessing them were arrested. This is in line 
with Bacon’s (2016) and Manning’s (2004) analyses of raids, and I identify this police 
tactic as informant-driven police operations. 
At some point throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as drugs were increasingly put on 
the political agenda, this police tactic was apparently the most applied police 
response to drug offences and the activities around them—which is reflected in the 
international literature as well (see e.g. Manning 2004; Rachlew 2009; Larsson 2014). 
During the 1990s these offences and activities were gradually described and defined 
as organised crime activities (see also Chapter 2). As a consequence, the Danish 
police found the need to gradually centralise the police response by establishing 
national units (amongst other Narcotics Information (Narkotikainformationen) in 
1984 and NCI in 1998) with the purpose of getting a better overview of the problem 
and in order to focus on the structures behind the criminal networks—instead of 
merely dealers on street-level (Strand 2011). In this process, police’s informant work 
went from being merely an operative tactic to a central part of the police’s 
intelligence work. This is an important widening of this working field which also 
research in e.g. the UK and Norway has shown (Gundhus 2006; 2012; James et al. 
2017; Larsson 2014; 2015; 2018) I will return to this issue later in this chapter. 
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Different Methods for Information Collection 
The current use of confidential informants in the Danish police entail a practice 
where informant handlers (kildeførere) at both local and national level continuously 
provide the police with information from their sources regarding past or ongoing 
criminal activities, or activities in the planning. This information is documented in 
intelligence reports (kilderapporter), which are kept in a national database with 
strict, limited access due to the sensitivity of the information. Information from 
confidential informants is to a varying degree used as a basis for different police 
activities which I divide into three main categories:  
1) intelligence purposes (knowledge-building, production of intelligence and analysis 
products) 
2) operational responses (searches and crackdowns/raids) 
3) investigations (before and during proactive (and reactive) investigations).  
Thus, information from confidential informants is currently applied broadly within 
the police and support a number of different police functions and personnel 
(intelligence units, operational units, and investigation units)—primarily within area 
of organised crime and drug policing. As informant work serves different purposes, 
it might also encompass different methods for information collection. Some 
propose a divide between two main strategies for collecting information in 
intelligence organisations, namely the traditional method and the requirement-based 
method (see Figure N derived and altered from CISC 2009 and Hestehave 2013). The 
traditional method (also referred to as the dragnet method or trawler-based method) 
emphasises collection of information to identify ‘something of interest’ (collection in 
case it is needed). The requirement-based method emphasises targeted information 
collection based on predefined intelligence-requirements such as intelligence-gaps 
(collection of what is needed) (CISC 2009).  
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Figure N. Two Methods for Information Collection. 
There are pros and cons in terms of both methods. The traditional method is 
concerned with broad non-specific information collection which gives the 
advantage that information, which at a later stage becomes relevant, can be found 
and come into use. However, this method often leads to information overload and it 
is difficult to differentiate between important and less important information 
(Sheptycki 2004; Hestehave 2013). The requirement-based method is a central 
element in intelligence-led policing as it is focused on specific information 
collection based on the most pertinent crime problems/crime events or 
intelligence-gaps (James 2013; Bacon 2016; Ratcliffe 2016). This calls for well-
defined intelligence needs, which cannot always be predicted, and other 
information is in risk of being overlooked. Moreover, the requirement-based 
method depends on highly structured and systematic practice. Most police services, 
however, have little experience as intelligence organisations and function in very 
informal ways—the most dominant method for information collection is therefore 
the traditional method (CSIC 2009). A central point here is that the differentiation 
between these main strategies for information collection is also relevant when it 




Focus on collecting information Focus on targeting information
General and broad collection of 
information
Selective collection of information based 
on pre-defined prioritisation
Investigates collected information to see if 
there are questions to answer (collection in 
case it is needed)
Collect information to answer intelligence-
requirements (collection of what is needed)
Produces intelligence for potential use (just 
in case it is needed)
Produces intelligence to support ongoing 
operations/investigations (as it is needed)
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Informant Handlers as Information Collectors? 
In this study, I focus primarily on confidential informant information in relation to 
investigations—but it should be noted that there is a close connection between 
source information used in intelligence, operational police work, and investigations 
as the practice of informant handlers are basically the same. In fact, informant 
handling (meddelerhåndtering) is currently in the (Danish) police officially viewed 
as a separate policing discipline and as such informant handlers often work in 
independent units or sections. This is connected to continuous attempts to 
professionalise this working area, and within this professionalisation lies the 
principle that informant handlers should not be involved in for example 
investigation activities, but should merely be viewed as collectors of information (or 
knowledge workers as Gundhus (2012) argues). This mirrors the historical transition 
I proposed earlier in this chapter; from informant handling being used as an 
operative tactic to a central part of the police’s intelligence work. I underline this 
condition as historically, informant handlers were to be found on street-level and 
they were indeed active in police operations such as searches and crackdowns 
(Larsson 2014; Larsson 2018). Thus, they were central in seizing drugs which 
defined and entailed the police’s response to organised crime. They acted therefore 
both as informant handlers, operational police, and detectives. However, the 
recruitment of informant handlers still in some ways seems to mirror the 
conventional understanding of this police activity as an operational tactic, as an 
informant handler explains:  
My impression is that the recruitment of informant handlers depends on that officer 
who picks up an informant on the street who turns out to have valuable and reliable 
information—then he becomes an informant handler. (…) There are no objective 
criteria or standards or personal characteristics as to what one should possess in 
order to do the job. It’s not necessarily bad, but there is no systematic method for 
recruitment in the organisation. 
301
In regards to proactive investigations, one of the explanations as to why these are 
often informant-driven is due to the practical condition that an intelligence report 
with information from a confidential informants is often necessary for the police to 
get a court order and as such get ‘the green light’ to begin a § 191 investigation (the 
import, production, sales, distribution, possession etc. of illicit drugs, The Criminal 
Justice Code). This green light enable the police to instigate certain covert 
investigative techniques for example wiretapping which is typically the first step in 
a proactive investigation (see Chapter 8 for further elaboration of these 
investigative steps). Another reason is that the use of informants is not believed to 
be particularly resource demanding and relies on a historically established practice 
within the police. As an Analyst describes it is regarded and used as a ‘rapid 
investigative tactic’:  
It is a short term way of working with investigation: Go ask some people if they 
know where drugs or guns are lying around and then go get them. The advantage is 
that you ‘feel it’ right away! You don’t need a long-term plan involving three or 17 
meetings—you just go and ask if he (the informant, my addition) knows something.  
The practice of informant-driven investigations is as such fairly straightforward and 
builds on a long experience as an operational tactic providing fast and visible 
results in accordance with the external and internal demands as discussed in 
Chapter 6. Accordingly, there are obviously some clear advantages associated to the 
police’s use of informants, as the information they provide is difficult or even 
impossible to obtain in any other way (see Marx 1988; Maddinger 2000; Billingsley et 
al. 2001; Manning 2004; Clark 2007; Rachlew 2009; Bacon 2016; Harfield & Harfield 
2016). Information from confidential informants is as such vital for the police’s 
possibilities to gain knowledge of specific criminal events and developments within 
the organised crime environment and as such to instigate police preventive or 
enforcive responses in due time (Bacon 2016). A preventive response can for 
example include the deescalating of an arising gang conflict through active 
communication with the involved parties whereas an enforcive response can 
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include the arrest of people suspected of various offences. However, the police’s use 
of confidential informant information entails some difficulties and involve a 
number of predicaments which as a result becomes problematic when talking about 
informant-driven targeting and proactive investigations, which I discuss in the 
section below. 
Challenges for Informant Work 
As mentioned before, the apparent relevance of looking at the police’s practices in 
connection with informants in this study lies in the circumstance that the quality of 
this type of police work indirectly sets the standard for the police’s priorities when 
it comes to proactive investigations. Thus, the practice of using confidential 
informant information as a street-level operational tactic employing searches and 
crackdowns with the purpose of finding e.g. illicit drugs or guns seems to be 
transformed into the fields of intelligence and proactive investigation. Recalling the 
presentation of research and Marx’ (1988) typology of police work in Chapter 2, 
covert and deceptive tactics of policing are powerful, but also problematic as they 
impose some challenges in connection with the tangible “professional” relationship 
between informant and police raises both legal and ethical questions concerning its 
use as a police tactic. In connection to this study and consequently the use of 
information from confidential informants in targeting and proactive investigations, 
the risks are specifically associated with: 1) methods for information collection and 
information evaluation, and 2) the application of this information in operational 
responses. According to Dean et al. (2010) knowledge is the main resource for an 
organisation—including the police; in fact, police organisations are first and 
foremost knowledge organisations (Ericsson & Haggerty 1997). In regards to the 
first two issues, I refer to two central arguments in Rønn’s work (2012).  
In her PhD study of the Danish police’s intelligence work, she concludes first that 
there are two main epistemological challenges in terms of this police activity: 
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1) We do not know what we know 
2) We do not know what we want to know. 
The first challenge suggests that there are organisational issues connected to 
distributing relevant information to relevant officials—implying that police do not 
have the necessary overview of the knowledge they actually possess and where this 
knowledge actually is. This is connected to the condition that not all information is 
processed and stored systematically and correctly in the appropriate systems or 
databases and therefore it cannot be searched and applied by analysts whose main 
functions are to ‘connect the relevant dots’ (Rønn 2012). Instead, pieces of 
information exist tacitly amongst police officers, detectives, and other intelligence 
personnel and this information is therefore kept outside the intelligence cycle 
which is supposed to distribute information and knowledge in the intelligence 
organisation (Ratcliffe 2008a). As such, this challenge impacts the entire foundation 
and existence of the intelligence organisation—it undermines its purpose, function, 
and efficiency.  
The second challenge suggests that information gathering is unfocused and trawler-
based—reflecting the traditional method for information collection. One 
explanation, Rønn (2012) puts forward is that intelligence personnel are in fact 
unable to express which pieces of information they regard as relevant and why. 
Instead, these decisions are often based on practical knowledge and professional 
expertise which are not easily elucidated. Thus, the predefinition of relevant and 
necessary information and knowledge gaps are quite difficult, and the approach 
therefore becomes to collect all available information ‘just in case it is 
needed’ (ibid.). Sheptycki (2004) argues that this approach, worst case, leads to 
information noise, overload of low-quality data, and thus a general reduction of the 
quality of intelligence organisations. The two epistemological challenges therefore 
become central in regards to the quality of intelligence work. Second, Rønn (2012) 
304
concludes that the current practice for information evaluation (primarily the 
assessment of 1) the reliability of the source, and 2) the credibility of the 
information)1 in police intelligence organisations are not sufficient in assessing the 
overall level of trustworthiness of a testimony. She therefore proposes a more 
qualitative evaluation methodology which incorporates six distinct categories to 
strengthen and improve these assessments (see Rønn 2012 for further elaboration). 
In sum, I find the epistemological challenges mentioned above and the issues 
concerning evaluation of information central for the specific area of informant 
work. The overall method for information collection and information evaluation in 
police intelligence systems is namely reflected in the practice of informant work. An 
unstructured approach to information collection generally can result in sporadic 
collection of information from confidential informants as well. Furthermore, the 
empirical material in this study supports at least two areas of the challenges 
mentioned above. First, it seems as if informant work is based on a random process 
from the recruitment of source handlers and recruitment of informants to 
collection and use of source information. An Analyst explains: 
There are no objective criteria or standards or personal characteristics in terms of 
what you need to possess in order to do this job. It is not necessarily a bad thing—
but it can narrow down the possibilities you have to collect information if you don’t 
reflect on your role in the relationship (between confidential informant and 
informant handler, my addition). (…) Organisationally, it’s more subjective criteria 
of who is able to ‘talk to people’—they use their intuition in the work. (…) ‘We just do 
what we’ve always done, we go and have a cup of coffee and talk to them and ask 
them what they know!’ But this is not always appropriate…     
Another Analyst elaborates on the recruitment of confidential informants: 
These people have become informants for many different reasons. They might have 
felt pressured in connection with an arrest or search, under custody and so on. Or 
they might have other motives. But we don’t concern ourselves with that until much 
further down the line. There’s no methodology in this area. It seems random. 
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Along the lines of Bacon (2016), police officers and detectives moreover report how 
information from confidential informants is rarely checked or verified systematically 
via other sources or channels—a fundamental function of the secrecy regarding 
such information which is furthermore connected to its inherent risks (see also 
Marx 1988; Manning 2004; Clark 2007; Rachlew 2009). Instead, it is most often 
stored, labelled and perceived as ’trustworthy’—and operational responses are often 
instigated on the basis of this information. A Detective explains how information 
from confidential informants leads to proactive investigations: 
Suddenly, you have 15 people on a team (efterforskningshold) working the case—and 
then six months later, you find out that there was nothing there! (der var ikke noget i 
det alligevel).   
Second, information from cover human sources was imperative both in the launch 
of and underway in connection with Operation Goldilocks. However, detectives were 
increasingly becoming skeptical regarding the trustworthiness of the sources and 
thus the ability of the source handlers to evaluate this information correctly (a 
similar conflict is described in the work of Gundhus 2006). A Senior Detective 
explains:  
It was information from a source (confidential informant, my addition) which 
launched the investigation. But we couldn’t use the information. Suddenly, it had to 
be launched right away because there is a tendency in this firm (the police, my 
addition) where people love to play fast and efficient instead of holding their horses 
(lige at synke spyttet) and see what’s really going on. And it had to be ‘right now’ as 
the source information was burning…but as it turned out we couldn’t use it at all…  

During the investigation, a broad assumption spread amongst detectives that the 
information from the confidential informant the police was receiving in connection 
with Operation Goldilocks was ultimately misinformation. The investigative measures 
which were taken and the events during the investigation strengthened this 
perception further. Misinformation, deceit, and treason propose some of the most 
fundamental problems and pertinent risks for the police in connection with 
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informant work (Marx 1988)—but it was never officially dealt with in connection 
with Operation Goldilocks. It remained an almost unspoken or at least indirectly 
addressed issue amongst detectives. This condition can be due to the general 
reluctance to deal with internal conflicts within police and the sometimes sensitive 
relationship between e.g. national and local level or different units and working 
areas. Still, I identify this circumstance as predominantly being a consequence of 
the lack of internal evaluation processes in connection with investigations, and 
ultimately the condition that police organisations often lack systematic processes 
for learning (Bjørkelo & Gundhus 2015). Based on the analysis above, I argue that 
police primarily operate with what I call a reactive model for informant work as 
opposed to a proactive model for informant work. These different models are ideal 
type models and illustrated in Figure O. The differences lies both in the approach, 
methods, purpose, and focus. 
Figure O. Reactive and Proactive Models for Informant Work. 
Reactive Model Proactive Model
CHARACTERISTIC Information-that-fell-into-our-lap Information-we-need-now-and-
in-the-future
DESCRIPTION Conventional informant 
handling
Strategic informant handling
PURPOSE Collection of information which 
quickly can be transferred into 
operational responses
Systematic information 
collection to build a 
knowledge-base over time to 
support strategic priorities, 
operational decisions, and 
intelligence collection plans 
(ICP)
307
The reactive model for informant work builds on the established and conventional 
practice for informant handling and as such a traditional approach to information 
FOCUS Topicality 
- Information collection based 
on changeable external and 
internal political issues 
- Short-term here and now 
problems e.g. violent conflicts 
between gangs and “pop-up” 
crime problems
Sustainability 
- Information collection 
concerning a selection of 
prioritised crime areas, crime 
groups, and criminal agents 
- Reduce knowledge gaps 
- Long-term threats to society 
e.g. subversive and 
undermining criminal 
structures
CONTENT - Information which is allowed 
to be “burnt” (used/acted upon) 
- Information which’s 
importance decline with time
Information which can be 






- Prevention of violence 
- Investigation support 
- Case-solving
- Knowledge of prioritised 
crime problems and threats  
- National overview of 
organised crime 
- Support of strategic and 
operational decision-making 
- Investigation support 
- Prevention of violent 
conflicts 
- Prevention of crime 
METHODS - Recruitment of source 
handlers who have good 
sources 
- Recruitment of confidential 
informants who continuously 
provide information about e.g. 
narcotics, weapons, and violent 
conflicts  
- Recruitment of confidential 
informants in the most 
important crime groups
- Strategic recruitment of 
source handlers with specific 
professional competences as 
information collectors 
- Targeted recruitment of 
confidential informants who 
possess information about 
specific social environments 
and specific crime areas 
APPROACH Traditional Requirement-based
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collection. The purpose is to collect information which as fast as possible can be 
used in police operations (such as informant-driven police operations) with the aim 
to make arrests or seizure illicit goods or money or disrupt ongoing violence. It is 
short-term focused and occupied with immediate problems and issues (Gundhus 
2012). Since informant handlers are recruited mainly as they already have (good) 
sources it is not characterised by meeting organisational priorities, but the priorities 
are rather set by the information which it brought in. Similarly, Manning (2004: 87) 
concludes, in connection to drug law enforcement overall, that this is in fact fact-
based rather than information-based: 
In many respects, short-term pragmatic police action based on the here and now 
obviates longer-term considerations of the information content and increase the 
salience facts. Because drug enforcement is based on short-term action, it is fact-
based, rather than information based. Fact-based work is that which assumes a 
short-term, fading signal in a message and a declining importance with time. This 
means it is not easily converted, re-framed, or re-contexted.  
In this context, I still use the word information rather than facts, but the sentiment 
from Manning (ibid.) is mirrored in the reactive model for informant work; this 
model too indicates that the relevance of the information is limited spatially and 
temporally, and that the quality of the information can be questioned since it is 
characterised by information-that-fell-into-our-lap. The proactive model for 
information work is founded in a requirement-based information collection model 
and has a long-term perspective as it seeks to aim for knowledge-building used to 
police the underlying structures of organised crime. It is selective and targeted in 
nature as it is concerned with prioritised areas, problems, and people who are 
assessed to encompass the greatest threats and risks. Therefore, recruitment of 
informant handlers is based on professional criteria in terms of competences for 
collecting and producing information—and the recruitment of sources is carried 
out in those environments the police wish to gain knowledge of cf. their priorities. 
This model’s success is deeply dependent on a well-founded selection of police 
priorities—and these still hold the risk of being wrong or inadequate.   
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Risks of Informant-Driven Targeting 
Risks and problems with police informant work as discussed above are connected 
to this work in general—but these issues are indirectly impacting proactive 
investigations in circumstances where these are based on informant-driven 
targeting. On top of the issues presented in the analysis above at least three 
dilemmas present themselves in terms of the conventional approach to targeting, 
which I unfold below.  
Over-policing Regular Customers  
The first issue is connected to the discussion of ideal offenders, presented in 
Chapter 6, and the practice of policing by typology (Holmberg 2003). As stated in 
Chapter 1, the police are not merely responders to organised crime—they have in 
wide terms both the power to define it and the power to process it in the way they 
see fit and they are as such both co-constructors, co-producers, and co-contributors 
of the phenomenon (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 1988; 2013; Manning Holmberg (2014). 
The organisationally shared assumptions in the police of the typical counterpart 
with specific stereotypical characteristics lead to a rather narrow perception of 
organised crime and consequently subjects for proactive investigations in the sense 
that these investigations target specific offenders committing specific offences. In 
accordance with Bacon (2016), the general understanding of proactive investigations 
within police have traditionally, as mentioned earlier, been that these investigations 
are drug investigations. This means that proactive investigations almost always are 
launched as § 191 investigations into illicit drugs (The Danish Criminal Justice Code). 
Proactive investigations are as such rarely concerned with other crime areas within 
organised crime (for example economic crime or environmental crime) as these do 
not meet the internal criteria in the police for the ideal crime type. For historic 
reasons (see Chapter 6), the continuous political attention towards bikers and gangs 
together with collectively shared assumptions of the typical counterpart within 
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police means that members of organised crime groups have become a well-defined 
group of people of which the police possess much information. Information is 
found where it is sought, and the circle of information collection is as such deeply 
dependent on who catches the attention of the police. If police are primarily 
occupied with this group of offenders, it is also this group of offenders they will 
gain knowledge of and as such they are widely ‘makers’ and ‘constructors’ of 
organised crime (Ericson 1981; Hobbs 2013). This is problematic as it runs the risk 
of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and as such over-policing some types of 
individuals or social groups whilst under-policing others.  
The typical counterpart is in this sense in risk of being over-policed as these 
individuals are ‘regular customers’ (Holmberg 2003). They do not only commit a 
great amount of offences but are also caught by the police gaze again and again 
(Finstad 2000; Holmberg 2003). This operational practice—known from uniformed 
police patrolling the streets looking for deviation from the norm e.g. “suspicious” 
behaviour and people, stopping suspicious cars and individuals based on certain 
visible characteristics and employing discretionary powers—is in this sense 
transferred into targeting priority offenders for proactive investigations. As this 
practice is based on an operative tactic historically used as the police’s main 
response towards drug crimes, this practice too has established a typical 
counterpart—the usual suspects (Gill 2000). Thus, the police can be said to have 
developed a sort of organisational tunnel vision leading them to focus on, target, and 
police the same group of offenders over and over again (see also Fahsing 2016 for 
the concept of systemic tunnel vision). 
Under-policing Hidden Populations 
The condition of over-policing some consequently means under-policing others. 
Thus, within the field of organised crime there is the issue of organised crime 
offenders operating below the surface, the so-called hidden populations, which is 
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frequently raised as a pertinent issue by detectives and analysts. An Analyst 
remarks: “The general picture is that we know a lot about bikers and gangs. And then 
there is a huge part that we know nothing about”. A Chief Superintendent elaborates: 
I think we have a good picture of parts of the organised crime environment—the part 
which is on the political agenda meaning bikers and gangs. And of course, we’re told 
that we need to focus on these and we do. But in my opinion, we have organised 
crime which operates under the radar. I can’t know for sure because we’re lacking 
intelligence. But it seems strange that groups that we know for sure are present in 
Denmark are very active in other countries. And we don’t know a lot about them. (…) 
Of course, we’ve done something about this occasionally, but it has been random. 
And there hasn’t been the same focus. 
Thus, the one-sided focus on bikers and gangs produce concerns within police that 
a ‘full picture’ and a complete overview of the organised crime problem does not 
exist. As a result, the police response in this sense randomly targets only a small 
portion of the problem (Hobbs 2013). This condition can be explained by the 
political demands and the specific performance measures as discussed in Chapter 
6. However, it can also be seen as a consequence of conventional targeting practice 
where these specific groups of offenders historically have been preferred. If 
confidential informants are recruited within the biker and gang environment by 
street-level police personnel operating in this environment—this will of course be 
reflected in the general information collection. Each investigation, moreover, 
provides additional information about this environment and the people in it, and as 
a result, the police have a disproportionate amount of information of the organised 
crime environment regarding bikers and gangs in comparison to other organised 
crime groups. In this context, under-policing therefore refers to two groups of 
hidden populations: 1) organised crime groups and networks which operate below 
the surface (for example Asian or Eastern European mafia or crime groups), and 2) 
organised crime offenders within the biker and gang environment which are less 
visible than the usual suspects (crime facilitators or money men working behind the 
scenes). Regarding the first group, a Chief Superintendent explains: 
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You can easily imagine that there are mafia-like activities which are isolated from 
bikers and gangs. And then we have a problem because we don’t have the excessive 
resources right now to try and elevate ourselves and look at it analytically to find 
out: what’s even there.  
A Senior Detective elaborates:  
There are so many out there under the radar and who are 100 times much more 
capable than one from the biker and gang environment. And we don’t get to them. 
And it would be nice if we were given the chance. But it’s the damn number 
(performance measure, my addition).   
However, in regards to the second group, it is also assumed that this group of high-
value targets is difficult to collect information about and subsequently to 
investigate. A Chief Superintendent says: 
And you could say: are there others from e.g. “Falcons” who lurk under the surface? 
You don’t see them and we know that, but we also know that they’re established over 
so many years that they’re capable of working themselves out of the spotlight and to 
get others to work for them and I’m thinking: it requires other investigation 
methods and we need to work more targeted on them.  
Thus, the targeting of priority offenders is not just a question of whom the police 
possess information about, but also the level of difficulties in gaining this 
information and moreover investigating these offenders. As I discussed in Chapter 
6, Operation Goldilocks for example which aimed for a high-value target, was 
eventually closed down as the investigation measures did not provide the desired 
results in the expected time frame. Although it was not the official explanation, 
detectives viewed this management decision as a conclusion that the target was too 
difficult to investigate. Thus, both formal requirements of meeting performance 
measures and organisational habits as well as preferences in regards to targeting 
usual suspects prevent the police from focusing on hidden populations and 
offenders operating under the radar and as such these are in risk of being under-
policed.     
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Random Selection 
As argued earlier, the established practice within police for information collection is 
based primarily on the traditional dragnet-based approach and moreover a reactive 
model of informant work (see Figure O). This model has the immediate advantage 
that it often collects information regarding ongoing problems or events, violent 
conflicts between gangs, homicides, etc. It deals with the here-and-now and 
‘problems of the day’ which can accommodate timely information which can be 
redirected into operational responses immediately. The weakness of such a model in 
terms of targeting is that it is not based on analytical principles for critically 
scrutinising, assessing, processing, and reviewing information and it therefore is in 
risk of passing over inaccurate information or even misinformation. Moreover, it 
fails to include a variety of other information as it does not reflect information 
concerning a national overview and a well-founded knowledge base of organised 
crime and its threats. Targeting therefore becomes, what Manning (2004) similarly 
argues about drug enforcement; fact-based rather than information-based, leaving 
decision-makers to prioritise on the basis of absent or flawed information.  
Informant-driven targeting is as such prone to select the most visible offenders who
—from a here-and-now perspective are ‘problems of the day’—but who in a broad 
perspective and long-term does not pose the most significant threats. If information 
from confidential informants, moreover, is used raw to direct targeting without any 
particular analytical processing, this means that this type of information prevails 
over other intelligence information and is perhaps given a proportional status 
which it does not deserve—and more severely it risks distorting the intelligence 
picture. Recalling Dean et al.’s (2010) model for strategic knowledge framework for 
sector policing of organised crime (presented in Chapter 2), this leads the police to 
carry out police work in sector 1 (random policing) and/or 2 (disadvantaged 
policing). The reason is that informant-driven targeting is prone to become a 
random selection of the most visible and active offenders who the police are given 
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information about. Consequently, this targeting practice does not only result in 
informant-driven targeting, but as a central nerve in the police’s response towards 
organised crime it becomes a response model of informant-driven policing. 
1 The predominant models in police organisations are the NATO Intelligence Evaluation System 
(6x6), the National Intelligence Model of the UK (5x5), and the Europol Intelligence Evaluation 
Matrix (4x4) (Rønn 2012). 
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Beyond the Usual Suspects: Analytical Approaches to 
Targeting  
Proactive Perspectives 
When analysing both policy documents, meetings, and individual reports it 
becomes clear that especially strategic management had a number of concerns 
about this approach as informant-driven targeting was first of all seen as a bottom-
up tactic and thus mirrored an operative/tactical rather than strategic prioritisation. 
To accommodate the narrow response model and the performance measures 
attached to this, strategic management wanted more control of the decision-making 
processes around targeting as they felt middle managers (superintendents) and 
informant handlers operating at tactical level had too much influence on decision-
making and prioritisation. Second of all, informant-driven targeting was not viewed 
as sufficient in terms of targeting ‘the right people’—meaning high-value targets 
with a considerable amount of influence and impact in the organised crime 
environment. Overall, strategic management perceived conventional approaches 
behind the launch of proactive investigations as scattered since cases often 
snowballed into each other, and haphazard information from confidential 
informants sat priorities as it was passed on to the police. This led to a condition 
where investigation resources were almost always tied up in ongoing casework and 
as such not available for management dispositions. Moreover, it was a concern that 
high-impact offenders and kingpins remained untouched as these were seldom 
targeted through the conventional approaches. In sum, strategic management 
requested a more systematic and transparent targeting process, and a firmer control 
with investigation resources.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, the performance measures connected to the political 
agreements and the police’s strategy included in the period of 2012-2018 a 
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performance goal which focused on targeting 15-25 priority offenders through 
proactive investigations and consequently the instigation of a narrow response 
model. Policy documents advocated a more strategic approach to targeting and this 
requirement was founded on the ambition to instigate a more proactive response 
towards organised gang crime and the specific offenders involved. For example, 
policy documents underline the need for a national overview of organised crime 
with the purpose of identifying and targeting key agents who have significant 
impact on the launch of and facilitation of criminal activities. The overall aim of this 
targeting is described as “…disturbing, reducing, and eliminating these agents’ influence 
in the organised crime environment”. Thus, in connection with the first set of 
performance measures in 2012 (National Operativ Strategiplan 2012) a key 
performance indicator was established directed at developing a specific ‘targeting 
tool’ (måludpegningsredskab). This ‘tool’ was to be used to identify individuals on a 
national basis who were believed to have significant influence on bikers’ and gangs’ 
criminality and/or the violent conflicts between them. First, a conceptual framework 
for targeting (måludpegningskoncept) (instead of a ‘tool’) was developed and 
included e.g. methodological guidelines and templates for analysts and intelligence 
personnel. In 2013-2016, this framework and its implementation was evaluated and 
on the basis of this evaluation a new methodology for targeting (metodisk ramme for 
måludpegning) was developed and launched in 2017. In this context, I draw upon 
the experiences from these two different targeting processes, which I refer to as the 
first round of targeting (2012-2015) and the second round of targeting (2017-2018).  
Strategic Targeting 
Both the initial conceptual framework and the latter methodology for targeting 
were concerned with the concept of what internally was referred to as strategic 
targeting (strategisk måludpegning). The purpose was to introduce a problem-
oriented approach which could enable the organisation to launch a proactive and 
coordinated police response towards organised crime within the narrow response 
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model. On the basis of a national overview of groups and individuals in the 
organised crime environment, strategic targeting was expected to form the basis of 
national and regional prioritisation. A change was proposed from the existing ad 
hoc and case-to-case approach to targeting to a more strategic and top-down 
managed process where proactive investigations were prioritised on a national level 
and on the basis of threat assessments. Strategic targeting was expected to for 
example: 
• Provide decision-makers with a better foundation to make strategic and operational 
decisions 
• Contribute to a systematic and homogenous process for an analytical-based 
prioritising of investigation targets 
• Target and coordinate investigation resources 
• Record decisions and priorities with the purpose of ensuring continuity and 
transparency of the process, and to provide knowledge for future dispositions.    
Furthermore, strategic targeting was aimed at e.g.: 
• High-impact offenders (toneangivende aktører) (e.g. kingpins) 
• Crime consultants (for example professional accountants) 
• Crime facilitators (for example spouses and family) 
• Organisations and businesses used for money laundering. 
Thus, it was the aim that strategic targeting should direct a police response towards 
under-policed offenders and hidden populations who were usually not 
incorporated in the ordinary police response and as such the broad response 
model. In the second round of targeting, the focus was specifically aimed at the 
connections between organised crime and legal businesses with the purpose of 
reducing money laundering and economic crime. This particular focus assumed 
that a police response towards these structures helps diminishing the crime 
business models and thereby the economic livelihood—the presumed central nerve 
of crime groups. In Dean’s et al. (2010) terms (see Chapter 2), this was supposed to 
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create a police response in sector 3 (targeted policing) and/or 4 (competitive 
policing) where the police operate with a policing strategy with a long-term 
contigency approach to organised crime targeting different forms of criminal 
enterprises. The ambition for the two strategic frameworks was to create common 
grounds for targeting practices by introducing guidelines for approaches and 
methods together with a proposed organisational model for tasks and 
responsibilities between different units and functions within organised crime 
policing.  
Developing a Framework 
The general idea behind the framework for strategic targeting was to collect 
information about crime groups and suspected offenders, and to analyse this in 
accordance with a variety of proposed themes such as the offenders’ capacity, 
specialisation, operational logics, connections, finances, applied crime business 
models etc. (see e.g. Dean et al. 2010). Overall, such analyses were meant to provide 
the basis for risk and threat assessments for individual targets looking at: 1) what 
current threat does the individual hold? and 2) which potential risk can the 
individual become in the future? This approach was initially inspired by practices 
within the intelligence area where assessments of threats and risks are central (see 
e.g. the Criminal Networks Prioritisation Matrix from the UK and the Criminal Group 
Risk Assessment Model from New Zealand Police Auckland (Avdija 2008; Alach 2012), 
as well as the literature on entrepreneurship and criminal specialisation in 
organised crime networks (see Dean et al. 2010). There is a great deal of experience 
and literature regarding ‘offender profiling’ meaning the targeting of unknown 
offenders who are responsible for specific crimes or certain crime types through a 
variety of techniques, data analysis, and methods  (see e.g. Rossmo 2000; Fox & 
Farrington 2012). However, research about targeting processes in relation to 
organised crime is much sparser although sought after (Maguire 2000; Ratcliffe et al. 
2014; Innes & Levi 2017).  
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However, The Sleipnir Model, developed at Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2010) is 
a well-known, widely used, and published method for measuring organised crime 
groups capability and thus producing strategic threat assessments of crime groups. 
Sleipnir operates with twelve different ‘attributes’ which are to be assessed 
qualitatively for each crime group on the basis of information and data from police 
databases and intelligence and police personnel. These attributes are ranked on the 
basis of prescribed points due to the attributes’ severity (the use of corruption is for 
example viewed as more serious than e.g. the use of violence). When threat 
assessments are produced for every crime group these can be compared with each 
other and ranked. Sleipnir is moreover humble in the way that it does not take for 
granted the significance of the collection and processing of information or as other 
models assume high quality data reliability and validity regardless of the fact that 
data accountability is a well-known problem in police agencies (Ratcliffe et al. 2014). 
In round two of targeting, Sleipnir was therefore introduced to strategic targeting as 
it was considered to be highly relevant in relation to the Danish organised crime 
groups. Besides from providing police management with an information-based 
analytical foundation for decision-making and prioritisation of investigation 
resources, strategic targeting was moreover promoting a proactive approach to 
targeting as it relied on a requirement-based intelligence model and advocated a 
long-term and group-oriented response to disrupt, prevent, and reduce organised 
crime (Ratcliffe 2008a). Such an approach included the notion that a market logic 
can be applied to organised crime in the sense that groups can be seen as cohesive 
entities or organisations where (criminal) activities and courses of action impact the 
entire crime market and result in reactions from competing agents or groups. This 
notion is related to the perception that crime groups can be viewed as crime 
businesses which’s existence and success are dependent specialisation and as such 
division of labour (Dean et al. 2010). Moreover, strategic targeting was based on the 
assumption that specific dynamics and subcultural logics rule the behaviour of 
gangs in the way that incidents which initially appear to be limited to a couple of 
individuals suddenly can expand into a conflict between two groups (Hestehave 
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2013). This collectivisation of individual actions implies that individual relations and 
interests become a matter for the entire group due to subcultural values such as 
fraternity and loyalty (Bay 1998b). 
For those reasons, strategic targeting was supposed to demarcate from informant-
driven targeting which focuses on demoting one individual at a time. Strategic 
targeting was therefore supposed to provide a proactive alternative to the 
informant-driven operational model which was not believed to be very efficient in 
terms of disrupting the organised crime environment as a whole. The ambition was 
to go beyond the targeting of individuals operating on a lower level and as such 
were considered to be ‘small potatoes’ in the big picture. Instead, the ambition was 
to support the narrow response model and target hidden populations and offenders 
who were usually under-policed but held key and significant functions for the 
groups’ perseverance and entrepreneurism (Dean et al. 2010).  
Implementing Strategic Targeting 
Round One 
Organisation 
The organisational set up regarding strategic targeting was initially implemented in 
the existing governance model for the task forces (see also Chapter 4 for an 
overview of the organisation of organised crime policing). This model included 
representatives from both national agencies, regional, and local level in the police 
districts. In Figure P, I have illustrated responsibilities and tasks at different 
organisational and geographical levels in relation to targeting: 
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Figure P. Organisational Set Up in Targeting (Round I).  
Preparation and formulation of strategies on organised crime and proactive 
policing, and the operationalisation of political goals and performance 
measurement takes place at national level and is the responsibility of the national 
police. These tasks involve primarily management level but include also ad hoc staff 
representatives from the police districts and the national units. Decision-making 
processes in connection with targeting and prioritisation of investigations took 
place on regional level, but with national coordination (coordination groups) based 
on suggestions from the targeting group. The various Intelligence & Analysis Units 
at both regional level and locally within the police districts produced moreover 
target profiles and investigation proposals for the targeting group and coordination 
groups.  
Internal Learning Points 
In connection with round one of strategic targeting (2012-2015), there were some 
overall learning points. First, the conceptual framework for targeting was 
interestingly used to a limited extent. Although strategic targeting was gradually 
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integrated in organisational language, the perceptions of the content of this concept 
were not aligned. In coordination meetings and targeting meetings, the criteria for 
being a high-value target, as proposed in the conceptual framework, were seldom 
discussed (see Gundhus 2012 for similar findings). Thus, the process of prioritising 
offenders as investigation targets mostly revolved around resources instead of the 
assessment of different strategic (or other) implications of a police response towards 
these targets. In targeting meetings especially, a common course of action was that 
representatives from the police districts put forward lists of names as a contribution 
to the overall ‘pool’ of potential targets and at the end of the meeting a prioritised 
list of targets was composed. In coordination meetings, target profiles and 
investigation proposals were discussed, prioritised, and decided upon—however, 
most discussion concerned current investigation capacity, and how resources could 
be divided and deployed between districts and units. Interestingly, an implicit 
notion within both meetings was that all proposed targets were ‘extremely 
criminal’ (særdeles kriminelle) and in this sense they were per default viewed as 
relevant to instigate proactive investigations off.  
Second, the practice of identifying targets (the analytical process and the 
construction of target profiles and/or investigation proposals) was rarely based on 
the conceptual framework and its inherent processes and methods. Additionally, the 
products were of a poor analytical quality. Even the template for target profiles 
included in the conceptual framework was hardly ever used by analysts and 
intelligence personnel. In those cases where it was used, it reflected a sense of 
‘filling out a form’ rather than mirroring an analytical process guided by particular 
queries and methods. Target profiles were often based on a limited amount of or 
single-source information, which was not critically assessed. The statements and 
conclusions were general rather than specific, and in many cases target profiles 
were characterised by a sort of circle argumentation as in: “NN is a known criminal 
and is associated with known criminals, therefore he is likely to commit crime”. As a basis 
for decision-makers’ prioritisation between Target A or Target B, target profiles 
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lacked both sound analytical grounds and directive conclusions and 
recommendations about threats and risks beyond implicit organisational notions. 
Target profiles, as genuine analytical products did not meet the general standards 
for intelligence work such as systematic scrutiny of information, assessment of 
validity etc. (Ratcliffe 2008a).    
Third, the lack of analytical anchoring of target profiles was connected to the 
condition that a national overview of the organised crime environment was sparse. 
In this context, a national overview refers to a knowledgebase of analytical products 
which explore different crime groups and networks with the purpose of describing 
and exploring their historical origins, functions, organisation, capabilities, 
capacities, resources, relations, connections etc. (Dean et al. 2010; Ratcliffe et al. 
2014). This is not to say that this overview did not exist—indeed specialised police 
officers who have monitored this environment through decades possessed such 
information, but in accordance with Rønn’s finding (2012) it was probably based on 
tacit knowledge which was not documented in any database or written down in 
analytical products.  
The lack of analytical products in the police can be explained by e.g. a historical 
practice as it indeed is a predominantly ‘verbal’ organisation. Albeit it can also be 
explained by the condition that intelligence work, and as such the monitoring of 
crime groups and offenders, traditionally have been regarded as processes rather 
than products. Demands from police management have usually been requests of 
‘one-pages’ providing a quick overview of for instance ongoing conflicts between 
groups, weekly newsletters or reports regarding pertinent crime events, or 
assessments of issues ‘here and now’ rather than analyses. Therefore, every time 
analysts were to construct target profiles, they had to begin by collecting and 
constructing new information and data and for example actively assemble narratives 
and organisational knowledge from relevant police officers and detectives. Since 
this was a resource demanding and time-consuming task, it was often omitted in 
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favour of ‘fresh’ information from confidential informants. Consequently, the 
conclusion from 2012-2015 was that strategic targeting was never really 
implemented according to the conceptual framework. As a result, targeting was 
practiced in accordance with the established course of action and as such primarily 
informant-driven despite of a new organisational set up.  
Round Two 
Organisation 
Round two of strategic targeting was initiated in 2016 in support of an updated 
version of the police’s strategy towards organised crime, and in connection with a 
new organisational set up and launch of two large regional investigation units (see 
Chapter 5 and 6). Yet, the advocation for strategic targeting was more or less the 
same as in connection with round one. Strategic management required more 
overview and control of priorities and resources in investigation units and as such 
the police response overall. They were skeptical in regards to the outcome of 
informant-driven targeting as they feared it overlooked hidden populations and was 
merely aimed at people operating at a low-level (Dean et al. 2010). Moreover, they 
found it problematic that the informant-driven approach empowered the 
operational/tactical level in the police as information and knowledge about the 
criminal environment and high-value targets were concentrated at and filtered 
through this level. The second round was as such instigated not only as a result of 
political demands, performance measurements, and a new organisational model, but 
as a reaction to internal demands. The new methodological framework was 
therefore launched with great ambition at a kick-off meeting in the beginning of 
2017 with participants from several national units, police districts, and co-operating 
partners. The outcome of strategic targeting was by management predicted to be a 
success.   
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Figure Q. Organisational Set-Up in Targeting (Round II). 
The new organisational set up, illustrated in Figure Q, called for the national unit 
to be responsible for targeting overall and imposed NCI to contribute with the 
majority of analytical resources. An independent analysis team was established with 
both national and regional participants, and two new targeting groups 
(måludpegningsgrupper) were established to support the regional coordination 
groups in their decision-making.  
Phase One 
The first phase concerned the production of strategic threat assessments of crime 
groups in accordance with Sleipnir—in the course of 2017. As no prior group 
analyses existed and as much information was tacit knowledge, the initial and 
corresponding tasks for the analysis team was to:  
1) build a knowledge base about crime groups 
326
2) develop general methodological guidelines for analysts and intelligence personnel 
to suit the context of the Danish police.  
The relevance and potential use of various databases and other sources for 
information for targeting purposes were therefore explored and included or 
excluded in an instructions sheet for analysts. Phase one of targeting was therefore 
not just about producing analytical threat assessments for decision-makers—the 
entire process was a methodological experiment with the aim of providing 
knowledge and best practice regarding strategic targeting processes. Since strategic 
targeting from the beginning was considered to be a long-term exercise which 
required resources, patience, and investments, it could not produce monthly target 
profiles for the targeting group and coordination groups. Strategic management 
therefore decided to establish what they called an interim targeting process, while 
waiting on the process of strategic targeting. This interim targeting imposed target 
profiles to be produced at regional level in the investigation units and in the 
Intelligence & Analysis Units in the districts. These target profiles were submitted 
monthly to the targeting group for assessment and further action. The initiative of 
interim targeting was taken by strategic management to meet steady operational 
demands from investigation units and administrative requirements for performance 
measurement. Interim targeting was as such an extension of the practice in the first 
round of targeting, although the analytical quality of the products was this time 
prioritised considerably.     
The outcome of phase one of strategic targeting was presented at a coordination 
meeting in the beginning of 2018. This included the presentation of analytical 
products ranking all crime groups in terms of their potential threats individually 
and in comparison with each other. Cf. Sleipnir, the amalgamation of the different 
threat assessments provided decision-makers with an overview of which groups 
were most pertinent for the police to deal with in terms of posing the most critical 
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and subversive threats such as e.g. their abilities to corrupt public institutions, to 
use of violence, to infiltrate legal businesses etc. 
Phase Two 
The next step, phase two, which proposed, in accordance with the methodological 
framework, in-depth analyses of those two-three groups which had the highest 
scores in the Sleipnir assessments and as such were ranked as posing the greatest 
threats overall. The analyses should evolve around inherent conditions specifically 
the groups’ finances and crime business models including methods for money 
laundering (Dean et al. 2010). The purpose was through these analyses to be able to 
point to key individuals within the groups whom, due to their functions, capacity, 
network, responsibilities, knowledge etc., were considered to be highly specialised 
and as such indispensable for the groups and their inherent function. These would 
then be nominated as high-value targets via target profiles which were then to be 
put forward to the targeting group for further assessment and decision-making. As 
it turned out, phase two never really got started. Throughout phase one it had 
proven difficult to shield the analysis team’s resources from other tasks and 
obligations as the analysts, due to their specialisation and skills, were in high 
demand throughout the organisation. They were for that reason never released from 
their regular tasks and responsibilities. ‘Problems of the day’ gradually took over 
from targeting and the long-term work in the analysis team. It was therefore 
difficult to maintain the analysis team as a unity, and the schedule was constantly 
altered, and deadlines postponed. Time estimations of the work were essentially 
difficult to produce due to the experimental stage of the process. Meanwhile, no 
manager was dedicated to the analysis team meaning that the coordinators had no 
real overview of resources or were in no position to decide over these. The same 
management who had launched the targeting process was increasingly imposing 
the analysts with other assignments. As a result, the process was delayed on more 
than one occasion, and management became increasingly impatient and 
328
dissatisfied, and gradually they seemed to loose interest and focused primarily on 
interim targeting. I discussed the situation with one of the participants in the team: 
“I’m not surprised about this”, he said. 
“Really?”, I said, “but they’ve always been aware that this would take time. That this 
was the long haul and not something which could provide fast results. It was agreed 
to be an investment in knowledge-building and testing of various methods for future 
purposes.” 
“But they don’t have that kind of patience. They don’t think long-term. They think 
about the pressure they’re experiencing right now—from the Commissioner 
(politidirektøren), from the media, from the Ministry of Justice, and political level. 
And perhaps they’re not even here next year, then they’re off to another 
management position, and meanwhile they want to serve at the pleasure of the 
people above them.” 
When phase two was about to begin, management requested new time schedules 
and resource estimations. Such were produced and put forward by the team 
coordinator and me. The proposal was attached with a number of reservations due 
to the difficulties of estimating an experimental process of which we had no 
experience. However, management never returned with a decision—and gradually 
other agendas came in focus, new assignments were prioritised, and the analysts 
returned to their prior tasks. Strategic targeting was as a result phased out during 
2018 and interim targeting became consequently the permanent targeting approach. 
In 2019, the second performance goal regarding the selection of priority offenders 
for proactive investigations was omitted from the strategy. At the same time, the first 
performance goal about the incarceration of members of organised crime groups 
was increased from 300 to 400 (Justitsministeriet 2018). 
Thus, the conclusion from both the first (2012-2015) and second round of strategic 
targeting (2017-2018) is that despite great efforts, organisational alterations, 
dedication from analysts, and good intentions from police management, the 
strategic targeting model did not find its grounds within the police. Consequently, 
strategic targeting was never fully implemented and established as a practice. 
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Targeting practices therefore still rely primarily on informant-driven targeting and 
on established modes of action. Moreover, due to amongst other alterations of 
performance measurements (increased numbers of incarcerated gang members), the 
broad response model has become the dominant operational model for the police’s 
response against organised crime promoting a policing strategy, which can be 
characterised as random or disadvantaged policing (Dean et al. 2010). 
Challenges for Strategic Targeting 
Time Consuming and Resource Demanding 
One of the most pertinent challenges for the introduction of a model for strategic 
targeting within the police was its experimental character and thus unpredictable 
nature. Time consumption and analytical resources were almost impossible to 
forecast in detail besides the overall and obvious prognose that it required long-
term investments. This condition resonates poorly within an action-oriented 
response organisation which is occupied with solving pressing issues here and now. 
The constant focus from ministerial and political level with new requests, demands, 
and expectations made it difficult for strategic management to instigate long-term 
experiments without certain prospects of operational results. In accordance with 
the findings in Chapter 6, even though police management was keen to introduce a 
new model for targeting, they were pressured from political level to provide results 
in terms of performance measures and the broad response model, and from within 
the organisation, the police districts, to provide operational support in order to sort 
of violent conflicts and pertinent crime problems. Strategic targeting was never 
meant to compete with fast operational results and decisiveness, but instead it was 
supposed to contribute with long-term strategic products to support a proactive 
response with the aim of impacting subversive criminal structures (Dean et al. 
2010). Still, the long haul in terms of collecting and producing relevant data and 
tacit information, and the long-term task of building analytical-based knowledge 
330
about crime groups etc. became a second priority for police management. The 
request for methodological ‘tools’ and organisational ’quick fixes’ (as discussed in 
Chapter 6) should therefore be seen in relation hereto. Thus, the aspect of time 
certainly impacted the possibilities for implementing strategic targeting as a 
practice. Strategic targeting was, to put it bluntly, viewed as too demanding. The 
consequence, however, seems to be that strategic and proactive responses are less 
sustainable within the police as these depend on rich investments in knowledge 
resources (Dean et al. 2010).     
Lack of Organisational Maturity 
The condition above is additionally connected to the issue of organisational 
maturity. Intelligence work is indeed information work (Brodeur 2010), which 
requires a specific organisational set up, long-term perspectives, well-defined tasks, 
and responsibilities in terms of information collection, data processing, analyses, 
and decision-making accordingly. Moreover, according to Dean et al. (2010) it is not 
the absolute amount of knowledge that policing has that is important, but rather it 
is the relative quantum of knowledge that will to a large extent determine how 
winnable this knowledge was for policing against organised crime. Historically, the 
police have a limited amount of experience with intelligence work and knowledge 
work (see e.g. Strand 2011; Christensen 2012). As Swedish criminologist P.O. 
Wikström (2007) explains this impacts the police’s possibilities in terms of 
preparing and carrying out knowledge-based crime prevention strategies which 
specifically require a long-term focus and a sound knowledge-base. This becomes a 
hindrance in terms of implementing analytical-based methods such as strategic 
targeting as the organisation can be viewed as immature in this regard. The 
organisational maturity evolves around at least three areas which are also found in 
other research on knowledge-based policing (see e.g. Williamson 2008; James 2013):   
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First, as we saw earlier in this chapter, organisational information collection and 
knowledge building about for instance crime groups and priority offenders can 
overall be characterised as sporadic. Information is often tacit and connected to 
specific personnel, which makes it fragile and without organisational anchoring. Yet 
such information is by Dean et al. (2010) regarded as the main resource for the 
police’s competitive advantage against organised crime. The active collection of 
information is moreover primarily dragnet-based and depending on confidential 
informants and ‘information-which-fell-into-our-lap’ as opposed to for example 
requirement-based strategic intelligence collection via e.g. intelligence collection 
plans (Rønn 2012).    
Second, the analytical competences available within the organisation are moreover 
sparse. The hiring of analysts and the training of police officers in intelligence work 
is merely in its beginning. Analytical work is therefore not cemented as a 
professional discipline and established practice within the police (see also a 
discussion of knowledge categories and levels of knowledge within police in Dean 
et al. 2010: 126f).  
Third, the management of knowledge work is still handled by police managers and 
legal managers with no experience or formal qualifications when it comes to 
analytical work or intelligence work. Thus, the management experience and 
management style from classic police work is transferred into analytical processes 
which require rather different management ideals, perspectives, and methods (Cope 
2004; Ratcliffe 2008b; Dean et al. 2010). Thus, organisational maturity can be said to 
have had great impact on the possibilities for implementing strategic targeting in 
the sense that the above described conditions are vital for knowledge work. The 
lack of experience with strategic knowledge work within the police therefore had 
the consequence that strategic targeting was dealt with in the same way as any 
operational police issue. 
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Internal Resistance 
An additional challenge for implementing strategic targeting is more delicate in 
nature as it involves the internal resistance within the police. As the empirical 
narrative from the introduction in this chapter suggests, there are two competing 
rationales within contemporary policing namely experience-based versus 
knowledge-based policing—with an organisational dilemma of choice to follow. 
This is amongst other mirrored in notions and actions of resistance, and in this 
connection, the opposition towards strategic targeting evolved around at least three 
different notions, which I explore in the following sections: 
“What’s wrong with the old way?” 
The first notion is a basic question of why new approaches and methods even need 
to be introduced in the police. Many police officers and detectives have great 
confidence in their own and their colleagues’ abilities of doing a good job as real 
police (see also Chapter 6) and therefore they see no reason to change the way of 
doing things. Another frequent critique of the conceptual framework for strategic 
targeting was that it was ‘too comprehensive’ and ‘too academic’ (langhåret) and as 
such difficult to read and operationalise for police officers. I have often wondered 
about this complaint given that police officers are exposed to much legal stuff 
which can be particularly difficult to understand for people outside the judicial 
system. However, I have never come across police officers who opposed having to 
familiarise themselves with the law. Perhaps this issue then does not have to do with 
the difficulties of reading and understanding an analytical (academic) product with 
complex content, rather it might have to do with the authority and status of the 
sender which is in line with similar research findings (see e.g. Cope 2004; Sheptycki 
2004; Gundhus 2006; 2012). It can also be a consequence of what is considered to 
be legitimate knowledge as discussed earlier and as such as legal knowledge is 
viewed as instrumental and thereby legitimate (Hoel 2011). Another explanation 
might be ‘the curse of expertise’ (Hinds 1999) where experienced expert view 
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themselves as too knowledgeable to learn. Analysts or academics are, as explained 
in Chapter 4, not regarded as high-status personnel within the police. A former 
colleague, now manager, told me once laughing about the status hierarchy within 
the police: it begins with police officers at the top, then prosecutors and legal staff, 
then clerks, and academics at the bottom. Thus, analysts are viewed as some who 
can contest strategic functions—but definitely not operational functions including 
investigation work. Thus, the idea to approach investigation work analytically was 
generally not supported by police officers and detectives. From operational level, it 
was also a concern that targeting became strategic in the sense that it suddenly 
embedded top management in investigations—a matter they felt was best resolved 
at tactical level. A Senior Detective explains: 
In the old days, before the police reform (in 2007, my addition), if you were in a 
narcotics unit and had a snowball (udløber) you could just run with it. We could 
usually go from investigation to investigation keeping ourselves busy. More and 
more it was based on information from confidential informants (…) Now it’s 
external information which is the basis before we start up a case…And sometimes 
it’s from 0 to 100 as these cases are very top-down (topstyrede). There are many 
stakeholders now a days and that’s okay, but I wish we could see the investigations 
proposals and its documents before we are to begin. 
The issue raised here by the detective is that decisions about investigations are 
taken before consulting detectives. In the case of Operation Goldilocks for example, 
this investigation was decided upon at Chief Superintendent level and along the 
way it turned out that the information from the key informant were leading the 
police in a wrong direction (see Chapter 8 for further elaboration). This top-down 
management induce detectives not to trust any information they have not collected 
themselves and to explore and double check all information they receive from ‘the 
outside’ for example from informant handlers and analysis units. A classic issue of 
information sharing resistance (Brodeur & Dupont 2006; Gundhus 2012). At 
operational level, superintendents, police officers, and detectives are as such 
concerned that the control of proactive investigations, especially in regards to 
targeting, are passed over to strategic management and other personnel groups 
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such as analysts. This condition has for them unwanted operational and practical 
implications, but it also reduce the discretionary powers of tactical level.   
“This is what we’ve always done!”     
The notion of wanting to maintain things as they are also supports the notion that 
strategic targeting is no new practice—that’s what police have always done just 
without a ‘fancy’ name. Accordingly, many knowledge-based approaches, including 
strategic targeting, are time and again referred to as ‘old wine poured onto new 
bottles’. The argument is that a tacit practice of strategic targeting exists within the 
police as priority offenders are targeted based on detectives’ local knowledge about 
offenders. A Chief Superintendent explains: 
I have doubts (about strategic targeting, my addition). I don’t know if we should 
work with those big performance indicators (måltal), but instead work in the 
direction which adds value to the investigation…we know in the districts that there 
are some high-impact offenders (toneangivende personer) in a certain environment 
who controls the agenda (sætter dagsordenen) and we want to target and eliminate 
these (rydde dem af vejen) anyway. So, to spend time putting them on a prioritised 
list…I don’t know if it would be any different than if there was no list. We would 
target these offenders anyway.    
An Informant Handler argues further: 
That’s all well and good with all those analyses and analysts with all their great new 
skills—but it doesn’t tell us anything we didn’t know before. Try talking to anyone in 
OC (the organised crime units, my addition) with just a little bit of knowledge about 
this field and he’ll be able to point to the top key targets in the organised crime 
environment in his sleep. You can’t analyse your way to an investigation.  
Consequently, the first criticism is directed towards the assertion that strategic 
targeting is something different than conventional practice, and the second critique 
is that no analytical approach can provide any new information—concluding that 
analytical work does not provide any value (merværdi). To understand this, it might 
be helpful to refer to Ratcliffe’s (2008b) concepts of ‘old’ and ‘new’ knowledge—
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respectively case-specific and offender-centric knowledge possessed by individual 
police officers and detectives, and knowledge about crime patterns, themes, and the 
relations between crime events. The first type of knowledge can be valuable in case-
solving and making arrest while the second type of knowledge is relevant for 
resource management and operational prioritisation. Implicitly lies the competition 
of different notions and assumptions of what is important, necessary, and 
meaningful in policing. This indeed reflects the organisational battle between 
knowledge-based and experience-based approaches and Gundhus’ (2012) depiction 
of police’s perception of the status of knowledge and professionalism, as I 
presented in Chapter 6. 
“Mind the top shelf!” 
The last issue I will investigate in this connection is the notion that strategic 
targeting is mostly focused on offenders in top of the crime groups. This is 
sometimes viewed as problematic as it is believed to be a group of people too 
difficult to investigate. Investigation ‘on the top shelf’ is seen as demanding and 
with little assurance of fruitful results (arrests) due to the offenders specialisation 
and long-term experience in the criminal environment. In general, it is viewed as 
too much of an effort to investigate these offenders as they are too professional and 
cannot be targeted through a typical proactive investigation or even covert 
measures. A Senior Detective explains: 
Some of these groups are managed by the top (topstyret). They are professional. 
Some of them have known each other all their lives and they’ve been committing 
crime together for 20 years. (…) These people speak in codes and they do so because 
they’ve known each other for so long and know what each other are thinking. They 
don’t have to mention anything about coke or amfetamin or money (…) They are 
loyal towards each other and they keep high security standards. They don’t need to 
speak on the phone about ‘who does what’. They know it. All agreed upon is ‘walk 
and talk’.  
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Thus, detectives propose an approach where offenders on low-level are targeted 
instead in order to get to the top. Or as a Detective states: “In the old days, we began 
from the head and then moved to the ass to work our way up again”. The rationale 
behind this approach is that investigations towards low-level targets will as such 
generate information about the bosses in the groups for new snowballing cases. In 
the case of Operation Goldilocks, Jerry who was the prime investigation target had no 
formal leadership but was believed to be one of the most influential individuals in 
the crime group. A Detective explains: 
Jerry is one of the greatest catches. He’s big business. And he shouldn’t have been 
targeted. We should have tapped the wire (gået op på) one of the others. We’ve used 
too many resources to follow up on Jerry. And he doesn’t talk! He’s very disciplined 
(…) But it’s not a new mistake. We often begin with the head and are forced to work 
our way down…and then up again. 
Detectives are generally sceptical towards investigating ‘big catches’ using the most 
conventional proactive investigation techniques. In order for the police to be 
successful in regards to these offenders, detectives suggest either extended legal 
powers, more advanced technical equipment, or the extensive use of police agents. I 
will return to these issues in Chapter 8. Thus, internal resistance within the police 
towards implementing strategic targeting seems to have played a central role for its 
survival. Informal structures are often essential when it comes to police practice 
and due to amongst other the autonomous character of police work, notions about 
this work are indeed essential for how it is carried out. Therefore, the notion of e.g. 
‘real policing’ can be seen as a hindrance when it comes to the implementation of 
new knowledge-based approaches.     
337
Cohesion or Conflict: Ritual Performances of 
Recognised Dramas 
Two Models for Targeting 
In the prior sections, I have identified and presented the counters of two different 
approaches and operational models for targeting priority offenders, which I 
illustrate below in two ideal type models (see Figure R). The first approach is 
experience-based and has historically been the ruling approach to target offenders 
for proactive investigation. It builds on investigation-led targeting or informant-
driven targeting and encompasses the established practice within police. Based on 
the prior analysis in this chapter, I will characterise this as a reactive targeting model 
as it stands on practices such as reactive approaches to informant work including 
information collection, and as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus. The 
aim is to instigate proactive investigations and hold offenders accountable for their 
criminality. Consequently, proactive investigation becomes both a mean and an end. 
Additionally, the model mirrors experience-based notions of police work which are 
included in the reactive policing paradigm.  
The second approach is knowledge-based and builds on a strategic targeting model 
which proposes structured information collection and intelligence analysis in order 
to identify and prioritise targets in terms of their threats. Based on the prior 
analysis in this chapter, I characterise this as a proactive targeting model as its 
operational focus is aimed at disrupting crime groups and their subversive activities 
through the most appropriate use of investigative resources. This mirrors the ideals 
of the proactive policing paradigm, and proactive investigation is as such primarily 
an instrument to support a preventive goal. 
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Figure R. Two Models for Targeting. 
Based on these findings, I will draw some conclusions. First, the police’s strategy 
and performance measures prescribe the targeting of priority offenders based on a 
proactive approach. Second, police’s strategic management advocate for a more 
strategically anchored targeting practice aimed at high-impact offenders with the 
purpose to disturb the crime groups overall (Ratcliffe 2008a; Dean et al. 2010). 
Despite two comprehensive attempts, the implementation of a strategic targeting 
model has not been successful in the sense that this model has not found its 
grounds in the police and become an established practice. Instead, an interim 
targeting model—resembling the experience-based approach—has been made 
permanent. Thus, the attempts to replace the conventional practices—a reactive 
model of targeting—with new analytical practices in line with the new policing 
paradigm—a proactive model of targeting—have failed. In the prior section, I have 
analysed some of the most apparent explanations as to why it has proven difficult to 
alter the established targeting practice despite of organisational desires and efforts. 
However, in this section, I will explore some of the underlying explanations as to 
why the reactive operational model takes over in the organisational battle between 
the reactive and the proactive paradigm. In this exploration, I will concentrate on 
339
two dominant questions asking: 1) why the target group of priority offenders does 
not change, and 2) why the practice of targeting remains the same. 
Favouring the Familiar  
As I have made clear through the analyses in the current chapter and in Chapter 6, 
organised crime policing is to a great extent concentrated on a typical counterpart 
which includes individuals from a specific social group which can be defined as 
police property (Bowling et al. 2020). Anchored in a practice stemming from 
uniformed patrol, police operate with a typological categorisations of citizens where 
the police gaze is used as an instrument to identify what deviates from the norm. 
Thus, the typical counterpart is perceived as an ideal offender committing an ideal 
crime type. Despite an organisational desire to go beyond the usual suspects and 
aim the police’s response towards more high-level targets and perhaps even hidden 
populations, police still seem to have an organisational tunnel vision in the sense 
that they again and again focus on the classic counterpart. This illustrates an 
apparent paradox: if the police are keen to move beyond the usual suspects—why 
do they not direct their attention towards these?  
In this connection, I will propose two possible explanations which are somewhat 
linked namely: 1) the organisational preference to focus on usual suspects and 2) 
the unfamiliarity with hidden populations. First, there is an organisational 
preference on both the strategic, the operational, and the tactical level to focus on 
well-known usual suspects as this classic counterpart is easy to identify, and police’s 
experience with this group of people is extensive (Manning 2004). Managers, police 
officers, and detectives are in other words in their comfort zone when they are 
working with this counterpart, and they are additionally somewhat motivated by 
their personal relations to these. The counterpart is recognisable and familiar in 
terms of characteristics and behavioural patterns—both as a social group (police 
property) and as individuals. Their modes of operation in relation to criminal 
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activities are as such easily caught by the police gaze even on a strategic level. In 
strategic meetings, for example, it became clear that strategic managers at chief 
superintendent level have had personal encounters with those priority offenders 
who were investigation targets going back when they themselves were street-level 
officers or detectives. This condition perhaps has to do with the one Manning (2004) 
points to namely that the police organisation becomes a social mirror of the 
environment it is mandated to monitor. Accordingly, the enforcement world mirrors 
the illicit world and there are some analogs between the dealing-using system and 
the enforcement system such as the pressure for sales and production of cases, 
concerns of security and secrecy, the use of covert action etc. According to Manning 
(ibid.), the business and enforcement of narcotics therefore share some similarities
—and covert policing can consequently come to mirror organised crime. Manning 
explains (2008b: 692): 
  
They resembled, by costume, manner, appearance and front, the people they hunt 
and arrest. In sum, they were marginal and symbolically distinctive from the rest of 
the organization and they dramatized this in action (…) They are entrepreneurs, 
work secretly, act illegally, and in this and other ways they act much like their 
opponents. These could be called mutually shared projections of social reality, now a 
part of the working mandate of the drug unit and the beliefs of drug dealers. The 
secret of the menacing, omnipresent and effective drug police is that there is no 
secret. They are daily enacting, in Weick’s (2001) terms, their sense of the job.  
Thus, perhaps police are focused on the usual suspects not only as they are familiar 
to them, but because the social world of these offenders’ street-oriented way of life 
resembles the traditional world of street-level organised crime policing. A central 
element in this regard is that the role of police make them morally superior of the 
counterpart—this street-level drama of organised crime policing plays out between 
the good and the bad. 
Second, the social world of the suspected hidden populations—money men and 
crime facilitators and advisors—is not familiar to the average police officer or 
detective. Besides from being unknown and unfamiliar per default, ‘the 
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suits’ (habitterne) often belongs to another social group and perhaps even social 
class of police; the language, the environment, the behavioural pattern etc. therefore 
require different social skills and competences to navigate in—and not least to 
investigate. If the environment and how it operates is a black box, it becomes 
difficult for detectives to instigate the appropriate investigation measures (Dean et 
al. 2010). This resembles high policing where threats and risks are cornerstone and 
as such the counterpart becomes more abstract (Brodeur 2007). Accordingly, this 
performance has no predefined role descriptions or script, and the unpredictability 
of how this investigation drama plays out seem to deter police to engage with this 
group of targets. In other words, the knowledge police have is the one they navigate 
from—underlining why knowledge and its content is the key asset of any (police) 
organisation (Dean et al. 2010). On the contrary, the conventional drama of cops and 
robbers has through decades been performed almost as a ceremonial ritual 
revolving around the same script and roles. In this drama, the counterpart is 
predictable in characteristics and behaviour—but more importantly they are known 
criminals and not only suspects and as such guilty until otherwise known. The 
investigation process therefore resembles a worrying suspect-driven case-building 
instead of exploration of suspicion, as I will show in the coming Chapter 8. Hence, 
the organisational preference to focus on a preferred group of offenders therefore 
becomes a barrier in terms of shifting the organisational focus to hidden 
populations and lesser known social environments such as those more 
sophisticated criminal entrepreneurs and professional agents (e.g. accountants or 
lawyers) working with (crime) businesses in the grey zone of legal and illicit 
operations (Dean et al. 2010).    
Illuminating Police Epistemic Culture 
As I have illustrated through the previous analysis, strategic management was 
dissatisfied with the conventional targeting model and consequently prioritisation 
and decision-making taking place at operational/tactical level. The prospects of a 
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targeting model aimed at hidden populations was furthermore desirable from a 
strategic management point of view. Still, despite this organisational inclination to 
replace conventional practices with a more prosperous approach to targeting, police 
returned to conventional and well-known measures. This manifests a second 
paradox: if police (management) was keen to alter established practices—why did 
they not maintain the strategic targeting model? In this connection, I will propose 
an overall explanation to this question which evolves around epistemic matters. The 
epistemic culture (Cetina 1999) of police is compelled by at least three essential and 
cohesive notions of knowledge and consequently how police come to know what they 
know about crime as a phenomenon and policing as a practice. These are the ‘high-
status of anecdotal evidence’, ‘the sustainment of the power to know’, and ‘the need 
to reduce complexities’. In accordance with Gundhus’ findings (2006; 2010), these 
notions are imperative in order to understand why new or different forms of 
knowledge of crime and policing have so strenuous conditions within the police, 
which I unfold in the following sections. 
The High-Status of Anecdotal Evidence 
Along with a number of researchers (see Van Hulst 2013 for an overview) Manning 
(2004: 87) argues that experience within the police is passed on by storytelling:  
Talk and immediate experience is passed on powerfully by analogical 
communication: stories, pictures, and maps. This is perhaps why the oral culture of 
policing is so important and durable—the work is case-oriented, reactive, and full of 
contingencies that are rich materials for storytelling.  
Furthermore, as I illustrated in the previous chapter experience-based knowledge is 
the highest ranking in the status hierarchy of knowledge for police officers 
(Ratcliffe 2008b; Manning 2010; Gundhus 2012). This condition is founded on the 
assumptive world of policing and interpersonal tactics of policing (Manning 2010) 
and notions of ‘real policing’ being taught on the streets and through one’s own and 
other police officers experience instead of for example being taught at The Police 
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Academy. Academic aspects of police training are viewed as irrelevant and even an 
obstacle for doing good police work (Manning 2010). Experience is as a result 
regarded as the most genuine and worthy and therefore legitimate knowledge, 
which the competence hierarchy from Gundhus’ (2012) also express—and this 
experience is often explicated through the telling of anecdotes. Even at strategic 
meetings—I have observed that a content-based discussion of a certain topic 
including presentations of research knowledge, statistics, analyses etc. can suddenly 
take a different direction if someone tells an anecdote about the matter (or cop 
stories see Van Maanen 1978a). This can change the entire agenda of a meeting as 
anecdotes are not only used to exemplify matters or making them more concrete, 
but since anecdotes are perceived as highly reliable information—if they are told by 
a trustworthy and well-respected source. I find this even to reflect the core of the 
police métier (Manning 2010)—the incident focus—which is framed and viewed 
exclusively as the officer at the scene describes it. The epigram of ‘you-had-to-be-
there-to-understand-what-was-done-why-it-was-done-and-the-results-produced’ 
which, according to Manning (2010), rules police culture thereby reinforce the 
inviolate and sacred centre of police work—the reasonable, thoughtful, rational, 
cogitating individual officer, on the street deciding things. Therefore, the officer’s 
account (the anecdote) becomes virtually the rule of thumb. The strength of the 
anecdote can therefore easily match for example a peer-reviewed research article as 
anecdotes are the highest valued currency of knowledge within the police. I refer to 
this condition as anecdotal evidence.  
In accordance with other research (Shearing & Ericsson 1991; Van Maanen 1973; 
Van Maanen 1978a; Waddington 1999), telling of anecdotes can be viewed as a 
ritualised practice within police where the same stories are told over and over; a 
retelling of different performances in regards to ‘the incident’ where idealisation is 
used to manage the impression of the various actors (Goffman 1959). This seems to 
have two main functions namely to 1) articulate police practice (as this is 
characterised as being mostly tacit), and 2) preserve institutional memory within the 
344
police (as this is characterised as being a non-written organisation). Waddington 
(1999), however, suggests that talk and actual doing have not much in common and 
that this canteen cop culture is not helpful to understand the essentials of policing; 
it is pure nostalgia. However, in this study, I view the ritualised practice of telling 
anecdotes as passing on and sustaining both experience (police practice/
interpersonal tactics), but perhaps more importantly world views and assumptions 
(about policing and crime)—a similar finding of Van Hulst’s (2013). It is therefore an 
important part of police epistemic culture. In relation to the sustainment of 
strategic targeting, the above argument suggests that anecdotal evidence turned out 
to be stronger than analytical-based knowledge simply because this knowledge type 
holds the highest status within police epistemic culture. 
The Power to Know  
Since experience function as the most valued knowledge type within police this 
means, as e.g. Gundhus (2012) shows, that other types of knowledge—for example 
analytical knowledge or educational knowledge—are not regarded as similarly 
valuable or trustworthy and consequently such knowledge forms have lower status. 
This condition mirrors obviously the competition between the two epistemic 
rationales from respectively experience-based policing and knowledge-based 
policing. Ratcliffe’s (2008b) differentiation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ knowledge and 
Gundhus’ (2012) division between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ professionalism are important in 
the sense that the conflict also concerns who possess these different types of 
knowledge. The detective is generally exponent for the old knowledge and the 
experience-based professionalism, whereas the new knowledge and standardised 
professionalism is more associated with intelligence or crime analysts and other 
personnel groups who do not carry out ‘real’ police work. I recall a discussion I had 
once with a former colleague at NCI—a police officer in an analytical function—
about whether or not a civilian could possess the job as an operational analyst 
(operativ analytiker), and he explained: 
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It has to be a police officer. It has to be someone who has or at least has had 
experience with the gangs and the ‘world out there’. Someone who has had the 
environment under his nails (op under neglene) in order to understand it. It’s like—
if you get a woman disease, wouldn’t you rather have a female doctor? One you know 
has felt it on her own body?   
The quote underlines the argument in accordance with Gundhus’ findings (2012) 
that many police officer do not value educational skills as adequate, and an 
authority figure is thus merely one whose skills are based on experience. Manning’s 
(2010) conclusion that there is a belief within police that the incident has the social 
reality attributed to it by the officer draws attention to the condition  that the police 
officer is the authority of and source to how incidents play out. This implies that 
knowledge derived from other than police officers are in itself questionable. The 
assumptions and the interpersonal tactics of policing which constitute and shape 
the police métier suggest that experience-based knowledge gives one the necessary 
insights—and since e.g. analysts, academics, or others in non-police functions are 
occupied with other types of knowledge produced in other ways they cannot know 
about police work and crime.  
In Chapter 4, I discussed the latent debates within police concerning: 1) who has 
the right to be part of the police organisation? and 2) who has the right to speak 
about police work? The two issues are interlinked, but the second discussion is 
particularly relevant in this context as it concerns the issue of knowledge monopoly 
and as such the power to know. Since policing is a tacit practice and the police 
organisation is ruled by informal structures (Manning 2010), knowledge is a strong 
currency in a number of ways as Hartmann (2014) equally concludes. The struggle 
of knowledge therefore equals the struggle of organisational power—and the 
powerful are as such the ones whose knowledge is high-status and sought after and 
who are regarded as trustworthy. Manning (1977) argues in this connection that the 
rhetoric of police professionalism is the most important strategy employed by the 
police to defend their mandate and thereby build self-esteem, organisational 
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autonomy and occupational solidarity and cohesiveness. This is similarly linked to 
the condition in relation to Operation Goldilocks earlier in this chapter, namely, that 
detectives verified the information they received from the source handlers and the 
analysis unit. They did not trust the information as they did not trust the processers 
of this information—analysts (generally) and informant handlers (specifically). The 
oral passing of information is therefore closely connected to the notion of ‘a good 
man’ which is a frequent used expression within police—it characterises a police 
officer who is trustworthy and whose backlist is reviewed and approved (see also 
Valland 2014 for a similar observation). Consequently, my argument suggests that it 
is not only a matter of old or new knowledge being right or wrong, but indeed who 
is the source of this knowledge. Since knowledge is power—a shift from 
conventional to strategic targeting would also suggest a shift from thick to thin 
professionalism and as a result a shift in who are knowledgeable and thus which 
organisational groups (analysts, managers, detectives, informant handlers etc.) who 
hold organisational power and thus has the power to know.    
   
Reduction of Complexity 
The last notion of police epistemic culture I will present here is already introduced 
in Chapter 6, namely reduction of complexity. In the prior chapter, it was discussed in 
relation to police’s preoccupation with providing quick-fix solutions and one-page 
management. In this connection, it concerns the epistemological understanding of 
the social world and policing which promotes a tendency to reduce its complexities 
and intellectual aspects. An Analyst explains: 
They (mangement, my addition) find it difficult to understand when I try to describe 
some of the tasks as integrated in organisational conditions—that it makes a 
difference for the way the job is carried out. They don’t understand it. That it makes 
a difference (the organisational surroundings, my addition). They don’t have that 
perspective; to live with a high degree of complexity within the organisation that’s 
not something they consider. They like to reduce the complexity in the tasks. Instead 
of saying: there are many different considerations we need to take into account, and 
we need to prioritise… Or that two different answers to the same question can both 
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be right at the same time…those sort of things… And I’m an example of that 
complexity.  
The point I derive from the statement above is that the efforts to reduce complexity 
of the social world and police work can create even more complexity. For example, 
when intelligence personnel and analysts encounter complex and sustainable crime 
problems or organisational challenges and management requests simplistic and fast 
solutions to these. In this sense, the need to reduce complexity generally can 
become a hindrance for instigating comprehensive police responses, but it can also 
become a barrier for organisational innovation and lead to a condition where police 
fall back on old habits and well-known practices.   
Since high-status knowledge in police is experience-based, this promotes decisions 
which are built upon individual officers’ discretion and the development of the 
police gaze. A central issue here is policing by typology which divides events and 
people into demarcated and conformist categories with little room for nuances and 
uncertainty. In terms of strategic targeting and the initial request for a ‘tool’ to 
identify targets, this implies that the epistemic notion of reducing complexities 
results in a search for ‘absolute’ knowledge or binary systems to categorise the 
social world (Atkinson 2013; Gundhus & Jansen 2020). In this perspective, the 
search for methods can be understood as a search for ‘tools’ to determine if 
offender A or offender B should be targeted. Strategic targeting, however, is on the 
contrary a model which increases complexities as its aim is to explore unknown or 
uncertain characteristics and perspectives in its focus on inherent threats and risks. 
The strategic knowledge framework is as such to build up competitive knowledge 
about the counterpart (organised criminals/crime businesses) which make the 
police able to plan, develop, and put in operation a wide and diverse range of 
intervention strategies to disrupt and dismantle organised crime (Dean et al. 2010). 
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Summary & Discussion: A Random Approach to 
Targeting Priority Offenders? 
In this chapter, I have explored the circumstances around the preparatory phase 
leading up to the launch of proactive investigations. I have analysed two competing 
approaches within police to target priority offenders—their pros and cons, and 
what make them successful and unsuccessful within police. I have explored how 
attempts were made to introduce new knowledge-based approaches to replace 
conventional experience-based approaches, and I have analysed the various reasons 
as to why this has proven difficult. In the current section, I account for the central 
findings and arguments outlined in this chapter. I discuss the continuous 
organisational conflict between aspirations and actions taken in reality in terms of 
transforming targeting of priority offenders from a reactive to a proactive practice, 
and how this impacts the overall police response towards organised crime. I return 
to the case of Operation Goldilocks and the empirical example presented in the 
introduction of this chapter as I discuss the circumstances surrounding these in 
relation to the analytical findings.   
Some vital conclusions can be drawn. Historically, two different approaches to 
launching proactive investigations and selecting investigation targets have been 
dominant within police: investigation-led targeting and informant-driven targeting. 
Informant-driven targeting is considered to be the most commonly used approach 
within the (Danish) police; a practice stemming from street-level work where 
information from confidential informants led to informant-driven police operations 
primarily aimed at drug offences—gradually during the 1990s referred to as 
organised crime. In this process, informant work went from being merely an 
operative tactic to becoming a central part of police’s intelligence work and 
additionally a cornerstone in police’s response to organised crime. The use of 
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information from confidential informants has some clear advantages such as the 
fast collection of actionable information with the possibilities of producing seizures 
and arrests. In relation to targeting and proactive investigations there are, however, 
some risks associated with e.g. methods for information collection and information 
evaluation, and the application of this information in operational responses. Police 
primarily operate with a reactive rather than a proactive model for informant work. 
This has to do with the condition that informant work is based on undirected 
approaches to recruiting source handlers as well as informants and is based on 
unstructured methods for collecting and applying source information. In 
connection with informant-driven targeting, this results in three main risks; 1) over-
policing regular customers by targeting the same group of offenders over and over, 
2) under-policing hidden populations e.g. organised crime groups operating below 
the surface or organised crime offenders with lesser visibility than the usual 
suspects, and 3) random selection of the most visible and active offenders whom 
police receive information about, but who are operating on a low-level scale. 
Informant-driven targeting as a central nerve in the police’s response towards 
organised crime is therefore in risk of becoming a response model of informant-
driven policing. 
Two different attempts were made to implement a strategic targeting model with 
the purpose to provide police management with an analytical-based foundation for 
decision-making and prioritisation. The reason was that strategic management 
wanted more control of investigation resources and influence on investigation 
targets, and since informant-driven targeting was believed to be insufficient in 
terms of targeting high-value offenders with considerable impact on organised 
crime. Strategic targeting promoted a proactive approach relying on a requirement-
based intelligence model and advocated a long-term and group-oriented response 
to disrupt, prevent, and reduce organised crime. The conclusion from the two 
rounds was that despite great efforts, organisational alterations, dedication from 
analysts, and good intentions from police management, the strategic targeting 
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model did not find its grounds within police and was never established as a 
practice. Consequently, strategic targeting was phased out during 2018 and an 
interim targeting model became the permanent targeting model. As a result, 
targeting practices therefore still rely primarily on conventional targeting 
approaches—informant-driven targeting—and established modes of action. In 2019, 
the second performance goal regarding targeting priority offenders for proactive 
investigations was omitted from the police’s strategy. Meanwhile, the first 
performance goal concerning the incarceration of members in organised crime 
groups was increased from 300 to 400. The broad response model was as such 
cemented as the dominant operational model for police’s response towards 
organised crime, and the police continues to operate with a random and/or 
disadvantaged knowledge framework. A key challenge for strategic targeting was 
that on both strategic and operational level it was viewed as too time consuming 
and demanding. Moreover, the lack of organisational matureness in regards to 
strategic knowledge work meant that strategic targeting was dealt with in the same 
way as any operational police issue. An additional challenge was internal resistance 
within police towards analytical-based approaches which seems to have played a 
central role for strategic targeting’s survival given that informal structures are often 
essential for police practice. The notion of e.g. ‘real policing’ stemming from police 
occupational culture (Reiner 2010) can as such be seen as a hindrance when it 
comes to the implementation of knowledge-based approaches.  
Thus, within police there is a competition between two ideal type models for 
targeting namely a reactive and a proactive model. The reactive model for targeting 
is predominantly experience-based building on investigation-led targeting or 
informant-driven targeting which stand on reactive approaches to informant work 
and information collection. The proactive model for targeting is knowledge-based 
building on strategic targeting which proposes structured information collection 
and intelligence analysis in order to identify and prioritise targets in terms of their 
respective threats. Despite organisational inclinations, the attempts to replace 
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conventional practices—a reactive model of targeting usual suspects—with new 
analytical practices—a proactive model of targeting hidden populations—failed. 
There are two overall explanations. First, there is an organisational preference to 
focus on the classic counterpart and the usual suspects as these are recognisable 
and familiar in terms of characteristics and behavioural patterns and since the 
social world and behavioural patterns of hidden populations such as ‘the suits’ (e.g. 
money men and crime facilitators) are not. Second, police epistemic culture is 
compelled by at least three essential and cohesive notions of knowledge which are 
imperative in order to understand why new or different forms of knowledge of 
crime and policing have so strenuous conditions within police. Experience-based 
knowledge is highest ranking in the status hierarchy of knowledge in police and it 
is often explicated and passed on through the telling of anecdotes. This becomes a 
ritualised practice and functions to articulate police practice and to preserve 
institutional memory. Anecdotal evidence can easily outweigh for example scientific 
knowledge. Since strategic targeting is concerned with analytical-based knowledge 
this meant that experience-based knowledge and the conventional model was 
preferred at the end.  
Moreover, since experience function as the most valued knowledge type within 
police other types of knowledge are not regarded as similarly valuable or 
trustworthy. A knowledge monopoly exists within police and as such the power to 
know. The struggle of knowledge therefore equals the struggle of organisational 
power—and the powerful are the ones whose knowledge is high-status and sought 
after and who are regarded as trustworthy. A shift from conventional to strategic 
targeting would also suggest an inconvenient shift in which organisational groups 
who has the power to know. Lastly, the epistemological understanding of the social 
world and policing promote a tendency to reduce its intellectual aspects and its 
complexities. Contrary to this, strategic targeting increases complexities as its aim is 
to explore unknown or uncertain characteristics and perspectives in its focus on 
threats and risks. Thus, the need to reduce complexity can be seen as a hindrance 
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for instigating comprehensive police responses, and a barrier for organisational 
innovation leading police to fall back on old habits and well-known practices. My 
main argument in this chapter is that due to organisational preferences and 
habitual thinking, proactive investigations often target priority offenders for 
proactive investigations using predominantly conventional and experience-based 
approaches such as informant-driven targeting. This can be compared to the 
approach of random patrolling from the standard policing model which mirrors a 
narrow perception of proactive policing as both a concept and practice (Bacon 
2016). Inherent in this approach lies a practice where offenders are randomly 
identified through the police gaze as they meet the criteria of being highly visible 
usual suspects whom police easily recognise and prefer to deal with.  
This stands in contrast to a systematic knowledge-based process consisting of e.g. 
the production of a comprehensive overview of high impact targets and the 
(relative) threats they compose. It runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as it preserves and reproduces stereotypical organisational notions of ‘bad 
guys’ instead of widening the scope to hidden populations. It mirrors as such the 
performance of the street-level drama of cops and robbers between good and bad 
(real police catching real criminals) where police identify and round up usual 
suspects as a ritual revolving around the same script and the same role descriptions. 
This well-known drama has been performed through decades and along the lines of 
Manning’s findings (2008c), it maintains a front stage performance of proactivity 
where police manage the impression of being able to control and impact the setting 
of organised crime as much as possible. It remains, however, a symbolic rather than 
an instrumental performance celebrating the ritual subculture of patrol as it 
predominantly evolves around offenders operating on a low-level scale whose threat 
to society may possibly be relatively limited. On the contrary, the performance of 
targeting hidden populations has no predefined role descriptions or predictable 
script and therefore, despite a strategic inclination to instigate and support strategic 
targeting, it has met difficulties when it comes to replacing standard routines in 
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police and is often set aside on the grounds of being too complicated and too 
resourceful. Thus, proactive investigation becomes an informant-led police activity 
rather than a component to intelligence-led policing (Cope 2004). Its impact as a 
central part of the strategy and police response against organised crime as a whole 
can as such be debated. 
Returning now to Operation Goldilocks and the empirical example presented in the 
introduction of the chapter: two main conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the 
prior analysis. First, the investigation target in Operation Goldilocks was identified 
through conventional methods for targeting—source information. Jerry had for a 
long time been on the police’s wish list as an investigation target as prior efforts to 
investigate him had failed. As the analysis in this chapter shows, the investigation 
was instigated rapidly as source information about Jerry came to police’s attention 
(information-that-fell-into-our-lap). Jerry was regarded as a high-value target—and 
in some ways as an under-policed agent. He was not a part of a hidden population 
as he was both familiar to police and visible in the organised crime environment, 
but he had a long past of steering clear of police’s measures. Police management 
saw this as an opportunity to get Jerry as they believed they had a source close to 
him. Since information from confidential informants most often can be 
transformed into police action it is regarded as valuable knowledge as it function as 
an instrument to perform good police work (making arrests) and as such meeting 
both formal and informal demands of policing. The source information in relation 
to Operation Goldilocks was as such by police management regarded as convincing in 
terms of making Jerry an investigation priority. Thus, the first step in the 
investigation process was to get a court order for interception in communications 
(indgreb i meddelelseshemmeligheden), and the investigation team instigated 
wiretapping on Jerry and his suspected collaborators from day one. This left little 
room to prepare the investigation process and most investigation resources were 
quickly bound to wiretapping. Detectives’ spent a lot of time in the initial phase to 
collect information about Jerry, his connections, and their movements and actions, 
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as I will elaborate further in Chapter 8. Moreover, Jerry’s function within the crime 
group he was attached to was not analysed in detail, and the source information 
which the decision about targeting him was built upon was not verified through 
other channels. Along the way, detectives became sceptical about the validity of the 
source information they had received on Jerry—both as they lacked trust in the 
department from where it came, and as they during the investigation found little 
support for the information from the confidential informant. In this sense, source 
information was critical for the entire operation—it encompassed the foundation 
for initiating the case, but it was also seen as vital for the investigation process as 
source information was supposed to support case work underway. When detectives 
found out that this information was not reliable it meant that they were to direct the 
investigation elsewhere. Since Jerry was considered to be ‘top shelf’, detectives had 
no inclinations that they could be successful building a case against him using 
merely conventional investigation tactics—source information was considered to be 
essential. Thus, informant-driven targeting and informant work as case support was 
crucial in relation to Operation Goldilocks. The quality of informant work therefore 
became imperative for the success of the investigation and consequently an indirect 
reason as to why the investigation did not progress in the way it was expected to, 
and ultimately why it was closed down.  
Second, in relation to the empirical example from the introduction of this chapter, 
through the analysis I have shown that the rationales of experience-based and 
knowledge-based policing were competing in the organisational battle of targeting 
methods. The comment from the police officer, Peter, about how it is not possible to 
‘learn investigation by reading a book’ is therefore essential for police epistemic 
culture; it is, in accordance with Gundhus’ findings (2012) perceived merely to be 
taught through experience and policing the streets. The perceptions about targeting 
expressed by Superintendent Carlyle equally reflect an epistemic notion that 
analytical processes do not contribute with new or valuable information—it merely 
is a process of ‘writing down what is already known’—understood as organisational 
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knowledge derived from experience. Strategic targeting can therefore be seen as an 
exponent for analytical knowledge or standardised knowledge (Gundhus 2012) and 
additionally this knowledge is possessed by people who are not viewed as 
knowledgable since their knowledge does not stem from experience and 
accordingly is viewed as ‘thin’ professionalism. This tells us something essential 
about attempts to implement strategic targeting and why conventional approaches 
became the preferred model. 
All in all, there are some predicaments and discrepancies between the strategic 
ideal of being proactive and the reality of police action. In the practical world of 
proactive investigation, however, informant work in its conventional form proposes 
some essential problems for instigating proactive and high-end police work; 
targeting hidden or under-policed populations who can be said to impact the 
underlying structures of organised crime. Consequently, the structures for reactivity 
are still dominant even for proactive investigations potentially leading to for 
example suspect-driven case-building which we shall see in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 8: The Act of Proactivity 
- On police’s instigation of reactive measures in proactive 
investigations 
Police organisations and criminal organisations have to rely substantially on their 
stock of knowledge as a resource. Such resource knowledge adds capacity to their 
performance capabilities and also positions them to build on competitive 
advantages. To that extent, policing and criminal entrepreneurs are engaged in a 
knowledge war. (…) it is not the absolute amount of knowledge that policing had 
that is important but rather it is the relative quantum of knowledge that will to a 
large extent determine how winnable this knowledge war is for policing against 
organised crime.  
- Organised Crime by Dean, Fahsing, and Gottschalk (2010: 174). 
Introduction 
“Let me tell you a story. A couple of officers from patrol are doing their rounds one 
afternoon in the rural areas. They’re driving alongside the meadow outside Little Village. 
They observe a car parked on a narrow country lane in the outskirts of the forest. They turn 
and drive into the road to investigate further. A farmer is coming towards them with a group 
of cattle. So they stop and ask him; ‘is that your car?’ and the farmer says: ‘no, it’s not my car. 
I suppose it belongs to those two men over there’—and the farmer points to the field. And 
in the middle of the cornfield two men are standing, talking to each other. The officers park 
the patrol car and walk towards the two men through the cornfield. The men stop talking. 
When they get closer, one of the officers recognise the men; it’s Jerry and Norman. The 
officers ask about their business at the cornfield and Jerry says: ‘we’re just enjoying the view 
of the ships approaching the harbour.’ I mean—this is what we’re up against!” 
It was late in the afternoon and we were sitting in Senior Detective John’s office. We had just 
discussed the difficulties in making investigational progress in Operation Goldilocks. I hadn’t 
heard that particular story before, but I was aware that detectives experienced significant 
challenges in terms of technical surveillance.  
John continued: “We had surveillance on Jerry one night and he had a visit from ‘King’. 
They leave Jerry’s house; they pass the surveillance team which is parked on the opposite 
site of the road. They talk about bitches and big tits when they pass the car. They go to a 
parking lot at the end of the road. They stand there for one minute and talk. One minute! 
Then they return and talk about bitches and tits again. We are lacking technical equipment 
which can be used in those situations and that’s our main challenge.”   
A couple of weeks later, I came into work early as always to make coffee (my most entrusted 
task in the investigation unit) and prepare myself for the day. But the office was busy—
almost all detectives from Operation Goldilocks were in their offices or walked around 
carrying out various tasks. I met Michael in the meeting room (which also served as an 
office and a lunchroom). He looked tired and was in his overcoat. 
“What’s going on?” 
“Our cover was blown”. 
“What?” 
“Yeah, during the night, I haven’t slept so I’m going home to sleep now.” 
Thomas entered the room carrying a stack of papers. 
“Shit,” I said. 
“Yeah,” he said. “I’ve just finished the report. They’ve asked for an account.” 
By ‘they’, I assumed he referred to investigation management. 
“What happened?”, I asked. 
“It’s that fucking equipment!” 
Michael shook his head in resignation. 
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The technical equipment for interception in open air (aflytning i det fri) had caused big 
problems from the very beginning of the investigation. The group of investigation targets 
and focus persons were upholding a disciplined use of a considerable amount of safety 
measures. This included amongst other the use of encrypted communication and walk-and-
talk meetings. These meetings were taking place in open air, typically in rural and isolated 
areas such as the above-mentioned cornfield, parking lots, rest stops etc. Such open-air 
locations made it difficult to place technical equipment, but also made it impossible for the 
surveillance team to come close. The detectives had tried in a number of ways to install the 
equipment in many different places and at many different distances, but even if they were 
successful the quality of the sound turned out to be too poor.  
Michael sat down in a chair around the meeting table, still in his overcoat. I went across the 
room to my working station, took off my jacket and put down my bag. No one spoke. 
Thomas placed the report on his desk and sat down. Two detectives from another 
investigation operation came into the room to have their morning coffee. 
“Morning,” they said. 
Fred, the investigation manager, entered the room, red-eyed and harried. 
“This is no one’s fault,” he said, “it’s just the conditions in which we operate,” he shrug his 
shoulders, “if we don’t try anything, we don’t get anywhere—that’s just the name of the 
game.” 
“Yeah, I know,” Thomas said, “and I’ve told Lou, but he’s absolutely gutted. He went home to 
sleep.” 
Fred was persistent: “It’s no one’s fault, it could have happened to anyone who was there, so 
that’s just how it is. This is not something we need to spend a lot of energy on.”  
I was sitting quietly wondering what might have happened and a little regretful that I’ve 
missed it all. It was obvious that the atmosphere had changed—the team’s frustrations 
concerning the lack of progress and success within the investigation had built up over a long 
time. These frustrations seemed now to have turned into some sort of resignation and 
perhaps even self-blame. The use of sarcastic remarks and black humour which typically 
dominated the team’s language and atmosphere was clearly lacking. 
Sandy and Peter showed up in the doorway, nodded ‘good morning’, joined the other 
detectives, and reached for the coffee pot. The room was tense with suspense.  
Fred approached Thomas: “did you finish the report?”.  
Thomas nodded and gave Fred the stack of papers, Fred left the room while beginning to 
read, heading for the upstairs management office.    
“So, let’s hear it. Was it Lou or the surveillance team?” Andrew, one of the detectives from 
another operation asked the straight-forward question; he sounded genuinely concerned 
and sympathetic.  
Peter shook his head: “no, it was…they had to replace the batteries in the camera…and 
suddenly Joey appears with a girl…out of nowhere. He sees both Lou and Thomas, and they 
had to make up a story. We were here at the base waiting…”  
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Thomas sighed: “it was around 3 am! And all the lights were out. They must have come out 
through the main entrance and went behind the building to the basement entrance.” 
“What story did you give them?” Andrew again. 
“That we were called to a burglary in the basement. But we didn’t have on uniforms. It’s a 
long shot, I don’t think they bought it…” 
“They didn’t say anything,” Michael said. “Perhaps they were just there by coincidence…” 
The conversation continued the entire morning. Several detectives joined and some of the 
surveillance officers. It was discussed how the night’s actions have played out, who said 
what, when and how, and there were speculations about how Joey, one of the investigation 
targets, and his girlfriend would interpret their random meeting with two detectives coming 
to investigate a burglary in a basement building in the middle of a Wednesday night. And 
further: how many and who had he and would he inform about this event in the entire 
criminal network? 
Despite the potential consequences for the investigation operation, there was no sign of 
internal conflicts or tensions between the detectives on the team, quite the contrary. The 
detectives showed undivided support to the officers involved—no jokes were made; no 
blame was assigned. ‘It could’ve happened to any one of us’ was expressed frequently. 
Instead, the discussion primarily concerned the possible ramifications for the investigation. 
Was the investigation cover blown? Were investigation targets and focus persons now aware 
that police were carrying out an operation? Would they install additional security measures, 
would they replace all their phone numbers, would they cut off communication, would they 
postpone the suspected incoming package (import of drugs)? The questions and 
uncertainties were many. 
Fred joined the conversation after his meeting with upstairs management: “what’s done is 
done,” he said, “now, we need to look ahead.”   
The narrative above reflects a number of central issues in regards to understanding 
the black box and the nature of proactive investigation. What differentiates 
proactive investigations from other types of investigative work is its covertness as it 
takes place in the shadows (Loftus et al. 2015). It can be nerve-racking, tense, and 
stressful. The condition that decisions about what to do and when; how to assess 
incoming information, when to shut down a surveillance operation, when to 
instigate crackdowns and arrests—is it too soon or is it too late—is wearing. 
Moreover, although covert operations mostly consist of passive activities the 
constant concern for ‘getting caught’ and getting one’s cover blown when 
instigating certain investigative action can lead to persistent paranoia—a 
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circumstance which detectives’ share with their criminal opponents (Manning 
2004). Proactive investigation is truly ‘the policing of uncertainties’ (Innes 2006) and 
it requires a constant balance between being passive, waiting, and proactively 
instigating investigative action. The investigation of organised crime is therefore not 
merely the investigation of separate criminal action or a single criminal event; it is 
an ongoing process, a non-stop train, if you will, without an end station, which 
police jump on and off, but which they are never able to stop. The criminal agents 
of organised crime are as such several steps ahead of the police, and some of them 
are even ‘professionals’ (Dean et al. 2010) in the sense that they take security 
precautions and direct their actions towards what is sensible in a criminal business 
perspective. Many detectives share as such the assumption that success in proactive 
investigations comes from ‘being there and being ready’ when the counterparts’ 
make mistakes. This is not merely a rational assessment but is connected to how 
detectives engage in and find meaning in ‘the narcs’ game’ (Manning 2004). 
The example above also draws attention to other important aspects of proactive 
investigation for example how this is organised, how it is practised, and detectives’ 
notions and assumptions about this policing discipline which is connected to the 
dominant police occupational culture (Reiner 2010). For example, the lack of 
technical equipment and the capabilities of criminal agents are by detectives 
perceived as the two overwhelming challenges for proactive investigations. This 
deserves some analytical attention. So, in relation to the practice of proactive 
investigations; which lines of enquiry guide lines of action and investigation tactics 
in order to uncover organised drug crime? What characterises the process and the 
various phases? On what grounds and rationales is investigative action instigated, 
and how valuable are different investigation tactics to the investigation process? 
And further: which collective assumptions are impacting investigative practice?  
In this chapter, I explore in detail how proactive investigations are practised. The 
chapter is concerned with exploring the black box of proactive investigation as an 
activity within the narrow response model and as an outcome of targeting priority 
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offenders as analysed in Chapter 6 and 7. Through this exploration I am searching 
for a fundamental methodology of proactive investigative work. Moreover, I am 
occupied with an exploration of the nature of proactive investigation by revisiting 
concept and practice in order to understand this specific phenomenon. Overall, I 
ask the fundamental question and analyse: how are proactive investigations carried 
out? 
My main argument in this chapter is that the process and practice of proactive 
investigation are mainly guided by the routine instigation of several lines of action 
and covert tactics founded in the accessible legal framework. This stands in contrast 
to a methodological framework led by context-dependent investigative queries and 
various lines of enquiry. Proactive investigation seems to be performed as a tacit 
practice where detectives follow a predetermined ingrained, unarticulated script 
and a set of inherent collective actions which are impacted by both individual and 
shared experience, the specific setting of the investigation team, and a number of 
collective epistemological notions about proactive police work and the criminal 
counterpart. Consequently, proactive investigation practice seems to be lacking 
deliberate, intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative action 
and ultimately encompass a proactive investigative methodology. Although proactive 
investigation is a practice of information work which empirically and by its content 
resembles intelligence work this is not recognised by detectives who uphold a 
collective perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-
level operational work or reactive investigative work known from the standard 
policing model. Detectives’ investigative action are furthermore impacted by an 
investigative mindset which are comprised by collective assumptions about 
proactive detective work stemming from the reactive paradigm and the experience-
based regime. Proactive investigation is therefore based on reactive practices in 
terms of investigation and information work, but also the proactive investigative 
mindset is dominated by a reactive epistemology.   
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First, I investigate the process, practice, and social organisation of proactive 
investigation with the purpose of identifying a comprehensive methodology. I 
present a process description of proactive investigative work and propose a model 
of proactive investigation and analyse this practice as a form of information work.  
Second, I discuss the difficulties of establishing a proactive investigative 
methodology and analyse some of the reasons for this which are grounded in 
detectives’ collective assumptions about proactive investigations and detective work.  
The chapter ends with a summary of its key analytical findings together with a 
discussion of how detectives’ investigative mindset impact proactive investigation 
practices overall. 
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The Black Box of Proactive Investigation: Searching 
for an Investigative Methodology 
A Process Description of Proactive Investigation 
A central characteristic of all police work that I have ever observed—whether it was 
operational responses or investigation tactics—is that it is carried out in a quiet and 
unarticulated manner. Policing is a tacit and silent practice. Of course there is the 
odd briefing or coordination before a large-scale police operation such as multiple 
arrests, searches, controls and the like, but day-to-day policing, investigation or 
patrol work, although it is carried out in teams, is predominantly carried out as a set 
of inherent routine actions by individual officers (Finstad 2000; Loftus 2010). This 
was also the case in Operation Goldilocks. The investigation team and its detectives 
had little structured coordination regarding the investigation process underway. On 
the contrary, the investigation proceeded and carried on following an unarticulated 
script for performance and actions and as such tacit practices. Within the (Danish) 
police there are no formal comprehensive procedural descriptions, guidelines, or 
methodological framework when it comes to investigation processes or practices 
other than the legal framework and various separate policy instructions or action 
cards. The detective occupation is therefore to a large extent depending on 
individual discretion. I will explain this observation in more detail during this 
chapter, but because of this condition, I will in the following sections describe and 
account for how the investigation proceeded chronologically as I observed it day-
by-day and as it was logged in the internal investigation database and in the 
investigation summary.  
I refer to this as a process description of proactive investigation. I do this before making 
further analytical categorisations and interpretations with the purpose of 
embedding the reader into the investigation process through an overview of the 
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different investigation steps that were taken. The aim is to show how the specific 
operation proceeded, what the main lines of investigative action were, and the 
rationales behind these as they were put forward by detectives. Afterwards, I 
categorise and analyse this process as I propose a generic model for proactive 
investigation by scrutinising the various stages in proactive investigation and core 
investigation tactics in order to develop a comprehensive methodology for proactive 
investigation practice. 
Start-Up 
Operation Goldilocks was initially planned to be a long-term operation with an 
expected duration of 18 months (see also the investigation proposal presented in 
Introduction). It was directed at a key target in organised crime, Jerry, who the 
police had years of dealings with and who they had already spent substantial 
investigation resources on over the years without significant results. In Brodeur’s 
(2010) and Marx’ (1988) terms this was accordingly a suspect-centered covert 
investigation operation. Jerry was considered to be a priority target and at the same 
time a demanding challenge as he operated ‘on the top shelf’ in organised crime. 
The categorisation of him as a priority target was, according to the investigation 
proposal and detectives, due to his:  
1) alleged influence on and high status in organised crime—especially in those 
organised crime groups which he had dealings with 
2) long criminal career making him particularly capable in carrying out criminal 
activities—especially in making large profits and setting up durable crime 
businesses 
3) years of experience with police and thereby an ability to apply countermeasures 
towards investigation tactics.  
The operational aims of the investigation were moreover to: 
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1) disclose Jerry’s criminal activities,  
2) identify the criminal network around him including his business partners,  
3) identify dealers and byers,  
4) collect information and documentation to support the national monitoring of the 
members of organised crime.  
The operation was instigated on the basis of source information from a confidential 
informant (as accounted for in Chapter 7) who provided the necessary grounds of 
suspicion (mistankegrundlag) for the police to instigate a proactive investigation 
according to § 742 and § 743 in The Administration of Justice Act. This source 
information concerned Jerry’s (and his collaborators’) import and distribution of 
illicit drugs and as such Operation Goldilocks was instigated as a § 191 investigation 
referring to The Criminal Justice Code.  
Instigating Initial Lines of Action and Tactics 
Wiretapping, Surveillance, and International Cooperation 
A few days after the operation was officially launched, the investigation team 
instigated three main lines of investigative actions.1 First, the investigation team got 
court orders to intercept telecommunications (kendelse til indgreb i 
meddelelseshemmeligheden) which is regulated in § 780 in The Administration of 
Justice Act. The court orders included Jerry, as the investigation’s prime target and a 
handful of individuals which police believed to be Jerry’s crime companions. The 
purpose was to monitor their supposed internal communication concerning illicit 
drug importation. Second, a surveillance operation was instigated using a separate 
surveillance team—a group of surveillance officers who had undergone training in 
surveillance tactics. At first, this operation consisted primarily of direct observation 
of the prime target, Jerry, with the purpose of monitoring and documenting his 
movements and contacts. Such an operation is not dependent on a court order but 
can be instigated by the police themselves if certain criteria are met (cf. § 791 a The 
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Administration of Justice Act). Third, as the suspicion concerned the import of illicit 
drugs from other European countries, investigation management began to pursue a 
cooperation with the involved countries. They were as such initially trying to 
instigate a JIT (joint investigation team), which typically are sat in motion via 
Europol and Eurojust. The purpose was to collect information about the 
investigation targets abroad and to establish cooperation with other police 
authorities which could become useful later on in the investigation process. 
Moreover, the purpose was to try to convince the cooperating authorities that they 
should instigate separate investigations themselves. Investigation management 
pointed to the condition that this would increase the amount of accessible 
information about the criminal network that Jerry was believed to be a part of and 
would perhaps increase the chances of getting a drug seizure. These initial lines of 
action and investigation tactics were persistent throughout the entire operation. 
Instigating Additional Lines of Action and Tactics 
Surveillance in Open Air and Intrusive Surveillance 
As the investigation proceeded, it became clear that its focus persons—besides 
being rather busy people, driving long distances and interacting with a lot of people 
including each other—had a high frequency of physical meetings; some reoccurring 
at fixed intervals and some spontaneously arranged. Moreover, they took a number 
of what detectives viewed as ‘countermeasures’ or ‘security measures’ towards police 
such as speaking in codes in telephone conversations and holding meetings in open 
air. This required detectives to attempt to intercept in communications by audio or 
video recording these meetings (aflytning i det fri) cf. § 780 in The Administration of 
Justice Act. Moreover, using the same legal grounds, detectives tried to instigate 
‘intrusive audio surveillance’ (rumaflytning) by placing surveillance devices in cars 
and residential locations of focus persons. As mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, these particular tactics required advanced techniques and presented 
considerable problems and concerns for the detectives throughout the 
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investigation. Despite of numerous attempts, they were never able to get any solid 
information from these tactics which could support the investigation process.  
Instigating Supporting Lines of Action and Tactics 
Historical Telephone Data, Covert Searches, and Financial Monitoring 
During the investigation process there was a shift in focus persons. Through 
wiretapping it became clear that some focus persons were of lesser interest than 
initially expected and after 1-2 months the monitoring of these individuals was 
terminated and the wires were taken down (aflytningerne blev taget ned). The 
investigation had instead accumulated information that other individuals were 
somehow connected to other focus persons or specifically to Jerry. Some of these 
were unknown to the police and some were usual suspects. In connection with 
some of these individuals, detectives requested historical telephone data (historiske 
teledata) which was used as a supporting tactic to find out which kind of contact 
there had been between these individuals and the investigation’s focus persons and 
other relevant contacts prior to the launch of the investigation. Covert searches 
(hemmelig ransagning) require court orders (cf. § 799, The Administration of Justice 
Act) and are exceptional since the suspect is not made aware of this as it is required 
in the case of regular house searches. In Operation Goldilocks it was attempted as a 
tactic on a few occasions. The purpose was to search cars and property in order to 
find e.g. illicit drugs, money, written correspondence, or other relevant 
incriminating information. Although it was a difficult and high-risk tactic as it 
required detectives to take chances with the danger of having their cover blown 
while carrying out these searches, detectives liked this tactic as it could be rather 
valuable. They had for example used covert searches in other cases where they were 
able to keep accounts of money and stash (of illicit drugs) in order to document 
sales and profits over time. However, in Operation Goldilocks, covert searches were 
not unfolded successfully until the investigation was shut down. The monitoring of 
financial transactions (edition) was used on a few occasions in the operation. It 
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requires a court order (§ 804 and § 806 in The Administration of Justice Act) which can 
impose financial institutions (such as banks) to hand over information to the police 
regarding specific people’s finances, transactions, deposits, assets etc. during a 
specific period of time. Such information can help disclose any irregularities in 
suspects’ income and as such strengthen the suspicion of illegal earnings or money 
laundering. 
Considering Lines of Action and Tactics 
The use of infiltration via an undercover agent (agentvirksomhed, cf. § 754 a The 
Administration of Justice Act) is a very rare investigative tactic as this is only to be 
applied under extraordinary circumstances and the rules are quite restrictive. It was 
considered at one point during Operation Goldilocks and the initial steps towards 
engaging the national unit of undercover operations were made. One of the 
investigation’s focus persons, Tim, was believed to be a “weak link” in the sense that 
he seemed to be a rather unstable person and served as a ‘useful idiot’ (nyttig idiot) 
for Jerry. He was unknown to the police and detectives wondered how he even had 
gotten involved with this network of organised criminals. Apparently, Jerry’s 
network used Tim as a driver and to make various deliveries across the country, to 
shop specific items they required, and as a storage for money. From the wires it 
became clear that Tim was quite loyal to Jerry, but that he lacked the experience as a 
criminal operative and therefore his security measures were not as well rehearsed. 
Thus, once in a while he would begin to talk about unsuitable issues over the phone 
which made Jerry frustrated and angry. Eventually, the relationship between the two 
got so tense that Tim became frightened of Jerry and withdrew from all contact 
with Jerry and his network before detectives were able to instigate an undercover 
operation.  
Another useful and typical investigation tactic in covert operations, according to 
detectives, was the use of a ‘controlled delivery’ (kontrolleret leverance). This means 
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that police passively follow and observe a particular transportation and 
consequently deliverance of illegal goods (e.g. illicit drugs) moving from one 
location to another—typically coming in over the borders. This import of drugs can 
be controlled by police in the sense that they know it is coming and when, but 
perhaps not where it is going and who is involved. Such a controlled deliverance 
can be crucial for and even determine the success of a proactive investigation as it 
brings about the possibility for detectives to catch the suspects in the act so to 
speak. The situation never presented itself in Operation Goldilocks as detectives were 
never able to collect information about how the network around Jerry imported and 
distributed drugs as they were suspected of. Other common proactive investigation 
tactics include for example the use of anonymous witnesses, but these were never 
relevant in Operation Goldilocks. 
Closing 
As revealed at an early stage in this thesis (Chapter 6), Operation Goldilocks was shut 
down after a period of eight months. Officially, this was done with regards to 
resource allocation. But amongst detectives, this management decision was 
perceived as a consequence of the lack of progress in the investigation against Jerry. 
Detectives’ assessments were that they could have built a case against some of the 
other focus persons in the periphery, but that this would not necessarily have led to 
Jerry. In terms of the lack of progress and success in relation to their efforts towards 
Jerry detectives identified at least three different reasons for this. First, Jerry was 
too experienced and had instigated too many countermeasures for the police to get 
close to him. Second, the investigation was not given the time needed to test all 
investigations tactics and different investigation ‘paths’ to Jerry. Third, technical 
issues—the lack of quality equipment to support especially the monitoring of 
meetings in open air—presented detectives with daily challenges and was 
considered to be the main obstacle for success in Operation Goldilocks. I will discuss 
these grounds for lack of success later in the chapter. The above presentation of the 
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investigation process of Operation Goldilocks proposes a typical recipe or script for 
main lines of action and investigation tactics and as such a process description of 
proactive investigation. Various investigation tactics can be selected and applied in 
different orders, but Figure S illustrates a typical process for proactive 
investigations. 
Figure S. A Process Description of Proactive Investigation. 
Investigation Organisation and Structure 
Roles, Functions, and Meetings 
The practical organisation of Operation Goldilocks consisted of an investigation team 
of around 10 detectives (two of these operated in another police district and two 
were lent from The National Investigation unit). Additionally, there was an 
investigation manager (efterforskningsleder), and a SIO (sagsstyrer). Moreover, the 
team was supported by a separate surveillance team consisting of a handful of 
surveillance officers. Another support function was a small team of technical/IT 
detectives (IT-efterforskere) who provided all operations in AIU with technical 
support. This could for instance be in terms of surveillance equipment, but also 
confiscated evidence (koster) such as computers, phones etc. Moreover, one of the 
detectives had the role of operational analyst (operativ analytiker) which meant that 
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he provided an intelligence and analytical support function to investigation teams 
in AIU. This consisted, however, primarily of making searches in the intelligence 
database (PED) on investigations’ focus persons to see if there were any historical 
intelligence information regarding these persons of interest. The access to this 
database was restricted to this detective. Yet, sometime in the middle of the 
operation this operational analyst was allocated to another investigation as a full-
time detective (which was his background before becoming an analyst) as there was 
a shortage of detectives. Furthermore, a particular prosecutor from the Prosecution 
Service (Anklagemyndigheden) was assigned to the case. 
The investigation team had daily investigation meetings every afternoon which were 
held in the meeting room with a video link to the detectives in the other police 
district. These meetings revolved around the progress in the investigation—
primarily by an ‘around the table presentation’ (bordet rundt) where detectives 
individually summarised today’s the events of the day such as actions taken by focus 
persons or conversations detectives found ‘interesting’. The investigation process 
focused overwhelmingly on information from wiretapping supported by 
information from the surveillance operation. Each detective was assigned a focus 
person which meant that their main task was to ‘keep up with’ their focus person in 
terms of movements, contacts, and conversations. The team worked as a general rule 
in the hours of 8 AM to 4 PM and as such they were not monitoring focus persons 
in real time, unless there was an (important) surveillance operation. Instead, they 
played back conversations from the day before and summarised these in 
investigation reports. However, on many occasions they coordinated to put in 
overtime during nights and weekends if they had surveillance operations or their 
focus persons had specific plans involving meetings which detectives wanted to 
monitor simultaneously. One detective was given the role of attending court 
together with the prosecutor when warrants and court orders were applied for. The 
prosecutor presented detectives’ reports to the judge who granted new court orders 
or extended existing ones. Extensions for interception in communications had to be 
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applied for every four weeks meaning that detectives continuously had to collect 
information from wiretapping and document these in investigation reports which 
could provide sufficient grounds for the court’s decision. During the entire process 
of the investigation all court applications were granted and my overall impression 
after studying the field and by talking to detectives is that such applications for the 
most part seems like formalities. 
Case Material and Case Management 
Other case material consisted of investigation reports regarding the movements, 
contacts, and conversations of focus persons. These reports could also be 
summaries of investigation steps—the ones that had proven successful and the ones 
that had not. An example could be if a detective had enquired about a particular 
person looking at e.g. residency, registered vehicles, criminal record, income and tax 
information etc. they would summarise this in a report and file it to the case. The 
surveillance team had a standard report which they produced for each day they had 
been in operation. This consisted of logs of times, places, and observations 
supported by photographs of the monitored individuals. A technical function in the 
investigation database made it possible to keep an investigation diary with the 
purpose of posting the most significant and recent events and investigation steps. 
This function was meant to provide detectives and investigation management with a 
comprehensive and quick overview of the investigation’s progress and as such swift 
information sharing. Nevertheless, during the operation I observed that this 
function was used in an unstructured and ad hoc manner and in terms of following 
the progress of the investigation it was necessary continuously to read all 
underlying report material. A long the way, a detective was assigned the role of 
indexer having to ensure a structured categorisation in the investigation database of 
the thousands of documents and reports which the investigation accumulated 
(bilagering). 
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Senior Investigation Officer (SIO) 
The SIO (a detective police inspector) managed the case as he coordinated and 
delegated investigation tasks at an overall level. He also monitored a focus person 
himself as they were too few detectives compared to focus persons. This meant that 
he was quite busy as he also had to read all investigation reports and was overall 
responsible for deciding upon new investigation steps. He was also supposed to 
plan ahead in terms of new investigation steps. Additionally, he was the detectives’ 
go-to-person when they had reflections about their focus persons or questions 
regarding investigation tactics. The SIO was overall an immensely experienced 
detective and he had a high status amongst detectives who viewed him as very 
competent. Moreover, he was friendly and had an engaging nature which resulted in 
his role as SIO being more advisory rather than issuing orders.    
Investigation Manager 
The investigation manager (a superintendent) was overseeing all operations in AIU 
not only Operation Goldilocks. He had the formal management responsibility and 
superintendent for all personnel. He had to monitor all progress in each operation 
and was the link between the unit, detectives, and investigation management. He 
reported about developments in each operation and status in terms of e.g. resource 
allocations to regional management and attended investigation manager meetings 
with the other investigation managers in the regional unit. In spite of a range of 
tasks, he was quite engaged in and attended almost all investigation meetings in 
Operation Goldilocks. The SIO consulted and coordinated moreover to a high degree 
investigation steps and lines of actions with him which he occasionally had to clear 
with the Chief Superintendent (politiinspektør). The reasons for his dedication to 
this particular operation was first of all that it was a large-scale investigation 
including an international dimension, and second of all that investigation 
management had launched it with great ambition and expectations of success. Thus, 
the internal awareness and interest for the operation at many levels was—at least in 
375
the beginning—considerable which resulted in the need for the investigation 
manager to follow the operation up close in order to continuously provide reports 
‘upstairs’.          
International Delegation 
Just about in the middle of the investigation, a delegation of Danish detectives was 
sent to one of the cooperating European countries’ law enforcement agencies in 
support of the investigation. Investigation management had been successful in 
terms of instigating a small-scale operation abroad and consequently to get court 
orders to intercept in communications of a couple of focus persons in those 
countries. The role of the delegation was as such to monitor the movements, 
contacts, and conversations of these focus persons taking place outside Denmark in 
order to keep up with their international activities. The detectives reported on a 
daily basis back to the SIO and the investigation team in Denmark about key events 
and investigation progress. This international cooperation agreement was decided 
upon bilaterally by the respective investigation units. The national unit (NCI), which 
had the responsibility and authority to handle international communication and 
collaboration, was only to a limited extent involved. The reason for this, as explained 
by investigation management, was that the time factor was crucial and that the 
bureaucracy which accumulated by involving NCI, Europol, and Eurojust would 
delay the investigation at great cost.      
Above, I have presented a process description of proactive investigation as I have 
accounted for the main lines of action which were taken in Operation Goldilocks, 
which central investigation tactics detectives instigated, and how the investigation 
was organised in terms of team structure, management and specific investigative 
functions and roles. In the following, I will analyse the processes and practices of 
proactive investigation by presenting an analytical model of proactive investigation 
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including investigation stages and main lines of enquiry. I will look into which 
purposes they serve, and what role they play in the investigation process.  
Instigating Covert Operations 
Covert police work offers means to discover otherwise unavailable information 
about crime (Marx 1988). Recalling Marx’ typology of police work (ibid.), presented 
in Figure C, Chapter 2, this can be done as non-deceptive passive surveillance or 
by using deceptive undercover measures or trickery by agent provocateurs. 
According to Bacon (2016) such techniques are used to confirm suspicions, fill in 
the gaps or connect the dots of the intelligence picture. More controversially, 
according to Loftus & Goold (2012), the ‘invisibilities of policing’ are also used to 
manipulate the environment, perceptions, and behaviour of the suspect in order to 
entice them to commit an offence or enable an officer to infiltrate a criminal 
network (agent provocateurs). Marx (1988) categorises covert operations by their 
types and dimensions as intelligence operations, preventive operations, and facilitating 
operations, and he distinguishes between operations directed at known targets and/
or based on prior intelligence. The case of Operation Goldilocks can in Marx’ (ibid.) 
terms be characterised as an intelligence operation and focused investigation as it was 
directed against a known target based on prior intelligence information with the 
purpose to uncover ongoing criminal activities. The operation consisted primarily of 
the use of passive surveillance although it was at some point considered to insert an 
undercover agent. The operation never progressed into manipulative actions or 
infiltration and as such it was more concerned with confirming a suspicion of the 
import and distribution of illicit drugs (Bacon 2016).  
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An Analytical Model for Proactive Investigation 
Models for Criminal Investigation 
As accounted for in Chapter 2, there are several models in the literature explaining 
criminal investigation as a circular process of problem-solving and information 
work (Innes 2003; Fahsing 2016; O’Neill 2018). Fahsing (2016) underlines that the 
lack of a shared conceptual model for legal fact-finding (investigation) stands out as 
a major systemic shortcoming both in daily investigative tasks and in the critical 
interaction between detectives, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. Fahsing 
proposes a model (2016) (see Chapter 2) which depicts a generic and cyclic process 
for investigation tasks in six stages, involving collecting, checking, connecting, 
constructing, considering, and consulting to answer the six investigation questions of 
What, Where, When, Who, Why, and How. This can be compared to models within 
crime analysis and the intelligence field (for example the SARA model for problem-
oriented policing (Eck & Spellman 1987) or the intelligence cycle (Ratcliffe 2008a), 
which are not linear, chronological processes, but instead are in moving back and 
forth between the separate stages. It therefore illustrates the process of information 
work in criminal investigations rather than lines of actions. Criminal investigations 
and all other forms of legal fact-finding should, according to Fahsing (2016), be 
approached and understood as sense-making processes which are heavily 
dependent on two critical factors: 1) the access to data, and 2) the ability of the 
observer to explore them with all the relevant hypotheses. These factors are strongly 
dependent on the phenomenological insight and the diagnostic capacity of the 
sense-maker since certain data only will appear in light of certain schemata and vice 
versa (ibid.). The close interaction between assumptions and data can be seen as 
fundamental to all discoveries—scientific or not (Kuhn 1962; Fahsing 2013). This is 
in line with Innes’ (2003) general categorisation of investigation work as information 
work in the sense that the majority of investigation steps are concerned with 
upholding some kind of information and making sense of it (see also Chapter 2).  
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Innes’ (ibid.) hierarchy of information (see Figure D, Chapter 2)—contending noise, 
information, intelligence, knowledge, evidence—depends on socially produced 
definitions by individual officers and the police organisation. Thus, the social 
production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use are 
constituted on the basis of how contextually situated social actors (detectives) make 
sense of their actions, interactions, and environment. Accordingly, this is also the 
case in proactive investigations which I will discuss further in the coming sections. 
Although they are generic, the models and processes above are based on and focus 
on reactive investigation work and the investigation stages and processes in 
proactive investigation therefore look somewhat different, which I analyse in the 
following. In this context, I differentiate between the process of proactive investigation 
and the proactive investigation process. The first refers to the stages and phases within 
proactive investigation in terms of main lines of action, and the latter refers to the 
tactical content and purposes of these lines of action. I find this distinction 
important in the discussion of either descriptive/normative/prescriptive 
investigation models for investigation (Fahsing 2016) in the search for a proactive 
investigation methodology as the stages of proactive investigation do not equal the 
lines of action. My main argument in this chapter is that the methodology of 
proactive investigation is not as pronounced as of reactive investigation, which my 
analysis in connection to the process description shows.  
In the following sections, I therefore propose a model of proactive investigation in 
which I combine aspects of the process description introduced above together with 
lines of enquiry, lines of action, and investigation tactics and investigation purposes. 
My aim is not to produce an ideal type normative or prescriptive model, but rather 
to explore the explicit and implicit and tacit as well as clearly expressed practices 
analytically. The purpose is ultimately to investigate if a comprehensive 
methodology of proactive investigation can be identified.  
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Stage 1: Initial Information Collection and Ordering Information  
Since proactive investigations begin with a concrete suspicion against a specific 
person or persons, the first stage of proactive investigation consists of two main 
lines of action: 1) Information collection, and 2) the ordering of this information. 
The underlying lines of enquiry which are guiding these lines of action are: who are 
peripheral individuals, focus persons, and investigation targets in a specific operation, and 
how does the social environment they operate in function, and what is going on? Thus, the 
tactical content at this stage is about: 1) Identifying investigation targets, and 2) 
ordering the criminal context.   
Although, detectives overall label all ‘person of interests’ within the investigation as 
focus persons, I will argue that these have different status and are by detectives 
attended to in different ways. In this context, investigation targets can be compared 
to prime suspects (Innes 2003) in the world of reactive investigation as these are the 
ones who are believed to be responsible for or main drivers behind carrying out the 
potential crime under scrutiny—depending on the strategy and focus of the 
investigation. Investigation targets are often identified before the launch of a 
proactive investigation, but they can also be identified during the investigation. 
Focus persons are the bulk of individuals who are active in an investigation and 
perhaps/perhaps not are engaging in the ongoing crime, but whom the police have 
grounds of suspicion against in order for them to be for example wiretapped. 
Peripheral individuals are people who appear in the investigation on/off as they are 
e.g. in contact with focus persons or investigation targets (family, friends, 
colleagues), but whom police have no direct suspicion against. These three 
categories can interchange during an investigation meaning that investigation 
targets can turn into focus persons or peripheral individuals and vice versa. In the 
case of Operation Goldilocks, it happened on several occasions that peripheral 
individuals turned into investigation targets, that investigation targets turned into 
focus persons, and that focus persons turned into peripheral individuals.  
380
The other main line of enquiry in this early stage of the investigation process is 
what I call the ordering of the criminal context. On a practical level, detectives do 
this by trying to establish how these individuals communicate, what they 
communicate about, what they do (general behaviour and routines), and who they 
meet. This line of enquiry provides information about how this particular criminal 
network functions and carries out its crime business, and what the different roles 
and responsibilities in the network are, and who makes decisions. The two main 
lines of enquiry are closely linked an interdependent. My analysis shows that they 
are overall trying to uncover: 
• Internal hierarchy and pecking order 
• Contacts and communication platforms 
• Behaviours and routines 
• Functions and roles 
• Indications of security and countermeasures 
• Indications of criminal activity. 
Through initial information collection and the ordering of this information, 
detectives begin to map these different themes, and thereby they start building an 
overall picture of the specific environment they are monitoring and the persons in 
it. To do this, they use investigation tactics such as for example wiretapping, 
surveillance, historical tele data, etc.  
Stage 2: Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing Information 
Collection  
Often, or at least occasionally, an investigation strategy or investigation plan is 
produced before the launch of a proactive investigation. This is e.g. formulated in 
the investigation proposal and is concerned with the objectives, resources, and 
duration of the investigation. However, due to the condition that proactive 
investigation operates in the world of uncertainties more than in the world of facts, 
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it can be difficult at an early stage to specify exactly how the investigation is going 
to proceed. Therefore, the second stage of proactive investigation is concerned with 
what I formulate into two lines of action: 1) specifying and deciding the investigation 
strategy, and consequently 2) focusing information collection to support this strategy.  
The purpose is to target investigation resources and investigation tactics where they 
are most useful. Wiretapping, directed surveillance and intrusive surveillance are 
extremely time consuming and resource demanding investigation tactics and they 
can easily overwhelm and incapacitate an entire investigation team if they are not 
used in a targeted manner. As detectives underline, these decisions are difficult to 
make as they can potentially exclude vital information from the investigation—but 
they can also provide the opposite. If the first stage of proactive investigation can be 
considered as exploratory, the second stage is much more focused and concentrated 
on specific investigation targets and the information collection around these with 
the purpose of building a case. The second stage build on the information 
collection in stage one and is as such concerned with the underlying lines of 
enquiry: How is the criminal operation unfolding, and who is involved? The tactical 
content at this stage is thus concerned with: 1) Determining the criminal operation, 
and 2) including/excluding the relevant operators.  
As mentioned earlier, when investigating presumed experienced criminal 
counterparts, such as Jerry, the amount of security and countermeasures which they 
take can be rather comprehensive and if practiced in a routined and disciplined 
manner the police’s use of various investigation tactics can be diminished. For 
example, if investigation targets use encrypted communication platforms, prefer 
physical meetings in open air, or avoid talking about potentially incriminating 
topics on the phone. Although it was not formulated as an actual investigation 
strategy neither verbally nor in writing, the overall aim of Operation Goldilocks was, 
by my interpretation, to map the whereabouts and contacts of Jerry to identify the 
“weakest” link (a person who might talk or brag about his criminal involvement on 
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the phone) or to identify a distributor/seller of drugs and concentrate the 
investigation on those individuals and hope it would lead to Jerry (also referred to 
as the ass to head-strategy in Chapter 7). Another possibility was to find the storage 
(of either illicit drugs or money) and to monitor this and the activities around it. 
Such approaches are common in proactive investigation and they encompass this 
investigation stage to try to identify the most successful investigation approach:   
• Interpersonal conflicts (liabilities) 
• Strengths (security measures) 
• Weaknesses (weakest links) 
• Production location (whereabouts) 
• Import (actions/crime business model) 
• Distribution lines (people) 
• Storage location (money/drugs). 
The purpose is to determine which investigation targets detectives should spend 
their time and energy on and which investigation approach to use. This can include 
a variety of investigation tactics such as wiretapping, intrusive surveillance, 
undercover operations, controlled delivery etc.    
Stage 3: Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence 
When the strategy for investigation has been determined and the necessary 
investigation tactics have been employed, the next stage of the process of the 
investigation is to follow this strategy in terms of collecting targeted information 
which can be used concretely to build a case against the suspects. This stage is 
therefore concerned with the production of investigation knowledge and evidence. This 
knowledge and evidence production can be said to encompass an investigation 
process where detectives assess information which—in the eyes of detectives—is 
viewed as ‘knowledge’ and hopefully by the courts can be assessed as ‘evidence’.  
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This distinction is important as information within the police and the prosecution 
service is of course sometimes regarded differently by the courts. Although 
detectives often talk about ‘evidence collection’ when they talk about ‘information 
collection’ they are somewhat humble towards the court’s assessment of this 
information and consequently their approval of this as ‘evidence’. Still, detectives 
can disagree with the courts and as such maintain their own perception of this 
information as ‘investigation knowledge’ and ‘evidence’ in this sense may be 
regarded as ‘judicial/legal evidence’. Thus, the main lines of enquiry at this stage are 
concerned with: How, when, and where are the suspects carrying out their criminal 
operation? and the tactical content at this stage is focused at: 1) Proving the suspects’ 
criminal activities, and 2) making arrests. 
In the case of Operation Goldilocks, this stage of the investigation was limited, but for 
as long as it proceeded, it focused on targeted information collection in terms of 
documenting meetings and contacts and distributions lines. This information 
collection was supposed to provide documentation to support the production of 
investigation knowledge (e.g. the certainty of guilt of the suspects), and eventually 
compose sufficient grounds for making arrests. In proactive investigations, arrests 
often take place after a carefully planned operation for example in connection with 
a controlled delivery, import or distribution of illicit drugs, money, or the like. Other 
types of arrest operations include coordinated arrests where the police plan a 
‘crackdown’ at a specific time towards the entire criminal network. The grounds for 
arrests are discussed with and sometimes decided upon by the prosecution service
—and occasionally arrests are employed at a much earlier stage than detectives 
would prefer. This is primarily due to the legal issue regarding the police’s duty to 
act when encountering a criminal offence (politiets handlepligt).     
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Stage 4: Constructing or Closing Cases 
The final and fourth stage is termination of the investigation—in a police context. 
This is not as such concerned with lines of enquiry and action, but rather there are 
two main options: either the continuous construction of a case or the closing of a 
case. The first option is about putting together a full and comprehensive account of 
the criminal activities of the network which has been under investigation with the 
purpose of taking these to courts. Such a case construction is primarily a ‘desk job’ 
in the sense that it is concerned with evaluating the information which has been 
collected all through the investigation and to assess if it can provide the necessary 
evidence to charge the suspects. The case is hereafter handed over to the 
prosecution service and they decide whether to prosecute or not. The second 
option is to close down an investigation which was the case of Operation Goldilocks. 
This decision was made by investigation management and was almost effectuated 
within days. Thus, all investigation tactics and information collection were 
terminated. By law (§ 788, The Administration of Justice Act) it is required that 
suspects in a given case are made aware that they have been under suspicion and 
under investigation by the police. However, to avoid investigations targets and focus 
person to become aware of police’s covert operations, the police can apply for 
postponement or exemption of this information (undladelse eller undtagelse af 
underretning) at the courts if it can harm the investigation, or other similar 
investigations (§ 788, section 4). Generally, it is difficult to close down proactive 
investigations as both detectives, investigation management, and prosecutors are 
continuously hoping to get ‘the big catch’ and thereby that the resources turned out 
to be well spent. This investigation stage is therefore primarily concerned with the 
assessing and processing information in terms of evidence. Either option ends the 
primary investigation process and typically resolves or reduces the investigation 
team significantly (until the case has gone to court). The model for proactive 
investigation is depicted in Figure T. 
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Figure T. Model for Proactive Investigation. 
The Social Organisation of Proactive Investigation 
According to Innes (2003), the social organisation of homicide investigation is an 
important issue in terms of understanding homicide investigation work as the 
organisational system acts to co-ordinate and control the actions of the individual 
investigators. This can equally be said to be the case for proactive investigations. An 
empirical finding in the context of this study is that proactive investigation is 
carried out as individual rather than collective acts. Thus, the process of proactive 
investigation can be viewed as a series of individual acts and tasks carried out by 
individual detectives which together make up and encompass the entity of the 
investigation. As a result, the processes and practices of proactive investigation are 
made up by a large amount of individual actions and a small amount of collective 
actions. Let me elaborate and provide examples:  
The work during Operation Goldilocks encompassed a range of collective actions, for 
example daily investigation meetings which were formally arranged and structured 
as ‘around the table presentations’ of significant events or developments within the 
operation or the planning of specific lines of action (e.g. the installation of 
surveillance devices, searches etc.). However, although these actions were taking 
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place in a somewhat formal and structured manner, the content of these actions was 
not particularly significant for the progress of the investigation. By this I mean that 
it was the informal process rather than the formal process which influenced 
direction, decision-making, and progress of the investigation, and the informal 
process depended much more on individual than collective action. The formal 
investigation meetings functioned primarily as a ‘status forum’ where investigation 
targets’ and focus persons’ movements and actions were accounted for, and where 
detectives presented their assumptions and ideas about ‘who has done what and 
why’ and to a much lesser extent ‘what will happen next and why’.  
Although the SIO often sought to instigate reflection amongst detectives, this 
process never became collective and the meeting forum rarely provided a forum for 
joint reflection or collective construction of hypotheses which perhaps could 
impact or change the direction of the investigation or investigative action. Instead, 
such processes took place tacitly—in the minds of detectives—or in informal 
settings (for example in spontaneous morning meetings) where a small group of 
detectives had their coffee and discussed the case and how to go about it. The SIO 
expressed an ambition to instigate joint reflection as he wanted to engage all 
detectives in decision-making and make sure that everyone could present their 
thoughts and ideas. Still, the investigation team seemed unfamiliar with this type of 
joint scenario-thinking and ultimately decision-making and it was difficult to get 
them involved in collective discussions. Furthermore, as I will explain later in this 
chapter, the processing of information as the essential core of investigative work 
predominantly took place in an individual manner where detectives individually 
assessed, interpreted, and added meaning to the information they collected through 
various investigation tactics, but based on individual rather than common grounds. 
Thus, the distinction between collective vs. individual and formal vs. informal may 
seem minor, as the investigation progressed altogether, but it has considerable 
significance for at least two reasons. First, since collective and formal processes 
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around the investigation are limited this results in an absence of structure in the 
investigation process which makes it difficult to maintain a clear direction of the 
investigation and to focus and coordinate decision-making around this specific 
direction. Granted, structure and direction can exist tacitly and informally, but 
proactive cases are per default made up by massive amounts of information which 
for a single human mind are impossible to overview without having some sort of 
clear structure to prevent e.g. overlooking relevant information. According to 
Fahsing (2016), all criminal investigations should early on generate all investigative 
hypotheses and follow up by real attempts to falsify the initial suspicion. Such 
procedures encourage the decision-maker to generate evidence that supports 
alternative outcomes, resulting in a more balanced and objective evaluation of the 
relevant evidence at the time of judgment. Fahsing (ibid.) adds that if detectives 
ignore this fundamental professional knowledge it may lead to ‘modern-day witch-
hunts’, tunnel vision, and confirmation bias.  
Second, the lack of collective and formal investigation processes can result in 
individual and perhaps autonomous practices which do not necessarily support the 
overall aim and direction of the investigation. Indeed, detectives seem to perform a 
well-rehearsed (common) drama for investigative action, but this appears as 
automated rather than supporting a clear collective determined method. Moreover, 
individual, tacit actions are prone to greater margins of error as it is difficult to 
evaluate and thereby certify. Consequently, investigative decisions are taking place 
primarily on a tactical level focusing on ‘investigative problems of the day’ as it is 
based sporadically on yesterday’s operational events and behaviours of investigation 
targets rather than on a clear strategic direction determined by proactive scenario-
building. The social organisation of proactive investigation becomes in that sense a 
composition of detectives’ separate acts which are based on their individual and 
preferred approaches to the investigation. Therefore, the application of 
predominantly informal and individual processes fails to instigate and support a 
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common methodology for proactive investigation practice amongst detectives and 
leaves investigative action to be based on various individual discretion.  
Until now, I have analysed proactive investigation practice comprised in an 
analytical model of proactive investigation directed by four overall stages 
accompanied by certain lines of enquiry and a variety of investigation tactics. I have 
furthermore analysed the social organisation of proactive investigation and the 
implications of this in relation to investigation work. In the following section, I will 
illustrate the differences between lines of action and lines of enquiry and how this 
distinction is important when trying to understand the practices of proactive 
investigation.  
Lines of Action vs. Lines of Enquiry 
According to Innes (2003), a line of enquiry is comprised of a number of interlinked 
and interdependent actions, which have the potential to collectively promote an 
enhanced understanding of a particular aspect of the crime. In the descriptive and 
in the analytical models for proactive investigation presented above, I also 
differentiate between ‘lines of action’ and ‘lines of enquiry’. I regard lines of action 
as ‘investigation steps’ (efterforskningsskridt) which are sometimes referred to in 
the literature and in the practical world of policing as lines of enquiry (Stelfox 2009; 
Cook & Tattersall 2014). However, based on the analysis in this study and the 
specific search for a methodology of proactive investigation in this chapter, I find 
this to be a misleading label, as the actions of detectives are very much different 
from the purposes of those actions. Thus, in the mentioned terminology I do not 
regard lines of enquiry to be equal to investigation steps (such as for example the 
instigation of wiretapping or surveillance). Lines of enquiry indicate that there are 
specific questions to enquire about and as such a specific reason to instigate certain 
actions understood as investigation tactics. This distinction does not merely have an 
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analytical value—it is based on empirical observations and it is therefore rather 
significant for the practice of (proactive) investigation as I will explain.   
A central analytical finding in this study is that investigation tactics (lines of action) 
in proactive investigation seem to be decided upon and instigated before 
investigative questions (lines of enquiry) are developed. This means that the 
instigation of investigative tactics (as illustrated in the process description of 
proactive investigation) are predominantly the ones that determine the investigation 
process rather than context dependent investigative queries 
(undersøgelsesspørgsmål) or hypotheses (lines of enquiry) constructed based on the 
case at hand.Thus, as in the case of Operation Goldilocks, various (covert) 
investigation tactics seem to be employed routinely even in the early stages of 
proactive investigation (e.g. wiretapping) as a kind of compulsory ritual, but without 
stemming from specific and tailored information requirements regarding the social 
environment and the social agents who are under scrutiny. Detectives were, in hind-
sight, sporadically critical towards the operation’s start up and the routine 
application of investigation tactics and viewed this as too abrupt and fast and not 
adequately prepared which they also connected to the lack of success in the 
investigation. A Senior Detective explains: 
The mistake was that we had an immediate start-up. Going from 0-100. I have often 
asked management if we could spend a little more time assessing the case before 
launching the investigation. But these start-ups are often managed from the top. (…) 
It’s not that I don’t want us to instigate all those investigation tactics, I just wish that 
we as detectives are given the initial investigation material in advance and try to 
illuminate some of the information through other channels than for example 
through the intelligence and analysis unit. We as detectives have a huge network and 
we know people who might be able to illuminate the investigation proposals further.   
Thus, the sudden launch of a proactive investigation from one day to another were 
regarded by detectives as serving primarily the needs of management to show 
action rather than being a requirement derived from the case. However, despite the 
fact that detectives encouraged management to change this approach they referred 
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to this as ‘typical practice’ in the launch of proactive investigations where 
investigation targets were decided upon by management. Moreover, the instigation 
of interceptions in communications are generally perceived as the very first step of 
proactive investigation and as such in the eyes of detectives this investigation tactic 
marks and defines the very beginning of a proactive case.  
Another example of routine actions is the construction of an investigation strategy, 
which is typically presented in the initial investigation proposals. This strategy was, 
in the case of Operation Goldilocks, viewed by detectives and even some managers as 
a procedural requirement and instrumental in terms of getting the operation 
approved higher up the chains of command. During the investigation, this strategy 
was never reviewed or altered as the investigation progressed and it was therefore 
guiding neither investigative actions nor decisions. The direction of the operation 
and consequently the ‘strategy’ of the investigation changed a number of times, 
however, this happened in an implicit and tacit manner and was rarely articulated 
as a change of strategy, but instead as a change of e.g. focus persons or investigation 
tactics. Similarly, in strategic meetings concerning prioritisation and coordination 
of investigation resources, reports about investigation progress are hardly ever 
described in strategic terms, but are rather accounted for in terms of which events 
have taken place, which people are involved, and what lines of action detectives 
have (tactically) instigated. The examples above underline that investigation actions 
are instigated routinely in almost a ritualised manner somewhat detached from 
strategic considerations. In this sense, there is a recipe, a procedure, a 
predetermined script for proactive investigation which is applied in each case, 
however, these are tacit and unarticulated and mainly handed over from senior 
detectives to junior detectives through apprenticeship and ‘watch and learn’. This 
experience-based, tacit practice building on silent work experiences, is well 
connected to the observation that measures are taken routinely and that lines of 
action are employed before formulating lines of enquiry.    
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The difference between the process description and the model for proactive 
investigation lies primarily in the fact that the first illustrates the investigation 
process as it can be identified empirically in detectives’ investigation practice. On 
the contrary, the model is my construction and analytical interpretation of this 
practice and which underlying lines of enquiry the lines of action are supposed to 
answer. Within this distinction lies furthermore the condition that the investigation 
process in the process description is carried out as a tacit practice following an 
inherent, unarticulated script for performance leaving little collective awareness to 
detectives and the collective investigation process explaining why things are done 
when they are done. My search for such a collective or even individual transparency, 
awareness, and structural order in investigative practice is not entirely based on an 
outsider’s need for structured and clear meaning and action. In fact, the lack of 
what I call ‘collective deliberate action’ represents an obstacle for the practice field 
of proactive investigation and the innovations within this field, which I discuss 
further later in this chapter. 
In the following section, I will analyse proactive investigation as a practice which 
predominantly consists of information work. Accordingly, I explore how proactive 
investigation can be determined and understood through 1) types of information 
work, and 2) types of information sources. 
Proactive Investigation as Information Work 
When looking at both the proactive investigation process (stages) and the process of 
proactive investigation (content) it becomes clear through the empirical analysis 
that although there are similarities these differ to a great extent from those of 
reactive investigation (Innes 2003; Fahsing 2016). This has to do with both the 
starting point of proactive investigations, the investigative questions which are to be 
answered, the lines of action—investigation steps and tactics—and not least the 
type of information work and information sources. First, the analysis above shows 
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that the stages of proactive investigation if compared to those of Innes’ (2003) looks 
somewhat different in a proactive investigation, for example in terms of the order of 
those stages:  
(3) suspect development—identification of investigation targets based on suspicion 
(2) the information burst stage—information regarding the targets is collected 
(1) the initial response—the actual ‘crime event’ takes place, for example the import of 
illicit drugs, and information is collected 
(4) suspect targeting—the suspects are arrested  
(5) case construction—the evidence is assessed in regards to prosecution. 
Second, the analysis shows further that investigative questions such as What, When, 
Where, and How cannot be clarified in the first stages of a proactive investigation as 
it is occupied with future or ongoing crime. Instead, the Who and Why questions 
are more or less clear from the beginning. This results in fairly different 
investigation approaches, processes, and practices, which are influenced by the 
types of information work and the types of information sources. 
Types of Information Work 
As underlined in Chapter 2, one of the most important conditions to understand 
when it comes to investigation processes is that it is predominantly information 
work and that detectives are knowledge workers (Innes 2003; Hald & Rønn 2013; 
Fahsing 2016). As such, almost all stages in the investigation and all investigation 
steps are concerned with identifying, collecting, and processing information. Innes 
(2003) characterises his information hierarchy as dependent on socially produced 
definitions by individual officers and the police organisation. Thus, the social 
production of information, its interpretations, communication, and use is 
constituted on the basis of how contextually situated social actors (detectives) make 
sense of their actions, interactions, and environment. The entire investigation 
process can therefore be seen as an analytical sense-making process (Fahsing 2016) 
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as detectives try to assess the information they collect in terms categorising this in 
an information hierarchy and evaluate its relevance in terms of a particular set of 
events, or the behaviour and actions of particular individuals. This is, in that sense, 
anything else but objective information collection—it is in fact a constant 
interpretation process where detectives categorise, add meaning, socially construct, 
and give certain powers to the individual pieces of information (Innes 2003; O’Neill 
2018). According to Hald & Rønn (2013), these processes even resemble those from 
social science and humanities e.g. hermeneutic analytical interpretation processes 
(Gadamer 1998). Accordingly, this is also the case for proactive investigation as I 
unfold in the following. 
Recalling the typological characterisation of strategies for information collection, 
presented in Chapter 7, and the model for proactive investigation, presented above, 
the type of information work in proactive investigation can be characterised as 
initially to follow a trawler-based strategy and later on to follow a requirement-
based strategy. Even though the social environment and some of the social agents 
are fixed from the beginning in a proactive investigation (as these are identified as 
suspects/targets), information collection at the initial stages (1-2 in the analytical 
model) is not directed, but instead explorative, data-oriented, general and broad 
with the purpose to identify ‘information of interest’ (just in cases is is needed) (see 
also Chapter 7). Using Innes’ (2003) terms, this information can both be ‘noise’ and 
‘information’, which have the possibilities of being turned into both ‘intelligence’, 
‘knowledge’, or ‘evidence’, as I demonstrated in the previous analysis. A key 
characteristic of proactive investigation is that the collection of what detectives 
regard as ‘factual information’ or ‘evidence’, which is central to reactive 
investigations (such as witness accounts and forensic evidence) is not as straight 
forward in proactive cases. As it, per default, investigates crimes which have not yet 
occurred or crimes in the making, proactive investigation operates in the world of 
suspicion, potential actions, and uncertainties. Information collection thereby 
becomes much broader as it is difficult to determine beforehand which information 
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that will become relevant (stages 1-2 in the model of proactive investigation). At 
later stages in the investigation process, information collection becomes, however, 
more selective as it is employed to support assumptions of guilt of the main 
investigation targets (stages 2-4 in the model of proactive investigation).   
Proactive Investigation as Intelligence Work 
Due to this condition, the premises of information work are perhaps even more 
central to and explicit in the processes of proactive investigation than the processes 
of reactive investigation as there is little concrete information (such as forensic 
evidence, witness accounts etc.) to deal with. Instead, in its practices and processes I 
argue that proactive investigation resembles more intelligence work than reactive 
investigative work as it is indeed concerned with policing uncertainties, scenario 
thinking and building, and interpretation (Rønn 2012; Sheptycki 2017; Fyfe et al. 
2018). In this type of investigative work, detectives become to a high-extent co-
producers of events and ‘investigation knowledge’ (Innes 2003; O’Neill 2018) for two 
main reasons.  
First of all, detectives have the power to selectively engage the police in potential 
criminal events and are able to influence how such events play out in the future—
for example by influencing these through the instigation of investigation tactics 
such as e.g. surveillance and undercover agents. Second of all, the assessment and 
interpretation of such events, of the social environments in which they occur, and 
the behaviour(s) of these environments moreover provide the police with a 
monopolised power to present these as ‘factual information’ or ‘evidence’ and bring 
them to court with potentially (severe) consequences. Brodeur (2010) underlines 
that the police’s influence on the construction of evidence and of what is perceived 
as factual circumstances is generally an overlooked and downplayed part of criminal 
investigation in both research and practice. Another reason as to why proactive 
investigation is similar to intelligence work is that it is typically very much 
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concerned with intelligence validation and further intelligence collection. As 
proactive investigation most often build on intelligence information (e.g. source 
information) this plays a central role as it provides the grounds for the entire case. 
Therefore, detectives are occupied with trying to validate this intelligence 
information throughout the investigation as they seek information which can 
support this intelligence which resembles a form of confirmation bias (Rossmo 
2009; Fahsing 2016) Moreover, further intelligence is often needed throughout the 
operation, and detectives agree that a good case is a case with a criminal informant 
close to the investigation target, as a Superintendent underlines:  
We need to be close to the targets through the source. We can’t depend on them 
communicating over the phones and sometimes it even seems like a waste of time, 
listening to the wires, as they seldom talk. But if we have a source up close, we have a 
chance to get insights of what they’re doing and when. 
Accordingly, the continuous flow of source information throughout a proactive 
investigation is by detectives viewed as being a crucial component in terms of a 
successful proactive investigation. Interestingly, however, information work in 
proactive investigation is not regarded by detectives as being similar to intelligence 
work and it is, for example, not viewed as part of any analytical process, which I will 
explain in more detail later on. 
Sources of Information Collection 
My analysis shows that the primary investigation tactics and thereby sources of 
information collection during a proactive investigation are first and foremost 
interception in communications (wiretapping) and secondly directed surveillance. I 
base this conclusion on both quantitative and qualitative components and begin 
with wiretapping.  
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Wiretapping 
Wiretapping of suspects’ phones has been used as an investigation tactic since 
almost the birth of proactive investigations towards organised crime around the 
1970s. Historically, this has gone from the wiretapping of land lines 
(fastnettelefoner) or perhaps even phone booths with more than one regular user to 
the wiretapping of individual mobile phones with only one permanent user. This 
investigation tactic is extremely time-consuming and has become even more so over 
time especially within the last 10-15 years since the amount of communication data 
has grown tremendously. In Operation Goldilocks, it was not uncommon that 
investigation targets had over one hundred phone conversations per day plus sent 
and received several hundred text messages. This accumulates an extreme amount 
of information for detectives to go through and assess on a daily basis and often 
results in information overload. The collection and ordering of such information 
seem at times to be overreaching the phases of interpreting this and thereby 
providing grounds for investigative action. Moreover, detectives viewed this 
investigation tactic as becoming less and less useful over time since the criminal 
environment had adapted its behaviour to avoid incrimination by instigating 
security measures against the police’s investigation tactics e.g. speaking in coded 
messages or using encrypted communication platforms.  
Despite of these conditions, wiretapping of the suspects’ phones is an assured part 
of proactive investigation and furthermore; it encompasses the majority of 
resources (detectives) and time (hours) in an investigation process. In quantitative 
terms, wiretapping is therefore the primary part of an investigation process. In 
qualitative terms, wiretapping is maintained as a main line of action based on at 
least three conditions. First, it contributes to determine the 
suspects’ (communication) network, contacts, and whereabouts (via GPS locations) 
which are essential to proactive investigations. Second, it provides at least some 
idea of the suspects’ behaviour and interpersonal relations, hierarchy, ways of 
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communication etc. Third, although being time consuming and perhaps ineffective 
as a tactic to collect ‘smoking guns’, it still provides detectives with small pieces of 
information which can be interpreted individually and put together in a larger, 
coherent narrative of the subject of investigation: the specific crime under scrutiny. 
Therefore, the process of information work in at least stages 1-3 of proactive 
investigation is to a great extent connected to collecting, assessing, and making 
sense of information from ‘the wires’ and ascribing meaning to this in the greater 
context of a specific investigation. This interpretation process is socially anchored 
in collective assumption between detectives of what can be considered as e.g. 
‘noise’, vs. ‘evidence’ and can be regarded as both an individual and collective 
process. Earlier, I presented the social organisation of proactive investigation work 
and underlined that this consists predominantly of a large amount of separate parts 
of individual actions and a small amount of collective actions. Thus, this social 
organisation is exemplified by the practices of information work, for example in 
connection with wiretapping as detectives collect, assess, add meaning, and 
interpret information individually and on a daily basis as they carry out their 
individual investigation tasks and instigate lines of action using their occupational 
discretion (Innes 2003; Manning 2004; Bacon 2016). As detectives are assigned one 
or sometimes even two suspects to monitor, they are individually the first and 
sometimes the only persons to select and interpret conversations and as such in 
deciding which conversations are ‘interesting’ in the context of the investigation 
and which are not. The initial information collection and interpretation of ‘noise’ 
therefore lies as an individual tasks at the individual detective who ‘trawls’ 
hundreds of conversations and texts each day to look for ‘interesting’ information 
and summarise these in investigation reports. 
This condition directs the analysis towards the investigation teams’ collective and 
the detectives’ individual competences in terms of assessing and interpreting 
information generally which is a key component of e.g. intelligence work (Ratcliffe 
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2008a). In the practical world of policing, this competence is by detectives viewed as 
a ‘an ability to wiretap’ which is furthermore perceived as one of the key 
components of being a good detective: 
It’s about having that ‘nose’ which means that you know what you’re looking for. To 
listen is not just ‘to listen’—it’s all the details, a pause in a sentence…that’s what 
you’re looking for. (…) To have a nose for what goes on in a muddy world rotten to 
the core. 
Another Detective explains: 
The most important thing is to listen and hear what’s being said—not what’s ‘being 
said with words’, but ‘what’s being said’. There’s a difference. Some can do it and 
some never learn. An ability to hear what’s being said between the lines. To be 
skeptical about what they (the suspects, my addition) say and do. For example if 
they’re agreeing to meet over a bite to eat. Is that their real intention? If they only 
meet for 10 minutes they probably haven’t eaten. Then it probably has to do with 
something else which they can’t discuss over the phone. It can be quite simple. But it 
can also be quite complicated to hear what they are saying…and you need to piece it 
together with all kinds of other things (…) You need to pay attention and look for 
that one little mistake which they might make during an entire investigation. And 
then you need to act. You need patience and the ability to act when an opportunity 
arise.   
Thus, detectives talk about a certain ability, a ‘nose’ or instinct to ‘hear what is being 
communicated between the lines’, to be critical about the information, which is 
provided, and to logically piece things together. A Senior Detective elaborates 
further: 
This conversation…how does it fit with this one? You can hear that sometimes 
they’re talking about something which is meant to be uninteresting…but then it’s 
really interesting! And then you need all your antennas open. And we do have some 
detectives, they can’t hear it and they’re lethal for such an investigation. We’re not 
better than the ones who are listening (on the wiretaps, my addition). And if there’s 
one who can’t manage, we loose valuable information…or loose…that thing: there’s 
something dodgy about that one…and then it turns out you’re right and then we’re 
suddenly following them to another country! That’s what we’re doing for a living: 
that the intuition tells us: it’s right over there it’s happening. And if you don’t have it, 
you can investigate for an entire year without a success… 
399
The last quote points furthermore to detectives’ perception of the core elements of 
being a good (proactive) detective; namely the inherent flair, intuition, or ‘sense of 
things’ which relies on gut feelings and cannot be assigned to just anyone or any 
detective for that matter. The notions about good investigation work underline that 
these abilities or competences lie beyond experience, but rather reflect the notion 
of investigative work as an innate quality or ‘art form’ (Tong & Bowling 2006; Innes 
2010b). One of the anecdotes I was told by detectives in relation to ‘the art of 
wiretapping’ was a story about a detective in a particular investigation who had 
attended the wires (passet aflytningerne) during a weekend where everybody else 
were off duty, but who had failed to realise that one of the phones had actually 
switched owners. As such, the detective had been listening to conversations without 
noticing the different voices and the differences in themes of conversation. This 
story was used as an example of a police officer who was utterly incompetent as a 
detective and as such a claim to the general notion that not all police officers are fit 
for detective work—it requires a certain ‘gift’.  
As mentioned earlier, the collective assumptions which are socially constructing 
meaning of investigation processes and information work (Innes 2003) are produced 
in a dynamic interplay between individual and shared experience amongst 
detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, and the epistemological 
notions of police work and the criminal counterpart. These are for example the 
assumptions mentioned earlier that conversations about casual themes such as 
cooking or shopping (non-suspicious information) can in reality be information 
sharing about criminal actions between two criminal agents (suspicious 
information) (see also Rønn 2012 for an elaboration of such assumptions within 
intelligence work). The small amount of collective processes of information work is 
connected to two areas; the collective investigation process, as explained earlier in 
this chapter, and what I refer to as quality assurance and underlying management 
control of information work. As there are no structures or procedures to assure the 
quality of or validation of information work in (proactive) investigations this is 
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carried out in a sporadic and ad hoc manner (Innes 1999; Dunnighan & Norris 
1999). In Operation Goldilocks, quality assurance was carried out, if one of the 
detectives wanted a second opinion from another detective or the SIO in terms of 
what was said on the wires or how to interpret this. They discussed the statements 
and agreed upon an interpretation. Once in a while, investigation management 
wanted to oversee some of the detectives’ work to ensure that they were thorough 
enough or were able to make ‘the right interpretations’, and as such they logged in 
an listened to conversations and compared these with investigation reports. 
Directed Surveillance 
Directed surveillance has not always been such a central part of proactive 
investigation as it is in its current form. Historically, detectives have themselves 
sporadically carried out observations of suspects instead of having a dedicated 
surveillance team. Especially since GPS locations from mobile phones have been 
made available, directed surveillance has been an important element in proactive 
investigation and information from GPS locations has been an invaluable support 
of directed surveillance. This has probably also impacted the increased use of this 
tactic—now a core element of proactive investigation due to both its extended 
quantifiable application and its inherent qualities. A significant difference 
historically is that surveillance teams, unlike earlier, in the large regional 
investigation units nowadays are regarded as professional in the sense that they 
have specific training and are full-time allocated to this task. The surveillance team 
in Operation Goldilocks had a distinct conceptual practice when they received 
surveillance tasks from detectives. They had a team manager, fixed meeting points, 
‘costumes’ to choose from, coded language in radio communications, a recipe for 
keeping observation logs, and a standard report form for their surveillance reports. 
The surveillance teams’ main purpose was to monitor and map the movements and 
meetings of investigation targets and focus persons to document this through 
observed accounts and preferably photographs. They took detailed notes about the 
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events they observed, and they logged places and times which could often be 
supported by GPS data and information from wiretapping. Due to the character of 
the information (accounts and observations of surveillance officers, photographs, 
and GPS data) this information was by detectives regarded as ‘investigation 
knowledge’ or ‘evidence’ as they perceive this to be incontestable, objective 
information about factual events. Therefore, the status of information stemming 
from directed surveillance is high and much treasured in proactive investigation. 
Interestingly, surveillance officers believed to possess much more information about 
the investigation’s suspects than merely information about contacts, places, and 
times. When driving around observing and monitoring suspects for days and 
months they got to know these individuals and felt they were able to decode their 
body language and behaviour. For example, they interpreted suspects’ and focus 
persons’ inter-relational status and their state of minds. A Surveillance Officer 
explains: 
I spend time with them (the suspects, my addition) everyday sometimes several 
hours and even on a distance I can see if Tom is having a bad day, if he’s rushed, if 
he looks over his shoulder or seems paranoid. If they have a meeting I can see if 
they’re arguing or enjoying themselves even though I’m too far away to hear they are 
saying. 
Such information was, however, by detectives regarded as ‘redundant’ or ‘surplus’ 
subjective information which was usually not logged in the surveillance reports. For 
that reason, detectives rarely asked surveillance officers about other than their 
‘objective’ observations of times and places. Not because they regarded other 
observations as untrustworthy, but because these were categorised as ‘subjective’ 
and therefore not suited for the investigation’s case files. In comparison, the 
interpretation of information from wiretapping was rarely referred to as subjective 
information assessment—it was in fact not addressed as information work and the 
implicit understanding was that ‘listening to the wires’ captured the very essence of 
proactive investigative work and depended on the individual detectives’ innate 
abilities to do this. Consequently, information collected by surveillance officers was 
402
perceived as objective and factual information and directed surveillance as an 
investigation tactic was deployed as an instrument to document contacts, meetings, 
and factual events. Still, the task of assessing and putting together the 
investigation’s various information with the purpose to produce meaning and a 
comprehensive narrative about what was going on, how, why, where, when and who 
was involved was assigned to the role of detectives. As I have presented in the 
analysis above, wiretapping and directed surveillance are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively the most central tactical components of proactive investigation. This 
does not mean that other investigation tactics are not important or even more 
effective—I merely argue that empirically these components are fundamental and 
have considerable significance for how proactive investigation is conceptually 
understood and practiced in the world of policing. In fact, in their dynamic dialectic 
these investigation tactics encompass the very essence of proactive investigation 
practice. When instigating demarcated surveillance operations during investigative 
work, detectives and surveillance officers perform and fulfil ‘the drama of cops and 
robbers’ in its purest form: surveillance officers are out on the streets driving 
around, observing, monitoring and ‘chasing’ usual suspects while detectives are ‘on 
the base’ wiretapping suspects phones, following their GPS locations, interpreting 
their actions, building possible scenarios, assessing investigative possibilities, and 
deciding which tactical steps come next. This can be said to illustrate ‘the act of 
proactivity’—a drama which is performed by detectives over and over to meet the 
ideal of being one step ahead of their counterparts. In the following sections, I 
discuss further if proactive investigation can be defined as a distinct policing 
methodology and I investigate some of the underlying notions and collective 
assumptions concerning proactive investigation and detective and their impact on 
proactive investigation practice. 
1 Within The Danish Administration of Justice Act, Chapter 71, there are different legal rules as to 
which investigative tactics require court orders and when the police can instigate investigative tactics 
on their own based on situational discretion (på øjemed). In general, the Danish police have wide 
powers of discretion—also when it comes to covert investigations. 
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The Nature of Proactive Investigation: Revisiting 
Concept and Practice 
Tactics, Methods, or Methodology? 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, my primary aim is to unfold the black 
box of proactive investigation practice and thus to identify a comprehensive 
methodology for proactive investigation. The purpose is to get closer to an 
understanding of the nature of this specific policing phenomenon. In the prior 
sections, I have analysed proactive investigation and presented both a process 
description and a model for proactive investigation.  
The process description illustrates the investigation process as it can be identified 
empirically in detectives’ investigation practice, whereas the model for proactive 
investigation is my construction and analytical interpretation of this practice and its 
underlying and implicit lines of enquiry. I have moreover analysed proactive 
investigation practice as a process of information work relying on specific sources 
for information collection, which primarily consist of interception in 
communications (wiretapping) and directed surveillance. Proactive investigation 
resembles empirically and by its content more intelligence work than reactive 
investigation work due to its focus on future and potential criminal action rather 
than past events and as it is occupied with scenarios and uncertainties. However, 
this is not recognised by detectives who uphold a collective perception that 
proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-level operational work or 
reactive investigative work (se also Chapter 6 and 7). A central analytical finding in 
the empirical observations suggests furthermore that the process and practice of 
proactive investigation is mainly guided by the routine instigation of covert tactics 
founded in the legal framework of proactive investigation. This stands in contrast to 
being a process and practice led by context-dependent investigative queries or 
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hypothesis and consequently various lines of enquiry. As such, proactive 
investigation is concerned with the questions of: what can be done within the legal 
frame and which investigation tactics are there grounds for using? rather than which 
investigation tactics are most appropriate to answer the queries we have? I will elaborate 
and support this finding by emphasising three main observations.  
First, my analysis shows that detectives routinely apply the same investigation 
tactics in more or less the same order regardless of the specific characteristics of 
the (crime) problem at hand. Not all crime problems look the same and are 
effectively to be dealt with in the same way. This practice routine therefore runs the 
risk of focusing narrowly on specific tactics and perhaps excluding other relevant 
and valuable investigation approaches which might be useful. As I have discussed 
in the two previous chapters, detectives perceive to a high degree proactive 
investigations in one way; as drug investigations where usual suspects with specific 
characteristics are primary operators (Manning 2004; Bacon 2016). This collective 
perception in combination with external and internal structures to measure the 
success of proactive investigation enables the exclusion of other potentially relevant 
types of organised crime (e.g. environmental crime, human trafficking, economic 
crime etc.) or types of criminal agents. Consequently, proactive investigation 
practice has the tendency to over-police some while under-police others.  
Second, the framework which guides proactive investigation is a legal framework 
rather than a methodological framework derived from the professional field of 
criminal investigation. It is obviously not surprising or undesirable that legal 
requirements set the frame for investigative action, quite the contrary. However, in 
the search for a methodology for proactive investigation this distinction is essential. 
According to Innes (2003: 177), investigative methodology is:  
…comprised of the combination of practices, procedures, processes, routines, 
conventions, theories, and techniques through which police respond to a crime. It 
informs the methods which police officers employ to acquire and interpret 
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information when investigating different types of crime, accounting for the 
situational factors pertaining to the specific incident. 
Moreover, Innes (ibid.) argues, the investigative methodology shapes how 
information is produced, interpreted, and constructed as knowledge and evidence 
in the process of investigation. As of now, the empirical analysis in this study has 
shown that proactive investigation is carried out as a tacit practice following an 
ingrained, unarticulated recipe and predetermined script for performance. There 
are as such specific practices, processes, routines, standards, and techniques which 
all together can be said to characterise proactive investigation as a distinct policing 
practice. This practice follows thereby a set of collective inherent actions which are 
informed, guided, produced, and supported in a dynamic interplay between 
individual and shared experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the 
investigation team, and by a number of collective epistemological notions about 
proactive police work and the criminal counterpart. As such, this proactive policing 
practice indeed makes sense for the detectives involved as it is those collective 
assumptions which are socially constructing meaning of investigation processes and 
information work (Innes 2003).  
Third, although proactive investigation is carried out in a routinised manner 
following an (inherent) recipe and a collectively recognised script for performance, 
as I discussed earlier, there are differences between lines of action and lines of 
enquiry. Proactive investigation is primarily tactical and consists of detectives’ 
individual lines of action rather than lines of enquiry. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
identify a clear methodological approach when applying Innes’ (ibid.) definition as 
this police activity mainly seems to be guided by covert measures founded in the 
legal framework of ‘what can be done’ rather than an investigative methodology of 
‘which methods are most appropriate’—involving a combination of practices, 
procedures, processes, routines, conventions, theories, and techniques (Innes 2003). 
Consequently, proactive investigation practice seems to be lacking deliberate, 
intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative action and 
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ultimately encompass a proactive investigative methodology. Along the lines of a 
finding from Hald (2011), this leaves proactive investigation practice in a gap 
between a broad legal frame guiding investigation tactics and the routinised 
employment of such tactics as a compulsory ritual, but without clear investigation 
methods or even methodology. 
Forth, due to the implications of the increasing societal threats and consequently 
the current political climate as described in Chapter 2, 5, and 6, proactive 
investigation towards organised crime enjoys wide legal frames and extensive 
powers. This field of policing therefore adopts more and more tactics from the field 
of high policing (such as e.g. the vast use of interception of communications, 
directed and intrusive surveillance, the use of confidential informants, infiltration, 
undercover agents, and covert searches etc.) (Brodeur 2007; Gundhus & Larsson 
2014). Still, proactive investigation is by detectives perceived as a continuation of 
traditional investigative work or street-level operations. Therefore, although these 
modern measures to a high degree are instigated in proactive investigation of drug 
crimes they seem to have an instrumental function as they are transferred without 
the essential knowledge-based notions of the proactive paradigm, for example the 
analytical dimension of intelligence-led policing (the assessment of intelligence 
information, structured scenario-thinking, risk assessment, crime analysis etc.). 
Instead, the extended legal measures from high policing are by themselves seen as 
innovative. Thus, proactive investigation becomes the instigation of high policing 
measures carried out in a low policing context of reactive policing. In the coming 
section, I will explore some of the underlying explanations as to why a methodology 
for proactive investigation is difficult to establish by looking at detectives’ implicit 
and explicit collective assumptions and perceptions about proactive investigation 
work. These collective assumptions and perspectives can be seen as vital 
components in sense-making processes (Innes 2003; Weick 1995; 2005) and I will 




According to Fahsing (2016) there is or at least has been an existing culture within 
police organisations of being overconfident in terms of discretionary judgement 
and decision-making which to a high degree impacts the process of criminal 
investigation. It is therefore important, he argues (ibid.), that detectives are aware 
and humble towards the highly complex task of criminal investigation and their 
own proneness to cognitive bias, tunnel vision, and other psychological 
shortcomings. Cook & Tattersall (2014) introduce the so-called ‘investigative 
mindset’ which is defined by ACPO and the ABC rule (Assume nothing, Believe 
nothing, Challenge and Check everything). The nature of such an investigative mindset 
is essential in terms of understanding and explaining detectives’ approaches, 
practices, and actions. In the following sections, I identify three overall components 
of an investigative mindset for proactive investigation work which, as I will show, 
differs somewhat from the international standard. My analysis points to the notions 
of ‘solving cases’, suspect-driven case building, and investigation as action and art. 
‘Solving Cases’ 
As stated earlier in this chapter, a central characteristic of criminal investigation is 
that it is predominantly information work and the detective can be seen as a 
knowledge worker (Innes 2003; Hald & Rønn 2013). Investigation can therefore, 
when broken down and analysed into its various steps, be seen as an analytical 
process as it resembles any other (scientific) analytical practice (Hald 2011; Fahsing 
2013). An overall characteristic of detectives’ proactive investigation practice is 
accordingly that it resembles intelligence work as it is indeed concentrated on the 
analysis of information, yet this is not articulated or recognised by detectives. In 
fact, detectives are quite skeptical about the domain of intelligence or analysis and 
regard this as being redundant in the world of policing. Whenever I asked 
detectives about analysis or intelligence work, they refused this as being a relevant 
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part of investigation work. “We have never been able to use any of it” or “you cannot 
analyse your way to an offender” were typical statements. Throughout Operation 
Goldilocks, the intelligence and analysis unit was accordingly never involved. 
Gundhus (2006) has a similar finding as analytical knowledge was by detectives 
viewed less relevant as is was more ‘distant’ or ‘thin’ knowledge (see also Chapter 7). 
Another ‘road not taken’ in the operation was furthermore the instigation of a 
‘follow the money-strategy’ or financial investigation. Instead, the dominant 
approach was continuously a traditional focus on narcotics and the search for 
seizures. A Detective explains: 
It has been neglected for many years. It almost never gets exposed. It’s difficult. 
They (moneymen, ed.) might even be gone when we’re in the picture. The 
moneyman can be utterly separate from narcotics—someone they trust, perhaps an 
old friend. Preferably one who’s not known to the police and who they don’t 
communicate with. And you need luck to uncover this in an investigation. Maybe if 
they’ve bought some real estate abroad…(…) We should do more about it. Also, the 
confiscation of their values… But you can’t because it’s so difficult to build the 
evidence. And when you have that large seizure  then you’re quit happy with that 
since they’re put away for many years…(…) and people like us don’t know much 
about that…money laundering and tax fraud…it’s a science in itself. We are focused 
on narcotics and sometimes other accounts such as extortion or violence, but usually 
we compromise the case (skærer sagen til).  
This preference to stick to narcotics seems to be anchored in both cultural and 
organisational conditions which have to do with stereotypical notions of ideal 
offenders and ideal crime types and plain and simple habitual thinking (which I 
accounted for in Chapter 6 and 7). Hence, the more difficult and unfamiliar 
investigative approaches are often omitted or downgraded which on many 
occasions changes focus from ‘bigger fish’ (high-impact offenders) to ‘smaller 
fish’ (low-impact offenders). The implications are that the police response rarely has 
a disruptive effect, but merely gives a momentary break to the usual offenders. 
Moreover, detectives keep the language from reactive investigation in the sense that 
they express that they are ‘looking for clues’ and ‘the needle in the haystack’, ‘the 
conclusive evidence’ or are concerned with ‘solving the case’. As such, they are to a 
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large extent focusing on ‘solving crimes’ and ‘putting people in jail’ rather than 
preventing harm or disrupting crimes in the making. One of the fulcrums of 
reactive investigation, the collection of what Innes (2003) refers to as ‘personal’ and 
‘physical’ evidence (e.g. witness accounts and forensic findings), is similarly the 
driving force in proactive investigation practices even though the inherent logic of 
the proactive framework entails a focus on criminal incidents which has yet to be 
committed. Instead of including an analytical approach and systematic information 
work from the field of intelligence (for example handling uncertainties, assessing 
risks, building scenarios), proactive investigation is occupied with tracing and 
uncovering specific evidence to prove the suspects’ involvement in criminal 
activities. This reactive notion of proactive investigation work can easily lead to 
classic case-building as the measure of success is large drug seizures and multiple 
arrests instead of preventing, fending off, or disrupting criminal actions (Bjerknes & 
Fahsing 2018), which I also accounted for in Chapter 6.  
Suspect-Driven Case Building 
Proactive investigation in general and the specific case of Operation Goldilocks was 
by detectives and investigation management never viewed or talked about as a 
covert operation which could also support intelligence purposes. It was, however, 
continuously described as a (proactive) investigation operation and the purposes 
were neither intelligence collection, prevention, nor facilitation (Marx 1988). 
Instead, detectives were, as explained in Chapter 6 and 7, predominantly concerned 
with identifying and documenting information which could be used as evidence to 
build a case against the prime investigation target, Jerry, and his collaborators. 
Detectives were overall convinced that this network of focus persons was importing, 
distributing, and selling illicit drugs—and that facts to prove this existed ‘out there’ 
and their job was accordingly to find and document this ‘evidence’ through various 
investigation tactics. Accordingly, their use of legal measures can as such be viewed 
as a sort of ad hoc instrumentalism (Sklansky 2012). As a result of this collective 
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assumption, daily conversations between detectives and investigation meetings 
expressed speculations regarding how drugs were imported, where they were 
stashed, how money was handled or kept, and whom other than the identified focus 
persons was involved. All information and case material which detectives collected 
throughout the investigation was interpreted in this ‘frame of guilt’. For example, 
when focus persons met with peripheral individuals together with other focus 
persons this led detectives to conclude that these peripheral individuals were 
playing a role in drug dealing. Or that the majority of physical meetings between 
focus persons (e.g. arrangements to meet for coffee) were planned with the purpose 
of arranging criminal activities. Such activities were per default regarded as 
‘suspicious behaviour’. It was therefore rarely a question of ‘if’, but rather of ‘how’, 
‘where’, and ‘when’. Occasionally, peripheral focus persons were replaced as it 
became clear through wiretapping that they had little contact with key investigation 
targets and that there were no indications that they played a prominent role in the 
particular criminal operation which was under scrutiny. At one investigation 
meeting, for example, a Detective said about his current focus person, Tom:  
I’m sure Tom is committing social fraud against the municipality as he works on a 
construction site while collecting welfare…and he definitely has a big consumption 
of hash…I just don’t think he’s involved in Jerry’s operation…he spend so much time 
at that construction site and at home with his girlfriend that I don’t know when he 
would have the time to do it…he has occasional contact to Martin (an investigation 
target, ed.), but nothing suspicious.  
Thus, the rationale was that Tom was probably a dubious and tragic type with his 
criminal record, drug use, and social fraud—he just was not active in Jerry’s 
operation. On those grounds, it was decided not to apply for an extension of 
intercepting in communications of Tom and he was excluded from the investigation 
as soon as the court order expired. New focus persons were added along the way if 
detectives became suspicious of their frequent contact to other focus persons or 
their general ’suspicious’ behaviour. Still, detectives never raised questions about 
the involvement of key focus persons—Jerry, Martin, Mik, Joseph—as part of the 
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alleged criminal network. Their main concern was how to prove it. This certainty of 
guilt built on some of the same grounds which were presented in the initial 
investigation proposal and consisted of the following:  
1) the criminal history of focus persons and their affiliation to organised crime groups 
2) recent intelligence information from confidential informants 
3) police’s prior investigations against focus persons 
4) focus persons’ use of security and countermeasures. 
   
Accordingly, both historical information from prior investigations, detectives’ own 
experience with this environment and their criminal history together with current 
information from confidential informants and the information which was collected 
on a daily basis during the operation contributed to and supported the same 
assumption and claim: the central focus persons of Operation Goldilocks, and 
particularly Jerry as a prime target, were conspiring and carrying out considerable 
and serious drug offences. The specifics of how and when they did so were as such 
the aim of the investigation operation to clarify. Therefore, besides being a focused 
investigation (Marx 1988), I will furthermore categorise proactive investigation, in 
the described form, as suspect-driven case building (Fahsing 2016). The practice of 
proactive investigation, although being knowledge-intensive and time critical police 
work (Dean et al. 2010) just as reactive investigations, therefore diverges from other 
criminal investigation practices. Proactive investigation is in its outset not occupied 
with the (objective) process of discovering, collecting, checking, and considering 
clues from various sources of information with the purpose of trying to construct a 
coherent account of the (criminal) event, as proposed by Fahsing (2016). As 
proactive investigation is per default building on police’s self-selection (Marx 1988), 
the suspect is in this regard identified as ‘guilty beforehand’, and the investigation 
process is no longer concerned with uncovering and documenting a series of past 
events, but rather to support the initial suspicion with new information and 
evidence. The result of the investigation seems to be given in advance and 
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detectives are in the investigation process most occupied with how to get there. This 
kind of investigative practice has in the classic literature raised concerns about 
investigative tunnel vision and detectives conviction of guilt (see e.g. Rachlew 2009; 
Fahsing 2016: O’Neill 2018 for overviews). It can moreover be seen as pragmatic way 
to deal with the ‘police predicament’ (Reiner 2010). 
Investigation as Action and Art 
The earlier mentioned reluctance detectives have towards analytical work is 
connected to the condition, which I have accounted for in Chapter 6 and 7, that 
detectives consider themselves as craftsmen and do not consider investigation or 
any part of policing to be an intellectual exercise. The perception of the detective as 
a craftsman is founded in the experience-based paradigm and the notions of real 
police work where policing is seen as an action-oriented and tacit practice taught 
‘on the job’ through apprenticeship (mesterlære)—and should not be made overly 
complicated. A Detective explains:   
It’s first and foremost good old police work which gives us the successes (of closing a 
case, my addition). You need to be willing to put a lot of hours in this job, to be 
flexible and available. The wife needs to pick up the kids, you can’t just leave work at 
4 pm if something has happened in the investigation. 
Together with a genuine interest in the field and the display of engagement by for 
example being available after working hours, certain practical skills are by 
detectives and managers moreover highlighted as vital competences for detectives 
to have. These skills evolve around technical competences such as being able to 
operate the equipment for wiretapping and case management systems in terms of 
organising case files, and procedural competences such as insight into the legal 
framework, the production of police reports and request for the courts 
(anmodninger til retten, fristforlængelser ) and the case work around arrested 
suspects (arrestantbehandling). Consequently, criminal investigation is viewed as an 
action-oriented practice focusing on carrying out various (individual) practical 
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investigative functions instead of an intellectual endeavour of information work 
(Innes 2003) involving (collective) systematic processes of collecting, analysing, and 
synthesising data. In the practical world of policing, though, proactive investigation 
did not present itself as a classic action-packed profession—compared to e.g. 
operational street-level work. On the contrary, in Operation Goldilocks detectives 
were most of the time sitting in their offices, behind their computers processing 
information. However, they sought to instigate action continuously (for example 
covert operations or new investigation tactics) as they were quickly impatient and 
wanted ‘something to happen’. The frustration which built up during time in the 
investigation team was very much connected to the fact that detectives had the 
perception that ‘nothing happened’ in the operation and detectives complained 
occasionally: “we can’t just sit here without doing anything!” A Superintendent 
categorised this behaviour from detectives as ‘classic’: 
There’s no doubt that people get frustrated when they sit banging their heads against 
the wall. And nothing happens. Then it’s easy to blame the technical issues. It’s a 
well-known fact in all investigations that frustrations go up and down. And then you 
need to catch people before there’s too much hassle (brok). That’s just how it is.   
Detectives view the process of policing organised crime as a form of ongoing game 
between themselves and the counterpart where different measures are dialectically 
set in motion. This ‘game playing’ is not directly articulated but is indirectly 
expressed at all levels within the organisation. The absence of action and as such 
detectives’ passive waiting for the counterparts’ countermove is as such perceived as 
unfitting and insufficient as it bears little resemblance to ‘the drama of cops and 
robbers’ known from street-level work. When talking about skills of detectives, 
another central component of detectives’ notions of the investigation endeavour is 
that it requires a particular and undefinable talent, gift, instinct, or 
‘nose’ (politinæse). This can be captured in a particular je ne sais quoi-ability, which 
police officers and detectives are believed to possess. This ability makes them 
reason in a certain way and notice specific details at e.g. crime scenes or during 
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wiretapping, and even to assess the potential guilt of a suspect. A Senior Detective 
argues: 
It’s not something you can be taught (proactive investigation, ed.). Either you can 
or you can’t. You need to have the ability. And I don’t care if you are a detective or a 
traffic cop…I’ve seen so many…some of them from the special operational unit 
(uroen)…they have it…they have the ability right away! And you can have another 
who’s been in an investigation unit for years and he still can’t… (…) I don’t care if 
they’ve attended 17 courses if they can’t do the job.  
The extensive literature on police culture (at least rank and files) points to a 
common finding; that police officers articulate policing as a ‘craft’ where experience, 
common sense, and a particular talent are vital skills (see e.g. Granér 2004; Loftus 
2010; Reiner 2010; Cockcroft 2012). Finstad (2000) uses the concept the police gaze 
to describe the distinct competences of patrol officers, and Norwegian police 
researcher Johanne Yttri Dahl (2019) has developed this concept in regards to 
surveillance officers. The most common reference within the Danish police is the 
police nose (politinæsen). To understand this concept in an analytical context, the 
police nose can be said to capture police officers’ individual experience together 
with their interpretation of the collective experience and institutional memory of 
police officers as an occupational group. Thus, both the police gaze and the police 
nose become symbols of the institutionalised organisational experience which is 
passed on through an ongoing socialisation process (Van Maanen & Schein 1977). 
The process consists of on the job training and the retelling of imperative 
anecdotes which represent specific ontological and epistemological notions about 
policing as an occupational field (see also Chapter 7). These ontological and 
epistemological notions are concerned with two main areas: 1) how to assess and 
categorise various social groups within society and specific situations and incidents 
which take place (e.g. crime and disorder), and 2) how police officer should manage 
these groups and situations when encountering them (Holmberg 2003; Diderichsen 
2013). Consequently, these notions impact police officers’ and detectives’ decision-
making and as such their discretion (Kleinig 1997; Loftus 2010; Reiner 2010). 
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Interestingly, the police gaze or the police nose as central components of the police 
culture are identified in research across police services around the world despite its 
most distinct characteristic: that it is a skill which cannot be articulated or 
accounted for in detail (Manning 2010; Reiner 2010; Rachlew &Fahsing 2015). This 
je ne said quoi-ability is instinctive, intuitive, context dependent, and perhaps even 
an emotional art form and is perceived as a skill which cannot be taught (for 
example through training at the Police Academy), but has to be embodied through 
one’s own experience and to some extent through the experience of fellow peers 
(other police officers). Danish philosopher Adam Diderichsen (2013) argues that 
this indicates that police officers consider themselves as morally superior in the 
sense that they know things which others do not. He also points to police officers’ 
accounts of the police nose as a central issue and goes on to say (ibid.: 66, my 
translation):   
Especially, when it comes to the type of knowledge which builds on a particular 
“police nose” it is essential that this is context dependent and will not be generalised 
into universal rules. “The nose” is a flair for the specifics of a particular situation or 
criminal incident which may be refined through experience, but which is not to be 
formulated in a specific wording to be passed on to others. 
In that sense, the notion of policing as an art form stands in contrast to the other 
essential and domineering notion which I discussed; that police work is first and 
foremost a practical endeavour (as opposed to theoretical) where experience and 
rational common-sense thinking are driving police officers’ decision-making and 
their discretionary actions. However, despite of the inconsistent experience and 
action-oriented notion of policing as a craft and the notion of policing as an art 
form (Tong & Bowling 2006; Innes 2010b), these notions seem to come together in 
the domineering epistemic rationale and as such how detectives view proactive 
investigation and detective work. Thus, the proactive investigative mindset can be 
said to be comprised by the three essential components; ‘solving cases’, suspect-
driven case building, and investigation as action and art, as analysed above, which 
are imperative to understand and explain detectives’ approaches, practices, and 
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actions. This investigative mindset is well in accordance with the experience-based 
epistemological regime and as such the other epistemological notions which I have 
analysed and discussed in this study in Chapter 6 and 7. This stands in contrast to 
the knowledge-based regime in which policing is viewed as a knowledge-driven 
profession which encompasses certain professional competencies—taught and 
developed through a theoretically anchored education and practiced in a specific 
methodological framework (O’Neill 2018). Moreover, the proactive investigative 
mindset is derived from and mirrors the one from reactive policing.  
Consequently, this mindset is therefore not merely guiding detectives’ tactical 
investigation approach but can be said to encompass an organisational mindset as it 
is generally expressed and reflected on all levels in the police organisation. 
Proactive investigation therefore stands on reactive practices to investigation and 
information work as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus with an aim to 
instigate proactive investigations in order to hold offenders accountable for their 
criminality rather than as a means to prevent emerging societal threats and/or (new) 
crime threats in a broad understanding of these. For those reasons, I will argue that 
not only the proactive practice, but also the proactive investigative mindset is 
dominated by the reactive paradigm.   
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Summary & Discussion: A Reactive Practice of 
Proactive Investigation? 
In this chapter, I have explored in detail how proactive investigation is carried out 
and practised. I have uncovered and explicated the black box of proactive 
investigation by analysing its processes, phases, and tactics. I have presented both a 
process description as well as a model for proactive investigation in my occupation 
with identifying a comprehensive methodology for proactive investigative work. I 
have furthermore explored detectives’ investigative mindset in order to understand 
the nature of this specific policing phenomenon and the actions and rationales it 
encompasses.  
In the current section, I account for the central findings and arguments outlined in 
this chapter. I discuss how detectives’ assumptions and notions about detective 
work and their investigative mindset indeed impact the practice of proactive 
investigations. I return to the case of Operation Goldilocks and the empirical example 
presented in the introduction of this chapter and discuss the circumstances 
surrounding these in relation to the analytical findings.   
Some vital conclusions can be drawn. Proactive investigation is carried out as a tacit 
practice following an ingrained, unarticulated predetermined script for 
performance and as such as a set of collective inherent routine actions. These 
actions are impacted by a dynamic interplay between individual and shared 
experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, and by 
a number of collective epistemological notions about proactive police work and the 
criminal counterpart. The social production of information, its interpretations, 
communication, and use are constituted on the basis of how detectives make sense 
of their actions, interactions, and environment. The entire investigation process can 
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therefore be seen as an analytical sense-making process where detectives try to 
assess and categorise collected information and evaluate its relevance in terms of 
the investigation at hand. Proactive investigation work is therefore not objective 
information processing, it is rather a constant interpretation process where 
detectives categorise, add meaning, socially construct, and give certain powers to 
the individual pieces of information. Although there are similarities, the analysis 
shows that the investigation stages and processes in proactive investigation look 
somewhat different than existing generic models for criminal investigation as they 
are primarily based on reactive investigation. In its practice and process proactive 
investigation resembles more intelligence work than reactive investigative work as it 
is concerned with policing uncertainties, scenario thinking and building, and 
interpretation of information. As such, detectives become to a high extent co-
producers of events and ‘investigation knowledge’. 
In this chapter, I have presented a process description for proactive investigation 
illustrating the investigation process as it can be observed empirically in detectives’ 
investigative practice. This process description provides an overview of main lines 
of investigative actions in proactive investigation and detectives’ rationales behind 
these. Furthermore, I have identified a model for proactive investigation which 
illustrates my construction and analytical interpretation of proactive practice, stages 
and processes, core investigation tactics and lines of action and the underlying lines 
of enquiry. The model encompasses four stages: 1) Initial Information Collection 
and Ordering of Information, 2) Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing 
Information Collection, 3) Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence, and 4) 
Constructing or Closing Cases.  
Wiretapping and directed surveillance are both quantitatively and qualitatively the 
most central tactical components of proactive investigation. They have as such 
considerable significance for how proactive investigation is conceptually 
understood and practiced in the world of policing. In their dynamic dialectic these 
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investigation tactics encompass the very essence of proactive investigation practice; 
when they are instigated simultaneously in a joint operation between detectives and 
surveillance officers they perform and fulfil ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ in its 
purest form. This performance as a clear illustration of ‘the act of proactivity’—a 
drama which detectives perform and reproduce over and over to meet the ideal of 
being one step ahead of their counterparts. There is an important difference 
between the process of proactive investigation and the proactive investigation 
process. The first refers to stages and phases within proactive investigations’ main 
lines of action, and the latter refers to the tactical content and purposes of these 
lines of action. This condition is connected to another important distinction 
between lines of actions and lines of enquiry; a central analytical finding is that 
investigation tactics (lines of action) in proactive investigation seem to be decided 
upon and instigated before investigative questions (lines of enquiry) are developed. 
Accordingly, the instigation of investigative tactics are predominantly determining 
the investigation process as opposed to context dependent investigative queries 
based on the specific case at hand. The process and practice of proactive 
investigation are furthermore mainly guided by a legal framework rather than a 
methodological framework led by context dependent investigative queries. 
My main argument in this chapter is that the methodology of proactive investigation 
is not as pronounced as of reactive investigation as it seems to be lacking deliberate, 
intentional, and transparent rationales which guide investigative lines of enquiry 
and ultimately encompass a comprehensive methodology for proactive 
investigation. Although proactive investigation empirically and by its content 
resembles intelligence work this is not recognised by detectives who uphold a 
collective perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-
level operational work or reactive investigative work (Manning 2004). Therefore, the 
application of high policing measures on proactive investigation of drug crimes 
seems to have an instrumental function as they are transferred without the central 
knowledge-based notions and analytical dimensions of the proactive paradigm. 
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Thus, proactive investigation becomes the instigation of high policing measures 
carried out in a low policing context. An important and essential part of 
understanding and explaining detectives’ proactive investigative action is the nature 
of their investigative mindset. This can be said to be comprised by collectively 
shared assumptions about proactive detective work and at least three dominant 
components, which are the notions of ‘solving cases’, ‘suspect-driven case building’, 
and ‘investigation as action and art’. These notions stem from the reactive paradigm 
and the experience-based regime and proactive investigation therefore stands on 
reactive practices to investigation and information work as it has an ad hoc, case-by-
case operational focus where detectives are occupied with holding individual 
offenders accountable for their criminality rather than as a means to prevent 
emerging crime threats. This investigative mindset can be regarded as an 
organisational mindset as it is expressed and reflected on all levels in the police 
organisation.  
Returning now to Operation Goldilocks and the empirical example presented in the 
introduction of the chapter: an overall conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the 
prior analysis. Proactive investigative work is indeed the policing of uncertainties 
(Innes 2006). It is a careful interaction between passive monitoring and (pro)active 
instigation of investigation tactics. As detectives continuously point to; a successful 
performance of proactive investigation work depends on the ability of knowing 
when to have patience and wait (observe, monitor), and when to make a move 
towards the counterpart (understood as investigative action). This ability is based on 
collectively shared assumptions of ‘good detective work’ as being partially formed 
by detectives’ individual experiences, and to some extent other detectives’ 
experience (taught through apprenticeship), and by an innate, inherent instinct, flair 
or ‘nose’ for this type of police work. As the empirical example in the introduction 
shows, the counterparts are by detectives perceived as a fairly competent 
components who have a variety of safety measures installed to counter police’s 
response based on years of experience in the criminal business. Logically, the 
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police’s success therefore depend to a great extent of the legal measures and 
investigation tactics they have at their disposal—and if mistakes are made by the 
counterpart. As such, the conclusion which detectives draw—that the technical 
equipment is casting for the outcome of the case—is in accordance with these 
perceptions. The ‘error’ of ‘getting caught’ by Joey (the investigation target), which 
detectives Lou and Thomas experienced when having to change a battery in the 
surveillance equipment, is in this sense viewed as an accident—but a predictable 
one as every active move in proactive investigations comes with a risk of ‘getting 
caught’. The investigation team’s support to the detectives and investigation 
manager Fred’s immediate focus on the investigation’s future rather than its past is 
therefore not only reasonable, but also understandable. Further, the circumstances 
point to another central condition: since proactive investigation work is based on 
the grounds of collective experience (a predefined script for performance), and 
detectives’ individual abilities (an innate capability), there are as such limited 
reasons for discussing or even changing approaches, tactics, or measures. 
Thus, the world of proactive investigation based on experience and routine action 
can be said to leave little room for evaluation or organisational learning as this is 
not regarded as a central nor important aspect of (traditional) detective work. The 
knowledge-based perspective emphasises, on the contrary, the constant application 
of analysis and evaluation as improvement of practice and deeper understandings of 
crime phenomena lie inherently in this paradigm. In conclusion, the collective 
epistemological assumptions about police work and the specific proactive 
investigative mindset which I have analysed in the previous three chapters direct 
and determine proactive investigative practice and help us understand why practice 
unfold the way it does. Proactive investigation becomes, in accordance with reactive 
investigation, a performance of “whodunnits” (Innes 2003) rather than of “what’s 
happening”. It focuses on “solving” the incident (which has not taken place), rather 
than looking at crime problems and crime patterns. It is occupied with individuals 
rather than groups, and as such it becomes a performance of suspect-driven case 
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building against ideal offenders rather than a knowledge-based hypothesis-driven 
examination of leads and scenarios (Fahsing 2016). With its offset and 
embeddedness in a reactive response service and in an experience-based epistemic 
culture, the fundamentals of the detective role remain unchanged and the ‘manifest’ 
continues with older patterns (Bacon 2016). The front stage performance of 
proactivity thereby becomes a symbolic celebration of the ritual subculture of 
patrol (Manning 2004; 2010).  
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Chapter 9: True Detective 
 - On police’s proactive performance and the proactive detective métier 
If it is constructed properly with all of its conventions arrayed in their right 
relations, the detective story is easy to read as a kind of morality play. When the 
detective’s case involves murder or some other heinous offense, the freeing of an 
innocent person wrongly accused of a crime, a master criminal whom others are 
incapable of stopping, or a desperate plea for help from a friend wronged or a 
sympathetic stranger in dire straits, the case takes on a moral dimension. It takes it 
from its end: putting right some moral wrong. Under such conditions detectives are 
not merely doing a job of toying as expert amateurs with an intriguing puzzle. They 
are on a moral mission. If they solve their case, it is a moral victory, a victory for 
what is right and for everyone who believes that right should prevail. If not, it is a 
moral defeat and everyone who believes that good should triumph over evil loses. 
- The Idea of Police by Carl B. Klockars (1985: 82). 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore how proactive investigations overall can be seen and 
understood as dramatic, social performances carried out on different front stages 
and backstages watched by different audiences. Building on the dramaturgical 
model (Goffman 1959) and the concept of the police métier (Manning 2010), I 
propose the existence of a specific (proactive) detective métier which can be 
identified as a stabilising medium for this proactive performance and its shaping 
forces. I use the empirical backdrop and combine the analytical findings from the 
previous chapters and develop and put forward a cohesive narrative and theoretical 
conceptualisation of the dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation and the 
proactive detective métier seen through these particular theoretical prisms (Goffman 
1959; Manning 1977; 2004; 2010; Manning & Raphael 2010). Overall, I ask and 
analyse: how is proactive investigation performed and what makes up and shapes 
the proactive detective métier?  
My main argument in this chapter is that the proactive performance is 
predominantly shaped, impacted, and determined by what can be regarded as the 
stabilising medium of a proactive detective métier. The métier is a countermeasure 
to the dynamics of the socio-political context in which it is situated. As a theoretical 
concept, the proactive detective métier takes its starting point in Manning’s (2010) 
police métier since this is aimed to reveal deep patterning of police action and its 
shaping forces—regardless of the overt manifestations. The proactive detective 
métier therefore shares similarities with the police métier. However, there are 
specific conditions, which are indeed connected to and affect especially proactive 
investigative work, which I find imperative to identify and analyse in the context of 
this study with the overall purpose to provide a better understanding of organised 
crime policing and proactive police performance. 
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First, I account for the dramaturgical performance of proactive investigation both 
on the public front stage and on police’s organisational front stage and backstage 
and analyse what this performance is compelled by. 
Second, I compose and develop the proactive detective métier. I analyse and 
introduce its shaping forces and components such as tacit assumptions, the police 
organisation, the proactive investigation operation, interpersonal tactics, modes of 
deploying resources, and rewarded activities and the socio-political context which 
the métier is situated in and stands in opposition to. 
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The Dramaturgical Performance of Proactive 
Investigation 
As accounted for in Chapter 3, Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical metaphors can be 
applied as instruments to analyse social interaction and as such also (proactive) 
police work. In this context, I use and apply central concepts from Goffman’s (ibid.) 
model and Manning’s further work (1977; 2004; 2010) to the main analytical findings 
in the previous four chapters. Thus, I propose the following cohesive narrative 
about the performance of proactive investigation: 
Proactive policing is carried out as a set of continuous performances played by 
individual actors—police officers, detectives, managers, and other police personnel
—forming a number of crisscrossing teams where they act in front of each other,  
and try to convince their different audiences that they are in fact who they propose 
to be, and that they have the mandate to perform (Goffman 1959). These 
performances are carried out front stage where they are witnessed by an audience 
compelled by the general public, including the political level (government and 
politicians), and backstage where the public performances are rehearsed. The police 
organisation is not a mini theatre, but it determines and supplies the specific 
scripts, fronts, and appearances, and stimulate the necessary teamwork which is 
applied in proactive performances (Manning 2008c). 
Due to its invisible and covert nature, proactive investigation is not at public display 
front stage as other types of police work. The front stage performance in this 
connection is as such a staged action (Manning 1977; Holmberg 2003) in the sense 
that police perform the roles as effective crime fighters with the purpose of showing 
the audience that the police should (continuously) be entrusted to have a number 
of covert measures at their disposal. The front stage performance of proactive 
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investigation serves as an illustration of the police’s overall response to organised 
crime through, for example, the odd crackdown, arrest, and seizure of illicit drugs 
which becomes a manifestation of the proposed qualities of proactive investigation 
as a backstage police activity and its societal eligibility. These front stage 
performances of proactivity provide the police with a stable mandate from their 
audience—the public and the political level—as their symbolic and staged action 
enable them to appear as being able to manage, diminish and control organised 
crime as much as possible (Manning 2004; 2008c).  
Thus, these front stage performances of proactivity function as ways of displaying 
action and operational results—and they are therefore essential for police’s 
continuous support by its audience in terms of legitimacy and accountability. 
Additionally, the front stage performance elevates otherwise invisible, low dramas of 
proactive investigation into high dramas of proactive policing, where police receive 
public attention via the media and suddenly are featured as heroes fighting 
organised crime—a threat to societal cohesion (Manning 2013). In this 
dramatisation and staging action of proactive police work, the police are certainly 
aware of their own social capital. Consequently, they manage impressions and 
reproduce—by habit and practice—notions and images of social control and are as 
such the central players in communicating dramas about themselves (Manning 
ibid.).   
Although the performance of proactive investigation is carried out ‘behind the 
scenes’, it is somewhat displayed on police’s organisational front stage. Here, the 
audience consists of other members of the police organisation who observe the 
internal performances of teams of managers and detectives. On the organisational 
backstage, managers and detectives relax and rehearse their performances on both 
the public and the organisational front stage. The performance of proactive 
investigation on police’s organisational front stage is focused on drug policing and 
follows a stable, ceremonial performance of the ritualised and well-known ‘drama of 
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cops and robbers’ relying on an ingrained, unarticulated, predetermined, and 
predictable script (Goffman 1959; Manning 2004; 2010). This drama has been 
symbolically performed through decades as it is a rerun from uniformed patrol 
policing celebrating the subculture of patrol (Manning 2010). It is embedded in an 
experience-based rationale stemming from the reactive policing paradigm which 
promotes the logic from the standard policing model of responding rapidly to 
events and acting upon them. It mirrors thereby reactive street-level dramas of drug 
policing where police identify, pursue, and catch usual suspects using a similar 
script, costumes, and props.  
Features from high policing such as wiretapping and directed surveillance are in 
the performance of proactive investigation the most central tactical components. In 
their dynamic dialectic, these investigation tactics encompass the very essence of 
proactive investigation practice. Consequently, when they are instigated 
simultaneously in a joint operation between detectives and surveillance officers this 
fulfils the performance of ‘the drama of cops and robbers’ in its purest form. This 
performance is as such a clear illustration of ‘the act of proactivity’—which 
detectives perform and reproduce over and over trying to meet the ideal of being 
one step ahead of their counterparts.  
In the ‘drama of cops and robbers’, uncertainties are reduced to well-known 
categories (e.g. the continuous fight between good and bad) and detectives rely on 
consistent role descriptions (crime fighters against ideal offenders). A successful 
performance ends with the arrest of the offender(s), which is applauded both 
internally within police and by the political and public audience. On the 
organisational backstage, this performance thereby functions as a way to maintain 
organisational stability and individual motivation to carry out detective work. Each 
case is as a result perceived as collectively meaningful—despite the broad 
recognition within the police of the dim prospects of police’s overall efforts to 
impact organised crime. Thus, the performing teams’ dramaturgical loyalty and 
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dramaturgical discipline supports the collective notion stemming from reactive 
police work of ‘solving’ the incident. Proactive investigation therefore becomes, in 
accordance with reactive investigation, a performance of ‘whodunnits’ and of 
suspect-driven case building. This performance stands in contrast to a proactive 
performance with the aim of identifying and reducing more general risks and 
threats from organised crime and their overall impact on society as a whole. Still, on 
all stages the actors as well as the audiences perceive, understand, and rhetorically 
refer to these performances as proactive revealing a fundamental embedded 
paradox of proactive investigations. 
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The Proactive Detective Métier 
As accounted for in Chapter 3, Manning (2010) proposes the concept of the police 
métier, which captures the nature of policing and outlines standard police practices 
and routines. Through this concept, Manning (ibid.) seeks to explain the dynamics 
and processes involved as police shape their social order in ways that often contrast 
with how the mandate of policing is publicly managed. The police métier captures 
as such ‘the show’ occurring both front stage and backstage characterised by 
occupational assumptions and organisational practices with a focus on ‘the 
incident’ reflecting conventional wisdom about why and how policing works. In the 
previous section, I have put forward a comprehensive narrative about the social 
performance of proactive investigation. I will argue that this performance is 
predominantly shaped, impacted, and determined by what can be regarded as the 
stabilising medium of a proactive detective métier—building on Manning’s (2010) 
concept of the police métier.  
There are obviously some apparent similarities between the police métier and the 
proactive detective métier, and the concept of the police métier is overall useful in 
explaining the dynamics of how policing is performed generally and why. However, I 
find it useful to identify those specific conditions which are connected to and affect 
proactive police work, especially proactive investigative work, to provide a better 
understanding of it. As a theoretical concept, the proactive detective métier is, in 
accordance with Manning (2010), aimed to reveal deep patterning of proactive 
police action and its shaping forces—regardless of the overt manifestations. In line 
with Manning (ibid.) through the analysis presented in the previous chapters, I have 
aimed to examine actual practices—modes of action and inherent logics—of 
proactive investigation on the ground and thereby taken a step back from the 
obvious labels and rhetoric which dominates the public front stage of policing and 
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instead stepped closer to the underlying patterning of proactive policing and its 
backstages. In this section, I will account for the content of this concept and its 
shaping forces as a way of trying to explain and thereby understand organised crime 
policing and proactive police performance. 
The Socio-Political Context 
As I have unfolded during this thesis, within the last decades there are and have 
been considerable efforts to reform and move the (Danish) police towards the new 
proactive policing paradigm and accordingly modernise the police organisation as a 
public service institution. These reform efforts have been driven by both external 
and internal demands and pressure to improve police’s performance in connection 
with both everyday and complex crime by employing e.g. problem-solving, 
preventive, and disruptive measures instead of the ineffective reactive standard 
model of policing. However, as this study has shown, over the last decades the 
socio-political context of policing has indeed resulted in shifting targets and 
objectives, conflicting rhetoric, and alterations in deployment of resources 
(Manning 2010; Holmberg 2019). These have, in the context of the Danish police, 
amongst other included conversions between different strategic directions 
(proactive/reactive), organisational structures (regional/local), approaches to 
recruitment and education (generalist/specialist) etc. This can be regarded as what 
Manning (2010: 213) refers to as “…an endlessly elastic socio-political context in which 
policing operates”. In the context of organised crime policing, this has resulted in e.g. 
ideals and ambitions of proactivity, but politically set performance measures have 
amongst others resulted in reactive and repressive police tactics.  
As a countermeasure to this dynamic and with the purpose of sustaining 
conventional police work and organisational stability, police have gradually built up 
the stabilising medium of the proactive detective métier. Therefore, as this study has 
shown, the police response towards organised crime overall is not altered radically 
432
as in the general run of things, both strategic, operational, and tactical decision-
makers seem to rely on familiar course of action. This is in accordance with the 
findings of Manning (2010) who argues that while the targets of action are shifting 
and shaped by politics, the range of police tactics in practice remains much the 
same, and the unstated purpose remains the same. Similarly, Bacon (2016) 
concludes that the fundamentals of the detective role remain unchanged and the 
‘manifest’ continues with older patterns.  
The proactive detective métier takes its outset in Manning’s (2010) police métier, but 
is specifically conditioned and shaped by: 1) assumptions about proactive detective 
work and the social world of organised crime, 2) the proactive investigation 
operation, 3) the police organisation, 4) interpersonal tactics and police epistemic 
culture, 5), modes of deploying resources, and 6) rewarded activities and measures 
of success. The proactive investigation operation resembles ‘the incident’ (Manning 
2010) as such operations or cases are the theatrical core of the performance of 
proactive investigations. In the following sections, I will unfold what I identify as 
the six shaping forces and components of the proactive detective métier using the 
previous chapters in this thesis as empirical and analytical backdrops. 
Components and Shaping Forces 
Assumptions about Organised Crime Policing 
A central part of the police métier is habits and assumptions focused on the trope 
of crime that envisions only the need to control, deter, and punish the visible and 
known contestants (Sheptycki 2017). In line with Manning & Raphael (2010), the 
assumptive world in which organised crime detectives operate consist of 
assumptions about the politics of the field, the ways of dealing with the counterpart, 
mistakes and successes at work, and routines and performances required of the 
practitioners. Within this assumptive world lies an assumed ‘practical model’ or 
‘logic in action’ that informs choices made in line with these assumptions. As such, 
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the practices of proactive investigation are verified with reference to the several 
compatible assumptions that produce them and the assumptions about organised 
crime policing are consequently the context within the practices have a life and a 
social reality. As I have analysed and demonstrated in Chapter 6, 7, and 8, the 
ruling assumptions in organised crime policing evolve around that detectives know 
the typical counterpart, their motivations, typical actions, and dynamics, and know 
how they are best policed: 
• Organised crime is primarily drug crimes, which are severe and moral crimes 
despite their consensual nature 
• The general public and law-abiding citizens should be shielded from organised 
crime offenders and their destructive impact on everyday social life 
• Organised crime offenders are typically members of outlaw motorcycle gangs and 
street gangs who are rational individuals who primarily engage in these crimes as a 
way of generating profits. They are individuals with doubtful morals and limited 
empathy guided by selfish objectives  
• The organised crime environment should be controlled and policed continuously 
and stopped from developing, but there are no prospects of eliminating their 
criminality 
• Policing by typology is a necessary tactic, which actually often provides fruitful 
results 
• Usual suspects are time and again proving why the police are continuously policing 
them 
• Long-term prevention or problem-solving in terms of organised crime is as naïve 
and a waste of resources. The most reliable and effective way to deal with these 
people are to arrest and incarcerate them on every given opportunity, removing 
them from the streets and preventing them from doing further harm 
• All peripheral individuals who have relations to organised crime offenders are 
perhaps “innocent”, but must be viewed as potential benefiters from their criminal 
operation 
• Democratic rights such as the right to privacy can be put aside in the policing of 
organised crime as the end outweighs the means. Systematic monitoring and 
surveillance of specific suspects are for example a necessary means 
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• New and supporting methods and tactics in organised crime policing should consist 
of technical advancements and extended legal frames.
In this perspective, some specific collective assumptions about organised crime 
policing and the particular social world of organised crime exist, which are shaping 
and informing detective work and proactive investigations. There is as such a clear 
dependency relationship between detectives’ collective assumptions of organised 
crime and organised crime policing and the practice detectives carry out and 
thereby provide a social reality. The collective assumptive world of detectives is as 
such constructing and reconstructing the detective identity. Moreover, it is shaping 
and impacting the proactive performance as well as upholding and passing over this 
assumptive world again and again by reproducing this ritualised act.  
The Proactive Investigation Operation 
As mentioned before, whereas Manning (2010) identifies ‘the incident’ as the 
theatrical core of the police métier and as such its ‘sacred centre’, my analysis 
shows that for organised crime detectives this lie in proactive investigation 
operations or ’the case’. In these operations and cases, detectives perform the key 
drama of ‘cops and robbers’, where they in the purest form display what this type of 
policing is all about. It is also through these operations and cases that detectives 
show police management and occasionally the public their operational value and 
claim and manifest their specific societal mandate of covert policing. This is best 
done on the organisational front stage by continuously employing various 
investigative tactics and thereby demonstrating investigation progression through 
explicit investigative action such as getting court orders, instigating wiretapping, 
employing surveillance operations, covert searches, identifying informants etc. It is 
least displayed by invisible information work on the organisational backstage which 
is difficult to report about and does not provide tangible results which can be 
disclosed and presented to management and thereby presented on the 
organisational or public front stage.  
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On the public front stage, covert and invisible policing seems widely accepted by 
the public audience as long as they are now and again reminded of the threat from 
organised crime for example when violent conflicts occur in public (see also 
Chapter 5). However, police crackdowns, large-scale arrests, and seizures of illicit 
drugs in e.g. the gang environment are widely presented on the public front stage 
via the media and are applauded and viewed as indications that organised crime 
policing functions according to its societal mandate and is indeed necessary in 
terms of keeping and sustaining societal order and safety. Here police manage the 
symbolic impression of taking action and being efficient (Manning 2013).   
The previous analysis shows that the entitlement to assess, interpret, and know 
about the social world of organised crime and how to effectively police it is given 
exclusively to the involved detectives by the police organisation. Organised crime 
detectives are predominantly seen as experts and specialists when it comes to both 
organised crime offenders and proactive police tactics. They are, as such within the 
police organisation viewed as both ‘knowers’ and ‘doers’ in this particular field of 
policing. This stands in contrast to other police officers who might be given the 
right to define ‘the incident’ at the scene unless ‘otherwise known’ (Manning & 
Raphael 2010), but who are not generally perceived as other than police generalists 
which possess this right only in their capacity of being police officers and being at 
the scene of the incident. Consequently, this means that organised crime detectives 
enjoy a high status in the police hierarchy with all the benefits that come with it. 
Efforts to reform and develop the professional field of proactive investigation are as 
such merely sustainable if they derive from organised crime detectives themselves 
(Loftus 2010).    
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The Police Organisation 
According to Manning & Raphael (2010), police work is institutionalised, structured, 
routinised, unquestioned and done as if there was no other way to do it. It is as 
such taken for granted in terms of effectiveness, purposes, and means. The 
fundamental assumption is that the organisation is functional and rational 
(Manning 2010). In terms of organised crime policing and proactive detective work, 
my analysis has shown that the police organisation is designed to allocate detectives 
to different cases and operations, which are dealt with one at a time in a temporal 
series of repeated, demarcated investigative efforts. These operations focus on one, 
perhaps a few, primary investigation targets and they are thereby individual rather 
group focused which stands in contrast to the collective nature of organised crime. 
Proactive investigation therefore stands on reactive practices to investigation work 
as it has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus with an aim to instigate proactive 
investigations in order to hold offenders accountable for their crimes rather than as 
a means to prevent emerging societal threats and/or (new) crime threats in a broad 
understanding of these.  
In accordance with ‘the incident’—which structures and concentrates organisation 
and resources (Manning 2010)—the organisational policy around proactive 
investigation work is set and derives from experiences and situated practices 
employed in operations and cases by individual detectives with limited guidance or 
supervision from management. As I have shown in Chapter 8, detectives enjoy, as 
such, in the organisational frame wide discretionary powers and are additionally, 
due to their organisational status as experts and specialist, instrumental in 
manifesting various approaches and tactics as best practice.  
The police organisation encompasses the formal frame of organised crime policing 
and proactive detective work and it demands mainly specific (political) performance 
measures to be obtained. This leads sometimes to altered priorities and resource 
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allocations at a general level, but everyday detective work and the performance of 
proactive investigations are predominantly set by detectives and investigation 
managers. This means that even though there might be a strategic inclination 
within the police organisation to instigate and support knowledge-based and 
analytical approaches to e.g. identify investigation targets this does not happen as it 
is not embedded into organisational structures and collective routines. The police 
organisation does not urge detectives to replace their standard routines and they 
maintain their experience-based approaches which are derived from reactive 
policing.  
Interpersonal Tactics 
Manning & Raphael (2010) propose the force of sanctioned interpersonal tactics of 
policing in the incident which are those thought to guarantee successful asserting 
of authority, taking control, closing the incident in some fashion, and returning to 
service. This study’s analysis shows that interpersonal tactics of proactive 
investigation are similarly concerned with the notion of ’real policing’ and 
consequently ‘real detective work’. These tactics are learned ‘on the job’ through 
individual experience and subsequently the experience of other detectives. They are 
anchored in a specific police epistemic culture, which forms how detectives come to 
know what they know about organised crime as a phenomenon and organised 
crime policing as a practice (Cetina 1999). The police epistemic culture is central in 
the sustainment of experience-based and conventional practices and the 
preservation of well-known and familiar aims and targets in proactive police work—
despite shifts in the elastic and dynamic socio-political context. As I have analysed 
and accounted for in Chapter 7, the police epistemic culture is compelled by three 
essential notions:  
• the high-status of ‘anecdotal evidence’ 
• the sustainment of ‘the power to know’ 
• the need to reduce complexities.   
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I find that detectives’ epistemic culture is founded on the assumptive world of 
policing where experience is regarded as the most genuine and worthy knowledge 
(Gundhus 2012) often explicated through the telling of anecdotes told by 
trustworthy, well-respected, and experienced detectives. Anecdotes about proactive 
investigation operations are as such central in supporting detectives’ epigram of 
‘you-need-experience-and-a-sense-for-detective work’ as this displays the 
detective’s account (the anecdote) of the social world of the counterpart and how to 
police them. Anecdotes function as such as evidence which is elevated to becoming 
general organisational knowledge about best practice. The telling of anecdotes is a 
ritualised practice of the proactive detective métier where the same stories are told 
over and over; a retelling of different performances in regards to ‘cases’. It functions 
as a way to articulate and thereby sustain proactive police practice, to preserve 
institutional memory, and to pass on world views and assumptions about organised 
crime policing and organised crime.  
Experience and ‘thick’ knowledge (Ratcliffe 2008b) is in accordance the most valued 
type of knowledge in the eyes of detectives as opposed to e.g. educational skills and 
‘thin’ standardised knowledge (Gundhus 2012). As such, the detective is the 
authority of and source to how cases are to be understood and handled. Tacit 
knowledge is the only knowledge type which gives one the necessary insights—and 
since e.g. analysts, academics, or others in non-police functions are occupied with 
other types of knowledge produced in other ways—their views on detective work 
and organised crime are therefore questionable and redundant. The rhetoric of 
detective professionalism is employed to defend their mandate and build collective 
self-esteem, organisational autonomy, and occupational solidarity and cohesiveness 
(Manning 1977). As a strong currency within the informal police organisation, 
knowledge equals organisational power and detectives hold the power to know 
(Innes & Sheptycki 2004).  
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Experience-based knowledge reduces complexities and intellectual aspects of 
detective work. Academic aspects of police training are e.g. viewed as irrelevant and 
even an obstacle for doing good police work (Manning 2010). This study has 
illustrated that proactive detective work resembles reactive detective work despite 
its inherent resemblance to intelligence work. Intelligence work is, however, 
occupied with uncertainties, risks, and threats and consequently it operates in a 
complex field of various social phenomena demanding nuanced perspectives on 
crime and its societal impact. Organised crime policing borrows indeed measures 
and rhetoric from high policing, but in its aim and practice it is like traditional 
police work focused on ‘catching criminals’ and ‘solving cases’ rather than 
disruption and prevention (Brodeur 1983; 2007; 2010). As I have displayed in 
Chapter 6, 7, and 8, good detective work and proactive investigation as a 
dramaturgical act have accordingly the following features: 
• Focusing on import, production, distribution, or sales of illicit drugs which is 
perceived as equal to organised crime 
• Identifying grounds of suspicion and prime targets quickly 
• Targeting well-known offenders operating low or mid-level as these are possible to 
reach through conventional proactive measures in a short-term while ‘top shelf’ 
targets and hidden populations with considerable security measures require lengthy 
and resourceful efforts and should be avoided 
• Employing essential investigative tactics such as wiretapping and covert surveillance 
immediately 
• Instigating further investigative lines of action to keep up investigation progress 
• Notifying management continuously of progressions and results 
• Deciding what to do and how to do it along the way based on the actions of the 
counterpart  
• Producing investigative solutions that make the case manageable—not 
overcomplicating it with e.g. complex financial lines of enquiry such as money 
laundering etc. 
• Replacing prime targets if investigative results rescind 
• Focusing on evidence production in terms of ‘proving’ the guilt of the suspect 
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• Seizing up the case by making crackdowns and arrests, confiscating illicit drugs, 
money, values etc. 
• Closing the case by handing the evidence over to the prosecution preferably 
resulting in long-time incarceration. 
The interpersonal tactics of proactive detective work are connected to both the 
collective assumptions of organised crime policing and police epistemic culture. 
Moreover, my analysis in Chapter 8 has found that a true detective encompasses a 
specific investigative mindset which is comprised by three essential components: 
• ‘solving cases’ 
• suspect-driven case building 
• investigation as action and art.  
The components of the proactive investigative mindset are derived from reactive 
policing and detectives keep for example the language from reactive investigation 
expressing that they are ‘looking for clues’, ‘the needle in the haystack’, ‘the 
conclusive evidence’, and ‘solving the case’. As such, proactive investigations focus 
on ‘solving crimes’ and ‘putting people to jail’ rather than preventing harm or 
disrupting crimes in the making. Proactive investigation is as such occupied with 
tracing and uncovering specific evidence to prove the suspects’ involvement in 
criminal activities. This reactive notion of proactive investigation work can easily 
lead to classic suspect-driven case-building as the measure of success is large drug 
seizures and multiple arrests instead of preventing, fending off, or disrupting 
criminal actions (Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018). Proactive investigation is in its outset 
not occupied with the (objective) process of discovering, collecting, checking, and 
considering clues from various sources of information with the purpose of trying to 
construct a coherent account of the (criminal) event (Fahsing 2016). Proactive 
investigation builds per default on police’s self-selection (Marx 1988) and the 
suspect is in this regard identified as ‘guilty beforehand’. The investigation process 
is therefore no longer concerned with uncovering and documenting a series of past 
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events, but rather to support the initial suspicion with new information which can 
be processed as evidence.  
Detectives do seemingly consider themselves craftsmen and do not consider 
investigation or any part of policing to be an intellectual exercise. It is, on the 
contrary, an action-oriented and experience-based, tacit practice. A true detective is 
engaged in his work, he works dynamic hours, and has certain practical and 
technical skills such as being able to operate the equipment for wiretapping and 
case management systems in terms of organising case files, as well as procedural 
competencies such as insight into the legal framework, the production of police 
reports, requests for court orders, and the case work around incarcerated suspects. 
My analysis has moreover revealed that detective work is viewed as an endeavour 
which requires a particular and undefinable talent, gift, instinct, or ‘nose’. This 
ability makes detectives reason in a certain way and notice specific details at e.g. 
during wiretapping, and even to assess the potential guilt of a suspect. This captures 
detectives’ individual experience together with their interpretation of the collective 
experience and institutional memory of them as an occupational group. Thus, the 
police gaze and the police nose are symbols of the institutionalised organisational 
experience which is passed on through an ongoing socialisation process (Van 
Maanen & Schein 1977). This process consists of on the job training and the 
retelling of imperative anecdotes which represent specific ontological and 
epistemological notions about policing and detective work as an occupational field. 
These ontological and epistemological notions are for organised crime detectives 
specifically concerned with how to assess and categorise various groups of people 
and organised crime offenders and the specific situations and incidents they are 
involved in, and how detectives investigate them. Consequently, these notions are 
indeed forming and impacting detectives’ decision-making and their discretion 
(Kleinig 1997; Loftus et al. 2015). Detective work as an emotional art form is 
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instinctive, intuitive, and context-dependent, and has to be embodied through one’s 
own experience and to some extent through the experience of fellow detectives.  
The analysis shows that this investigative mindset is not merely guiding detectives’ 
tactical investigation but can be said to encompass an organisational mindset as it is 
generally expressed and reflected on all levels in the police organisation. It reveals 
and displays therefore underlying patterns of how proactive and reactive police 
work in the practical world of policing take the same form and patterning, and 
therefore how the proactive detective métier functions as a way of sustaining the 
specific proactive performance.  
Modes of Deploying Resources 
According to Manning (2010), there are ritualised, repetitive modes of deploying 
resources within policing which ground ‘order’ and ‘ordering’ in places and doings 
rather than in categories of crime, law, and morality. In this sense, policing is more 
about the control of territory and the symbolisation of that control. In this study, I 
have shown that the deployment of resources within organised crime policing is, in 
accordance with the assumptions about organised crime policing and organised 
crime offenders, the understanding that police know which crimes are occurring, 
which groups of people who commit these crimes and why they do so.  
For historical reasons, due to political attention, and as a consequence of habitual 
thinking and organisational preferences, organised crime offenders are primarily 
regarded as drug offenders predominantly members from organised crime groups. 
These are continuously and routinely identified and targeted through the police 
gaze (Finstad 2000) based on experience and the collectively shared assumption of 
their status as ‘bad guys’. They are offenders who are—due to their social status and 
type of offending—perceived as police property (Reiner 2010). These prolific 
offenders can be considered to be ‘easy targets’ as they might indeed commit 
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serious and organised crime on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale which 
makes them less demanding for police to deal with. My analysis in Chapter 8 shows 
further that the perception of their guilt built on some of the same grounds which 
make them continuous focus persons: 
1) their criminal history and their affiliation to organised crime groups 
2) recent intelligence information from confidential informants 
3) the police’s prior investigations against them 
4) their suspicious behaviour and e.g. use of security and countermeasures. 
However, what is sought after is what is found: the circle of information gathering 
for intelligence purposes and the identification of focus persons, potential suspects, 
and investigation targets etc. reproduces organisational anchored stereotypes. A key 
finding in the analysis is therefore that proactive investigations target often ‘usual 
suspects’, who are randomly identified as they meet the criteria of being highly 
visible classic counterparts whom the police can easily recognise and moreover 
prefer to deal with. 
The information collection circle, therefore, produces records, which are kept about 
these issues and sustain the validity of this practice as they are based on the same 
assumptions, and moreover it supports the same mode of deploying resources 
(Manning 2010). This runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as it 
preserves and reproduces stereotypical organisational notions of ‘bad guys’ instead 
of widening the scope to bigger threats and hidden populations. Consequently, 
organised crime is overall viewed in a narrow scope failing to look at the broader 
field of organised crime both in regards to crime areas and groups of people. 
   
Rewarded Activities 
The cluster of rewarded activities are the organisational inducements and the 
distribution of these on how to perform policing (Manning & Raphael 2010; 
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Manning 2010). These are based on assumptions about how the social world 
operates as well as what practices are necessary to cope with this world. In regards 
to organised crime policing, this is where detectives are viewed as experts and 
specialists. This study shows therefore that the rewarded activities for proactive 
police work derive from the reactive policing paradigm and particularly the 
standard model of policing. They revolve around illicit drug seizures and arrests and 
the overall success is ‘solving cases’ meaning producing investigation information 
which counts as evidence and thereby provides grounds for prosecution.  
Although the proactive policing paradigm proposes knowledge-based analytical 
work, problem-solving, and prevention, these are not activities which are rewarded 
at neither the public front stage nor the organisational front stage. In fact, my 
analysis has shown that proactive policing is not viewed as a different paradigm for 
police action—it is primarily viewed is a smarter way of doing traditional police 
work. Therefore, the police organisation and its response to organised crime is 
continuously tied to an instrumental understanding and its symbolic and staged 
acts of crime control and ceremonial proactive performance prevents a 
revolutionary paradigm shift. 
The study points to the circumstance that the proactive investigation operation can 
be seen as a window in which detectives’ proactive practices are displayed—similar 
to Manning’s (2010) ‘incident’. Here, the subjective and objective forces that govern 
proactive police performance are mobilised. The activities—the investigative tactics 
and lines of action employed by detectives—build on a predetermined and 
predictable script of ‘best practice’ and although this is tacit, non-verbalised and 
lacks description in terms of purpose and aim (lines of enquiry), it is widely 
recognised within the police organisation as ‘drug policing’ as it resembles street-





PART FOUR: CURTAIN FALL  
 

Chapter 10: Closing 
- On the study’s findings, accomplishments, and reflections 
So much for endings. Beginnings are always more fun.  
True connoisseurs, however, are known to favour the stretch in between, since 
it’s the hardest to do anything with. 
- From ‘Happy Endings’ in Murder in the Dark by Margaret Atwood (1983). 
Conclusions 
In this PhD study, I have explored how police respond to organised crime via 
proactive investigation as a representation of one of the most dominant 
international trends within policing namely the introduction of the proactive 
policing paradigm. The introduction of this paradigm in different reform efforts has 
proved to be a sustainable trend in contemporary policing in most Western 
countries and has proposed a move from a traditional law and order and response 
focus (the reactive paradigm) towards a more problem-oriented, analytical, proactive 
focus (the proactive paradigm) (Manning 2010; Sherman 2013; Weisburd et al. 2019). 
Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition and based on a thorough 
empirical investigation of the Danish police, I have examined the following research 
question:  
How do proactive investigations as a part of the proactive policing paradigm unfold in the 
police and which conditions impact this and why?  
Thus, I have scrutinised how the police organisation conceptualises and interprets 
proactivity, how proactivity is implemented and practiced in terms of investigations, 
and how external and internal structures as well as formal and informal worlds of 
policing influence and shape this practice. The study is aimed at contributing to the 
‘black box’ of proactive investigation and the existing knowledge gap in current 
research on criminal investigation (Innes 2003; Manning 2004; Stelfox 2009; 
Brodeur 2010; Hald & Rønn 2013; Bacon 2016; Fahsing 2016; O’Niell 2018; 
Weisburd et al. 2019). To answer the research question, I draw the following 
conclusions:  
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The Socio-Political Context 
Proactive investigations unfold in a specific social and political context, which on a 
structural level impacts conditions for all police work. The microcosmos of 
proactive investigation is therefore connected to macro-oriented politics and 
societal developments since the police as a social institution react to and interact 
with the different stimuli it is exposed to. My analysis shows that the contextual 
frame for the Danish police is shaped by both external and internal conditions 
which have direct and indirect influence on how proactive investigations are 
organised and carried out. These conditions include both specific criminal 
incidents and crime problems as well as political and organisational alterations and 
reforms.  
First, the political and public pressure on the Danish police’s priorities, 
dispositions, work processes etc. have increased remarkably, within the last decade 
and the political and public focus on police accountability and public trust suggest 
that police are no longer an unchallenged authority. Second, even though the 
general crime level is decreasing, assessments of risks, threats, and potential harm 
to society in general present a more diffuse and complex crime picture for the 
police to deal with (Rigspolitiet 2017). Third, due to single crime events and isolated 
threats and risks (especially terrorism, gang conflicts, and migration), the police are 
spending a vast amount of resources carrying out reactive law and order-related 
tasks such as guarding physical objects (soft targets) and border control. This 
circumstance removes resources and staff from not only day-to-day policing, but 
also complex crime investigation and preventive tasks and innovative proactive 
perspectives on police work are downsized or set aside in favour of trying to keep 
up with e.g. reported volume crime (see also Christensen 2012). Forth, the amount 
of internal processes such as structure reforms, reorganisations, budget 
adjustments, implementation of information technologies, changes within 
management, demands for certified personnel in specific functions etc. have created 
452
a great deal of turbulence within the police and interfered with the core tasks of 
policing (Degnegaard 2010; Stevnsborg 2010; 2016; Balvig et al. 2011; Fyfe et al. 
2013; Terpstra et al. 2019). Fifth, the introduction of new public management as a 
governance model promoting new management ideals of rationalisation, efficiency, 
and performance measurement has especially challenged the police as a value-
based social institution operating on a social mandate, where issues such as 
legitimacy, accountability, public trust, legal equality, and professional ethics etc. are 
central (Gundhus 2012). These specific traits are consequently in risk of becoming 
secondary at the expense of rationality and efficiency even though these are not 
central in the police’s social mandate.   
This study shows that the five identified structural conditions have and are 
continuously impacting and shaping the Danish police and consequently the 
conditions for how proactive police work is carried out. Continuous conversion 
between different strategic directions for the police (proactive/reactive), 
organisational structures (regional/local), approaches to recruitment and education 
(generalist/specialist) go on with such a pace that the ideas and the implementation 
of them seem to be abandoned before their potential positive outcome manifest 
themselves in the practical world of policing. Consequently, this analysis of the 
socio-political and structural context of the Danish police shows that despite 
considerable efforts to reform and move the police from merely a reactive police 
force towards a proactive police service this paradigm is continuously constrained. 
The ideals of proactivity and modernisation have been difficult to pursue due to 
these specific external and internal conditions and have amongst other resulted in 
the sustainment of predominantly reactive police responses.  
Strategic Frame and Organisational Structures 
Proactive investigations unfold as part of and are impacted by a formal strategy and 
action plan which guides the overall police response towards organised crime. This 
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strategy is intended to have both a long-term and short-term perspective as well as 
both a reactive and proactive focus. My analysis shows that the police’s response is 
trying to deal with urgent crime problems and violent conflicts as well as 
accumulating crime and those underlying structures which are believed to enable 
organised crime. This leads to the instigation of what I divide into two different 
response models: 1) a broad response model targeting members of organised crime 
as a whole through everyday police work, and 2) a narrow response model targeting 
a small group of priority and high-value offenders through proactive investigations. 
Although prevention and proactive police work are pinpointed as central 
components of the police’s strategy, my analysis demonstrates that this is only to a 
limited extent reflected in the politically determined objectives and performance 
goals. These have, on the contrary, through a decade been guided by a ‘tough-on-
crime approach’ prompting repressive and punitive efforts—such as multiple 
arrests and incarceration of offenders (Smith & Uglevik 2017).  
The introduction of two specific performance goals in terms of organised crime 
regarding: 1) the continuous incarceration of 225-300 members of organised crime 
groups, and 2) the identification of 15-25 priority offenders for proactive 
investigations dominate the police’s response in a sense where it impounds the 
police’s time and resources and captures the strategic agenda. Consequently, the 
police are under significant pressure to allocate their time and resources into 
primarily reactive investigations and operational responses focusing on criminal 
incidents and conflicts here and now whilst trying to meet political performance 
goals. The energy being put into ‘the numbers’ game’ (meeting performance goals) 
therefore inhibits a long-term focus and long-term planning. It steers the police in a 
reactive rather than a proactive direction focusing on the short-term perspective 
and the broad response model. Consequently, the analysis shows that police’s 
response to organised crime is primarily characterised by reactive police work and 
solving ‘problems of the day’ and delivering a rapid response focusing on multiple 
arrests and incarceration as the primary measures of success. This stands in 
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contrast to the inherent notion of the proactive paradigm which e.g. prescribes a 
knowledge-based police response focusing on a long-term perspective and a 
problem-oriented operational model targeting the underlying structures and threats 
of organised crime including ‘problems of tomorrow’. The formal objectives and 
measures of success for the police’s response—including proactive investigation—
are in other words reactive in nature.  
The study illustrates how police try to implement these political demands and 
initiatives loyally and to the best of their abilities—despite the condition that 
especially police management have genuine concerns about this strategy’s ability to 
provide a comprehensive police response towards systemic and persistent 
organised crime problems. My analysis therefore uncovers a constant organisational 
battle over the strategy and action plan as police are forced to choose between what 
they identify as a focus on current violent conflicts and on underlying enabling 
structures of organised crime. Accordingly, this battle mirrors the persistent 
dilemma of police as being either a reactive response service dealing with the short-
term problems at hand or a proactive service with a focus on instigating problem-
oriented responses with a long-term focus. At the end, my analysis shows that in the 
practical world of policing the formal organisational and strategic structures seem 
to commission the instigation of a reactive enforcement strategy and repressive 
police tactics. 
Informal Collective Assumptions 
Proactive investigations unfold in and are impacted by an informal world of 
policing where the presiding assumptions amongst managers, police officers, and 
detectives evolve around some of the same perceptions of how to measure success 
as presented in the formal strategy. The dominant understanding is namely that 
‘good’ police work is ‘real policing’ focusing on catching and arresting ‘bad guys’ 
who fit certain (stereotypical) characteristics (Gill 2000; Holmberg 2003; Manning 
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2004). The internal success of police work is therefore—in accordance with political 
expectations—measured in the amount of arrests, the number of conviction years, 
and the seizures of weapons and illicit goods. The study reveals that the immediate 
impression of how proactive investigation is interpreted on strategic level implies 
that this is rooted in the ideas of the proactive paradigm, which is expressed in 
management language and reflected in various policy documents. Nevertheless, this 
appears to be a rhetorical and on-the-surface performance to accommodate the 
front stage of policing where the ideal of proactivity and smart policing lives. 
Instead, my analysis uncovers that the informal world of policing dominates the 
backstage, which is compelled by collectively shared assumptions about police work 
and the criminal counterpart supporting the reactive paradigm.  
For that reason, the study shows that the reactive approach is not only determined 
by political expectations and external structures—it seems to mirror an 
organisational preference of being a response service focusing on delivering a rapid 
response to criminal incidents sanctioning those offenders involved as prescribed 
in the standard model of policing. Proactive investigation is in this perception 
viewed as having the same purpose as reactive investigation: to identify a 
perpetrator with the aim of prosecuting and arresting him. Accordingly, although 
proactive policing promotes prevention per default this is not a central aspect of 
neither police perception nor practice. The condition that prevention of crime is 
not a high-status task within the police organisation is connected to the notion of 
‘real policing’, but also to an organisational preoccupation with fast and visible 
results which creates immediate gratification and short run hedonism (Cohen 1955). 
Consequently, in the general run of things, both strategic and operational decision-
makers seem to rely on familiar course of action founded in the reactive policing 
paradigm. This can be explained by two overall conditions namely: 1) proactive 
policing is not perceived as a distinct paradigm for police action, but merely a 
smarter way of doing traditional police work, and 2) experience-based ‘thick’ 
knowledge (the cornerstone of reactive policing) is the highest ranking 
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professionalism within the status hierarchy of police which stands in opposition to 
more abstract ‘thin’ standardised analytical knowledge (the cornerstone of proactive 
policing) (Gundhus 2012; Ratcliffe 2008b). Hence, the study shows that the police 
response towards organised crime overall is not altered radically and a 
revolutionary paradigm shift is absent. 
Informant-driven Targeting 
Proactive investigations unfold in and are impacted by a historical context where 
two different approaches have dominated the launch of proactive operations and 
the selection of investigation targets. In this study, I divide these approaches into 1) 
investigation-led targeting and 2) informant-driven targeting. Informant-driven 
targeting is considered to be the most commonly used approach within the 
(Danish) police—a practice stemming from street-level work where information 
from confidential informants have led to informant-driven police operations 
primarily aimed at drug offences (since the 1990s referred to as organised crime). 
My analysis portrays how informant work in this process went from being merely an 
operative tactic to becoming a central part of police’s intelligence work and 
additionally a cornerstone in police’s response to organised crime. The use of 
information from confidential informants has some clear advantages such as the 
fast collection of actionable information with the possibilities of producing seizures 
and arrests. However, in relation to identifying investigation targets in proactive 
investigations there are some risks associated with e.g. methods for information 
collection and information evaluation, and the application of this information in 
operational responses (Innes 1999; Dunnighan & Norris 1999).  
The reactive nature of policing is also reflected in the approach to informant work 
as the police primarily operate with what I identify as a reactive rather than a 
proactive model for informant work. This has to do with the condition that 
informant work is based on undirected approaches to recruiting informant handlers 
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as well as informants, and as it is based on unstructured methods for collecting and 
applying source information. The analysis shows that in connection with informant-
driven targeting in proactive investigations, this results in three main risks; 1) over-
policing regular ‘customers’ by targeting the same group of offenders over and over, 
2) under-policing hidden populations e.g. organised crime groups operating below 
the surface or organised crime offenders with lesser visibility than ‘the usual 
suspects’, and 3) random selection of the most visible and active offenders whom 
police receive information about—but who are operating on a low-level scale. As a 
result, proactive investigation is in risk of becoming an informant-led police activity 
rather than a component to intelligence-led policing. Additionally, informant-driven 
targeting as a central nerve in police’s response towards organised crime is 
consequently in risk of becoming a response model of informant-driven policing. 
The study reveals that there is a competition between two ideal type models for 
identifying targets for proactive investigations namely what I identify as a reactive 
and a proactive model. The reactive model for targeting is predominantly 
experience-based building on investigation-led targeting or informant-driven 
targeting which stand on reactive approaches to informant work and information 
collection. The proactive model for targeting is knowledge-based building on 
strategic targeting which proposes structured information collection and 
intelligence analysis in order to identify and prioritise targets in terms of their 
respective threats. Despite organisational inclinations, the attempts to replace 
conventional practices—a reactive model of targeting usual suspects—with new 
analytical practices—a proactive model of targeting under-policed and hidden 
populations—have not found its grounds within police as an established practice.  
My analysis demonstrates that a key challenge for strategic targeting in connection 
to proactive investigation is that on both strategic and operational level within 
police it is viewed as too time consuming and demanding. Moreover, the lack of 
organisational matureness in regards to strategic knowledge work means that 
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strategic targeting is dealt with in the same way as any operational police issue. An 
additional challenge is internal resistance towards analytical-based approaches in 
the police organisation. The analysis establishes how this resistance is connected to 
two overall conditions: First, there is an organisational preference to focus on ‘the 
classic counterpart’ and ‘the usual suspects’ as these are recognisable and familiar 
for police in terms of characteristics and behavioural patterns (Gill 2000; Manning 
2004).  
This preference makes police favour this group of people as opponents in 
organised crime instead of hidden populations such as ‘the suits’ (e.g. money men 
and crime facilitators) since the social world and behavioural patterns of this group 
is unknown. Second, the presence of a distinct police epistemic culture dominates 
and impacts how police work is perceived and carried out and is imperative in 
order to understand why new or different forms of knowledge of crime and policing 
have so strenuous conditions within police.  
Police Epistemic Culture 
Proactive investigation practice is impacted by a distinct epistemic culture, which is 
compelled by at least three essential and cohesive notions of knowledge: First, 
experience-based knowledge is highest ranking in the police’s status hierarchy of 
knowledge and it is often explicated and passed on through the telling of anecdotes. 
This becomes a ritualised practice and functions to articulate police practice and to 
preserve institutional memory. ‘Anecdotal evidence’ can easily outweigh for example 
scientific and analytical knowledge. Second, since experience and tacit knowledge 
function as the most valued knowledge types within police other types of 
knowledge are not regarded as similarly valuable or trustworthy. Within the police 
métier (Manning & Raphael 2010) lies therefore the notion that other personnel 
groups in non-police functions are excluded of valuable insights—which points to 
the condition that police personnel have monopoly of knowledge and as such ‘the 
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power to know’. The struggle of knowledge therefore equals the struggle of 
organisational power—which mirrors the competition of the experience-based and 
knowledge-based rationales. Third, the epistemic understanding of the social world 
and policing within the experience-based rationale promotes a tendency to reduce 
its intellectual aspects and complexities. Contrary to this, the knowledge-based 
rationale and e.g. strategic targeting increases complexities as the aim is to explore 
unknown or uncertain characteristics and perspectives as it focusses on future 
threats and risks. As such, these three identified conditions can be seen as a 
hindrance when it comes to implementing knowledge-based approaches within 
police and as a barrier for organisational innovation leading police to fall back on 
old habits, institutionalised routines, and well-known practices.  
Consequently, my study shows that there are some predicaments and discrepancies 
between the strategic ideal of being proactive and the reality of police action. 
Despite a strategic inclination to instigate and support strategic targeting it 
becomes difficult when wanting to replace standard routines in police. As a result, 
due to organisational preferences and habitual thinking, proactive investigations 
often target priority offenders for proactive investigations using predominantly 
conventional and experience-based approaches such as informant-driven targeting. 
This can be compared to the approach of random patrolling from the standard 
policing model, which mirrors a narrow perception of proactive policing as both a 
concept and practice (Bacon 2016). Inherent in this approach lies a practice where 
offenders are randomly identified through ‘the police gaze’ (Finstad 2000) as they 
meet the criteria of being highly visible usual suspects whom police can easily 
recognise and moreover prefer to deal with. These prolific offenders can be 
considered to be ‘easy targets’ as they indeed commit serious and organised crime 
on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale which make them less resourceful for 
police to deal with. This stands in contrast to a systematic knowledge-based process 
consisting of e.g. the production of a comprehensive overview of high impact 
investigation targets and the (relative) threats they compose.  
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My analysis illustrates therefore that in the practical world of proactive 
investigation, informant work in its conventional form proposes some essential 
problems for instigating proactive and high-end police work targeting hidden or 
under-policed populations who can be said to impact the underlying structures of 
organised crime. As a result, the reactive model of targeting priority offenders for 
proactive investigations runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as it 
preserves and reproduces stereotypical organisational notions of ‘bad guys’ instead 
of widening the scope to other crime areas and populations.  
The Practice of Proactive Investigation 
Proactive investigation unfolds as a distinct policing discipline carried out as a tacit 
practice following an ingrained and unarticulated recipe as a set of collective 
inherent actions. This is impacted by a dynamic interplay between individual and 
shared experience amongst detectives, the specific setting of the investigation team, 
and by a number of collective epistemic notions about proactive police work and 
the criminal counterpart. The social production of information, its interpretations, 
communication, and use are constituted on the basis of how detectives make sense 
of their actions, interactions, and social world. The entire investigation process can 
therefore be seen as an analytical sense-making process where detectives try to 
assess and categorise collected information and evaluate its relevance in terms of 
the case at hand (Weick 1995; Innes 2003; Fahsing 2016). Proactive investigation 
work is therefore not objective information processing—it is rather a constant 
interpretation process where detectives categorise, add meaning, socially construct, 
and give certain powers to the individual pieces of information. 
Although there are similarities, my analysis shows that the investigation stages and 
processes in proactive investigation look somewhat different than existing generic 
models for criminal investigation since these are primarily based on reactive 
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investigation. In its practice and process, proactive investigation resembles more 
intelligence work than reactive investigative work as it is concerned with policing 
uncertainties, scenario thinking and building, and interpretation of information. 
Detectives thereby to a large extent become co-producers of events and 
‘investigation knowledge’. Detectives’ main lines of action in proactive 
investigations can be comprised into a model illustrating stages and processes, core 
investigation tactics, and the underlying lines of enquiry. The model encompass 
four stages: 1) Initial Information Collection and Ordering of Information, 2) 
Determining Investigation Strategy and Focusing Information Collection, 3) 
Producing Investigation Knowledge and Evidence, and 4) Constructing or Closing 
Cases. Wiretapping and directed surveillance are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively the most central tactical components of proactive investigation. They 
have as such considerable significance for how proactive investigation is 
conceptually understood and practiced.  
A central analytical finding is that there is an important distinction between ‘lines 
of actions’ and ‘lines of enquiry’; investigation tactics (lines of action) seem to be 
decided upon and instigated before investigative questions (lines of enquiry) are 
developed. Accordingly, the instigation of investigative tactics are predominantly 
determining the investigation process as opposed to context dependent 
investigative queries based on the specific case at hand. The process and practice of 
proactive investigation are furthermore mainly guided by a legal framework rather 
than a methodological framework led by context dependent investigative queries. A 
central argument in this study is consequently that the methodology of proactive 
investigation is not as pronounced as of reactive investigation. It seems instead to 
be lacking deliberate, intentional, and transparent rationales which guide 
investigative lines of enquiry and ultimately encompass a comprehensive 
methodology for proactive investigation. 
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Investigative Mindset 
Proactive investigation practice is impacted by detectives’ investigative mindset, 
which is an important and essential part of understanding and explaining how 
proactive investigations unfold. This can be said to be comprised by collectively 
shared assumptions about proactive detective work and at least three dominant 
components, which are: 1) the notions of ‘solving cases’, 2) suspect-driven case 
building, and 3) investigation as action and art. Although proactive investigation 
empirically and by its content resembles intelligence work this is not recognised by 
detectives. They keep instead the language from reactive investigation in the sense 
that they are concerned with ‘solving the case’, and they uphold a collective 
perception that proactive investigative work is a continuation of street-level 
operational work or reactive investigative work occupied with ‘putting people to jail’ 
rather than preventing harm or disrupting crimes in the making. This reactive 
notion of proactive investigation work can easily lead to classic suspect-driven case-
building of “whodunnits” rather than investigations of “what’s happening” as the 
measure of success is large drug seizures and multiple arrests instead of preventing, 
fending off, or disrupting criminal actions (Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018). Therefore, the 
application of high policing measures in proactive investigation of drug crimes 
seems to have an instrumental function as these measures are transferred and 
applied without the central knowledge-based notions and analytical dimensions of 
the proactive paradigm and as such as sort of ad hoc instrumentalism (Sklansky 
2012). Thus, proactive investigation becomes the instigation of high policing 
measures carried out in a low policing context. Furthermore, detectives consider 
detective work as an action-oriented and tacit practice taught ‘on the job’ through 
apprenticeship and experience—which requires a certain innate gift or talent. It can 
for that reason not be taught through e.g. education.  
These notions all stem from the reactive paradigm anchored in an experience-based 
rationale and proactive investigation therefore stands on a reactive investigative 
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mindset which has an ad hoc, case-by-case operational focus occupied with holding 
individual offenders accountable for their criminality rather than as a means to 
prevent emerging crime threats. This investigative mindset can be regarded as an 
organisational mindset as it is expressed and reflected on all levels in the police 
organisation.  
Proactive Investigations as Performances 
Proactive investigations unfold as continuous backstage and front stage 
performances following an ingrained, unarticulated, predetermined, and 
predictable script (Goffman 1959; Manning 2010). The police organisation is not a 
mini theatre, but it determines and supplies the specific scripts, fronts, and 
appearances, and stimulate the necessary teamwork of detectives which is applied 
in proactive performances (Manning 2008c). Due to its invisible and covert nature, 
proactive investigation is not at public display front stage as other types of police 
work. The front stage performance in this connection is as such a staged action 
(Manning 1977; Holmberg 2003) in the sense that police perform the roles as 
effective crime fighters with the purpose of showing the audience (the public and 
the political level) that police are to be entrusted to have a number of covert 
measures at their disposal. The front stage performance of proactivity functions as a 
way of displaying action and operational results and serves as an illustration of the 
police’s overall response to organised crime through, for example, the odd 
crackdown, arrest, and seizure of illicit drugs. This becomes a manifestation of the 
proposed qualities of proactive investigation as a backstage police activity and its 
societal eligibility. These front stage performances of proactivity provide the police 
with a stable mandate from their audience as their symbolic and staged action 
enable them to appear as being able to manage, diminish, and control organised 
crime as much as possible (Manning 2004; 2008c).  
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Although the performance of proactive investigation is carried out ‘behind the 
scenes’ it is somewhat displayed on police’s organisational front stage. Here, the 
audience consist of other members of the police organisation who view the internal 
performances of managers and detectives. The performance of proactive 
investigation on police’s organisational front stage is focused on drug policing and 
follows a stable, ceremonial performance of the ritualised and well-known ‘drama of 
cops and robbers’ relying on a predictable script (Goffman 1959; Manning 2004; 
2010). This drama has been symbolically performed through decades as it is a rerun 
from uniformed patrol policing celebrating the subculture of patrol (Manning 2010). 
It is embedded in an experience-based rationale stemming from the reactive 
policing paradigm promoting the logic from the standard policing model of 
responding rapidly to events and acting upon them. It mirrors the reactive street-
level drama of drug policing where police identify, pursue, and catch usual suspects 
using a similar script, costumes, and props. In the ‘drama of cops and robbers’, 
uncertainties are reduced to well-known categories (e.g. the continuous fight 
between good and bad) and detectives rely on consistent role descriptions (crime 
fighters against ideal offenders). A successful performance ends with the arrest of 
the offender(s), which is applauded both internally within police and by the 
political and public audience.  
On the organisational backstage, this performance function as a way to maintain 
organisational stability and individual motivation to carry out detective work. Each 
case is as a result perceived as collectively meaningful, despite the broad 
recognition within police of the dim prospects of police’s overall efforts to impact 
organised crime. Thus, the performing teams’ dramaturgical loyalty and 
dramaturgical discipline support the collective notion stemming from reactive 
police work of ‘solving’ the incident, and proactive investigation therefore becomes, 
in accordance with reactive investigation, a performance of ‘whodunnits’ and of 
suspect-driven case building. This performance stands in contrast to a proactive 
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performance with the aim of identifying and reducing more general risks and 
threats from organised crime and their overall impact on society as a whole. 
The Stabilising Medium of the Proactive Detective Métier 
Proactive investigations unfold in an endlessly elastic socio-political context in 
which policing operates impacted by shifting targets and objectives, conflicting 
rhetoric, and alterations in deployment of ressources (Manning 2010). In the context 
of organised crime policing, this has resulted in e.g. ideals and ambitions of 
proactivity—but also politically set performance measures which results in reactive 
and repressive police tactics. This is the dynamic side of organised crime policing, 
and as a countermeasure to this dynamic and with the purpose of sustaining 
conventional police work and organisational stability, police have gradually built up 
the stabilising medium of the proactive detective métier. While the targets of action 
are shifting and shaped by politics, the range of police tactics remains much the 
same, the unstated purpose remains the same, and the fundamentals of the 
detective role remain unchanged and the ‘manifest’ continues with older patterns 
(Manning 2010; Bacon 2016).  
The detective métier represents the tacit assumed ideas about ‘detective work’ and 
‘the social world of organised crime’—what is processed and why—which is 
determined and shaped by several conditions and forces. The ruling collective 
assumptions in organised crime policing evolves around that detectives know the 
typical counterpart, their motivations, typical actions, and dynamics, and know how 
they are best policed. There is as a clear dependency relationship between 
detectives’ collective assumptions and the practice they carry out provide a social 
reality. The collective assumptive world of detectives is as such constructing and 
reconstructing the detective identity, and shaping and impacting the proactive 
performance as well as upholding, passing over, and reproducing this ritualised act. 
In the core of the proactive detective métier lies ‘the proactive investigation 
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operation’. The proactive investigation operation can be seen as a window in which 
detectives’ proactive practices are displayed. Here, the subjective and objective 
forces that govern proactive police performance are mobilised. In these operations, 
detectives perform the key drama of ‘cops and robbers’, where they in the purest 
form display what this type of policing is all about. ‘The police organisation’ 
encompasses the formal frame of organised crime policing and proactive detective 
work and it demands mainly specific (political) performance measures to be 
obtained. The fundamental assumption is that the organisation is functional and 
rational (Manning 2010). In relation to organised crime policing and proactive 
detective work, the police organisation is designed to allocate detectives to different 
cases and operations, which are dealt with one at a time in a temporal series of 
repeated, demarcated investigative efforts. The police organisation provides 
detectives with wide discretionary powers as they are perceived as experts and 
specialist and both ‘doers’ and ‘knowers’. Therefore, organisational policy around 
proactive investigation work is set and derives from experiences and situated 
practices employed in operations and cases by individual detectives with limited 
guidance or supervision from management.  
The forces which shape the detective métier underline their ceremonial position for 
repeating what is valued and recognised in organised crime policing and reproduce 
the modes of action through ‘rewarded activities’, ‘deployment of resources’, and 
‘interpersonal tactics’. The cluster of rewarded activities are the organisational 
inducements and the distribution of these on how to perform policing (Manning & 
Raphael 2010; Manning 2010). The rewarded activities for proactive police work 
derive from the reactive policing paradigm and particularly the standard model of 
policing as they revolve around illicit drug seizures and arrests and the overall 
success is ‘solving cases’—the production of investigation information which count 
as evidence and thereby provide grounds for prosecution. Although the proactive 
policing paradigm proposes knowledge-based analytical work, problem-solving, and 
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prevention, these are not activities which are rewarded at neither the public front 
stage nor the organisational front stage. 
The deployment of resources within organised crime policing is, in accordance with 
the assumptions about organised crime policing and organised crime offenders, the 
understanding that police know which crimes are occurring, which groups of 
people who commit these crimes, and why they do so. This keeps the police in some 
kind of control of what they do and why and provides a demarcation towards 
unknown worlds of unpredictability and uncertainties (Innes 2006; Sheptycki 2017). 
For historical reasons, due to political attention, and as a consequence of habitual 
thinking and organisational preferences, resources are deployed to drug 
investigations predominantly targeting members from organised crime groups. 
These are continuously and routinely identified and targeted through the police 
gaze based on experience and the collectively shared assumption of their status as 
‘bad guys’. They are offenders who are—due to their social status and type of 
offending—perceived as ‘police property’ (Reiner 2010). These prolific offenders are 
moreover perceived to be ‘easy targets’ as they might indeed commit serious and 
organised crime on a continuous basis, but at a low-level scale which make them 
less resourceful for police to deal with. Consequently, organised crime is overall 
viewed in a narrow scope failing to look at the broader field of organised crime both 
in regards to hidden crimes, crime areas, and groups of people. 
Interpersonal tactics are sanctioned actions in proactive investigation operations 
which are thought to guarantee successful investigations which end in arrests and 
prosecution. They are concerned with the notion of ’real policing’ and consequently 
‘real detective work’; the tactics are learned ‘on the job’ through individual 
experience and subsequently the experience of other detectives. They are anchored 
in a specific police epistemic culture, which forms how detectives come to know 
what they know about organised crime as a phenomenon and organised crime 
policing as a practice (Cetina 1999). This epistemic culture is central in the 
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sustainment of experience-based and conventional practices and the preservation 
of well-known and familiar aims and targets in proactive police work—despite shifts 
in the elastic and dynamic socio-political context. Interpersonal tactics of proactive 
detective work are connected to both the collective assumptions of organised crime 
policing and police epistemic culture. A true detective encompasses moreover a 
specific investigative mindset which is derived from reactive policing. Proactive 
investigation builds per default on police’s self-selection (Marx 1988) and the 
suspect is in this regard identified as guilty beforehand. The investigation process is 
therefore no longer concerned with uncovering and documenting a series of past 
events, but rather to support the initial suspicion with new information, which can 
be processed as evidence.  
In conclusion, I have through a thorough analysis presented a cohesive narrative 
about how proactive investigations unfold in the police as well as identified a 
number of conditions which impact this specific practice and provided explanations 
of why this is. Through this, I have attempted to disclose the ‘black box’ of proactive 
investigation in order to provide grounds for better understanding this 
phenomenon and consequently its implications for society.  
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Contributions 
In the beginning of this thesis, I stated a clear knowledge ambition for this study: 
First, through an extensive empirical examination to explicate and analyse existing 
practices around proactive investigation in regards to the police’s response to 
organised crime—including the conditions which shape and influence this practice 
and why. Second, through this empirical analysis to build a theoretical framework 
for ‘the performance of proactive investigation’ and by developing a theoretical 
concept called ‘the proactive detective métier’. Third, through a detailed account of 
the methodological approach to develop and lay out the groundwork for a 
comprehensive ‘embedded police research methodology’.  
The empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions are interlinked and 
should be viewed as a coherent research contribution. This contribution about 
proactive policing in general and proactive investigation specifically and how these 
phenomena can be studied, interpreted, and understood is accordingly my 
significant original contribution to the research field and police practice. My 
knowledge ambition is more specifically connected to two overall aims: 1) to 
contribute to parts of the knowledge gaps within the research field of police science
—including proactive policing, organised crime policing, criminal investigation, and 
police sociology, and 2) with this contribution to deliver a notable and detailed 
knowledge foundation which is essential in order to develop police’s professional 
practice in relation to proactive policing and proactive investigation. Consequently, 
I aim this contribution at both a scholarly and a police audience. 
In order to create this contribution, I have in accordance with Klockars’ (1985) 
recipe for police research, explored the concept and practice of proactive 
investigation on both a structural, organisational, and individual level focusing on 
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both policy and action. In accordance with Manning (2010), I have explored the 
dynamic interplay between external and internal structures as well as formal and 
informal conditions which impact the proactive concept and practice. I have strived 
to understand and explain this specific practice field and the conditions under 
which it unfolds both empirically and theoretically.  
A key contribution is that I have uncovered and clarified aspects of proactive 
investigation practice and made parts of invisible policing visible. I have moreover 
presented a theoretical interpretation of this where the conditions surrounding the 
police’s response to organised crime and the microcosmos of proactive 
investigation are elevated to knowledge about how police organisations act, interact 
with, and react to societal changes, shifting public and political expectations and 
demands together with established organisational modes of action. I have, for 
example, demonstrated how a societal orientation towards proactivity encounters a 
dominant reactive paradigm in the practical world of policing, and how different 
epistemic rationales of knowledge and experience compete within the police. This is 
done to clarify the obvious connection between the police and police action in the 
context of society and the police’s role in society (Manning 2010). By this, I provide 
significant knowledge about the world of proactive policing—not only through 
proactive investigation as an observable practice—but as an example of an enduring 
phenomenon (proactivity) in modern society and the implications of this in relation 
to democratic policing. This is pertinent in the debate about police’s continuous 
accountability and legitimacy. This specific knowledge contribution would not have 
been possible to produce without applying the embedded police research 
methodology. I regard therefore this methodology of producing knowledge from 
within to be essential for police research which focuses especially on invisible 
policing and the continuous dynamics between policy, organisation, and practice.  
As promised in Chapter 4, I will now return to the issues regarding how this study 
can be assessed as a scientific research contribution. Even though the concepts of 
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generalisability, reliability, and validity are viewed as the dominant parameters in 
social sciences for assessing the quality of research these concepts stem from 
quantitative research and positivist paradigms which makes it difficult to transfer 
them into qualitative phenomenological-hermeneutic research (Kvale & Brinkman 
2015). Knowledge is organised information—it is both selective and reductive as the 
production of knowledge clarifies and organises empirical complexity, but it also 
leaves out information (Hastrup 2004; Baarts 2015). The knowledge I have produced 
in this thesis about proactive investigation practice is socially constructed, context 
dependent and it cannot be objective or detached from judgements. It is situated in 
a specific time and space and created and produced in the simultaneity span 
between a practical and theoretical knowledge field. It is anchored in my specific 
preunderstanding, autobiography, backstage knowledge, experiences, perspectives, 
norms, and values. It is furthermore influenced by how I approached the research 
field, how I was met, who I met, what I observed, which roles I was given, which 
roles I took etc. These conditions are unique—and because of this it does not make 
sense to talk about reliability as this specific study cannot be repeated by another 
researcher. Accordingly, the thesis poses an interpretation of the world of proactive 
investigation and suggests possible theoretical explanations and represents a 
snapshot of what goes on and why seen through a particular lens.  
The quality of the study should thus be assessed by imposing other criteria than the 
ruling criteria of social science. In Chapter 4, I presented three criteria for 
assessing the quality of this study proposed by Fredslund (2001): 1) the researcher 
presents her preunderstanding explicitly and makes the researcher visible as a 
subject, 2) every step of the research process is accounted for and justifie, and 3) the 
study’s interpretations are discussed in regards to their transferness to other 
situations. Additionally, I have suggested eight criteria for excellent qualitative 
research proposed by Tracy (2010): 1) worthy topic, 2) rich rigor, 3) sincerity, 4) 
credibility, 5) resonance, 6) significant contribution, 7) ethical, and 8) meaningful 
coherence. To accommodate these criteria, I have in Part Two given a detailed 
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account of all phases of the research process—from planning the study to writing 
up the thesis. I have presented and justified my preunderstanding and how it 
changed along the way and I have made myself visible as a reflexive and reflecting 
writing subject by providing several confessional and impressionist tales through 
conscious subjectivism (Van Maanen 1988; Ericsson 1991; Baarts 2015). Throughout 
Chapter 1-4 I have tried to create transparency and sincerity by continuously 
displaying self-reflexivity accounting rigorously for both theoretical framework, the 
research process, and my preunderstanding and continuous deliberations as well as 
considering ethical aspects. Moreover, I have both in Chapter 1 and in this chapter 
accounted for the relevance and importance of the research topic and the specific 
research question. In Part Four I have sought to build meaningful coherent 
narratives about the study’s findings by providing a number of analyses on both 
micro and macro level based on a variety of empirical material derived from 
different research methods. I have thereby strived to provide a significant and 
credible contribution both empirically, methodologically, and theoretically. The 
assessment of the quality of this contribution can hereby determine the study’s 
future and potential resonance, influence, implications and transferness to other 
situations and thereby relevance for other policing contexts than the Danish 
context. For example, can the findings from this study be transferred to other police 
organisations in Scandinavia, in Europe, or in other Western countries? In other 
words: are the findings in this study generally valid?    
Overall, I suggest that this study’s findings and conclusions encompass an analytical 
generalisability (Fog 2004). The systematic scientific process in which this study has 
become suggests that it can be regarded as scientific knowledge. The analytical 
findings and conclusions can be lifted accordingly to comment on proactive 
policing and proactive investigation on a more general level, which does not only 
apply to the context of the Danish police. Of course, the particular empirical 
observations and findings, which are presented in this study, are context-dependent 
and my interpretations of these are unique, as accounted for above, and 
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consequently other interpretations and explanations can be proposed through 
different perspectives, in different times, by different researchers. However, I 
propose predominantly a systemic analysis which is an attempt to articulate a 
perspective on (proactive) policing as an activity, as an organisation, as a set of 
situated actions (Manning 1977). The context of the Danish police therefore 
becomes merely an example of ‘police’. The robustness of this knowledge and 
thereby its ‘truthfulness’ and ‘rightness’ is based upon its concrete, detailed 
empirical anchoring which is qualified through theory. This process elevates the 
contribution to be able to comment on and therefore to be relevant in other police 
contexts as it is occupied with universal dynamics and mechanisms which are 
connected to ‘police’ and ‘policing’ in many places.  
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Perspectives 
In this final section, I will concentrate on the study’s conclusions’ and 
contributions’ implications for research, practice, and society. I have named this 
thesis Coppers Chasing Usual Suspects as I find it to capture the essence of what is 
actually happening when it comes to proactive investigation. Detectives, police 
officers, and police managers are attributed the role of ‘coppers’—protectors of 
society—and they also view themselves in this role, as a shield against subversive 
actions. Accordingly, they chase and pursue a number of suspects which are visible 
and known to them; sometimes they catch them and sometimes they fail in catching 
them. This ongoing ‘drama’ is and should be viewed as a distinct policing discipline, 
which requires specific capabilities and resources. Since I have observed this 
practice up close, I have an utmost respect for and admire the work these detectives 
and police officers carry out on a daily basis; tirelessly trying to keep at least some 
threats from organised crime from evolving even though this is an overwhelming 
and endless task. I have seen how dedicated, engaged, and loyal these detectives are 
to this task and how they rarely give up even though it sometimes seems as a 
hopeless endeavour. This ‘sense of mission’ is one way of assigning meaning to the 
work and perhaps avoiding boredom (Innes 2003). 
The job of policing organised crime also comes with a burden as the police are 
expected to be the ones who (solely) are to solve and fix this issue—which rarely lets 
itself be fixed—by providing public safety and security, and maintaining social order 
and a cohesive anti-corrupt society. However, this type of invisible policing also 
comes with a responsibility of doing so according to the social mandate the police 
have been given. This includes the use of covert measures and the wide degree of 
discretionary powers, which the police are entrusted with and have the mandate to 
use towards (a self-selected segment of) members of the public. For those reasons, 
475
there are some implications and predicaments regarding proactive policing and 
proactive investigation, which my study has brought attention to. 
As accounted for throughout this thesis, within the last decades, the police have 
been submitted to e.g. an increased attention from political level in terms of their 
use of resources and more specific demands in terms of the use of specific police 
tactics. They have experienced an increased critique from the public in terms of 
service levels and procedural justice. They are presented with a more complex crime 
picture and new crime and security threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, and 
migration. Further, they have been constrained as an organisation and as 
individuals within this organisation by management ideals from new public 
management promoting cost-efficiency and politically set performance 
measurements which are poorly suited for police work. These conditions have 
presented police with several challenges over the years for example the increasing 
loss of control and susceptibility towards random political initiatives on an 
organisational level, and loss of meaning and diminished discretion on an 
individual level. 
Therefore, in my view, in order to maintain and live up to its social mandate, public 
support and trust, legitimacy, accountability, and their rightful position and high 
status in society, the police organisation and police practice need to be 
professionalised. As a result, the police needs to modernise the police organisation 
in the sense that it mirrors the surrounding society and modern, democratic values 
in terms of e.g. organisation, management, recruitment, working conditions, etc. 
This suggests a transparent and outwards looking organisation where the interests 
of the public and the duty to serve them is the core focus and task. Moreover, 
policing needs to become a professional practice rooted in robust scientific 
knowledge about what matters in policing and what works in policing (Weisburd & 
Neyroud 2011; van Dijk et al. 2016; Hartmann 2018). In order to become a 
professional practice, it is required to build on a professional framework of best 
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practice and the police education should be based on scientific derived knowledge 
about the police profession. This suggestion might seem naïve and too 
comprehensive, but other countries, such as the UK and Norway, have in fact done 
this successfully and these serve as international role models whereas the Danish 
police education for example has been demoted to a non-credited training 
education (Diderichsen 2017).  
I find this transformation of police practice imperative to secure future public 
demands for democratic policing, where police action is carried out anchored in 
dominant principles of e.g. legality, proportionality, legal rights, and concerns for 
the individual and where basic human rights are considered (Manning 2010; 
Harfield & Harfield 2016; Bjerknes & Fahsing 2018). A central issue here is of 
course security of justice. Further, it is imperative to continuously examine that 
police resources are spent where they have the biggest impact on crime problems 
and public safety. The issues mentioned here are concerned with both ‘what 
matters’ and ‘what works in policing’ (van Dijk et al. 2016). 
All types of police work need to be accounted for and justified and police responses 
should be appropriate and proportional in accordance with democratic values and 
cost-efficient in terms of public spending. This not only applies to everyday 
policing, but indeed to invisible policing such as organised crime policing and 
proactive investigation as these covert activities are certainly relying on public trust. 
Therefore, it requires transparency—not into its operational details—but into its 
methods and tactics and their qualities, effects, and potential outcomes. This study 
has taken a step to clarify and analyse aspects of this, but further research is needed 
to provide the necessary grounds for a professional framework for e.g. proactive 
investigation. A robust knowledge base will furthermore provide the grounds for 
developing a more competitive police practice, which is better equipped to meet the 
future challenges of (organised) crime and societal demands. 
477
It is no secret that I—due to my preunderstanding, autobiography, and scientific 
position—since my initial employment within the Danish police have been driven 
by an overall ambition to contribute to develop policing as a profession. In this 
connection it concerns the particular field of (proactive) investigation. I find that the 
dominant perception within police of police work as a craft carried out merely as an 
experience-based endeavour guided by intuition and individual grounds of 
discretion, as my study has found in accordance with other research, inhibits 
professional development and organisational learning. It does so as this practice is 
not described in terms of actions taken or methods and as it is claimed to be a set 
of routine practical demarcated tasks and that the way that these should be solved 
best is through the individual officers’ discretionary assessments of each situation. 
Within this perception lies the condition that there are limited motivations for 
discussing or even changing approaches, tactics, or measures since these are viewed 
as best decided upon by the individual officer based on his experience, innate 
capability, and situational discretion—leaving little room for innovation at an 
organisational level. This stands in contrast to having a collective methodology 
defining police work which can continuously be discussed, evaluated, developed, 
and improved. Consequently, it contributes to maintaining reactive practices—even 
in proactive policing—and stands in the way of improving policing. It moreover 
runs the risk of police spending time, energy, and resources on fruitless activities at 
best—and counterproductive activities at worst.  
The police organisation is not a static institution, the police do not exist in a 
vacuum, and they are not derived from society. Policing should not remain the same
—it should evolve to reflect the values and norms of the society in which it is 
carried out and consequently mirror these values and norms in how it is carried out 
to maintain its entrusted mandate to have tremendous impact on people’s lives, 
safety, and welfare. 
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This PhD study explores how the police respond to organised crime via pro-
active investigation as a representation of a new policing paradigm called 
proactive policing. Anchored in a phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition 
the study is based on comprehensive ethnographic fieldwork in the Danish 
police and examines: how do proactive investigations unfold in the police 
and which conditions impact this and why?
The study’s empirical findings are analysed and interpreted through a the-
oretical framework compelled by Erving Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical 
model for social interaction and Peter K. Manning’s (2010) theoretical con-
cept of the police métier. Throughout the thesis, a theoretical framework is 
built and developed concerning the police’s proactive performance which is 
determined by a specific proactive detective métier. Moreover, the ground-
work for a comprehensive embedded police research methodology is devel-
oped and proposed (Hartmann et al. 2018).
The study contributes with unique empirical, methodological, and theoreti-
cal knowledge about proactive policing in general and proactive investiga-
tion specifically and how these phenomena can be studied, interpreted, and 
understood.
